Operation Goodwood was a British offensive during the Second World War, which took place between 18 and 20 July 1944 as part of the larger battle for Caen in Normandy, France. The objective of the operation was a limited attack to the south, from the Orne bridgehead, to capture the rest of Caen and the Bourguébus Ridge beyond.
Goodwood was preceded by Operations Greenline and Pomegranate in the Second Battle of the Odon west of Caen, to divert German attention from the area east of Caen. Goodwood began when the British VIII Corps, with three armoured divisions, attacked to seize the German-held Bourguébus Ridge, the area between Bretteville-sur-Laize and Vimont and to inflict maximum casualties on the Germans. On 18 July, the British I Corps conducted an attack to secure a series of villages to the east of VIII Corps; to the west, the II Canadian Corps launched Operation Atlantic, synchronised with Goodwood, to capture the Caen suburbs south of the Orne River. When the operation ended on 20 July, the armoured divisions had broken through the outer German defences and advanced 7 mi (11 km) but had been stopped short of Bourguébus Ridge, only armoured cars having penetrated further south and beyond the ridge.
While Goodwood failed in its primary aim, it forced the Germans to keep powerful formations opposite the British and Canadians on the eastern flank of the Normandy beachhead and Operation Cobra, the First US Army attack which began on 25 July, caused the weaker German defences opposite to collapse.
Background
Caen
The historic Normandy town of Caen was a D-Day objective for the British 3rd Infantry Division, which landed on Sword Beach on 6 June 1944. The capture of Caen, while "ambitious", was called the most important D-Day objective assigned to I Corps (Lieutenant-General John Crocker). Operation Overlord called for Second Army to secure the city and then form a front line from Caumont-l'Éventé–south-east of Caen, to acquire space for airfields and to protect the left flank of the First US Army (Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley), while it moved on Cherbourg. Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give the Second Army a staging area for a push south to capture Falaise, which could be used as the pivot for a swing left, to advance on Argentan and then towards the Touques River. The terrain between Caen and Vimont was especially promising, being open, dry and conducive to mobile operations. Since the Allied forces greatly outnumbered the Germans in tanks and mobile units, a fluid fast-moving battle was to their advantage.
Hampered by congestion in the beachhead and forced to divert effort to attack strongly held German positions along the 9.3 mi (15.0 km) route to the town, the 3rd Infantry Division was unable to assault Caen in force and was stopped short of the outskirts. Follow-up attacks were unsuccessful as German resistance solidified; abandoning the direct approach, Operation Perch—a pincer attack by I Corps and XXX Corps—was launched on 7 June, to encircle Caen from the east and west. I Corps, striking south out of the Orne bridgehead, was halted by the 21st Panzer Division and the attack by XXX Corps bogged down in front of Tilly-sur-Seulles, west of Caen, against the Panzer Lehr Division. The 7th Armoured Division pushed through a gap in the German front line and tried to capture the town of Villers-Bocage in the German rear. The Battle of Villers-Bocage saw the vanguard of the 7th Armoured Division withdraw from the town but by 17 June, Panzer Lehr had been forced back and XXX Corps had taken Tilly-sur-Seulles. The British postponed plans for further offensive operations, including a second attack by the 7th Armoured Division, when a severe storm descended upon the English Channel on 19 June. The storm lasted for three days, significantly delaying the Allied build-up. Most of the landing craft and ships already at sea were driven back to ports in Britain; towed barges and other loads (including 2.5 mi (4.0 km) of floating roadways for the Mulberry harbours) were lost and 800 craft were stranded on the Normandy beaches, until the next high tides in July.
Epsom, Windsor and Charnwood
After a few days to recover from the storm, the British began Operation Epsom on 26 June. The newly arrived VIII Corps (Lieutenant-General Richard O'Connor), was to attack west of Caen, southwards across the Odon and Orne rivers, capture an area of high ground near Bretteville-sur-Laize, encircling the city. The attack was preceded by Operation Martlet, to secure the VIII Corps flank by capturing high ground on the right of the axis of advance. The Germans managed to contain the offensive by committing all their strength, including two panzer divisions just arrived in Normandy, earmarked for an offensive against British and American positions around Bayeux. Several days later, the Second Army made a frontal assault on Caen Operation Charnwood. The attack was preceded by Operation Windsor, to capture the airfield at Carpiquet just outside Caen. By 9 July, Caen north of the Orne and Odon rivers had been captured but German forces retained possession of the south bank and a number of important locations, including the Colombelles steel works, whose tall chimneys commanded the area.
Shortly after the capture of northern Caen, the British mounted a raid against the Colombelles steelworks complex to the north-east of the city, which was a failure. The factory area remained in German hands, its tall chimneys providing observation posts that overlooked the Orne bridgehead. At 01:00 on 11 July, elements of the 153rd (Highland) Infantry Brigade, supported by Sherman tanks of the 148th Regiment Royal Armoured Corps, moved against the German position. The intention was to secure the area for troops from the Royal Engineers to destroy the chimneys before retiring. At 05:00, the British force was ambushed by Tiger tanks and was forced to withdraw after losing nine tanks. The Second Army launched two preliminary operations; according to General Bernard Montgomery, their purpose was to "engage the enemy in battle unceasingly; we must 'write off' his troops; and generally we must kill Germans". Historian Terry Copp called this the moment where the Normandy campaign became a battle of attrition.
