The Battle of Raab took place during the Summer Campaign of the Hungarian War of Independence. It was fought on 28 June 1849 in the city of Raab, Hungary (now known as Győr). The Hungarian Revolutionary Army was led by General Ernő Poeltenberg and General Artúr Görgei. The Austrian Empire was led by Julius Jacob von Haynau, with assistance from a Russian division led by Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin.
After the Battle of Pered, Haynau's army, joined by the Habsburg emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria, crossed the Danube to the southern bank of the river, unnoticed by the Hungarian troops. They attacked the Hungarian units placed around Győr, Árpás, Marcaltő and Ihász, dividing György Kmety's division from the main troops and forcing them to retreat towards Southern Hungary.
The imperials mustered greater than five times the number of Hungarian troops (69,350 imperials – 12,888 Hungarians) at the outset. Görgei was not in the city at the start of the battle, because he was in Pest, and arrived to Győr only towards the end of the battle. He led the Hungarian cavalry and Hungarian troops as they retreated from the city. After the battle, Görgei's troops retreated to the fortress of Komárom, followed by the imperials.
Background
Artúr Görgei's failed offensive ended with the Hungarian defeat in the Battle of Pered on 20 and 21 June 1849. This attack was chosen at an unlucky moment, because Austrian field marshal Julius Jacob von Haynau on 19 June moved his troops from the northern banks of the Danube to the southern banks, in order to prepare to advance towards the Hungarian capitals of Pest and Buda. But he still had enough troops to deploy with around 15 000 more soldiers in the battle than Görgei, thanks to the Russian division led by Lieutenant-General Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin, misleading the Hungarian commander, thinking that the imperials would remain on the northern bank. After the battle Haynau continued undetected, moving his troops to the southern bank. Haynau was very different from the earlier Austrian main commanders in Hungary; unlike the over meticulous Windisch-Grätz and the overanxious Welden, he was a very determined commander, who was not deterred from fulfilling his strategical plan, by minor setbacks, like the smaller defeats from Szered (on 9 June), Csorna, Seregakol and Aszódpuszta (on 13 June), Seregakol and Vásárút (on 14 June) and Pata and Sopornya (on 15 June), giving lectures to those commanders (General Franz Schlik or Lieutenant General Johann Wilhelm Freiherr Burits von Pournay) who started to hesitate and wanted to retreat, about courage and the importance of accepting the fight. Haynau took the decision to transfer his troops from the left banks of the Danube to the right, and to advance towards Buda and Pest on 18 June, calculating that the Russian army led by Field Marshal Ivan Paskevich will come and operate on the left bank, and when he understood that the Russians are not arriving there (because of the late start of their Hungarian campaign, and their slow advance), he decided to stick to his initial plan of advancing on the right bank of the Danube towards the Hungarian capitals. On this bank of the Danube he was more able to use his numerical superiority, than on the left bank crisscrossed by many rivers, was closer to Pestbuda, and to the Austrian army of Southern Hungary led by Lieutenant General Josip Jelačić.
After the Hungarians managed to confuse themselves about Haynau's intentions, by entering with the Austrians in the Battle of Pered, after crossing the Danube on 24 June, the IV. (Reserve) took a position at Mosonmagyaróvár, the Panyutyin division at Rajka, the bulk of the I. corps at Moson, its vanguard at Öttevény, and its brigade from the left flank at Hédervár, while the different brigades of the III. corps spread in a line, across a wider area. On 26 June the Wolf brigade took a position at Árpás, the Veigl and Dossen brigades at Egyed, the Schneider (formerly Wyss) brigade took Csorna, while the Gerstner brigade from its right flank occupied Szany.
During this time, relations between Lajos Kossuth, the governor of Hungary, the Szemere-government, and its secretary of war, Görgei, worsened, causing a conflict between the political and military leadership. This lasted until the Hungarian Surrender at Világos, disrupting the Hungarian efforts of defense. In the middle of June, Görgei openly declared that he was against the Hungarian Declaration of Independence (proclaimed on 14 April 1849), claiming that this triggered the Russians to send their troops against the Hungarian revolution. However, discussions between the Habsburg empire and the Russian Empire about the Russian intervention had started two weeks before the declaration).
After 21 June, Görgei was both the commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army and the Minister of Defence of Hungary in the Szemere-Government. He was often forced to travel between Pest and his general staff office in Tata. On 24–26 June he was in the capital, participating in a ministry council. He convinced the government to accept his plan of gathering all Hungarian forces (except of those of Transylvania and Southern Hungary) around Komárom, in order to achieve numerical superiority. He proposed to attack Haynau's troops and march against Vienna. Should that fail, he would retreat to Komárom. The cause of this desperate plan was that on 15 June Russian troops crossed Hungary's borders, entering with 193 000 soldiers and 584 cannon. This joined the 165 000 Austrian soldiers with 770 cannon against the 150 000 Hungarians and their 857 cannon (464 field cannon and 393 fortification cannon). Görgei realised that the Hungarians had no chance to win, unless they destroyed Haynau's Austrian forces before the Russian troops arrived. In the ministry council held in the evening of 26 June, despite the majority's anti-Görgei feelings, his plan was accepted. On the morning of 27 June, Görgei returned to take over the leadership of the troops, having heard about the concentration of the imperial troops near Győr. The imperials planned to encircle the Hungarian troops in Győr, forcing them to surrender. Failing that they planned to split the Kmety division from the Hungarian VII corps led by Ernő Poeltenberg, and to force them to evacuate the city.
