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part of World War II
The Battle of Vevi (or Veve, Greek: Μάχη της Bεύης), in Greece, also known as the Battle of the Klidi Pass, was part of the Greek campaign of World War II. It took place on 11–12 April 1941, north of the town of Amyntaion, close to the northwestern Greek border. Allied troops fought forces from Nazi Germany.
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The Battle of Vevi (or Veve, Greek: Μάχη της Bεύης), in Greece, also known as the Battle of the Klidi Pass, was part of the Greek campaign of World War II. It took place on 11–12 April 1941, north of the town of Amyntaion, close to the northwestern Greek border. Allied troops fought forces from Nazi Germany.
German forces invaded Greece and southern Yugoslavia from Bulgaria in the first week of April 1941. Following the collapse of resistance in Yugoslavia, the left flank of the Vermion line held by Greek and British Empire forces became exposed. A new plan intended that Imperial British forces would hold off Germans forces in western Macedonia, until non-motorised Greek infantry units had withdrawn on foot from Mount Vermion to Mount Siniatsiko, and a new defensive line had been formed between Mount Olympus and the Aliakmon River.
On the morning of 10 April, the German XL Panzer Corps advanced from Monastir to seize the Greek city of Florina, 13 km (8.1 mi) south of the Yugoslav border, utilising the Monastir Valley (or Monastir Gap). Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH), a brigade group-level unit commanded by Oberstgruppenführer Josef "Sepp" Dietrich and accompanied by 9th Panzer Division, advanced further south and occupied the town of Vevi on 11 April. The German 73rd Infantry Division followed behind LSSAH and attacked to the west, to widen the front of the German breakthrough. Confronting the Greek Cavalry Division in an action at Pisoderi Pass, the 73rd failed to make any progress.
A mixed Australian-British-New Zealand-Greek formation – known as Mackay Force – was hastily assembled. Its task, in the words of the British Empire's commander in Greece, General H. Maitland Wilson, was to "stop a blitzkrieg down the Florina Valley." The force was named after its commander, the Australian Major General Iven Mackay, who deployed his headquarters in Perdika.
The Klidi Pass (Kirli Derven) – which links the towns of Vevi and Klidi to the south – is 100–500 m (110–550 yd) wide, a winding defile, with steep, rocky and treeless sides up to 1,000 m (3,300 ft) high.
During April 1941, conditions at the top of the pass were "bitterly cold"; rain turning into snowstorms. These hindered the ability of the Allied infantry to sleep, especially the Australians and New Zealanders – who were tired after a long and sudden journey from North Africa, and were not experienced in or equipped for wintry, mountain conditions.
Mackay Force was deployed in two sub-sectors: Greek forces around the town of Kelli, 10 km (6.2 mi) east of the pass and British Empire forces at the pass (Kirli Derven) itself.
The British Empire's units occupying Kirli Derven itself were predominantly Brigadier George Vasey's Australian 19th Infantry Brigade: the 2/4th (minus one company) and 2/8th Battalions, complemented by the British 9th Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps (also known as the 1st Rangers). The infantry were supported by parts of the New Zealand 27th (Machine Gun) Battalion, the Australian 2/1st Anti-Tank Regiment, the British 2nd Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery and other smaller elements of Australian and British artillery units. Vasey's headquarters were located a substantial distance away, approximately 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) south of the town of Klidi.
Around the pass, Vasey's three infantry battalions were spread across a 16 km (9.9 mi)-wide front: the 2/8th was on the ridge to the east of the pass, the 1st Rangers was on a north-facing spur on the western side, and the 2/4th was to the west of the Rangers, on Golema Glava height 1,001 m (3,284 ft)). New Zealand machine gunners were distributed among the infantry. Australian and British artillery units were concentrated in the pass itself.
The Kelli sub-sector was covered by a Greek brigade-level force, primarily the Dodecanese Regiment (three battalions totaling 3,500 personnel), which was reinforced by the Greek X Border Sector (500 personnel), three Greek artillery batteries (one mountain artillery, one field artillery and one anti-tank artillery battery equipped with 75 mm (2.95 in) field guns), one sapper (engineer) company and one machine gun company. The total strength of the Greek force – under Colonel Sergios Aristotelis – was about 5,000 personnel and 15 guns. The 3rd Battalion, Dodecanese Regiment (III/Dod.) was deployed on the right flank of the British Empire' units, on Delinski Dol heights 1,200 m (3,900 ft)), followed by I/Dod., II/Dod. and X Border Sector to the far right. Two 75mm guns were deployed in the antitank role between III/Dod. and I/Dod., controlling the road that passed through the village of Kelli.
Immediately west of Mackay Force and covering its left flank, across Radosi heights (Mala Reka ridge), were the 350 personnel of the Greek I/88 (1st Battalion, 88th Regiment; 21st Brigade), part of the Greek Cavalry Division.
The German forces detailed for the attack on Klidi Pass belonged to the 9th Panzer Division and LSSAH. During the rapid advance through south Yugoslavia, 9th Panzer had formed a Vorausabteilung Appell (Vor.Abt. Apell; "advance guard formation") under the commander of the 9th Motorised Infantry Brigade (Schützen-Brigade), Oberst Wilhelm von Apell, which crossed into Greece together with the LSSAH. The action would also be supported by artillery from XL Corps' assets.
