The Battle of the Menin Road Ridge, sometimes called "Battle of the Menin Road", was the third British general attack of the Third Battle of Ypres in the First World War. The battle took place from 20 to 25 September 1917, in the Ypres Salient in Belgium on the Western Front. During the pause in British and French general attacks from late August to 20 September, the British changed some infantry tactics, adopting the leap-frog method of advance.
Waves of infantry stopped once they reached their objective and consolidated the ground, while supporting waves passed through the objective to attack the next one and the earlier waves became the tactical reserve. General adoption of the method was made possible when more artillery was brought into the salient, by increasing the number of aircraft involved in close air support and by the Royal Flying Corps giving the tasks of air defence, contact-patrol, counter-attack patrol, artillery observation and ground-attack to particular aircraft.
In early September, optimism increased among German commanders that the Flanders offensive had been defeated and several divisions and air units were transferred elsewhere. Drier weather and extensive road repairs made it much easier for the British to move vast amounts of supplies forward from the original front line. Visibility increased except for frequent ground fog around dawn, which helped conceal British infantry during the attack, before clearing to expose German preparations for counter-attacks to British observation and attack.
The British infantry succeeded in capturing most of their objectives and then holding them against German counter-attacks, inflicting many casualties on the German defenders and Eingreifdivisionen, sent to reinforce them, by massed artillery and small-arms fire. German defences on the Gheluvelt Plateau, which had been retained or quickly recaptured in July and August were lost and the British began a run of success which lasted into early October.
Background
Strategic background
The Kerensky Offensive by Russia in July had accelerated the disintegration of the Russian Army, increasing the prospect of substantial German reinforcements for the Western Front. The French attack at Verdun in August had inflicted a defeat on the German 5th Army similar in extent to the defeat of the 4th Army in the Battle of Messines in June but morale in the French army was still poor. In reports to the War Cabinet on 21 August and 2 September, Sir Douglas Haig repeated his view that the British campaign at Ypres was necessary to shield the other armies of the alliance, regardless of the slow geographical progress being made in the unusually wet weather of August.
Tactical developments
The German 4th Army had defeated British attacks on the black and green (second and third) lines set for 31 July, in the centre and on the Gheluvelt Plateau on the southern flank of the battlefield during the frequent weather interruptions in August. These defensive successes had been costly and by mid-August, German satisfaction at their achievements was accompanied by concern at the extent of the casualties. The rain, constant bombardments and British air attacks had also put great strain on the German defenders between British attacks. After 31 July, Gough had ceased attempts to exploit opportunities created by Fifth Army attacks and began a process of tactical revision, which with the better weather in September, inflicted several costly defeats on the Germans.
The capture of the green line from the southern flank of XIX Corps to the northern flank of XIV Corps, required an advance of 2,500–3,500 yd (1.4–2.0 mi; 2.3–3.2 km). An advance of 5,000 yd (2.8 mi; 4.6 km) to the red line was not fundamental to the plan and discretion to attempt advances towards it was left with the divisional commanders, based on the extent of local German resistance, in accordance with the manual SS 135 (December 1916), which laid down the means by which divisions would organise attacks. Had the German defence collapsed and the red line been reached, the Fifth Army would still have to attack Flandern I-, II- and III- stellungen except for Flandern I Stellung for a mile south of Broodseinde. On 10 August, II Corps attacked to reach the black line of 31 July, an advance of 400–900 yd (370–820 m) and at the Battle of Langemarck on 16 August, the Fifth Army objective was the green line 1,500 yd (1,400 m) distant.
II Corps had been ordered to capture the rest of the black line on 2 August. The three corps of the Fifth Army to the north were then to complete the capture of their part of the green line on 4 August, while XIV Corps and the French First Army crossed the Steenbeek on the left flank. The unusually wet weather caused the attacks to be postponed until 10 August and 16–18 August, the Battle of Langemarck. Some objectives were still occupied by the Germans after operations later in the month. Principal responsibility for the offensive was transferred to General Herbert Plumer on 25 August. The Second Army boundary was shifted north into the area vacated by II Corps on the Gheluvelt plateau. Haig put more emphasis on the southern fringe of the plateau, by giving to the Second Army the bulk of the heavy artillery reinforcements moved from Artois.
Prelude
British preparations
The staff of General Headquarters (GHQ) of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) quickly studied the results of the attack of 31 July and on 7 August sent questionnaires to the army headquarters about the new conditions produced by German defence-in-depth. The 4th Army had spread strong points and pillboxes in the areas between their defensive lines and made rapid counter-attacks with local reserves and Eingreif divisions, against Allied penetrations. Plumer issued a preliminary order on 1 September, which defined the Second Army area of operations as Broodseinde and the area southwards. The plan was based on the use of much more medium and heavy artillery, which had been brought to the Gheluvelt Plateau from VIII Corps on the right of the Second Army and by transferring more guns from the Third Army and Fourth Army in Artois and Picardy.
The 112 heavy and 210 field guns and howitzers in the Second Army on 31 July, were increased to 575 heavy and medium and 720 field guns and howitzers. The extra artillery was to destroy German concrete shelters and machine-gun nests, more numerous in German "battle zones", than the "outpost zones" which had been captured in July and August and to engage in more counter-battery fire. The new guns allowed the equivalent to one artillery piece for every 5 ft (1.5 m) of the attack front, more than double the density in the Battle of Pilckem Ridge. Few German concrete pill-boxes and machine gun nests had been destroyed during earlier preparatory bombardments and attempts at precision bombardment between attacks had also failed.