On 16 June Kmety reported the apparition of 16,000 Austrian soldiers with 40 guns at Sopron. After this the Hungarian scouts reported day by day, more movements of the Austrian troops south to the Danube, as they crossed, by Haynau's order, the Danube, for the offensive which they planned to start soon, in the direction of Győr and Komárom. Kmety and other Hungarian commanders conducted some reconnaissance actions in that area, but they weren't able to observe the regrouping of the Austrian troops from the northern to the southern shore of the Danube.
The Battle of Pered from 20 to 21 June was the last attempt of the Hungarian army to defeat the Austrian main army under Haynau, but the intervention of the Russian division led by Lieutenant General Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin decided the outcome of the battle, and the Hungarians were forced to retreat in the vicinity of the fortress of Komárom. This defeat took out the initiative from the hands of the Hungarians, and now it was the Austrians, who went on the offensive. This event increased Poeltenberg's concerns about the eventual starting of an offensive toward Győr, but his scouts reported to him only contradictory information. Poeltenberg thought that the Austrian troops will receive reinforcements on 28 June, so he proposed on 24 June to the Central Operational Bureau (Központi Hadműveleti Iroda) and Klapka, that his corps and Kmety's division should attack immediately the Austrian troops around Győr before that day, but he did not receive any response. On 25 June Kmety reported to Poeltenberg that 30,000 Austrian soldiers are marching towards Győr from the direction of Sopron. Later he sent a report to both the Central Operational Bureau and Klapka, that the Austrians are planning to encircle Győr from the south, cutting the Kmety division from his troops, and the best way to prevent this is that Kmety should move with his troops from Marcaltő (where he was ordered to station by Bayer and Görgei) to Ménfő because here he will prevent the k.u.k. troops to cut him from the VII. corps. But in the case of an Austrian success in this matter, he will be forced to retreat from Győr, to avoid the encirclement.
Prelude
On 26 June, the imperial troops attacked. Besides their overwhelming numerical superiority, they had another factor to boost their moral: the presence of the young emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria, at the Austrian headquarters at Mosonmagyaróvár. Their plan was for their III corps (the right wing of Haynau's army) to encircle the Hungarian positions from Győr. On 27 June the main body crossed at Árpás, the Gerstner brigade from Marcaltő, and the Schneider brigade from Bodonhely. The Gerstner brigade advanced to Lesháza, taking a position on the road towards Pápa, covering the advancement of the main body. The main body of the Austrian army had to advance to Pannonhalma, or, if the IV corps did not defeat the Hungarian troops from Győr, they would march towards Táplán.
On 27 June Görgei learned that the Austrian army was preparing to attack along the line of the river Rába, and during the evening he was informed that the imperials had crossed the river, cutting the Kmety division from the VII Hungarian corps. The imperials encircled the positions of the VII corps, intending a concentric attack the following day. Knowing this, Görgei departed that night towards Győr.
The IV. corps (called also the reserve corps) advanced on 27 June towards Lébény, on 28 June to cross the Rába at Rábapalota, and after uniting with the Schneider brigade to attack towards Szabadhegy. They were to be followed by the Benedek brigade and the Russian division led by Fyodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin. At the same time on 28 June the I corps attacked Abda. The II corps remained on the southern banks of the Danube, defending Csallóköz and the lower Vág region. 69 350 imperial soldiers faced 17 480 Hungarians.
According to Haynau's plan, this offensive had to fulfill several goals: to encircle the VII. corps of Poeltenberg, to occupy Győr, and to cut off the link of the VII. corps with the Kmety division.
Poeltenberg's goal was to hold on until he was reinforced. (None would arrive). The Hungarian Operational Office, led by Colonel József Bayer, sent the Hungarian II corps on 28 June to Gönyű, the I corps to Hull, and the III corps to Érsekújvár. On 26 June the Hungarian division led by Kmety, with his 4 530 soldiers and 15 cannon moved away from the Rába-line, retreating towards Pápa. The reason for his move was the crossing of superior imperial troops, before his reinforcements and 4000 cartridges arrived. Even if the reinforcements had arrived in time, Horváth would have had no chance against the four imperial battalions commanded by Colonel Karl Wolf von Wachentreu. The Hungarians lost 16 (according to other sources 30) soldiers during this retreat. Kmety wanted to cross the Rába at Pápoc, and to attack from behind the advancing imperials, but he needed more troops. So he waited for his battalion (which had been sent to Mórichida), but when it returned, he saw that his soldiers were too tired for another march. Instead, he was forced to retreat from Marcaltő.
On 27 June Lieutenant Colonel Hümér Kupa received the news about Kmety's retreat from the Rába line and Poeltenberg's order to take a position at Ménfő. On 28 June at 10–11, the latter decided to attack with 14 cavalry companies, 6 battalions, and 21 cannons, hoping to force them to retreat to Mórichida. General György Klapka's (2nd in charge of the main army after Görgei) chief of general staff, Mayor Péter Szillány, ordered Poeltenberg to position his troops between Ménfő, Kismegyer, and Szabadhegy, and to stop the imperial advance. Poeltenberg hoped that, during his attack at Ménfő, Kmety would prevent the imperial's southern wing to reinforce the troops he planned to attack. But on 27 June, Kmety was defeated in the Battle of Ihász, leaving Poeltenberg's left flank exposed. And when the k.u.k. III. corps advanced to Tét, Poeltenberg's left wing was tactically outflanked.
Unlike the right wing of the III. corps, represented by the Gerstner brigade, the other imperial corps occupied their pre-battle positions without any opposition.