The Battle of the Heligoland Bight was the first "named" air battle of the Second World War, which began the longest air campaign of the war on 3 September 1939, the Defence of the Reich. After the declaration of war, RAF Bomber Command began operations against Nazi Germany but limited their attacks to those targets that were purely military and had little risk of civilian casualties. This largely limited their efforts to attacks on the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) warships in German ports to prevent their use in the Battle of the Atlantic.
Early operations led the RAF to conclude that fighter aircraft were not a serious threat against modern bombers. They were also marked by a lack of coordination and minor issues such as bad weather and communication problems that meant none of these early operations were very intense. The RAF implemented changes to ensure more aircraft could be launched more rapidly to make up for these issues.
On 18 December 1939, a force of three squadrons was launched against capital ships anchored in the Wilhelmshaven area. Originally 24 Vickers Wellingtons took off, but two turned back due to engine trouble before reaching German airspace. The German reaction was slow, but eventually between 80 and 120 fighter aircraft were launched, although only 44 made contact with the British bombers. Of the 22 bombers that reached the target area, the Luftwaffe shot down 12, over half the force.
The battle had a huge influence on both sides' strategies. It led the RAF to abandon daylight missions in favour of night bombing as daytime casualties were too high. In contrast, the failure of the raid led the Luftwaffe to believe Germany proper was invulnerable to enemy attack. This belief was reinforced by the success of the Battle of France, which meant that opposing air forces were pushed too far away for effective bombing attacks on the German homeland.
The Germans' neglect of their day fighter force had serious strategic consequences in later years. By the time they began reorganising defences to combat continued RAF raids and also the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) strategic bombing campaign, they were already engaged in a war of attrition for which they were not prepared. This oversight was one of the contributing factors in the defeat of the Luftwaffe in the Defence of the Reich campaign. The Battle of the Heligoland Bight was later described as "amongst the most important actions of the entire war".
Background
RAF strategy
Before the outbreak of war, RAF Bomber Command firmly believed that air power could win wars without the need for naval and land fighting, since "the bomber will always get through." Tightly flown bomber formations with heavy defensive armament were thought capable of warding off enemy fighters even without fighter escort. The RAF lacked a four-engine bomber with adequate defensive protection which could carry heavy bomb loads to German targets. The only possible targets within range of British bombers were those in the industrial region of the Ruhr.
The Netherlands and Belgium wished to remain neutral and refused to allow the RAF to establish bases from which they could fly deeper into Germany. They also forbade overflying by British bombers to and from Germany. After the outbreak of war, the French refused to allow RAF bombers to bomb German cities from French airfields. The French felt secure behind the Maginot Line but their air force did not possess the modern bombers to attack the Luftwaffe. French fighter forces were not yet ready for an all out defensive campaign against the Germans either. A fear of retaliation was the main French reason. The only recourse was to fly missions directly from Britain and only ports or coastal cities in northern Germany were within easy reach. This state of affairs suited the British, in particular, the Admiralty.
The most immediate threat to the Allies during the Phoney War period was the U-boat. Some German submarines had been sent to sea before the British declaration of war. Once war was declared, the U-boats began operations against British ships that were bringing in supplies from North America and areas of the British Empire. German submarine U-47 sank the battleship HMS Royal Oak at Scapa Flow in October 1939, with the loss of 786 crew. As a consequence the Admiralty pressed for the RAF to concentrate its efforts on RAF Coastal Command rather than a strategic bomber force. This was debated within the British establishment well into 1941. To avoid the bombing of civilian targets, the British formulated the Western Air Plan 7B (WAP 7B), which planned for attacks on German warships. German ships were legitimate targets and, at sea or in port, were far enough away from civilian areas to avoid unnecessary casualties. The Plan revolved around their elimination to prevent their use as supplements to the U-boat fleet.
3 September – 17 December
To fit in with this strategy, the initial plans of the RAF involved raids against German shipping on receipt of the results of aerial reconnaissance. This was attempted on 3 September, when a Bristol Blenheim (flown by Flying Officer Andrew McPherson of No. 139 Squadron RAF)—on a reconnaissance flight over the North Sea—spotted a large naval force in the Schillig Roads off Wilhelmshaven. The radio failed and an attack could not be launched until McPherson returned to base, when 15 Handley Page Hampdens and nine Vickers Wellington bombers were sent against the German ships. The weather was poor and the bombers failed to find any targets.
