The Buffalo Soldier Tragedy of 1877, also known as the Staked Plains Horror, occurred when a combined force of the all-Black Buffalo Soldier troops of the United States Army's 10th Cavalry and local buffalo hunters wandered five days in the Llano Estacado (sometimes translated as Staked Plains) region of northwest Texas and eastern New Mexico during July of a drought year, where four buffalo soldiers and one buffalo hunter died.
News of the ongoing event and speculation about it reached East Coast newspapers via telegraphy, where it was erroneously reported that the expedition had been massacred. Later, after the remainder of the group returned from the Llano, the same newspapers declared them "back from the dead."
Buffalo Hunters' War
A large band of Comanche Indian warriors and their families, about 170 in number, left their reservation in Indian Territory in December 1876 for the Llano Estacado of Texas. In February 1877, they attacked a group of buffalo hunters and stole their stock, wounding several hunters, one fatally. On March 18, the hunters struck back and then retreated, while the Comanche did the same but continued sporadic raiding over the next several months. This event was called the Buffalo Hunters' War or Staked Plains War.
Background
In May 1877, a group of buffalo hunters led by James Harvey, a Civil War veteran and long-time buffalo hunter, was looking for a buffalo herd. After a series of Comanche raids led by Red Young Man, in which much stock was taken and a few hunters killed, the hunters started looking on the Llano Estacado region of northwest Texas and eastern New Mexico for revenge against the Comanche, who had gone far beyond their legal hunting grounds. The buffalo hunters were a mix of former Union and Confederate soldiers, former trappers, and others.
Captain Nicolas Merritt Nolan, an Irish native, was one of the 10th Cavalry's favorite officers, described as "very fine and soldier-like." Nolan had joined the American Army in 1852 as a 17-year-old, rising through the enlisted ranks when he found a niche riding horses. During the Civil War, he fought well, received honors, and became an officer. After the war, he volunteered for duty with the buffalo Soldiers of the 10th Cavalry and commanded Company A (later Troop A) for almost a decade and a half.
Nolan had left Fort Concho on July 10, 1877, with a force of 63 officers and men for a scout (reconnaissance) on the Llano Estacado, looking for Mescalero Apache and Comanche who were out raiding. His route took him past the Llano's eastern rugged caprock northwest toward Bull Creek, following a route he had earlier taken northwest in 1875. During that scout, he followed an Indian trail into the Llano until it grew cold, then turned back. He was threatened with court-martial for not being aggressive enough on that scout, an event that deeply shamed him, and his subsequent patrolling was considered aggressive.
Another event that may have been a factor was the death of Nolan's first wife on February 13, 1877, the eve of Valentine's Day. This event staggered him, and he was described as "bewildered and forlorn." His daughter Kate attended the Ursuline Academy in San Antonio, and his seven-year-old son Ned was cared for by a servant. Nolan "bore his cross ... awkwardly" but tried to cope with the loss.
Nolan took command of Fort Concho on July 6. Grierson had to go east to attend urgent family duties. Almost immediately, orders came for the command to go after the Indian raiders. Because Nolan had already sent out Troop C, he went out with Troop A, leaving only one officer and 16 men at Fort Concho. While en route northeastward, he encountered a former scout who reported over 100 Comanche on the Llano near the head of the North Concho River with a large herd of horses and other stock.
About noon on July 17, Nolan met the buffalo hunters led by Harvey. One of the key players was the hunters' main guide, Jose Piedad Tafoya, a former Comanchero—traders with the Comanche. Tafoya knew the Llano well, but was weak in English. With the help of other hunters, he spoke with Nolan at Bull Creek, which was 7 mi (11 km) east of Muchaque Peak in Borden County. After Nolan showed the hunters his orders, they were willing to combine forces despite initial mistrust.
The hunters had previously been in an armed conflict with the Comanche and were seeking to recover their stock as well as seek revenge. It was decided that they would provide guidance and firepower and that Nolan's soldiers would engage in combat and offer medical aid and supplies. Nolan's personal aim was to redeem himself and demonstrate his worthiness of a command that would restore his good reputation. The goal of both groups was to find water every 24 hours. In compliance with his orders, Nolan set up a supply base at Bull Creek, across from the buffalo hunter supply base.
The events that unfolded over the next two weeks led to a series of command-and-control errors, compounded by civilian distrust. Alongside recruits, the oppressive heat, wool uniforms, and alcohol supplied by the hunters to the soldiers created a perilous mix that tested Nolan and his men. He had planned a 20-day scout from his Bull Creek supply base, utilizing mules from the wagons as pack animals and dispatching the empty wagons back to Fort Concho for additional supplies to be ready upon his return at the supply base.
On the evening of July 18, some of the hunters' supplies, including alcohol, were shared with some of the soldiers for a small price. Some of the sergeants not staying in the supply camp apparently partook. Later the next day, when 40 of the 60 men of Company A set out for Cedar Lake, the sergeants failed to check that every soldier had filled his canteen with water, with the result that in the heat of the day those who had been drinking the evening before were terribly parched and did not ration their water. Their example led many of the recruits to drain their canteens. The hunters carried more water than the soldiers, aware that the heat and weather would make finding water harder. They were also conditioned to the heat and maintained strict water discipline.
