Five offensives were launched in the Kivu region of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) between 2009 and 2012 by the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) with logistical support from the United Nations Mission (MONUC). Three offensives were directed against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), one of which was a joint operation with the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) that also targeted elements of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). Two offensives targeted the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The campaign weakened the FDLR and the ADF but did not achieve their objective of eliminating them. An agreement was reached to integrate the CNDP into the FARDC in 2009, but it broke down in 2012 when some former CNDP members mutinied, formed the March 23 Movement (M23), and began a rebellion.
The eastern DRC remained unstable since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003 because of Laurent Nkunda's Rwandan-backed CNDP rebels challenging President Joseph Kabila's government. Nkunda claimed that he was protecting Congolese Tutsis from the Rwandan Hutu FDLR extremists, which he said were supported by the Kabila government, but both groups committed widespread atrocities against civilians, as did the FARDC. When the FARDC's unsuccessful offensive against the CNDP between August and October 2008 nearly led to the fall of the North Kivu provincial capital Goma, the United States and other international actors arranged negotiations between the governments of Kabila and Rwandan President Paul Kagame. On 5 December 2008, the DRC and Rwanda announced plans to launch Operation Umoja Wetu ("Our Unity" in Swahili) as a joint offensive against the FDLR by their forces, and to start peace talks between the CNDP and the Kabila government. Kabila and Kagame reached an agreement on the arrest of Nkunda in return for an operation against the FDLR.
Umoja Wetu began on 20 January 2009 when RDF troops crossed the Congolese border into North Kivu. RDF columns assisted by FARDC brigades moved through the province and destroyed the FDLR's main bases near Kibua, Walikale Territory. However, the group dispersed its fighters into the forests and hills of North Kivu, and an attempt by the FARDC–RDF coalition to encircle and cause a mass surrender of the FDLR's command was unsuccessful. The operation was declared over on 25 February 2009, and temporarily reduced the group's capabilities, but it resumed attacks on civilians and on the FARDC a month after the end of Umoja Wetu. The FARDC, with logistical support from MONUC, launched another campaign against the FDLR known as Operation Kimia II ("Silence") on 2 March. Military action was expanded into South Kivu, which was where the group had moved its headquarters during Umoja Wetu. The 23 March 2009 agreement between the government and the CNDP led to the integration of the latter's members into the FARDC, and they were deployed in Kimia II.
Kimia II ended on 31 December 2009, after international and domestic criticism that the operations that year caused immense harm to civilians. The FDLR carried out reprisal attacks on civilians, and the FARDC was increasingly undisciplined after the integration former CNDP fighters. Although the FARDC–MONUC coalition destroyed several FDLR bases, it failed to dismantle the group's command structure. Operation Amani Leo ("Peace Today") was launched on 1 January 2010, during which MONUC imposed new conditions on the Congolese military in return for its support, as an effort to reduce human rights violations. But this had the effect of the FARDC undertaking most actions on its own, and the operation still failed to neutralize the radical core of FDLR fighters or the group's command. On 25 June 2010, after the ADF militia attacked a military camp, the FARDC began Operation Ruwenzori against the group, which lived in the Ruwenzori Mountains, with MONUC support. Despite some tactical successes, the operations did not prevent the FDLR or ADF from continuing reprisal attacks against civilians.
Rwanda deployed special forces troops into eastern Congo in February 2011. Although some senior FDLR officers were killed or captured, the group withdrew deeper into the country. The ADF also remained active. On 8 March 2012, the FARDC and MONUSCO announced Operation Radi Strike, also directed against the ADF. On 11 April 2012, Kabila declared the end of all combat operations in the east, which included both Amani Leo and Radi Strike, after the government's attempt to arrest Bosco Ntaganda and redeploy units of former CNDP fighters to other parts of the country caused a mutiny. The mutineers accused the government of breaking the 23 March agreement, and formed the March 23 Movement in May 2012.
Background
The Second Congo War officially ended in 2003 with a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the creation of a transitional government to reunify the country. An integration process began to merge the warring parties—the Rally for Congolese Democracy–Goma (RCD–Goma), the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), President Joseph Kabila's Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), and various Mai-Mai groups—into a new national army, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). However, fighting continued in the eastern DRC.