The tactical refinements of the Second Army sought to undermine the German defence by making a shallower penetration and then fighting the principal battle against German counter-attack (Eingreif) divisions. By further reorganising infantry reserves, Plumer ensured that the depth of the attacking divisions roughly corresponded to the depth of local German counter-attack reserves and their Eingreifdivisionen. More infantry was provided for the later stages of the advance to defeat German counter-attacks, by an infantry advance of no more than 1,500 yd (1,400 m) before consolidating. When the Germans counter-attacked they would encounter a British defence-in-depth, protected by artillery and suffer heavy casualties to little effect, rather than the small and disorganised groups of British infantry that the Germans had driven back to the black line on the XIX Corps front on 31 July.
Minor operations
During the lull in early September, both sides tried to improve their positions; on 1 September, a determined German attack at Inverness Copse was repulsed. Further north in the XIX Corps area, a battalion of the 61st (2nd South Midland) Division rushed Hill 35 but only took a small area; another attempt on 3 September failed. Next day, the division attacked Aisne Farm and was repulsed but the neighbouring 58th (2/1st London) Division took Spot Farm. On 5 September, the 61st (2nd South Midland) Division tried again at night, took a German outpost on Hill 35 and then lost it to a counter-attack. An attack from south of Hill 35 by the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division with the 125th Brigade and part of the 127th Brigade took place on 6 September. For several days, practice barrages were conducted and a daylight reconnaissance by a small party probed to within 25 yd (23 m) of Beck House. During the night, the Germans sent up many flares and rockets, disclosing their barrage line and many undetected posts.
The British barrage schedule had required four rounds per-gun-per-minute but the gunners fired up to ten. The 125th Brigade attacked Iberian, Borry and Beck House farms and captured Beck House but small-arms fire from Hill 35 stopped the rest of the attack, which was a costly failure. The Germans retook Beck House at 10.45 a.m. and enfiladed the rest of the attackers, who were withdrawn, except on the extreme right. Another German counter-attack at 7.30 p.m. by fresh storm-troops, forced the battalion to retire, except from a small area 150 yd (140 m) forward, which was abandoned next day; the division suffered c. 800 casualties. Another night attack by the 61st (2nd South Midland) Division on Hill 35 failed and in the XVIII Corps area, a company of the 51st (Highland) Division made an abortive raid on Pheasant Trench.
Two battalions of the 58th (2/1st London) Division conducted raids on 8 September and next day the 24th Division withstood another determined German attack at Inverness Copse. On 11 September, a night attack by a battalion of the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division failed to capture The Hut. A covering party for a group of soldiers working in no man's land, discovered an Inniskilling Fusilier, who had lain wounded since 11 August, subsisting on rations recovered from dead soldiers. On 13 September, the Guards Division was pushed back from the far side of the Broembeek and the Wijdendreft road. Next day a battalion of the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division edged forward 100 yd (91 m) and a battalion of the 58th (2/1st London) Division attacked the Winnipeg pillbox; in the evening a German counter-attack took ground towards Springfield.
On 15 September, covered by a hurricane bombardment, a battalion of the 47th (1/2nd London) Division attacked and captured a strong point near Inverness Copse, fire from which had devastated earlier attacks and took 36 prisoners. A battalion of the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division captured Sans Souci and the 51st (Highland) Division launched a "Chinese" attack using dummies. A day later, a German attack on the strong point renamed Cryer Farm, captured by the 47th (1/2nd London) Division was a costly failure and in the XIV Corps area, another attack was stopped by small-arms fire by the 20th (Light) Division. A party of the Guards Division was cut off near Ney Copse and fought its way out; a lull followed until 20 September.
British plan
Plumer planned to capture Gheluvelt Plateau in four steps at six-day intervals, for time to bring forward artillery and supplies, a faster tempo of operations than that envisaged by Gough before 31 July. Each step was to have even more limited geographical objectives, with infantry units attacking on narrower fronts in greater depth. The practice of attacking the first objective with two battalions and the following objectives with a battalion each was reversed, in view of the greater density of German defences the further the attack penetrated; double the medium and heavy artillery was available than for on 31 July. Reorganisation in this manner had been recommended in a report of 25 August, by the Fifth Army General Officer Commanding RA (GOCRA), Major-General Herbert Uniacke. The evolution in organisation and method was to ensure that more infantry were on tactically advantageous ground, having had time to consolidate and regain contact with their artillery before German counter-attacks.
The British began a "desultory" bombardment on 31 August and also sought to neutralise the German artillery with gas, including gas bombardments on the three evenings before the assault. Aircraft were reserved for systematic counter-attack reconnaissance, to avoid the failures of previous battles, where too few aircraft had been burdened with too many duties, in bad weather. The three-week pause originated from lieutenant-generals Thomas Morland and William Birdwood, the X and I Anzac corps commanders, at a conference of 27 August. The attacking corps made their plans within the framework of the Second Army plan, using General Principles on Which the Artillery Plan Will be Drawn of 29 August, which described the multi-layered creeping barrage and the use of Fuze 106, to avoid adding more craters to the ground. The Second Army and both corps did visibility tests to decide when zero hour should be set; the use of wireless and gun-carrying tanks, were discussed with Plumer on 15 September. X Corps issued its first Instruction on 1 September, giving times and boundaries to its divisions.