Trận đánh
1879 last major battle of the Anglo-Zulu War
The Battle of Ulundi (also known as the Battle of kwaNodwengu or the Battle of oCwecweni) took place at the Zulu capital of Ulundi (Zulu: oNdini) on 4 July 1879 and was the last battle of the Anglo-Zulu War. The British Army broke the military power of the Zulu Kingdom by defeating the main Zulu army and capturing and burning the royal kraal of oNdini.
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The Battle of Ulundi (also known as the Battle of kwaNodwengu or the Battle of oCwecweni) took place at the Zulu capital of Ulundi (Zulu: oNdini) on 4 July 1879 and was the last battle of the Anglo-Zulu War. The British Army broke the military power of the Zulu Kingdom by defeating the main Zulu army and capturing and burning the royal kraal of oNdini.
After the Zulu victory at the battle of Isandlwana in January over Lord Chelmsford's main column and the failure of the first invasion of Zululand, the British launched a new invasion. In April 1879, despite the Battle of Kambula and the Battle of Gingindlovu, that had been costly defeats for the Zulus, the British were back at their starting point. News of the defeat at Isandlwana had hit Britain hard and a flood of reinforcements had arrived in Natal, with which Chelmsford prepared a second invasion of Zululand. Chelmsford was aware by mid-June that Sir Garnet Wolseley had superseded his command of the British forces. Chelmsford was ordered by Her Majesty's Government to "... submit and subordinate your plans to his control". Chelmsford ignored this and various peace offers from Cetshwayo to strike while the Zulu were recovering from their defeats and to attempt to regain his reputation before Wolseley could remove him from command of the army.
... everyone understood that he would try and end the war before he was superseded ... that 'poor Lord Chelmsford' might get a chance, win a battle ...
Cetshwayo's translator, Cornelius Vijn, a Dutch trader he had imprisoned at the start of the war, informed Chelmsford through the peace offers of gathering Zulu forces.
For his renewed offensive Chelmsford's strength was increased to 25,000. The very size of the force overwhelmed the supply and transport capacity of Natal and Chelmsford would have to use a number of troops that could be sustained in the field. For his main column, he fielded two cavalry regiments, five batteries of artillery and 12 infantry battalions, amounting to 1,000 regular cavalry, 9,000 regular infantry and a further 7,000 men with 24 guns, including the first British Army Gatling gun battery. The supply train consisted of 600 wagons, 8,000 oxen and 1,000 mules. The structure of the force was reorganised; No. 4 column (Colonel Evelyn Wood) became the flying column, Colonel Charles Pearson was relieved of command by Major General Henry Crealock and his No.1 column became the 1st Division and Major General Newdigate was given command of the new 2nd Division, accompanied by Chelmsford.
All through April and May there was much manoeuvring by the British, particularly with supply and transport. On 3 June, the main thrust of the second invasion began its slow advance on Ulundi. The correspondent of The Times wrote, "We are wandering towards Ulundi much as the Children of Israel wandered towards Canaan ... ". The 1st Division was to advance along the coast, supporting the 2nd Division, which with Wood's flying column, an independent unit, was to march on Ulundi from Rorke's Drift and Kambula. With his army damaged after Kambula, King Cetshwayo refrained from attacking the extended and vulnerable supply convoys and the British advance was unopposed.
On the evening of 6 June, jittery British troops and artillery in laager at Fort Newdigate, opened fire on an arriving piquet company of Royal Engineers commanded by Lieutenant John Chard of Rorke's Drift fame, killing two horses and wounding one. By 16 June the slow advance was quickened by the news that Wolseley was on his way to Natal to take command. It " ... acted as the "spur to the head" which expedited Lord Chelmsford's movements." On 17 June a depot named 'Fort Marshall' was established – not far from Isandlhwana. On 28 June Chelmsford's column was 17 mi (27 km) away from Ulundi and had established the supply depots of 'Fort Newdigate', 'Fort Napoleon' and 'Port Durnford' when Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived in Cape Town. Wolseley had cabled Chelmsford ordering him not to undertake any serious actions on 23 June but the message was only received through a galloper on this day. Chelmsford had no intention of letting Wolseley stop him from making a last effort to restore his reputation and did not reply. A second message was sent on 30 June reading:
Concentrate your force immediately and keep it concentrated. Undertake no serious operations with detached bodies of troops. Acknowledge receipt of this message at once and flash back your latest moves. I am astonished at not hearing from you.
Wolseley, straining to assert command over Chelmsford, tried to join the 1st Division, lagging along the coast behind the main advance. A final message was sent to Chelmsford explaining that he would be joining the 1st Division and that their location was where Chelmsford should retreat if he was compelled. High seas prevented Wolseley landing at Port Durnford and he had to take the road. As Wolseley rode north from Durban, Chelmsford was preparing for battle. Wolseley's efforts to reach the front had been in vain.
