Operation Veritable (also known as the Battle of the Reichswald) was the northern part of an Allied pincer movement that took place between 8 February and 11 March 1945 during the final stages of the Second World War. The operation was conducted by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group, primarily consisting of the First Canadian Army under Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar and the British XXX Corps under Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks.
Veritable was the northern pincer movement and started with XXX Corps advancing through the Reichswald (German: Imperial Forest) while the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, in amphibious vehicles, cleared German positions in the flooded Rhine plain. The Allied advance proceeded more slowly than expected and at greater cost as the American southern pincer, Operation Grenade, was delayed by the deliberate flooding of the Roer River by German forces under Alfred Schlemm, which allowed them to be concentrated against the Commonwealth advance.
On 22 February, once clear of the Reichswald, and with the towns of Kleve and Goch in their control, the offensive was renewed as Operation Blockbuster and linked up with the U.S. Ninth Army near Geldern on 4 March after the execution of Operation Grenade. Fighting continued as the Germans sought to retain a bridgehead on the west bank of the Rhine at Wesel and evacuate as many men and as much equipment as possible. On 10 March the German withdrawal ended and the last bridges were destroyed.
Background
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied Commander, had decided that the best route into Germany would be across the relatively flat lands of northern Europe, taking the industrial heartland of the Ruhr. This first required that Allied forces should close up to the Rhine along its whole length. Montgomery's 21st Army Group had established a front along the River Maas in late 1944 and had also considered several offensive operations to enlarge and defend the Nijmegen, Gelderland bridgehead and its important bridges (captured during the operation to capture Arnhem). One such proposal, Valediction (a development of an earlier plan; Wyvern) - an assault south-eastwards from Nijmegen between the Rhine and Maas rivers, initially had been shelved by Montgomery. A conference was convened at Maastricht, in Netherlands' Limburg, on 7 December 1944 between Allied generals, to consider ways of maintaining pressure on the Germans throughout the winter. Consequently, Valediction was brought forward and allocated to the First Canadian Army. British XXX Corps was attached to the Canadians for the operation and the date was provisionally set as 1 January 1945. At this point, the name Veritable was attached to the operation in place of Valediction.
In the event, Veritable was delayed by the diversion of forces to stem the German attack through the Ardennes in December, (Battle of the Bulge or the Ardennes Offensive) and the advantages to the Allies of hard, frozen ground were lost.
The objective of the operation was to clear German forces from the area between the Rhine and Maas rivers, east of the Netherlands (Dutch) / German (Deutsch) frontier, in the Rhineland. It was part of Eisenhower's "broad front" strategy to occupy the entire west bank of the Rhine before crossing the river. The Allied expectation was that the northern end of the Siegfried Line was less well defended than elsewhere and an outflanking movement around the line was possible and would allow an early assault against the Ruhr industrial region.
Veritable, starting on 8 February was the northern arm of a pincer movement. The southern pincer arm, Operation Grenade, was to be made by U.S. Ninth Arm (Lieutenant General William Hood Simpson) increased to ten divisions, starting on 10 February. The US Ninth was still under 21st Army Group. The British Second Army was in the middle of the two arms.
Montgomery's directions were that "First Canadian Army, keeping its left on the Rhine, was to attack south-eastwards as far as the general line Xanten-Geldern"
The operation had complications. First, the heavily forested undulating terrain, squeezed between the Waal/Rhine and Maas/Meuse rivers (separated by six miles near Nijmegen widening to twenty at the objective line) , reduced Anglo-Canadian advantages in manpower and armour; the situation was exacerbated by soft ground which had thawed after the winter and also by the deliberate flooding of the adjacent Rhine flood plain.
German preparations was three defensive belts. Each of these formed of two or three lines of trenches 600 to 1,000+ yards apart, with minefields and barbed wire. Farmhouses and villages were turned into strongpoints and the towns had extensive defences laid out around them.
The start line of Veritable was between Boxmeer and Nijmegen. The Allies were able to use the rail network to bring up the units but the roads were in poor state needing 80 companies of engineers and pioneers to keep them usable following the thaw. Movement was at night with forces concealed during the hours of daylight; Allied air cover preventing German reconnaissance. Supply dumps were built up.
Order of battle
Allied
At this stage, 21st Army Group consisted of the British Second Army (Lieutenant-General Miles C. Dempsey), First Canadian Army and the U.S. Ninth Army . In Veritable, the reinforced British XXX Corps (one of two such formations in the First Canadian Army), under Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks, would advance through the Reichswald Forest and its adjacent flood plains to the Kleve – Goch road.
The First Canadian Army had had a severe time clearing the approaches to Antwerp during the previous autumn. It was, numerically, the smallest of the Allied armies in northern Europe and, despite its name, contained significant British units as part of its structure. For Veritable, it was further strengthened by XXX Corps. For Veritable it was expected the First Canadian Army would have four armoured and seven infantry divisions, five independent armoured brigades and four infantry formations "of brigade status"
The British and American strategic bombing force would probably be available for support but it was under the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and could not be guaranteed. Fighter-bombers of No 84 Group of the Second Tactical Air Force would be assisting. In the lead up to the Operation, the 2TAF, US Ninth Air Force, RAF Bomber Command and US Eighth Air Force were striking targets such as HQs, bridges, rail and road routes as far as the Ijssel and the Ruhr to isolate the battle area. For the operation itself 83 and 84 Groups had 59 squadrons and could apply for further support from 2TAF. The air operations were coordinated with XXX Corps HQ through an attached Forward Control Post with a Mobile Radar Control Post to direct aircraft in bad weather.
