The Battle of Dak To (Vietnamese: Chiến dịch Đắk Tô - Tân Cảnh) in Vietnam was a series of major engagements of the Vietnam War that took place between 3 and 23 November 1967, in Kontum Province, in the Central Highlands of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The action at Đắk Tô was one of a series of People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) offensive initiatives that began during the second half of the year. PAVN attacks at Lộc Ninh (in Bình Long Province), Sông Bé (in Phước Long Province) and at Con Thien and Khe Sanh, (in Quảng Trị Province), were other actions which, combined with Đắk Tô, became known as "the border battles". The post hoc purported objective of the PAVN forces was to distract American and South Vietnamese forces away from cities towards the borders in preparation for the Tet Offensive.
During the summer of 1967, engagements with PAVN forces in the area prompted the launching of Operation Greeley, a combined search and destroy effort by elements of the U. S. 4th Infantry Division and 173rd Airborne Brigade, along with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 42nd Infantry Regiment, 22nd Division and Airborne units. The fighting was intense and lasted into late 1967, when the PAVN seemingly withdrew.
By late October U.S. intelligence indicated that local communist units had been reinforced and combined into the PAVN 1st Division, which was to capture Đắk Tô and destroy a brigade-size U.S. unit. Information provided by a PAVN defector provided the allies a good indication of the locations of PAVN forces. This intelligence prompted the launching of Operation MacArthur and brought the units back to the area along with more reinforcements from the ARVN Airborne Division. The battles on the hill masses south and southeast of Đắk Tô became some of the hardest-fought and bloodiest battles of the Vietnam War.
Background
Border outpost
During the early stages of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, several U.S. Special Forces Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camps were established along the borders of South Vietnam in order both to maintain surveillance of PAVN and Viet Cong (VC) infiltration and to provide support and training to isolated Montagnard villagers, who bore the brunt of the fighting in the area. One of these camps was built near the village and airstrip at Đắk Tô. After 1965, Đắk Tô was also utilized as a forward operations base by the highly classified MACV-SOG, which launched reconnaissance teams from there to gather intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail across the border in Laos. In 1967, under the overall direction of commander of Special Forces in Vietnam, Colonel Jonathan Ladd, the camp began to take mortar fire. Ladd flew in, organized reconnaissance and identified the entrenched hill bunker complex as the source of the shelling. Journalist Neil Sheehan quoted Ladd as recommending, unsuccessfully, to Major General William R. Peers: "For God's sake, General, don't send our people in there .... That's what the bastards want us to do. They'll butcher our people. If they want to fight us, let them come down here where we can kill them."
Đắk Tô lies on a flat valley floor, surrounded by waves of ridgelines that rise into peaks (some as high as 4,000-foot (1,200 m)) that stretch westward and southwestward towards the tri-border region where South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia meet. Western Kontum Province is covered by double- and triple-canopy rainforests, and the only open areas were filled in by bamboo groves whose stalks sometimes reached 8 inches (200 mm) in diameter. Landing zones (LZs) large enough for helicopters were few and far between, which meant that most troop movements could only be carried out on foot. Temperatures in the highlands could reach 95 degrees Fahrenheit (35 degrees Celsius) during the day and could drop to as low as 55 °F (13 °C) in the evening.
Operation Greeley
In January 1967, Peers had taken command of the 4th Infantry Division, which had responsibility for the defense of western Kontum Province. Prior to the onset of the summer monsoon, Peers set up blocking positions from the 4th Infantry Division's 1st Brigade base camp at Jackson Hole, west of Pleiku, and launched Operation Francis Marion on 17 May. The 4th had on hand its 1st and 2nd Brigades, while its 3rd Brigade operated with the 25th Infantry Division northwest of Saigon.
Throughout the middle of 1967, however, western Kontum Province became a magnet for several PAVN spoiling attacks and it appeared that the PAVN were paying an increasing amount of attention to the area. Immediately after taking command, Peers instituted guidelines for his units in order to prevent them from being isolated and overrun in the rugged terrain, which also did much to negate the U.S. superiority in firepower. Battalions were to act as single units instead of breaking down into individual companies in order to search for their enemy. If rifle companies had to act independently, they were not to operate more than one kilometer or one hour's march from one another. If contact with the enemy was made, the unit was to be immediately reinforced. These measures went far in reducing the 4th Infantry's casualties.
From 17 June to 11 October the 173rd Airborne Brigade, 4th Division units and ARVN units conducted Operation Greeley in and around the Dak To area.
Prelude
By early October, U.S. intelligence reported that the North Vietnamese were withdrawing regiments from the Pleiku area to join those in Kontum Province, thereby dramatically increasing the strength of local forces to that of a full division. In response, the 4th Infantry began moving the 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry into Đắk Tô to launch Operation MacArthur. On 29 October, the 4/503rd Airborne Infantry returned to the area as a reinforcement. The battalion was moved west of Đắk Tô to the Ben Het CIDG Camp to protect the construction of Fire Support Base 12 on 2 November. The PAVN's official history places the context for the PAVN/VC as a directive from the General Staff for battlefields groups increase operations to allow local forces and units to preserve strength, and for battlefields groups to conduct exercises and gain experience.
