The Battle of Hébuterne, (La Bataille de Toutvent, La 2e Bataille d'Hébuterne, La bataille de Serre-Hébuterne) took place from 7 to 13 June 1915 on the Western Front in Picardy, during the First World War. The French Second Army (General Noël de Castelnau) conducted the attack as part of a general action by several French armies, to hinder the movement of German reserves to Vimy Ridge, during the decisive action of the Tenth Army in the Second Battle of Artois (9 May – 18 June).
The village of Hébuterne is north of Albert and south of Gommecourt. After the fighting of 1914, the French and German lines ran between the village and Serre-lès-Puisieux (Serre) to the east, a village on the D 919 road, north of Beaumont-Hamel. About halfway from Hébuterne to Serre was Ferme Toutvent (Windy Farm) just inside a bulge in the German front line.
After several weather delays, the Second Army attacked on 7 June, overran the German first and second lines on a 3,900 ft (1,200 m) front and captured Toutvent Farm. From 7 to 13 June, both sides attacked and counter-attacked but the initial French gains were held and the new positions were consolidated. The French suffered 10,351 casualties and the Germans about 4,000. Two German trenches jutting into the new French position were fortified and called the Heidenkopf (pagan's head; Quadrilateral to the British).
Background
Hébuterne and Serre
North of the Ancre river, the Auchonville Spur, the Beaucourt Spur from Colincamps and Grandcourt Spur, with the village of Serre-lès-Puisieux (Serre) on its summit to the north, point south-west down to the river. The Colincamps–Beaucourt Spur has a slight east–west rise to the north of Beaumont-Hamel, later known to the British as Redan Ridge. In the shallow valley between the Auchonvillers and Beaucourt spurs lies Beaumont-Hamel and the road to Auchonvillers. Hébuterne is 9 mi (14 km) north of Albert and Gommecourt lies further north. After the fighting of 1914, the front line ran between the village and Serre to the east, a village on the D 919 road, south of Hébuterne and north of Beaumont-Hamel, south-west of Puisieux and to the north-east of Mailly-Maillet. About half-way along the Rue de Serre from Hébuterne to Serre lay Ferme Toutvent (Windy Farm), just inside the German front line.
Battle of Albert (1914)
On 21 September 1914, General Erich von Falkenhayn, Chief of Staff of Oberste Heeresleitung (the German army supreme command), ordered the 6th Army (Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria) near Amiens, to attack westwards and envelop the French northern flank, which was south of the Somme. An offensive by the French Second Army (General Noël de Castelnau) forced Falkenhayn to divert two corps as soon as they arrived. The troops extended the front northwards from Chaulnes to Péronne on 24 September, to drive the French back over the Somme (from Ham to Péronne, the river runs north). On 26 September, the French dug in south of the Somme and on 27 September, the German II Cavalry Corps (Höhere Kavallerie-Kommando 2) drove back two French reserve divisions, clearing the front for the XIV Reserve Corps (General Hermann von Stein).
General Louis de Maud'huy found that instead of making another attempt to get round the German northern flank, his forces were menaced by a German offensive north of the Somme going in the opposite direction. From 25 to 27 September, the French XXI Corps and X Corps north of the Somme, with four Territorial divisions and the French II Cavalry Corps on the right flank, defended the approaches to Albert. On 28 September, the French were able to stop the German advance on a line from Maricourt to Fricourt and Thiepval south of the Ancre. The Germans could see French troops in Beaumont-Hamel and Serre on the far side of the valley. On 29 September, Joffre reorganised the command of the French forces north of the Somme into a new Tenth Army. By 5 October, the German Guard Corps had reached Serre; by October, the front line on which the French and then British Armies faced the Germans around Serre had been formed, little to change until the big German retreat of Operation Alberich (9 February – 20 March 1917).
1915
Strategic developments
In March 1915, General Joseph Joffre, head of Grand Quartier Général (GQG) the supreme commander of the French armies, realised that the dire state of the Russian army made a defensive strategy in France impossible. Inactivity would benefit the Germans, even though the French had only begun to replace the industrial plant and raw materials overrun in 1914. Increasing the output of munitions was also in its infancy. General Ferdinand Foch proposed a "general action" on the Western Front to confuse the defenders and pin down reserves, then a "decisive action" at a place where the Germans would not be able to establish a new front after a breakthrough with only a short retirement. Joffre accepted a plan to capture Vimy Ridge and exploit eastwards into the Douai plain.
The French army had not completed its adaptation to siege warfare and much of the equipment necessary, particularly heavy artillery, did not exist. Joffre favoured continuous battle involving all resources but advocates of methodical battle like Foch, wanted a series of attacks, with pauses to reorganise and consolidate. Analysis of after-action reports received since 1914 led to the publication of But et conditions d'une action offensive d'ensemble (Objectives and Conditions of General Offensive Action, 16 April 1915) and Note 5779, a version circulated to divisional commanders. The note contained instructions on infiltration tactics, "rolling" barrages and the use of poison gas, which were to be used systematically for the first time. Joffre persuaded the British to attack on the northern flank of the Tenth Army.
Tactical developments
Over the winter lull, the German army began to reduce divisions from twelve to nine infantry battalions, to make it easier to shuffle whole divisions from quiet sectors. A German western offensive was cancelled in April, due to the deteriorating situation on the Eastern Front, where the Austro-Hungarian army faced collapse. The new 11th Army, which had been assembled from divisions raised in Germany over the winter and several other new divisions were sent east. The initiative in the west was left with the Entente armies, apart from the Second Battle of Ypres (22 April – 25 May 1915) and attacks in the Forest of Argonne during the summer. The defences of the German army in the west had been improvised since late 1914 but in many places were vulnerable to the growing number of French heavy guns. In the spring, the Westheer began to implement a standard defensive scheme and to build a second position, far enough behind the first position to require an attacker to pause to move field artillery into range. The front-line trench was elaborated into a front position with three wired-in trenches and camouflaged strong points; a line of concrete machine-gun nests designed for all-round defence were sited between the front and second positions.