At the start of the operation, Allied deployment was, from left to right across the Allied front:
- 3rd Canadian Infantry Division (Major-General Daniel Spry)
- 2nd Canadian Infantry Division (Major-General Bruce Matthews)
- 4th Canadian Armoured Division (Major-General Chris Vokes)
- 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division (Acting Major-General Colin Barber)
- 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division (Major General Robert Ross)
- 51st (Highland) Infantry Division (Temporary Major-General Thomas Rennie)
Further divisions were committed as the operation progressed:
- 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division (Acting Lieutenant-General Ivor Thomas) – Part of XXX Corps' reserve at the start of the operation.
- Guards Armoured Division (Temporary Major-General Allan Adair) – Part of XXX Corps' reserve at the start of the operation.
- 4th Armoured Brigade (United Kingdom) (Brigadier H. J. B. Cracroft) – Part of XXX Corps' reserve at the start of the operation.
- 11th Armoured Division (Temporary Major-General Philip Roberts) – transferred across the Maas from the British Second Army as the operation progressed.
Two Army Groups Royal Artillery were deployed for supporting fire. The 79th Armoured Division contributed their specialist vehicles (mine-clearing flail tanks, flamethrowing Churchill Crocodiles, amphibious Buffaloes, troop-carrying Kangaroos and combat engineer AVRE tanks).
German
Assessments by the OKH (the German Army High Command) were that an Allied advance through the Reichswald would be too difficult and the expected assault would be by the British Second Army from the Venlo area. Reserves were therefore placed to respond to this. Alfred Schlemm, the local German commander, strongly disagreed, believing, correctly, that the Reichswald was the more likely route. He acted against the assessments of his superiors and therefore ensured that the area was well fortified, strengthened the Siegfried Line defences and quietly moved some of his reserves to be nearer this line of attack which meant that fresh and hardened troops were readily available to him.
- 84th Infantry Division (Major-General Heinz Fiebig) - An inexperienced and under-equipped division re-formed after its destruction at Falaise in Normandy.
- Luftwaffe 2nd Parachute Regiment - well-equipped, placed between the western tip of the Reichswald and the Maas.
- 1062nd Grenadier Regiment and 1051st Grenadier Regiment, covered the edge of the forest facing the Allies
- 1052nd Grenadier Regiment - defended the Rhine flood plain on the German right.
- Two more, ineffective, units were held in the rear area: the Sicherungs Battalion Münster (a small unit of elderly men used to guard static installations) and the 276th Magen ("Stomach") Battalion, whose personnel had chronic digestive ailments that made them unsuited for active roles in the defence.
- 655th Heavy Anti-Tank Battalion - Around 36 self propelled assault guns, the only German armour immediately available in the Reichswald.
- 180th Infantry Division (Bernhard Klosterkemper) - Guarding the Maas river bank, facing the British 2nd Army.
- 6th Parachute Division (Hermann Plocher) - Elements fought in defensive positions at Kleve and Goch.
- 7th Parachute Division (Wolfgang Erdmann) - Elements in reserve at Geldern, as a result of Schlemm's expectation of an offensive through the Reichswald.
- 47th Panzer Corps (General Heinrich Freiherr von Lüttwitz) - Army Group H's armoured reserve, at Dülken, south-east of Venlo. After the fighting in the Ardennes, its two divisions, the 116th Panzer and the 15th Panzer Grenadier, were at just over 50 per cent strength with no more than 90 tanks between them.
- 15th Panzer Grenadier Division (Wolfgang Maucke) - A possible reserve formation, according to Allied assessments, that might be in place within six hours of the assault.
- 346th Division (Steinmueller)
Terrain
The Allied advance was from Groesbeek (captured during Operation Market Garden) eastwards to Kleve and Goch, turning south eastwards along the Rhine to Xanten and the US advance. The whole battle area was between the Rhine and Maas rivers, initially through the Reichswald and then across rolling agricultural country.
The Reichswald is a forest close to the Dutch/German border. The Rhine flood plain, 2–3 miles (3.2–4.8 km) wide (and which, at the time of the operation, had been allowed to flood after a wet winter), is the northern boundary of the area and the Maas flood plain is the southern boundary. The Reichswald ridge is a glacial remnant which, when wet, easily turns to mud. At the time of the operation, the ground had thawed and was largely unsuitable for wheeled and tracked vehicles. These conditions caused breakdowns to a significant number of tanks.
Routes through the forest were a problem for the Allies, both during their advance through the forest and later for supply and reinforcements. The only main roads passed to the north (Nijmegen to Kleve) and south (Mook to Goch) of the forest - no east–west metalled route passed through it. There were three north–south routes: two radiating from Hekkens to Kranenburg (between two and five kilometres behind the German frontline) and to Kleve; and Kleve to Goch, along the eastern edge of the Reichswald. The lack of suitable roads was made worse by the soft ground conditions and the deliberate flooding of the flood plains, which necessitated the use of amphibious vehicles. The few good roads were rapidly damaged and broken up by the constant heavy traffic that they had to carry during the assaults.
The Germans had built three defence lines. The first was from Wyler to the Maas along the western edge of the Reichswald, manned by the 84th Division and the 1st Parachute Regiment; this was a "trip-wire" line intended only to delay an assault and alert the main forces. The second, beyond the forest, was Rees, Kleve, Goch and the third ran from Rees, through the Uedemer Hochwald to Geldern.
Operation Veritable (Battle of the Reichswald)
Preparations for the operations were complicated by the poor condition of the few routes into the concentration area, its small size, the need to maintain surprise and, therefore, the need to conceal the movements of men and materiel. A new rail bridge was constructed that extended rail access to Nijmegen, a bridge was built across the Maas at Mook and roads were repaired and maintained. Elaborate and strict restrictions were placed on air and daytime land movements; troop concentrations and storage dumps were camouflaged.
Operation Veritable was planned in three separate phases. Crerrar envisaged: