The Southern Russia intervention was an Allied military intervention in present-day Ukraine between December 1918 and April 1919 on the Black Sea shores of the former Russian Empire, as part of the Allied intervention in Russia after the October Revolution. The intervention was an involvement in the Russian Civil War on the side of the White movement, but lacking in forces and sympathy among the local population, it was a failure that ended with the evacuation of the territory.
French-led forces landed in Ukraine in December 1917. Short on personnel, officers and supplies, demoralized and receptive to Soviet propaganda, they soon had to leave the initial offensive plan and adopt a defensive strategy against the Bolshevik forces. Thanks to the arrival of reinforcements throughout December 1918 and January 1919, the Allies managed to take control of various cities in Ukraine and Crimea: Kherson, Nikolaev, Sevastopol and Tiraspol, some ceded by agreement by the Central Council of Ukraine.
With troops short and demoralized, unwilling to risk their lives in Russia for a cause they did not understand, the French commanders saw little future for the campaign. Bolshevik forces seemed numerous, well commanded and supported by the population that had received those of the Entente with hostility. The anti-Bolsheviks, for their own part, were unable to forge an alliance, separated by deep differences that caused the French frustration. The defeats at Kherson and Nikolaev in March convinced the French commanders of desirability of reaching an agreement with the Bolshevik authorities and ending the expedition. This was approved at the end of March and carried out at the beginning of the following month. Otaman Nykyfor Hryhoriv formally submitted to the Bolshevik command of Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko, had succeeded in expelling the Allied forces from the occupied coastal cities in late 1918 and early 1919.
Background
First actions in Russia
On 23 December 1917, the British and French governments had divided the region into zones of operations: Crimea, Donbas, and Ukraine remained on the French side. In addition, the Prime minister of France, Georges Clemenceau, approved a loan of one hundred million francs to finance anti-Bolshevik activities in Russia. Clemenceau's idea was to use control of the grain-rich Ukraine and the industry of Donetsk to try to recover the losses of French investors in Russia, after the new Bolshevik government had refused payment of the Russian debt. During the first year of Bolshevik rule, French aid to its enemies was limited to funding and the dispatch of some military advisers. This was not, however, Clemenceau's original plan, which provided for the sending of various allied units to Russia once the fighting in the Balkans and the Middle East had ended. The allied expeditionary force was to serve as the unifying nucleus of the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces. These troops were to facilitate the establishment of a new Russian Government, favourable to the political and economic interests of the Entente. Shortly before the October Revolution, the French high command in Paris had outlined plans to intervene in Russia in order to maintain the Eastern Front and prevent areas of strategic economic interest from falling into German hands.
Following the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk peace treaty between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers in March 1918, the French Foreign Ministry, supported by its former ambassador to Russia, Joseph Noulens, advocated the total rupture of relations with the Bolshevik government, while the military commanders defended the agreement with Lenin to limit the German advance. Noulens and the ministry proposed, on the contrary, to support the anti-Bolshevik groups bent on overthrowing the Bolshevik government. In the late summer of 1918, Paris adopted the position hostile to Moscow that its diplomats recommended. Clemenceau decided to send a military expedition to Russia, despite the scepticism of the military commanders about its chances of success.
French plans
The first indication of the French government's intentions to intervene in the south of the former Russian Empire was the appointment on 7 October 1918 of General Henri Berthelot—a veteran of the Romanian Front— at the head of a military mission that covered Romania and Ukraine. His mission was not only to ensure the withdrawal of the Central Powers from the two territories, but also to "carry out the economic encirclement of Bolshevism and bring about its downfall." Berthelot had to use the allied units deployed in the Balkans in a military intervention that combined political and economic objectives, in the style of colonial expeditions. To allay the suspicions of Anton Denikin, who considered Berthelot too pro-Romanian, and to assure him of the seriousness of the French plans, the French general told Denikin's representative, General Dmitry Shcherbachev, that the Allies were willing to employ twelve divisions in southern Russia and collaborate with their forces in the fight against the Bolsheviks. These promises were based on informal information that Berthelot had received in France before leaving on his mission and were exaggerated, although they fed the illusions of the Volunteer Army.
For his part, General Franchet d'Espèrey, from whose forces Berthelot's forces were to come and who was on bad terms with Clemenceau, severely criticized the intervention plans. According to Franchet d'Espèrey, the forces planned for the operation were insufficient, part of the units that had to march to the east were very weak and some, like the Senegalese, would not be able to stand the harsh climate of the region. He also warned of the discouragement and weariness of the war that had spread among some units. Soon Berthelot began to share Franchet d'Espèrey's scepticism about the campaign: instead of the planned twelve divisions, he was only able to obtain three, and one of them was weakened by the spread of influenza in its ranks.