The Vor.Abt. Apell, on the right flank, consisted of the following units:
From XL Corps' assets, II./37 Schwere-Artillerie-Battalion (2/37th Heavy Artillery Battalion) – with 12 150 mm guns – along with a battery from the 29th Observation Battalion, had the mission of counter-battery fire.
LSSAH placed its battalions as follows: on the right the reinforced I./LSSAH: Kampfgruppe Witt (KG Witt) was to attack Vevi Pass frontally, and on the left the reinforced III./LSSAH would attack the recognised Schwerpunkt (focal point) of the battle, to achieve a breakthrough from Kelli toward Amyntaio. Battalion II./LSSAH, minus its 7th and 8th Companies,) would stay in Florina as a reserve securing the area from south and west. The reconnaissance group (under Kurt Meyer) was initially ordered to link up with 2nd Panzer Division near Edessa, although this plan later changed, so that the reconnaissance group would pursue the Allies toward Sotir after the pass was opened. To support KG Witt, V./LSSAH (a "Heavy Battalion") detached 15 tracked self-propelled artillery pieces, comprising its battery of six Sturmgeschütz III (StuG III) assault guns (75 mm) and its Panzerjäger company of nine Pz.Jg. I (47 mm gun). The LSSAH pioneer battalion would stand behind KG Witt waiting for orders (ie. to clear mines and repair damage on the road). One light howitzer battery would provide direct support to III./LSSAH, and a heavy howitzer battery to KG Witt. The LSSAH artillery regiment, minus an 88 mm Flak battery, would coordinate its actions with KG Witt. Sturmbannführer Fritz Witt led KG Witt, which was composed of:
The dividing line between LSSAH and Vor.Abt. Apell was about two kilometres west of the Niki-Vevi-Klidi road and parallel to it. The missions assigned to them were: the LSSAH was to open the pass, while the Vor.Abt. Apell would move (after the LSSAH attack) from the area of Flambouron toward Aetos and Xino Nero (Eksisou), and the rear of the forces defending the pass.
On the Dodecanese Regiment's front at midnight (10/11 April), the Germans attempted reconnaissance patrols and probing attacks against Glava Hill, but were repelled after a two-hour battle. The Germans repeated these actions at 14:00 against Delinski Dol but were also warded off.
The Waffen-SS did not probe the British Empire's front until the afternoon of 11 April. This included an encounter with Australian artillery positions on the main road; Captain Gordon Laybourne Smith of the 2/3rd Field Regiment later commented that the German commander had sent: "In all his insolence ... trucks down the main road ... to within 3,000 yards [~2,750 metres] of our infantry, and proceeded to debus [i.e. disembark]. At first I could not believe it was an enemy, all had been so still and quiet. Then came some sense. My orders flew over the wire and the first rounds screamed through the air... A few furious moments and back went the Hun [a derogatory term for Germans], but five trucks stayed in the road as silent witness that my troop could shoot". More prolonged skirmishes were directed at the positions of the 2/8th Battalion. These became more aggressive as night closed in. In the words of the Australian War Memorial: "[d]espite being strung out and exhausted from a long march to the position and bitterly cold weather, the 2/8th managed to fend them off."
By the morning of 12 April, fresh snow over 30 cm (11.8 in) deep lay on the hillsides. By dawn, many of the Australians and New Zealanders stationed in the Hills were suffering from frostbite and were unable to operate their weapons effectively. However, orders had now been issued for an orderly withdrawal to the Aliakmon line, to begin that evening.
At 08:30 on 12 April (09:00 according to one German source), the main German attack was launched.). Without artillery preparation, the 1st Company of LSSAH, acting as the vanguard of KG Witt on its left flank, attacked the key Hill 997, which was occupied by a company of the 2/8th Battalion, under Captain Bill Robertson. After hard close fighting, by 11:00 they had captured the Hill, having in the process overrun an Australian platoon of which only six men survived. At 12.30 the 7th KG Witt' company extended the attack toward Hill 917 which it captured after strong resistance by 14:00. The Hill was defended by an Australian company under Captain Coombes at the far left of 2/8th's sector, near where it adjoined the 1st Rangers.
According to the Australian official history, at 11:00 the 1st Rangers – possibly believing that the 2/8th was retreating – began to withdraw. This opened the pass itself to the Germans, created a gap between the 2/4th and 2/8th Battalions, severed communications between Vasey and the 2/8th and left Australian anti-tank guns without infantry protection. To the west of the battlefield, the Greek 21st Infantry Brigade reported at 12:00 that it had lost contact with the Australian 2/4 Battalion. At 13:00, the Dodecanese Regiment reported that the Australians of the 2/8th Battalion were retreating, although the Regiment itself had taken no such order yet. The two companies of the 2/8th Battalion on the western flank (Coombes' and Robertson's), were forced to retreat up the slopes.
However, in the words of Australian official historian Gavin Long: "At 2:00 pm ... Lt.-Col. [John] Mitchell of the 2/8th ... ordered a counter-attack which regained some vital ground on top of the ridge... After six hours of intermittent fighting in the pass and on the slopes to the east, the 2/8th still held the Hills though their left had been mauled; the Rangers, however, were rallying astride the road about two miles to the rear, but five of the six supporting guns of the 2/1st Anti-Tank Regiment had been left without protection and abandoned. Thus the ridge held by the 2/8th formed a deep salient."
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