On 3 November, Sergeant Vu Hong, an artillery specialist with the PAVN 6th Regiment, defected to the South Vietnamese and was able to provide U.S. forces with detailed information on the disposition of PAVN forces and their objectives, both at Đắk Tô and at Ben Het, 18 kilometers to the west. The PAVN had fed approximately 6,000 troops into the area, most of which made up the 1st Division. The 66th Regiment was southwest of Đắk Tô preparing to launch the main attack, while the 32nd Regiment was moved south to prevent any counterattacks against the 66th. The independent 24th Regiment held positions northeast of Đắk Tô to prevent reinforcement of the base from that direction. The 174th Regiment was northwest of Đắk Tô, acting as a reserve or an offensive force as the situation dictated. In addition, the 1st Division was supported by the 40th Artillery Regiment. The goal of these units was the taking of Đắk Tô and the destruction of a brigade-size American unit.
The PAVN actions around Đắk Tô were part of an overall strategy devised by the Hanoi leadership, primarily that of General Nguyen Chi Thanh. The goal of operations in the area, according to a captured document from the B-3 Front Command, was "to annihilate a major U.S. element in order to force the enemy to deploy as many additional troops to the Central Highlands as possible." As the Americans quickly discovered, the area had been well prepared by the PAVN. The number and elaborateness of defensive preparations found by U.S. and ARVN troops indicated that some had been prepared as much as six months in advance. As General Peers noted:
Nearly every key terrain feature was heavily fortified with elaborate bunker and trench complexes. He had moved quantities of supplies and ammunition into the area. He was prepared to stay.
After contact with the PAVN forces on the 4th and 5th, Schweiter received orders to move the rest of his brigade back to Đắk Tô. Their immediate goal was first to establish a base of operations and bolster the defenses at Ben Het. They would then begin to search for the headquarters of the 66th Regiment, which U.S. intelligence believed to be in the valley stretching south of FSB 12. Simultaneously, most of the remaining elements of the 4th Infantry Division moved into the area around Đắk Tô. They were joined by two 1st Cavalry battalions (the 1/12th and 2/8th Cavalry) and ARVN forces consisting of the four battalions of the 42nd Regiment and the 2nd and 3rd Airborne Battalions. By this time, the village and airstrip had become a major logistical base, supporting an entire U.S. division and airborne brigade and six ARVN battalions. The stage was set for a major pitched battle.
Battle
The first fighting of the new operation erupted on November 3rd 1967 when companies of the 4th Infantry came across PAVN defensive positions. The next day the same thing occurred to elements of the 173rd. The American and ARVN troops soon applied a methodical approach to combat in the highlands. They combed the hills on foot, ran into fixed PAVN hill-top defensive positions, applied massive firepower, and then launched ground attacks to force the PAVN off. In all of these instances, PAVN troops fought stubbornly, inflicted casualties on the Americans, and then withdrew.
To expand the coverage of supporting artillery fire, the 4/503rd Airborne Infantry was ordered to occupy Hill 823 (14°37′34″N 107°38′53″E / 14.626°N 107.648°E), south of Ben Het, for the construction of Fire Support Base 15. Since the rest of the battalion's companies were already deployed elsewhere, the 120 men of Company B would combat assault onto the hilltop by helicopter alone. After several attempts to denude the hilltop with airstrikes and artillery fire, Company B landed unopposed that afternoon, but the hill was not unoccupied. Fifteen minutes later, contact was made with the PAVN. The battle that ensued raged at close quarters until early the following morning when elements of the 66th Regiment withdrew, leaving behind more than 100 bodies. Nine men of Company B were killed and another 28 were wounded.
The following morning Company B was relieved by Lt. Col. David J. Schumacher's 1/503rd, which (against the admonitions of Colonel Livsey) was divided into two small Task Forces. Task Force Black consisted of Company C supported by two platoons of Company D and Task Force Blue which was composed of Company A and the remaining platoon of Company D. Task Force Black left Hill 823 to find the PAVN who had attacked Company B, 4/503rd. At 08:28 on 11 November, after leaving their overnight laager and following a PAVN communications wire, the force was ambushed by the 8th and 9th Battalions of the 66th Regiment and had to fight for its life. Task Force Blue and Company C, 4/503rd was sent to relieve the beleaguered Task Force Black. They encountered fire from all sides during the relief attempt, but they made it, reaching the trapped men at 15:37. U.S. losses were 20 killed, 154 wounded, and two missing.
The commanding officer of Task Force Black, Captain Thomas McElwain, reported a PAVN body count of 80, but was commanded by Schumacher (whose conduct of the action later came under severe criticism) to go out and count again. He then reported back that 175 PAVN soldiers had been killed. He later stated that "If you lost so many people killed and wounded, you had to have something to show for it." McElwain and Schumacher later clashed over McElwain's recommendation for a decoration for Private First Class John Andrew Barnes, III, who had leapt on a grenade and sacrificed his life to save wounded comrades during the action. Schumacher refused to endorse the recommendation, stating that he did not think medals were for "men who committed suicide." Barnes was later awarded the Medal of Honor.
The PAVN claim that during the battle against the 1/503rd from 8 to 11 November, they lost 32 killed or wounded.
The PAVN simultaneously attacked the three companies of the 3/8th Infantry on Hill 724 (14°35′35″N 107°41′28″E / 14.593°N 107.691°E). Beginning at 13:07 and lasting for thirty minutes, a mortar barrage rained onto the battalion's laager site. PAVN troops then charged out of the jungle to the attack. By the time the action ended at 19:03, 18 Americans were dead and another 118 were wounded. The 4th Infantry claimed that 92 PAVN had died in the clash.
An Associated Press article from 12 November quoted the PAVN death toll to have risen above 500 with 67 US troops having also died.