The Battle of Wood Lake occurred on September 23, 1862, and was the final battle in the Dakota War of 1862. The two-hour battle, which actually took place at nearby Lone Tree Lake, was a decisive victory for the U.S. forces led by Colonel Henry Hastings Sibley. With heavy casualties inflicted on the Dakota forces led by Chief Little Crow, the "hostile" Dakota warriors dispersed. Little Crow and 150 followers fled for the northern plains, while other Mdewakantons quietly joined the "friendly" Dakota camp started by the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands, which would soon become known as Camp Release.
Background
Pressure on Sibley
In early September 1862, the U.S. defeat at the Battle of Birch Coulee and the sieges at Hutchinson, Forest City and Fort Abercrombie caused further panic, as the exodus of Minnesota settlers continued. Both Governor Alexander Ramsey and Colonel Henry Hastings Sibley were criticized heavily for their failure to act more swiftly to protect them. Many Republican supporters of Governor Ramsey questioned his choice of former governor and Democrat Henry Sibley to lead the army, in scathing newspaper editorials that accused Sibley of excessive sympathy for the Dakota due to his extensive personal and business ties with them.
After repeated pleas from Governor Ramsey, the U.S. government started to take the conflict in Minnesota more seriously. On September 6, 1862, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton created the new Military Department of the Northwest and appointed General John Pope to command it; Pope himself finally reached Minnesota on September 16. Stanton told Pope to "employ whatever force may be necessary" to defeat the Dakota. Pope, anxious to vindicate himself following his defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run, proceeded to put pressure on Sibley to move forcefully against the Dakota, but struggled to secure more troops to support the war effort.
The new recruits that Sibley had managed to organize were woefully lacking in experience, and he faced shortage of food, guns, ammunition and clothing. Many of these supplies finally reached Sibley's forces between September 11 and 14. On September 19, after two days of heavy rain, Sibley left Fort Ridgely with his entire command as they began their march up the Minnesota River valley. Estimates of the size of his command at this time range from 1,450 to 1,619 men.
By the time Sibley and his troops had reached Lone Tree Lake on September 22, they were running very low on food. Famished, it was no wonder that several members of the "unruly" 3rd Minnesota Infantry Regiment were tempted to forage for potatoes at the Upper Sioux Agency on the morning on September 23, unwittingly triggering what came to be known as the Battle of Wood Lake.
Communication between Sibley and Little Crow
After the Battle of Birch Coulee, Colonel Sibley had left a message for Little Crow in a cigar box attached to a stake in the battleground, opening a dialogue between the two camps.
In a letter written for him by Antoine Joseph Campbell around September 10, Little Crow hinted to Sibley that he might be willing to negotiate the release of the "one hundred and fifty-five prisoners" whom they had treated "just as well as us." His letter ended with a question: "I want to know from you as a friend, what way that I can make peace for my people?"
Although the safety of the prisoners was paramount to him, Sibley refused to negotiate with Little Crow. Based on intelligence shared by the "mixed blood" messengers who had delivered Little Crow's letters, Sibley understood that many Dakota were increasingly disillusioned with Little Crow, that some of his own warriors had plotted to kill him, and that the divisions among the Dakota would likely work to his advantage.
Unbeknownst to Little Crow, a few Mdewakanton chiefs including Wabasha, Wakute and Taopi had managed to smuggle a separate letter to Sibley, voicing their opposition to the war and offering their assistance. Sibley responded by assuring the chiefs: "I have not come into this upper country to injure any innocent person...but to punish those who have committed cruel murders upon innocent men, women and children."
With Sibley unwilling to open talks unless he released the prisoners, Little Crow became increasingly aware that he was running out of options.
Dakota war council
Little Crow (Taoyateduta) received word that Sibley's troops had reached the Lower Sioux Agency and would reach the area below Yellow Medicine around September 21. Runners were reporting Sibley's movements every few hours.
On the morning of September 22, Little Crow's soldiers' lodge ordered all able-bodied men to march south to the Yellow Medicine River. Little Crow's camp crier announced rewards for anyone bringing back the scalps of Sibley, Joseph R. Brown, William H. Forbes, Louis Robert or Nathan Myrick, or the American flag. While hundreds of soldiers marched willingly, many more went because they felt under duress from the soldiers' lodge headed by Cut Nose (Marpiya Okinajin); they were also joined by a contingent from the "friendly" Dakota camp who sought to prevent a surprise attack on Sibley's army.
A total of 738 men were counted when they reached a point a few miles from Lone Tree Lake, where they had learned that Sibley's army had set up camp.
A council was held to discuss the plan of attack. Little Crow sought to motivate the warriors by saying, "We are many and strong. This plan will not only secure for us an easy victory but lots of plunder, especially provisions. Remember the starving ones at home." He proceeded to argue that Sibley's army could be taken easily if they surrounded the camp under the cover of darkness and stated, "I have just been to the edge of the bluff and looked over and saw to my astonishment but a few tipis there; only five officers' tents."
