The 1959 Tibetan uprising or Lhasa uprising began on 10 March 1959 as a series of protests in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, fueled by fears that the government of the People's Republic of China planned to arrest the Dalai Lama. Over the next ten days, the demonstrations evolved from expressions of support for the 14th Dalai Lama to demands for independence and the reversal of the 1951 Chinese annexation of Tibet. After protesters acquired weapons, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) shelled protesters in the Dalai Lama's summer palace and deployed tanks to suppress the demonstrations. Bloody fighting continued for the next three days while the Dalai Lama escaped to India. Thousands of Tibetans were killed during the 1959 uprising, but the exact number is disputed. The 10 March anniversary of the uprising is observed by exiled Tibetans as Tibetan Uprising Day and Women's Uprising Day.
Armed resistance in Kham and Amdo
In 1951, the Seventeen Point Agreement between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and representatives of the Dalai Lama was put into effect. Socialist reforms such as redistribution of land were delayed in Tibet proper. However, eastern Kham and Amdo (western Sichuan / Xikang and Qinghai provinces in the Chinese administrative hierarchy) were outside the administration of the Tibetan government in Lhasa, and were thus treated more like other Chinese provinces, with land redistribution implemented in full. The Khampas and nomads of Amdo traditionally owned their own land. Armed resistance broke out in Amdo and eastern Kham in June 1956.
Prior to the PLA invasion, relations between Lhasa and the Khampa chieftains had deteriorated, although the Khampa remained spiritually loyal to the Dalai Lama throughout. Because of these strained relations, the Khampa had actually assisted the Chinese communists in their initial invasion, before becoming the guerrilla resistance they are now known for. Pandatsang Rapga, a pro-Kuomintang and pro-Republic of China Khampa revolutionary leader, offered the governor of Chamdo, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, some Khampa fighters in exchange for the Tibetan government recognizing the independence of Kham. Ngabo refused the offer. After the defeat of the Tibetan Army in Chamdo, Rapga started mediating in negotiations between the PRC and the Tibetan rebels. Rapga and Topgay engaged in negotiations with the Chinese during their assault on Chamdo. Khampas either defected to the Chinese PLA forces or did not fight at all. The PLA attack succeeded.
In 1956, armed conflict between Tibetan guerrillas and the PLA started in the Kham and Amdo regions, which had been subjected to socialist reform. Guerrilla warfare later spread to other areas of Tibet. By 1957, Kham was in chaos. Resistance fighters' attacks and People's Liberation Army reprisals against Khampa resistance groups such as the Chushi Gangdruk became increasingly brutal. Kham's monastic networks came to be used by guerrilla forces to relay messages and hide rebels. Punitive strikes were carried out by the Chinese government against Tibetan villages and monasteries. Tibetan exiles assert that threats to bomb the Potala Palace and the Dalai Lama were bluffs made by Chinese military commanders in an attempt to intimidate the guerrilla forces into submission. The Xunhua Incident of April 1958, taking place in Amdo, has been described as a precursor to the later Tibetan uprising.
The Lhasa government continued to abide by the seventeen-point agreement and sent a delegation to Kham to quell the rebellion. After speaking with the rebel leaders, the delegation instead joined the rebellion. Kham leaders contacted the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but the CIA under President Dwight D. Eisenhower insisted it required an official request from Lhasa to support the rebels. Lhasa did not act. Eventually the CIA began to provide very covert support for the rebellion without word from Lhasa. This CIA support was initially limited to the training of six Khampa militants in 1957, ten militants in 1958, and the delivery of 200 vintage British Lee-Enfield rifles along with radio gear in late 1958.
In mid-February 1959 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party's Administrative Office circulated the Xinhua News Agency internal report on how "the revolts in the Tibetan region have gathered pace and developed into a nearly full-scale rebellion," in a "situation report" for top CCP leaders.
The next day, the Chinese leader saw a report from the PLA General Staff's Operations Department describing rebellions by Tibetans in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai. He again stressed that "rebellions like these are extremely favorable for us because they will benefit us in helping to train our troops, train the people, and provide a sufficient reason to crush the rebellion and carry out comprehensive reforms in the future".
The PLA used Hui soldiers, who formerly had served under Ma Bufang to crush the Tibetan revolt in Amdo. Hui cavalry were stationed in Southern Kham. The situation in all of Tibet became increasingly tense, as a growing number of Tibetans began to support the Khampa uprising, while "anti-Chinese communist agitation" spread among the Tibetans. The regional government in Lhasa neither wanted to back a rebellion nor publicly oppose it. Dissatisfied, the Chinese Communist Party put pressure on the Dalai Lama's government to join the operations against the rebels, and made it increasingly clear that a spread of the insurgency would lead to "all-out repression" in Tibet. In this unstable situation, the Chinese generals resident in Lhasa was summoned back to mainland China, leaving the inexperienced PLA commander Tan Guansan in charge, just as the date of the Monlam Prayer Festival approached. This festival had previously been used by participants to voice "anti-Chinese sentiments".