Montgomery
On 10 July, Montgomery, the commander of all the Allied ground forces in Normandy, held a meeting at his headquarters with Dempsey and Bradley. They discussed 21st Army Group operations, following the conclusion of Operation Charnwood and the failure of the First US Army break-out offensive. Montgomery approved Operation Cobra, an attack to be launched by the First US Army on 18 July. Montgomery ordered Dempsey to "go on hitting: drawing the German strength, especially the armour, onto yourself—so as to ease the way for Brad".
In early July, Montgomery had been informed by the Adjutant-General to the Forces, Ronald Adam that due to the manpower shortage in Britain, the pool of replacements to maintain his infantry strength was nearly exhausted. Dempsey proposed an attack consisting solely of armoured divisions, a concept that contradicted Montgomery's policy of never employing an unbalanced force. By mid-July, the Second Army had 2,250 medium tanks and 400 light tanks in the bridgehead, of which 500 were in reserve to replace losses. The armoured element of the Second Army consisted of the Guards Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Division and the 11th Armoured Division and the 4th Armoured Brigade, 8th Armoured Brigade, 27th Armoured Brigade and 33rd Armoured brigades, the 31st and 34th Tank brigades and the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade.
At 10:00 on 13 July, Dempsey met with Crocker, Lieutenant-General Simonds of II Canadian Corps and O'Connor. Later that day, the first written order for Operation Goodwood—named after the Glorious Goodwood race meetings—was issued. The document contained only preliminary instructions and general intentions; it was to stimulate detailed planning, and alterations were expected. The order was also sent to senior planners in the United Kingdom so that air support for the operation could be secured. When VIII Corps had assembled in Normandy in mid-June, it was suggested that the corps be used to attack out of the Orne bridgehead, to outflank Caen from the east but Operation Dreadnought was cancelled when Dempsey and O'Connor doubted the feasibility of the operation.
Prelude
Goodwood plan
In the outline for Goodwood, VIII Corps, with three armoured divisions, would attack southwards out of the Orne bridgehead, a pocket of ground east of the river taken by the Allies on D-Day in Operation Deadstick. The 11th Armoured Division was to advance south-west over Bourguébus Ridge and the Caen–Falaise road, aiming for Bretteville-sur-Laize. The Guards Armoured Division was to push south-east to capture Vimont and Argences and the 7th Armoured Division, starting last, was to aim south for Falaise. The 3rd Infantry Division, supported by part of the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division, was to secure the eastern flank by capturing the area around Émiéville, Touffréville and Troarn. The II Canadian Corps would simultaneously launch Operation Atlantic, a supporting attack on the VIII Corps western flank, to capture Caen south of the Orne river. The British and Canadian operations were tentatively scheduled for 18 July and Cobra was postponed for two days, to enable the First Army to secure its start line around Saint-Lô.
Detailed planning began on Friday 14 July but the next day, Montgomery issued a written directive ordering Dempsey to change the plan from a "deep break-out" to a "limited attack". Anticipating that the Germans would be forced to commit their armoured reserves, rather than risk a massed British tank breakthrough, VIII Corps was instructed to "engage the German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans". He was to take any opportunity to improve the Second Army's position—the orders stated that "a victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank"—but not to endanger its role as a "firm bastion" on which the success of the forthcoming American offensive would depend. The objectives of the three armoured divisions were amended to "dominate the area Bourguébus–Vimont–Bretteville", although it was intended that "armoured cars should push far to the south towards Falaise, spread[ing] alarm and despondency". The objectives for the II Canadian Corps remained unchanged and it was stressed that these were vital, only following their achievement would VIII Corps "'crack about' as the situation demands".
The 11th Armoured Division was to lead the advance, screen Cagny and capture Bras, Hubert-Folie, Verrières and Fontenay-le-Marmion. The divisional armoured brigade was to bypass most of the German-held villages in its area, leaving them to be dealt with by follow-up waves. The 159th Infantry Brigade, was initially to act independently of the armoured brigade and capture Cuverville and Démouville. The Guards Armoured Division, advancing behind the 11th Armoured Division, was to capture Cagny and Vimont. Starting last, the 7th Armoured Division was to move south beyond the Garcelles-Secqueville ridge. Further advances by the armoured divisions were to be conducted only on Dempsey's order. The detailed orders for the II Canadian Corps were issued a day later, for the capture of Colombelles, the remaining portion of Caen and then be ready to move on the strongly held Verrières (Bourguébus) Ridge. If the German front collapsed, a deeper advance would be considered.
Second Army intelligence had formed a good estimate of the opposition Goodwood was likely to face, although the German positions beyond the first line of villages had to be inferred, mainly from inconclusive air reconnaissance. The German defensive line was believed to consist of two belts up to 4 mi (6.4 km) deep. Aware that the Germans were expecting a large attack out of the Orne bridgehead, the British anticipated meeting resistance from the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division bolstered by SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 25 of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. Signals intelligence found that the Hitler Youth had been moved into reserve and although it was slow to discover that SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 25 was not with the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division, having also been placed into reserve, this oversight was rectified before 18 July. Battle groups of the 21st Panzer Division with around 50 Panzer IV and 34 assault guns, were expected near Route nationale 13. The 1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler was identified in reserve with an estimated 40 Panther tanks and 60 Panzer IV and the presence of two heavy tank battalions equipped with Tiger tanks was established. German armoured strength was estimated at 230 tanks and artillery strength at 300 field and anti-tank guns. The Second Army believed that 90 guns were in the centre of the battle zone, 40 on the flanks and 20 defending the Caen–Vimont railway line. The British had also located a German gun line on the Bourguébus Ridge but its strength and gun positions were unknown.