Operation Solstice (German: Unternehmen Sonnenwende) was a German offensive operation in January 1945 and formed part of Operation Nordwind. The strategic objective of Operation Solstice was an area shaped like a triangle between the rivers Ill and Rhine near the towns of Erstein and Sélestat. The area around Erstein was to serve as a springboard for an advance to Molsheim, which was located about 15 kilometers further north, in the event of an encirclement of Strasbourg. The attack was to be launched from the northernmost point of the Colmar Pocket by a German infantry division reinforced with an Panzer brigade. In the early days, German troops made rapid progress and even surrounded and destroyed a French battalion. However, the French troops in this area managed to prevent the Germans from crossing the Ill, and as a result, the offensive quickly came to a halt. The push toward Molsheim was no longer considered.
Introduction
Shortly after the start of the Battle of the Bulge, the American 3rd Army focused entirely on the Ardennes. The American 7th Army then took over part of the front line from the 3rd Army. Subsequently, the French 1st Army had to stretch its front line in Alsace. Meanwhile, the Germans planned a new offensive, Operation Nordwind, in Alsace-Lorraine.
German plan
The plan for Operation Nordwind, developed at the end of December 1944, had its main axis of attack in the northern Vosges and was to be carried out by the German 1st Army. This attack would begin on December 31, 1944. Additionally, the 19th Army would also carry out two attacks on either side of Strasbourg. One was a crossing of the Rhine at Gambsheim, which ultimately began on January 5, 1945. The other was from the Colmar Pocket to the north, starting on January 7, 1945.
The latter attack was originally just a secondary attack with “battalion-sized assaults.” In the first days of January 1945, the staff of the 64th Army Corps was ordered to prepare an attack from the line Diebolsheim–Hilsenheim to the north. The preliminary goal was the river Ill, and to capture a sector from Erstein to Sélestat (German: Schlettstadt). Two days before the scheduled start date of January 7, the 198th Infantry Division would conduct a small raid on Neunkirch, with the goal of taking prisoners and gathering intelligence. The corps' plan, approved by higher command, envisioned an attack along the western side of the Rhône–Rhine Canal.
Units involved
Wehrmacht
The overall command of this operation lay with Army Group Upper Rhine under Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler. The operation was executed by the 19th Army under the command of General der Infanterie Siegfried Rasp. Rasp appointed the 64th Army Corps under General der Infanterie Hellmuth Thumm to carry out the attack.
The main attack was to be carried out by the 198th Infantry Division under Generalmajor Otto Schiel. This division consisted of three regiments: the 305th Grenadier Regiment, the 308th Grenadier Regiment, and the 326th Grenadier Regiment, and had a combat strength of 2,692 men. A relatively strong armored force was also assembled, consisting of:
- 106th Panzer Brigade “Feldherrnhalle”, under Oberst Franz Bäke (replaced by Major Bernhard von Schkopp from January 12, 1945). This brigade had (operational) 1 Panzer IV, 3 Panthers, 1 Jagdpanzer IV, and 3 Flakpanzers.
- Kampfgruppe Noak, under Major Karl-Heinz Noak. This Kampfgruppe consisted of about half of the schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 654, formed from Kampfgruppen Schnepf and Heyn with a total of 20 Jagdpanthers. Also attached were 2 tank destroyer companies, the 1st Company of Heeres-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 93 and the 1st Company of Heeres-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 525, totaling 22 Nashorns. During the operation, the armored elements of the 106th Panzer Brigade were subordinated to Noak.
- Heeres-Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 280, under Major Kurt Kühme. The brigade had 12 StuG III and StuH 42 assault guns.
As reinforcement, Thumm also had the 269th Infantry Division (Generalleutnant Hans Wagner) in reserve. Parts of this division were deployed after a few days, but the entire division was transported to the Eastern Front in mid-January and was thus no longer available. Additionally, the Divisions-Füsilier-Battalion 708 of the 708th Volksgrenadier Division was available.
Allies
The defence of the Rhine sector and the Colmar Pocket was the responsibility of the 1st French Army under "Général d'armée" Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. The northern sector of the Colmar Pocket was defended by the French 2nd Army Corps, and the relevant sector was held by the 1st Free French Division (Fr: 1re DFL) under "Général de brigade" Pierre Garbay. This division had only taken over the sector on December 31, 1944, after having served on the Atlantic Coast. In the immediate direction of the attack was the 4th Brigade (under Colonel Raynal). This consisted of:
• Bataillon de marche no. 21 (abbreviated BM 21, under Captaine Fournier)
• Bataillon de marche no. 24 (abbreviated BM 24, under Commandant Pierre Coffinier)
• Bataillon d'infanterie de marine et du Pacifique (abbreviated BIMP, under Commandant Edmond Magendie)
Parts of the rest of the division were deployed in the following days for support. Also involved were elements of the Alsace-Lorraine Independent Brigade (under Colonel André Malraux).
Condition of troops
Both the French and German troops involved in the fighting were not in optimal condition. The 1st Free French Division had lost much of its experienced personnel in late autumn 1944. Around 6,000 experienced Senegalese (colonial) troops were replaced by inexperienced members of the Forces françaises de l'intérieur (FFI). This replacement of what were then called "blacks" with white men is known in France as “Blanchiment des troupes coloniales” (freely translated: the "whitening" of colonial troops). As a result, the division's combat strength was greatly reduced and was certainly not at its previous level by early January.