A group of Tutsi RCD officers led by Brigadier Laurent Nkunda felt that they had been marginalized during the DRC's political transition and refused to integrate, along with forces loyal to them. Goma, in the DRC's North Kivu province, became the base of RCD dissidents. When the transitional government appointed new ex-FAC regional commanders in South Kivu, some RCD officers refused to recognize them, and their dispute became violent in Bukavu in May 2004. Government forces killed Tutsi civilians during the fighting, who were perceived as a Rwandan fifth column. In response, Nkunda led his troops to capture Bukavu on 2 June 2004, who then committed indiscriminate atrocities against civilians. He withdrew on 11 June because of international pressure on the RCD and Rwanda, but after a massacre of Congolese Tutsis on 13 August, Nkunda claimed that a genocide was taking place.
Among the most significant armed groups present in the eastern DRC were the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which were estimated to have from 6,000 to 6,500 fighters in late 2008. Led by members of the former Hutu government in Rwanda that had been involved in the Rwandan genocide in 1994, it was perceived by the current Rwandan government as both a political and economic threat. Its presence in the DRC had been one of the reasons for Rwanda's invasions during the First and Second Congo Wars between 1996 and 2003, and those conflicts were also used by Rwanda to establish coordinated exploitation of the DRC's mineral wealth. The FDLR were used by the Congolese government to fight Rwandan and Rwandan-backed rebel forces.
After the 2006 general election created a political structure in North Kivu that was unfavorable for the RCD, Rwanda gave its permission for local Tutsi leaders to support Nkunda, who established the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) on 30 December 2006. Nkunda's forces had previously launched attacks against the FDLR that resulted in many civilian casualties, leading to retaliatory attacks by the FDLR that also killed civilians, and he decided to expand his "crusade" by creating the CNDP. Nkunda's actions caused increased tension across the eastern DRC, from southern Ituri, through North and South Kivu, down to northern Katanga. The Congolese government issued an arrest warrant for Nkunda in September 2005, but initially pursued a strategy of appeasement during the FARDC's integration process. Nkunda consolidated his control over the 81st and 83rd Brigades of the former RCD, and recruited or press ganged Congolese Tutsis. The CNDP grew into one of the most powerful armed groups in the DRC, partly due to Rwandan support.
Nkunda stated that his goal was to protect Congolese Tutsis by fighting against the FDLR, which he claimed was supported by the Kabila government. Pro-government forces saw Nkunda and the CNDP as defending Rwandan interests. There were multiple clashes and negotiations between the Kabila government and the CNDP between 2006 and 2008. The FARDC had launched a total of five offensives against the group since 2004. As of January 2008, at least 800,000 people were internally displaced in North Kivu and another 100,000 in South Kivu, more than at any time since 2003, and the region's population continued to suffer from atrocities, including sexual violence. Various peace efforts culminated in the Nairobi agreement on 7 November 2007 between the DRC and Rwanda, for the disarmament of the FDLR and repatriation of its members, and the Goma agreement between the government and a collection of armed groups, including the CNDP, on 23 January 2008. The terms of the Goma agreement were based on the integration of rebels with the government, the restoration of state authority, and the return of refugees.
However, by June 2008 the agreement was breaking down, with at least 190 ceasefire violations recorded by the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) since the Goma conference. The Congolese government wanted to make use of other militia groups to weaken the CNDP, and fighting was breaking out between several of them. But the CNDP's main concern was that the government, including Kabila and National Assembly speaker Vital Kamerhe, refused to pass a sweeping amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the rebels. The government did not want to encourage impunity, and these crimes were also the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Nkunda's top commander Bosco Ntaganda already had an ICC warrant. There were also disagreements between the DRC and Rwanda on which FDLR members were genocidaires that had to be repatriated, and the FARDC was believed to not have the military capability to fully defeat the group.
Prelude
After the DRC made another commitment to disarm the FDLR in the Nairobi agreement, on 15 January 2008 the Congolese government gave the group an ultimatum to do so before 15 March. Minister of Defense and Veterans Chikez Diemu said that after the deadline they would be disarmed by force. FARDC chief of staff Lt. Gen. Dieudonné Kayembe and MONUC commander Lt. Gen. Babacar Gaye began planning a military operation against the FDLR in late November 2007. Kayembe met with Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) chief of staff Gen. James Kabarebe on 16 March 2008, and they agreed to not provide assistance to groups that undermine either state, referring to the FDLR and the CNDP. On 21 April, the FARDC launched Operation Kimia with the support of MONUC, attacking FDLR positions in the Rutshuru Territory. The peace agreement with the CNDP had completely broken down by August, and the FARDC launched its sixth offensive against the CNDP on 28 August, which eventually ended Operation Kimia.
Some of the FARDC brigades that had been created by the integration process since 2004 were reasonably well integrated, but they collapsed during the fighting with CNDP in late 2008, and some soldiers deserted to rejoin their rebel groups. In an offensive launched on 26 October, the CNDP captured the Rumangabo military base in North Kivu and reached within 20 kilometers of Goma, the provincial capital. The town of Rutshuru was also captured, and the CNDP doubled the size of its territory. Goma was abandoned by the FARDC, and the fighting displaced an additional 250,000 people in the province. Both sides committed war crimes. On 11 November, Kabila replaced Kayembe as chief of staff with Lt. Gen. Didier Etumba, who said he would address the acts of indiscipline committed by the FARDC in North Kivu, the siphoning of soldiers' pay and rations, and low morale. Although the 8th Military Region, responsible for North Kivu, was commanded by Brig. Gen. Vainqueur Mayala, Kabila and his senior officers were extensively involved in the direct command of the operations, often bypassing the regular command structure by giving orders to brigade and battalion commanders by satellite phone.
The "Goma crisis" of autumn 2008 led to a turnaround in diplomatic relations between the DRC and Rwanda. When the personal relationship between Kabila and Kagame was at an all time low, in September US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer submitted a peace proposal to the Congolese and Rwandan delegations at the UN, which included a joint military operation against the FDLR. From October, there was "intense diplomatic activity" by African, European, US, and Chinese diplomats directed at DR Congo and Rwanda to stop Nkunda from taking Goma, the fall of which threatened to destabilize Kabila's government and ruin the credibility of the UN mission. Nkunda, who since mid-2008 was more interested in Congolese national politics than the safety of Tutsis, was increasingly seen as a liability by Kagame, and Rwanda was under pressure from its European partners to end its support for the CNDP. This created the circumstances for Kabila and Kagame to reach a rapprochement.
A series of meetings between Congolese and Rwandan officials took place. Kabila and Kagame met on 7 November in Nairobi, Kenya, which resulted in a secret agreement between them on the basis of US proposal. They also agreed that Nkunda would be removed at the same time as the attack on FDLR. In return, the CNDP would be integrated into the Congolese military, which would give the group influence over southern North Kivu's "Petit Nord" region (Goma and the territories of Rutshuru, Masisi, and Walikale). Starting from November, Kabila's advisor and national police chief John Numbi began working with James Kabarebe to arrange the replacement of Nkunda with his subordinate, Ntaganda. On 5 December 2008, Congolese and Rwandan foreign ministers Alexis Thambwe Mwamba and Rosemary Museminali met in Goma and announced in a joint communique that their countries intend to launch a joint anti-FDLR operation, Umoja Wetu ("Our Unity" in Swahili), and to start direct talks between the CNDP and the Kabila administration.
Further meetings took place after the announcement. On 9 December, the US organized a meeting in Kigali for the "tripartite plus one" mechanism, consisting of the defense ministers of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. On 14 December, Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) troops entered the Orientale province of eastern Congo for a surprise offensive against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) with Congolese and South Sudanese forces. Talks to arrange Rwanda's participation in Operation Umoja Wetu took place on 30 December 2008 in Kigali, between Congolese and Rwandan defense ministers Charles Mwando and Marcel Gatsinzi. On 9 January 2009, the plans for the Umoja Wetu operation and Nkunda were discussed in Kinshasa by the chiefs of staff, Etumba and Kabarabe, along with Numbi and Kabila. On 16 January, Ntaganda won over the majority of the CNDP's officers and promised to integrate the group with the FARDC. Kabila and Kagame worked to limit the involvement of the international community in the resolution of the situation, because Rwanda always officially denied supporting the CNDP, and because Ntaganda had an ICC arrest warrant. FDLR fighters began to conduct reconnaissance in the forests of Kivu to prepare to evade the attackers, and during a meeting at the group's military headquarters on 5 January, they decided to respond to Umoja Wetu by dispersing their members.
Operation Umoja Wetu
Order of battle
As of November 2008 the FARDC had 20,000 troops deployed in the Kivus, including 10,000 on the North Kivu front line. North Kivu is the FARDC's 8th Military Region, and as of December 2008, Axis North was the FARDC tactical headquarters for operations in the province. A joint FARDC–RDF command center was established in Goma for Operation Uomja Wetu, led by Gen. John Numbi. MONUC, whose new mandate from December 2008 required it to protect the Congolese population from any armed threat, had limited access to information from the Congolese or Rwadan forces. Though MONUC was not directly involved, it sent a liaison team to the FARDC–RDF joint headquarters on 27 January 2009, and they had to negotiate by offering logistical support to the FARDC in return for more information.
Three Rwandan intelligence battalions were deployed for the FARDC–RDF joint operation, and they had a strength of 4,500 soldiers.