On the same day the first cable was received, Cetshwayo's representatives again appeared. A previous reply to Chelmsford's demands had apparently not reached the British force, but now these envoys bore some of what the British commander had demanded – oxen, a promise of guns and a gift of elephant tusks. The peace was rejected as the terms had not been fully met and Chelmsford turned the envoys away without accepting the elephant tusks and informed them that the advance would only be delayed one day to allow the Zulus to surrender one regiment of their army. The redcoats were now visible from the Royal Kraal and a dismayed Cetshwayo was desperate to end the hostilities. With the enemy in sight, he knew no Zulu regiment would surrender so Cetshwayo sent a further hundred white oxen from his herd along with Prince Napoleon's sword, which the Zulu had taken 1 June 1879 in the skirmish in which the Prince had been killed. The Zulu umCijo regiment, guarding the approaches to the White Umfolozi River where the British were camped, refused to let the oxen pass, deeming it a useless gesture, seeing as it was impossible to meet all Chelmsford's demands, fighting was inevitable. The irate telegram from Wolseley issued on 30 June now reached Chelmsford, and with only 5 mi (8.0 km) between him and a redemptive victory, it was ignored.
Commanding Officer; Colonel Richard Glyn.
Commanding Officer: Colonel William Collingwood.
Commanding Officer: Major General Frederick Marshall.
Commanding Officer: Brigadier General Sir Evelyn Wood.
Accompanied by Royal Engineers, Royal Artillery, Army Service Corps, 2nd Battalion Natal Native Contingent, Army Medical Department, and Natal Native Pioneer Corps.
On 3 July, with negotiations having broken down, Colonel Redvers Buller led a cavalry force across the river to reconnoitre the ground beyond. A party of Zulus were seen herding goats near the Mbilane stream and troopers moved to round them up. On a hunch, Buller bellowed an order for them to stop and prepare to fire from the saddle. His instinct proved right, for 3,000 Zulus rose from the long grass at that moment and fired a fusillade, before charging forth. Three troopers were shot dead and Buller ordered his men to retire. As they dashed back to the river, Baker's Horse who had been scouting further across, took up position and gave covering fire for the river crossing. Their crossing in turn was covered by the Transvaal Rangers on the opposite bank. This incident had placed the entire reconnaissance in grave danger, but Buller's alertness and leadership saved them from annihilation. Chelmsford was now convinced the Zulus wanted to fight and replied to Wolseley's third message, informing him that he would indeed retreat to the 1st Division if the need arose and that he would be attacking the Zulus the next day.
That evening Chelmsford issued his orders. The British, having learned a bitter lesson at Isandlwana, would take no chances meeting the Zulu army in the open with their normal line of battle. Their advance would begin at first light, prior to forming his infantry into a large hollow square, with mounted troops covering the sides and rear. Neither wagon laagers nor trenches would be used, to convince both the Zulus and critics that a British square could "beat them fairly in the open".
At 6:00 a.m., Buller led out an advance guard of mounted troops and South African irregulars, which after Buller had secured an upper drift (river crossing at a ford), was followed by the infantry, led by the experienced Flying Column battalions. By 7:30 a.m. the column had cleared the rough ground on the other side of the riverbank and their square (in reality a rectangular shape) was formed. At 8:45 a.m.the Zulu engaged the cavalry on the right and left which slowly retired and passed into the square. The leading face was made up of five companies of the 80th Regiment in four ranks, with two Gatling guns in the centres, two 9-pounders on the left flank and two 7-pounders on the right. The 90th Light Infantry with four companies of the 94th Regiment made up the left face with two more 7-pounders. On the right face were the 1st Battalion of the 13th Light Infantry, four companies of the 58th Regiment, two 7-pounders and two 9-pounders. The rear face was composed of two companies of the 94th Regiment, two companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 21st Regiment (Royal Scots Fusiliers). Within the square were headquarters staff, No. 5 Company of the Royal Engineers led by Lieutenant Chard, the 2nd Natal Native Contingent, fifty wagons and carts with reserve ammunition and hospital wagons. Buller's horsemen protected the front and both flanks of the square. A rearguard of two squadrons of the 17th Lancers and a troop of Natal Native Horse followed.
Battalions with Regimental Colours uncased them; the band of the 13th Light Infantry struck up and the 5,317-man strong 'living laager' began its measured advance across the plain. No Zulus in any numbers had been sighted by 8:00 a.m., so the Frontier Light Horse were sent forth to provoke the Zulu. As they rode across the Mbilane stream, the Zulu inGobamkhosi regiment rose out of the grass in front of them, followed by regiment after regiment rising up all around them. The Zulu Army under the command of umNtwana Ziwedu kaMpande - around 12,000 to 15,000 strong, now stood in a horseshoe shape encircling the north, east and southern sides of the square. A Zulu reserve force was also poised to complete the circle. The Zulu ranks stood hammering the ground with their feet and drumming their shields with their assegais. They were made up of veterans and novices with varying degrees of confidence. The mounted troops by the stream opened fire from the saddle to trigger a premature charge before wheeling back to gallop through the gaps made in the infantry lines for them. As the cavalry cleared their front at about 9:00 a.m., the four ranks of the infantry with the front two kneeling, opened fire at 2,000 yd (1,800 m) into the advancing Zulu ranks. The pace of the advance quickened and the range closed between the British lines and the Zulus. The British were ready and the Zulu troops faced concentrated fire. Zulu regiments had to charge forward directly into massed rifle fire, non-stop fire from the Gatling guns and the artillery firing canister shot at point-blank range.
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