The Germans were in a similar position. The 198th Infantry Division had suffered heavy losses during its retreat from Provence. These were replenished in autumn 1944 with two grenadier battalions, a fortress infantry battalion, a fortress MG battalion, a naval training unit, remnants of two other battalions, parts of a security regiment, parts of a naval artillery unit, etc. —in short, a motley collection of various troops from various origins. The 106th Panzer Brigade initially had 2 Panzer IVs and 12 Panthers, of which only 1 and 3 respectively were operational. Note that a full Panzer brigade should have had 36 Panthers and 11 Jagdpanzer IVs. However, the brigade had 80% of its personnel (including the panzer grenadiers). Heeres-Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 280 likewise had only about a quarter of its organic assault guns.
Insignia of the most important units:
Course of battle
Day 1: 7 January 1945
The attack began as planned. The 305th GR, operating on the left, advanced through the forest of Sermersheim at 05:00, but due to a blown-up bridge near Riedhof and French resistance from outposts of the 11th Cuirassier Regiment (Fr: 11e Régiment de Cuirassiers), the regiment only reached the northern and western edges of the forest of Sermersheim and the Riedwald by evening. The group on the right (308th and 326th GR) captured Neunkirch around 08:50, marking the breakthrough. Now "Kampfgruppe Noak" could break out, the Zembs was crossed, and around 10:30 the first armored vehicles appeared in front of Osthouse; around noon tanks appeared south of Erstein, fired, and then disappeared again. At 13:00, the canal bridge south of Krafft was captured. Later in the afternoon, an attack toward Krafft followed, but due to anti-tank fire, one Jagdpanther was destroyed and another damaged. A company of BM 21 managed to blow up the bridge over the drainage canal of the Ill. Subsequent attacks were cancelled, and the Germans switched to defence in this area.
Following the tanks, infantry advanced and captured Witternheim around 10:30, then launched an attack on Herbsheim from the southeast around 11:00. This attack was repelled by French units, as was a second attack at 16:30. A night-time attack was also repelled with the help of three light tanks from the 1st RFM (Fr: 1er Régiment de Fusiliers Marins).
During the day, in the area between the Rhône–Rhine Canal and the Rhine, only skirmishes occurred with German troops occupying Rhinau and Friesenheim; the French had retreated to Boofzheim. For BM 24, the situation seemed calm until early afternoon, when two German armored vehicles (the previously mentioned Jagdpanthers?) were reported northwest of Gerstheim. BM 24 was ordered to stay in place as a counterattack was being prepared via the roads Osthouse–Gerstheim and Sand–Obenheim. These actions were in fact only reconnaissance missions, but the Germans became alert and delayed their northward push, focusing more on Sand and Benfeld. By the end of the day, the 1re DFL began reinforcing the sector with whatever was available. The remnants of Combat Command 5 of the 5th French Armored Division were assigned to the sector, and BM 11 (2nd Brigade) was rapidly relieved by American troops. That same evening, Himmler gave the order to strengthen the attacks toward Benfeld and then advance northwest toward Molsheim.
Day 2: 8 January 1945
Despite their efforts, the Germans made only limited progress, while French troops launched their first serious counterattacks. After spending the night at Krafft, "Kampfgruppe Noak" slowly advanced along the Sand–Obenheim road, but by evening GR 326, despite tank support, could advance no further than the Pfifferwald; in fact, they encountered French attempts to re-establish contact with BM 24 along this axis. At 09:00, a French detachment encountered German tanks and had to retreat, and at 14:15 an action by elements of BM 11 had the same result. Further north, the Germans attempted attacks on the Osthouse bridge at 07:30, 11:00, and 12:30, all of which failed. A French attempt at 10:15 on the Osthouse–Gerstheim road also failed. In the afternoon, the same unit, now reinforced by BM 11, moved to the eastern edge of the Osthouse Forest before receiving the order to withdraw. French offensives also failed in the evening.
The connection with BM 24 could not be reestablished, but the German advance toward Sand also temporarily came to a halt. German leadership was dissatisfied with the aggressiveness of the German armored troops and Major Noak was replaced by Oberst Franz Bäke.
All day, Rossfeld and Herbsheim were bombed, and to the west the Germans expanded their hold on the forests. East of the canal, Daubensand was lost, and a German battalion crossed the Rhine near Gerstheim. The commander of BM 24 then considered a withdrawal to the north. At 20:00, he received permission to reach Gerstheim after having recalled the French troops from Boofzheim. However, during the night BM 24 was ordered to remain in Obenheim.
Day 3: 9 January 1945
This was a crucial day. The link between the Pfifferwald (GR 326) and Hirtzwald groups was severed, cutting off all communication with the garrisons of Rossfeld and Herbsheim. The "Kampfgruppe Noak" advanced to the Ill river south of Heussern. It was against this advance that new attempts to liberate BM 24 would collide. A mixed group (BM 11 - CC 5) attacked around 9:30 a.m. on the Sand-Obenheim axis and by 3:00 p.m. had reached the eastern edge of the Pfifferwald. Around 5:00 p.m., about twenty German tanks appeared in front of Ehl, without infantry, creating a dual threat: a possible crossing of the Ill or an attack? The French group withdrew.