Lhasa uprising
According to historian Tsering Shakya, the Chinese government was pressuring the Dalai Lama to attend the National People's Congress in April 1959, in order to repair China's image in relation to ethnic minorities after the Khampa rebellion. On 7 February 1959, a significant day on the Tibetan calendar, the Dalai Lama attended a religious dance, after which the acting representative in Tibet, Tan Guansan, offered the Dalai Lama a chance to see a performance from a dance troupe native to Lhasa at the Norbulingka to celebrate the Dalai Lama's completion of his lharampa geshe degree. According to the Dalai Lama's memoirs, the invitation came from Chinese General Zhang Jingwu, who proposed that the performance be held at the Chinese military headquarters; the Dalai Lama claimed that he had agreed. However, Tibetologist Sam van Schaik stated that the Dalai Lama was the one who proposed that the dance should take place in the military headquarters as the Norbulingka was too small. Both parties did not yet agree on a date, and the Dalai Lama seemed to put the event "out of his mind", focusing instead on his ongoing examinations for his Geshe degree as well as the Monlam Prayer Festival.
Besides Tan and the Dalai Lama, nobody was seemingly informed of the plans for the dance. As a result, the date for the planned performance was only finalized 5 or 3 days beforehand when Tan reminded the Dalai Lama of the dance; the latter then suggested 10 March. The decision was seemingly concluded on a whim. Neither the Kashag nor the Dalai Lama's bodyguards were informed of the Dalai Lama's plans until Chinese officials briefed them on 9 March, one day before the performance was scheduled, and insisted that they would handle the Dalai Lama's security. The Dalai Lama's memoirs state that on 9 March the Chinese told his chief bodyguard that they wanted the Dalai Lama's excursion to watch the production conducted "in absolute secrecy" and without any armed Tibetan bodyguards, which "all seemed strange requests and there was much discussion" amongst the Dalai Lama's advisors. Some members of the Kashag were alarmed and concerned that the Dalai Lama might be abducted, recalling a prophecy that told that the Dalai Lama should not exit his palace.
Tibet is independent! Chinese leave Tibet!
— Slogans used by protesters during the early uprising
According to historian Tsering Shakya, some Tibetan government officials feared that plans were being laid for a Chinese abduction of the Dalai Lama, and spread word to that effect amongst the inhabitants of Lhasa. On 10 March, several thousand Tibetans surrounded the Dalai Lama's palace to prevent him from leaving or being removed. The huge crowd had gathered in response to a rumor that the Chinese were planning to arrest the Dalai Lama when he went to a cultural performance at the PLA's headquarters. This marked the beginning of the uprising in Lhasa, though Chinese forces had skirmished with guerrillas outside the city in December of the previous year. The protesters publicly pleaded that the Dalai Lama should not attend the meeting with the Chinese officials, claiming that he would be kidnapped. Although CCP officials insisted that the "reactionary upper stratum" in Lhasa was responsible for the rumor, there is no way to identify the precise source. The protests soon turned violent. At first, the violence was directed at Tibetan officials perceived not to have protected the Dalai Lama or to be pro-Chinese; attacks on Chinese started later. One of the first casualties of the mob was a senior lama, Pagbalha Soinam Gyamco, who worked with the PRC as a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region, who was killed and his body dragged by a horse in front of the crowd for 2 kilometres (1.2 mi). The protesters also began to use openly anti-Chinese slogans such as "The Chinese must go, leave Tibet to Tibetans".
As protests and violence spread, the Dalai Lama informed the protesters that he would stay at the palace, yet this was no longer enough for the growing crowd. Protesters began to demand Tibetan independence, and urged the Dalai Lama's government to publicly endorse their actions. Barricades went up on the streets of Lhasa, and Chinese government soldiers and Tibetan rebel forces began to fortify positions within and around Lhasa in preparation for conflict. A petition of support for the armed rebels outside the city was taken up, and an appeal for assistance was made to the Indian consul. Chinese and Tibetan troops continued moving into position over the next several days, with Chinese artillery pieces being deployed within range of the Dalai Lama's summer palace, the Norbulingka.
On 12 March thousands of women gathered in front of the Potala Palace in Lhasa on the ground called Dri-bu-Yul-Khai Thang. The leader of this nonviolent demonstration was Pamo Kusang. This demonstration, now known as Women's Uprising Day, started the Tibetan women's movement for independence. On 14 March at the same location thousands of women assembled in a protest led by "Gurteng Kunsang, a member of the aristocratic Kundeling family and mother of six who was later arrested by the Chinese and executed by firing squad."
After consulting the state oracle and concluding that the situation had become too unstable, the Dalai Lama and his close confidants opted to flee Lhasa. On 15 March, preparations for the Dalai Lama's evacuation from the city were set in motion, with Tibetan troops being employed to secure an escape route from Lhasa. On 17 March, two artillery shells landed near the Dalai Lama's palace, triggering his flight into exile. The Dalai Lama secretly left the palace the following night and slipped out of Lhasa with his family and a small number of officials. The Chinese had not strongly guarded the Potala, as they did not believe it likely that the Dalai Lama would try to flee. After reaching Lhoka, the Dalai Lama linked up with Kham rebels who began protecting him and upon reaching Lhotse at the Indian border, he proclaimed the restoration of Tibet's independence.