Joffre canvassed the French army commanders for proposals for local offensives to assist the main effort by the Tenth Army but on 14 April rejected all but the plans submitted by the Second Army. Because of the manpower shortage in the Second Army, Castelnau suggested a limited attack to capture the German first position but Joffre wanted a more ambitious plan to break through the German defences, even if this narrowed the attack front. Joffre provided the 53rd Division, the XVII Corps and used the new 151st Division and the 154th Division to increase the XI and XIV Corps to three divisions each. Preparations were to begin immediately, ready for late April and early May. When the Germans began the Second Battle of Ypres on 22 April, Joffre had to alter his offensive plans. Flanders was reinforced by three divisions from the Tenth Army and replaced by XVII Corps and the 53rd Division from the Second Army, which made the double attack by the Tenth and Second armies impossible to achieve. From 15 May, Joffre began preparations for the second big attack by the Tenth Army. It was even more important than during the first attack on 9 April for the other French armies to divert German attention from the Tenth Army front. On 17 May, Joffre ordered the commanders of the Second, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth armies to carry out spoiling attacks and to produce schemes for a larger effort.
Prelude
Plan
Deprived of the XVII Corps and the 53rd Division, Castelnau continued to work on the plan to support the main effort by the Tenth Army, assuming that the divisions would be replaced; if not the resources would have to come from within the Second Army. XI Corps (Général Maurice Baumgarten) was to attack with the 21st Division (Général Dauvin) comprising the 64th, 65th, 93rd and 137th Infantry Regiments and the 97th Territorial Infantry Regiment. The division was so understrength that Castelnau set only the German front line and the second trench as the objective but later became more optimistic that a German collapse might occur. XI Corps was reinforced with a brigade from XIV Corps and a battalion of the 56th Division; Joffre agreed to the I Cavalry Corps moving closer to the front, ready to exploit success. Castelnau kept command of the army artillery, the 53rd Infantry Brigade, a battalion of the 56th Division and the I Cavalry Corps, ready to exploit opportunities. Preparations had to be complete by 30 May and on 28 and 29 May, Castelnau issued orders for the attack to begin on 1 June. Toutvent Farm was to be attacked after two days' artillery preparation and then the troops were to dig in facing Serre to the south-east and La Louvière Farm to the north-east. Once the objectives had been achieved, Castelnau would decide if reserves were to continue the attack towards La Louvière Farm and Serre, then swing north. The 21st Division was reinforced by a 75 mm field gun group, heavy artillery batteries of XI Corps and part of the artillery of the 56th Division.
To disguise the point of attack, the other Second Army corps were to simulate preparations on 30 and 31 May, especially with artillery-fire. On 6 June, Castelnau altered the plan to accommodate Joffre's late changes. The 21st Division with the 53rd Brigade and a battalion of the 56th Division under command, was to attack at 5:00 a.m. on 7 June, with the support of 22 batteries of 75 mm field guns, eight batteries of heavy artillery and 30 58 mm Crapouillot (toad) mortars; the 56th Divisional artillery was to bombard Gommecourt further north. The 51st Division was near Marieux in army reserve and the I Cavalry Corps assembled around Villers-Bocage. The deceptions on the rest of the front ordered on 28 May continued. The artillery preparation begun on 5 June had proceeded satisfactorily and by 2:00 a.m. on 7 June, the 21st Division with the battalion of 56th Division on its left flank, was east of the Hébuterne–Auchonvilliers road, opposite Toutvent Farm and the 53rd Brigade formed the second line on the west side of the road. The 51st Division in reserve, echeloned its brigades back from Bayencourt, Courcelles and Beaussart, its rear elements at Marieux and Sarton; the divisions of I Cavalry Corps gathered to the north of its billeting area.
French preparations
An attack on Toutvent Farm, 1.9 mi (3 km) from Beaumont-Hamel was a secondary effort for the larger scheme. The Second Army could conduct the attack if Joffre allotted more ammunition; surplus heavy artillery was transferred to Lorraine front and Crapouillot mortars to the Tenth Army, which left the Second Army with sixty heavy guns for the attack; Castelnau asked for more ammunition to be sure of destroying the German fortifications. As the preliminaries were complete, the attack could begin in four days and on 24 May, Joffre approved the plan, granted the extra ammunition and another 24 Crapouillot mortars. French reconnaissance found no sign of German troop or artillery transfers from the 2nd Army, which had eleven German divisions opposite, from Berles-au-Bois to the Oise, to the 6th Army at Arras.
The Second Army comprised twelve divisions in the XIII, XIV and XI Corps and the independent 62nd Division, 56th Division and the 86th Division. The I Cavalry Corps (Général Louis Conneau), with three divisions, was concentrated to the west of Amiens from 12 May. The 21st Division was withdrawn from the front line from 24 to 26 May and replaced by Territorial troops. On 29 May, Joffre transferred the 51st Division from the Fifth Army to the Second Army to permit Castelnau to commit all of the Second Army reserve if the Germans collapsed; the attack of the Tenth Army on Vimy Ridge was postponed because of poor weather until 7 June. Joffre moved a division of the Colonial Corps into the Second Army area, in case the attack was more successful than expected; Joffre also offered the 6th Division, which was in reserve behind the Tenth Army but Castelnau declined.