After several weeks without receiving further instructions about his mission, Berthelot finally obtained more instructions on 21 November: the operation was to go beyond the occupation of Odessa and for this it would have three French and as many Greek divisions, in addition to a Romanian contingent that would be sent to him later. Berthelot, who considered these forces insufficient to guarantee the success of the mission, suggested the inclusion of fifteen Romanian regiments, framed in mixed Franco-Romanian divisions, which made it necessary to increase the French forces by about seven or nine regiments. Both the support units and the artillery or the financing of these units would have to be borne by France. In December, he warned again of the likelihood of failure if the forces assigned to the campaign proved too meager, a view shared by Franchet d'Espèrey, who preferred to arm local anti-Bolshevik forces and limit French involvement to advisers. Finally the French Government, wishing to demobilize units and with other regions to attend to, did not approve of Berthelot's plan, and only sent part of a French division and some Greek units. The inclusion of these was due to Clemenceau's desire to use Allied rather than French troops wherever possible and to the availability of relatively fresh Greek forces, provided in exchange for promises of favourable consideration of Greek territorial claims at the Paris Peace Conference.
Indeed, the Greek authorities promised the participation of forty-two thousand men, framed in three divisions of the I Army Corps, although only two of them—the 2nd and the 13th—were finally deployed in Ukrainian territory. The ground troops were joined by an allied squadron made up of French, British and Greek ships.
Situation of the region on the eve of the intervention
In November 1918, the German 7th Division reached Odessa—a city with a very mixed population, barely a fifth Ukrainian and a large number of Russians and Jews— to replace the retreating Austro-Hungarian forces. The unit was soon cut off from the rest of the country by the forces of the Ukrainian Directorate, who surrounded it. British and French warships docked at the port (17 December), but no troops landed. The presence of these ships, however, encouraged Polish and Russian officers to create volunteer units. With the arrival of Directorate forces in the outskirts of the city on 24 December, these units took refuge in the port, under allied protection. The city was left in the hands of units led by Symon Petliura, who maintained an uneasy truce with Denikin.
Intervention
A French expeditionary force, Army of the Danube (AD), landed in the city a week after the arrival of the Directorate units and, with the help of Polish and Russian officers and after heavy fighting, expelled them from the city. The Germans remained neutral in the conflict, while they tried with relative success to abandon the city. The German 15th Division at Nikolaev was in a similar situation to the 7th, captured at Odessa.
The initial objective of the French Government was to achieve the military defeat of the Bolsheviks and at the same time gain a zone of influence in the area that could bring economic benefits. Once Odessa was under control, General Borius, in command of the French forces that had occupied it, declared it under French protection. He appointed General Grishin-Almazov, a local representative of Denikin, as military governor of the city, which intensified the impression that the French were backing him.
While Polish, Russian, and Romanian contingents remained in Odessa, Greek units landed in Kherson. Other Allied units fanned out across Sevastopol on 25 December. Joint command was left to French General Philippe d 'Anselme as of January. He ordered the German 15th Division to maintain order in Nikolaev. This city, together with Tiraspol and Kherson, was controlled by the Allies. D'Anselme negotiated the peaceful surrender of Kherson and Nikolaev with Petliura's delegates. These conversations disgusted Denikin, even though D'Anselme reminded him that his orders stated that he must cooperate with all anti-Bolshevik forces and that the deals with the Directorate they were not political, but only military. Negotiations with the Directorate continued unsuccessfully until February, when the Bolsheviks expelled them from Kiev. The latter had been willing to accept practically all of the French demands except for the resignation of Petliura, but this was not enough for an agreement to be reached between the Entente and the former. In addition, the weaker that the Directorate became, the less the French were interested in forming an agreement with it. The talks, however, had made it possible to expand the perimeter under French control around Odessa and facilitate the control of a strip of territory that reached the Dnieper, without the need to fight.
However, the coastal cities were cut off from the rest of Ukraine by the forces of the Directorate and the various otamans. The main one, Nykyfor Hryhoriv, who was opposed to the rapprochement with France and abandoned his loyalty to the Directorate to go over to the Bolsheviks, controlled the interior. The French and their allies were unable to expel him from his positions during the operations they carried out during the month of February.
Status
The French plan depended on the collaboration of all the anti-Bolshevik forces in the area, which was not achieved. The general hostility of the population, the resistance of the Bolsheviks, the mutinies of their own troops, the lack of supplies and the disunity of the anti-Bolshevik forces first convinced the French military commanders and then their Government of the inconvenience of continuing the military intervention in the region. From direct intervention, the French moved on to a strategy of containment and aid to the White movement.
The disunity of the anti-Bolshevik formations, which had already been made clear at the Iaşi Conference, became evident again in Ukraine and caused great frustration to the French military commanders. The quarrels between the different groups, which included anyone from monarchists to socialists, prevented the drafting of a common political program.
In addition, relations between the Volunteer Army and the French commanders were tense. They considered it excessively reactionary, lacking popular sympathy and forces in the area to become the core of an anti-Bolshevik army. Various French officers' impressions of Denikin's supporters were unfavourable: they continued to maintain their pre-war habits of arrogance and irresponsibility, they were a small force and overstaffed. The perception of the Russian officers of the French expeditionary force was also negative: they found French commanders arrogant and criticized their contacts with their political rivals in the region.