When the combined commands of Nolan and Harvey made a dry camp on the evening of July 19, Nolan discovered that his men lacked water. The hunters were amused at this, perhaps thinking it was a good lesson for the soldiers. The next day led them up Sulfur Draw (referred to as Tobacco Creek by Nolan) and made the difficult climb up the caprock onto the "Yarner" of the Llano. They headed for a large playa—a shallow depression that fills only when it rains—that the hunters reported nearby, reaching it on July 21. Lieutenant Charles Cooper estimated this basin at about 5 acres (20,000 m2) in size, with a maximum depth of 33 in (840 mm). There, they all delighted in the water and played. Cooper described the rare event of men of different cultures and races, horses, mules, birds, and other animals enjoying the water as one of the greatest "aggregations of the animal kingdom ever witnessed" "outside a circus tent" in one small place.
Divergent goals
On the afternoon of July 18, at about 16:00 in the 100 °F(38°C)-plus heat, Quanah Parker, a Kwahada leader, rode into camp from the north with two older Comanche couples. They were equipped with Army horses, rifles, supplies, and a large official envelope that contained a pass to leave the reservation for 40 days. It was dated July 12, and signed by the Indian agent J. M. Haworth at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and more importantly, by Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie of the 4th Cavalry. The pass authorized Parker and the Comanche couples to seek out, find, and bring back the large band of Comanche under Red Young Man. It also warned against anyone harming them on their mission.
Nolan accepted the pass as genuine, but his writings show his frustration at Parker competing for his own mission. Cooper wrote that Nolan swore and unleashed a long series of invective-filled frustrations at everyone who seemed to be against "his" mission. It took him a while to calm down. He then asked Parker questions on the whereabouts of the Comanche raiders and their destination. Parker glanced in one direction and gestured in another while Tafoya translated. Despite being proficient in English, Parker never spoke it with Nolan.
In a three-way conversation, Tafoya served as the intermediary between Parker and Nolan, providing translations . The goals of all parties differed. Tafoya and Parker prioritized their own objectives, and despite a history of animosity between them, Tafoya seemingly agreed to deceive the soldiers in exchange for the return of his livestock with added interest. He intentionally mistranslated parts of the conversation to mislead Nolan. Through the three-way dialogue and translations, Nolan swiftly discerned that a deal had been struck between Parker and the interpreter/guide Tafoya. Subsequently, Nolan began to lose critical trust in his primary trail guide. Later, his confidence in the hunters wavered, and perhaps these witnesses to Nolan's outburst also began to question their faith in their commander.
After Parker departed southward, he remained faithful to his mission and successfully persuaded the Comanche raiders to return to the reservation. Tafoya upheld his commitment and led the soldiers off the main trail, diverting them from a false path laid by the Comanche raiders. Subsequently, Tafoya recovered his missing livestock and those of many others. He was later hailed as "the honest, loyal, and gallant company guide" until the truth was eventually revealed.
After a night march, Nolan, his troopers, and the buffalo hunters arrived at Cedar Lake around 08:00 on the morning of July 22 and found the once-expansive 4-by-6 mi (6-by-10km) lake in 1875 had dried up. Using cups, however, the men dug deep holes throughout the day to slowly obtain water. The following day, Tafoya, Harvey, and Johnny Cook embarked on a scouting mission to the south and west of Cedar Lake. During their absence, Parker visited and stayed for approximately six hours. Upon the return of Tafoya, Harvey, and Cook, they reported fresh signs of Indians moving towards Double Lakes. By noon on July 25, they reached Double Lakes only to find them dry, prompting the men to dig for water.
Nolan grew increasingly frustrated as he sensed something amiss. Many of the hunters became impatient, convinced that the Comanche raiders were hiding in the sand hills, and so they dispatched a scout in that direction without the soldiers. Several other hunters abandoned the mission. Concerns about the arid conditions led them to believe that this was the underlying issue. They pointed out to the soldiers that most of the bison and pronghorn had departed the area, indicating a severe drought. As one hunter remarked, "If the rest had good sense, they wouldn't (go further) either."
First Sergeant William L. Umbles was demoted on that day, although the exact reasons remain uncertain. Some speculated that Nolan was displeased with him, suggesting that Umbles may have attempted to persuade him to turn back, potentially eroding Nolan's trust in the first sergeant following a prior alcohol incident. Although both men remained silent about the precise cause, many observed Umbles' frustration, evident in his behavior during the ensuing period of challenge. The hunters returned to camp, excited after discovering a significant trail of signs, with Tafoya estimating that a group of 40 Comanche was near Rich Lake. Boots and saddles were swiftly called for, and the men hastened to depart.
Despite the urgency, Nolan had not immediately appointed another acting first sergeant and, in his eagerness to set out, overlooked ensuring that all canteens were filled. Although that task was typically the first sergeant's responsibility, it ultimately fell on the commander to ensure that such essential tasks were completed.
The "thirsting time"
Day one
On the afternoon of July 26, between 14:00 and 15:00, Captain Nolan led his soldiers, along with Jim Harvey's hunters, westward from Double Lakes towards the trail of 40 Comanche Indians near Rich Lake, 7 miles away. Upon reaching the lake, they found no water, and the Indian sign reported by Tafoya was not corroborated by the other scouts, indicating that the trail was likely made by only eight horses. While Tafoya's initial plan had seemed promising, most of the soldiers were now without water; and despite efforts to dig in the dry soil, no water source was found. The hunters shared their water sparingly.