However, Gabriel Renville (Tiwakan) and Solomon Two Stars, two leaders from the "friendly" Dakota camp who had refused to participate in previous battles, argued vehemently against the plan. Renville said that he had been up to the same bluff and that there were far more troops than Little Crow had said. He pointed out that Sibley's army had "spy-glasses" and had probably already seen them, and were ready with their big guns. Two Stars ridiculed Little Crow's plan and said it was cowardly, "so cowardly as to be unworthy of a Dakota brave and of the great chief who proposed it." He also said that attacking at night would mean they would not have the support of the "friendlies": "I do not think your attack is a good one, because if the attack is made at night, only part of us will go, and many will not go. Your plan would therefore fail." Renville and Two Stars deliberately prolonged the debate, trying to delay the attack until morning, when they would have a better chance of warning Sibley's troops.
The leaders of Little Crow's soldiers' lodge struggled to arrive at a consensus. However, Solomon Two Stars had suggested that it was better to attack Sibley's soldiers from close range when they were marching, as it was a battle tactic that had worked well for the Tetons (Lakota). One of the leaders of the fight, Rattling Runner (Rdainyanka), son-in-law of Chief Wabasha, agreed that this was the best plan and said that they should "lie still" that night and attack at daylight. Strung out along the road, the troops would be in a long, poorly defended column as they marched. Upon learning that Sibley's troops had thrown up breastworks to fortify the campsite, the leaders of the "hostile" Dakota soldiers' lodge finally agreed that it was unsafe to attack them at the lake at night, and developed a plan to attack the troops on the road early in the morning.
Battle
Campsite at Lone Tree Lake
On September 22, Colonel Sibley's troops had camped east of Lone Tree or Battle Lake, a small lake drained by a creek running northeast to the Minnesota River, about five miles north of what is now Echo, Minnesota. (Historians have concluded that "the battle was simply named for the largest lake in the vicinity," Wood Lake, which is about three miles southwest of the battle site. In his narrative of the war, Big Eagle suggested that the reason for the battle being "misnamed" was that the old Dakota name for Lone Tree Lake had been "M'da-chan," meaning "Wood Lake".)
The 3rd Minnesota Infantry Regiment camped along the crest south of the creek, and the 6th Minnesota was next to the small lake to the left. The 7th Minnesota was at the right rear behind the creek's ravine. All units and the wagon train and artillery were partially enclosed by trenches.
Sibley planned to meet Little Crow's forces further north, in the open plains above the Yellow Medicine River, where he believed his better equipped forces with their rifled muskets and artillery with exploding shells would have an advantage against the Dakota with their double-barreled shotguns. His plan for the following day was to "cross the wooded Yellow Medicine River valley and go to the ruined Upper Sioux Agency using the Government Road."
Dakota battle plan and positions
The Dakota battle plan was to attack Sibley's troops as they were marching a mile or more to the northwest of the lake, along the road leading to the Upper Sioux Agency.
Big Eagle (Wambditanka) later explained: "At the point determined on we planned to hide a large number of men on the side of the road. Near the lake, in a ravine formed by the outlet, we were to place another strong body. Behind a hill to the west were to be some more men. We thought that when Sibley marched out along the road, and when the head of his column had reached the farther end of the line of our first division, our men would open fire. The men in the ravine would then be in the rear of the whites and would begin firing on that end of the column. The men from behind the hill would rush out and attack the flank, and then we had horsemen far out on the right and left who would come up. We expected to throw the whole white force into confusion by the sudden and unexpected attack, and defeat them before they could rally. I think this was a good plan of battle... We felt this would be the deciding fight of the war."
On the night of September 22, Little Crow and the Dakota chiefs carefully moved their soldiers into position, often with a clear view of Sibley's troops, who were unaware of their presence. Big Eagle recalled, "We could hear them laughing and singing."
Big Eagle was confident that the plan would work: "Our concealed men would not have been discovered. The grass was tall, and the place by the road and the ravine were good hiding places. We had learned that Sibley was not particular about sending out scouts and examining the country before he passed it. He had a number of mounted men, but they always rode together, at the head of the column, when on a march, and did not examine the ground at the sides of the road."
Once the preparations were complete, Little Crow, Big Eagle and the other chiefs went to the hill to the west so they would have a better view of the fighting. Meanwhile, Dakota fighters lay in the grass along the side of the road with tufts of grass woven into their headdresses for disguise, waiting patiently for daybreak.
Third Minnesota Infantry Regiment
The "wild card" among Sibley's troops was the 3rd Minnesota Infantry Regiment. The 270 men of the 3rd Minnesota in his command had suffered an embarrassing defeat by the Confederates in the First Battle of Murfreesboro, Tennessee, on July 13, 1862, when Colonel Henry C. Lester had decided to surrender instead of going to the aid of one of their detachments which had been attacked. The vast majority of the regiment disagreed with the surrender. The 3rd Minnesota was then sent to St. Louis, Missouri to be paroled; the regiment was part of a formal prisoner exchange on August 27, 1862, and was sent back to Minnesota.
With the outbreak of the Dakota War, the men of the 3rd Minnesota saw an opportunity to prove themselves, and Colonel Sibley had high hopes for his experienced Civil War veterans. However, the 3rd Minnesota had lost most of their officers who were still held prisoner by the Confederates, except for Lieutenant Rollin C. Olin. Upon reaching Fort Snelling, Major Abraham E. Welch, formerly of the 1st Minnesota Infantry Regiment, had been assigned as their commander.