A similar attempt was made on 4 September, when McPherson again spotted warships off Brunsbüttel, Wilhelmshaven and in the Schillig Roads. The radio failed again and no attack could be launched until McPherson's return. A force of 10 Blenheims from No. 110 Squadron RAF and No. 107 Squadron RAF along with five more from No. 139 Squadron and eight Wellingtons of No. 149 Squadron RAF took off to locate the German warships Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Admiral Scheer, which some aircraft found. No. 149 Squadron was not prepared for war. At least one of the crews—Flying Officer (F/O) Bill McRae—nearly took off without a bomb load; looking in, he noticed the bomb bay was empty. On the way to the target, Squadron Leader Paul Harris ordered his gunners to test their weapons. They all failed and he was heading into German territory defenceless. Not wanting to turn back on his first raid, he pressed ahead.
The same targets were attacked by 9 Squadron later in the day, in and around Brunsbüttel. Results were poor with five Blenheims and two Wellingtons lost and only minimal damage caused to the German warships. Admiral Scheer was hit by three bombs that failed to explode, while the light cruiser Emden—not one of the priority targets—was present and also damaged by a Blenheim that crashed into the forecastle of the ship. The crash killed 11 sailors and injured 30. One Wellington bomber accidentally strayed over Danish territory and dropped five bombs on the town of Esbjerg, mistaking it for Brunsbüttel; one bomb hit an apartment block, killing one and wounding seven. The accidental bombing led to false rumors that British forces had occupied Southern Jutland.
II./Jagdgeschwader 77 (II. Gruppe of JG 77; II Wing, Fighter Group 77, Oberstleutnant Carl-August Schumacher) took off from Nordholz Airbase and intercepted 9 Squadron. Feldwebels Hans Troitzsch and Alfred Held each claimed a victory and Leutnant Metz another. These aircraft from No. 9 Squadron were the first RAF aircraft to be shot down by enemy fighters during the war and Troitzsch was most likely to have been the first enemy pilot to shoot one down. Another four Blenheims of No. 107 Squadron were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. The Germans believed their air defences had established an effective defence from Allied attack. Use of the early Freya radar had given the German fighters eight minutes warning of their approach.
The delay between spotting German warships and the arrival of the bombers was considered to be too great, and it was decided to carry out reconnaissance in force, with formations of bombers being sent out over the North Sea to find and attack German warships. Their orders forbade them from attacking ships in port, infringing neutral airspace or even attacking German warships escorting merchant ships. A patrol on 29 September resulted in five Hampdens being shot down by Messerschmitt Bf 109s of II./JG 77 but an attack by 24 Wellingtons of 149, 38 and 115 squadrons on 3 December was more successful, claiming a German minesweeper sunk (confirmed as "M1407" by German archives, sunk by an unexploded bomb passing through the ship), while defensive fire from the Wellington gunners repelled attacks by German fighters, shooting one down for no loss. The German pilot shot down was future German ace Günther Specht. He was shot down by Corporal Copley of No. 38 Squadron RAF.. A German report stated the attack was cleverly executed from out of the sun and delivered to avoid the nearby civilian areas.
An armed reconnaissance by twelve Wellingtons on 14 December resulted in six being lost as the formation, at very low level because of the low cloud base, was engaged by fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guns. The RAF believed that none of the lost Wellingtons had been shot down by fighters and so maintained faith in their defensive capabilities when flown in tight formations. This summation was odd considering that several of the surviving bombers had damage from small calibre weapons such as those found on Messerschmitt fighter aircraft. The Luftwaffe claimed five bombers (plus one probable) for the loss of one fighter while none of the German FlaK units claimed a victory.
German defences
The Luftwaffe's air defence organisation went through a number of changes in the first months of the war. The defence of the northern German ports and vital strategic targets was given to the local or nearest Luftverteidigungskommando (Air Defence Command). In this case the unit responsible for the protection of German warships of the Kriegsmarine was the Luftverteidigungskommando Hamburg (Air Defence Command Hamburg).
The system was impractical; the Hamburg air defence district controlled air and ground defences but each was geographically in no position to help the other. There was no combined arms synthesis, meaning that the FlaK arm did not directly support the German defences thereby forming one mass defence. Instead, fighter units protecting the coast were held there, with Kriegsmarine FlaK units, while the Hamburg air defence artillery was held too far inland. The Luftwaffe fighters and FlaK units were located too far apart to coordinate.
Coordination was not helped by the poor relations between the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine Commanders-in-Chief, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring and Großadmiral (Grand Admiral) Erich Raeder. The system required both services to work together but it produced co-operation difficulties. A solution to the problem was twofold. Fighter units defending the North Sea coast were subordinated to Luftgaukommando XI (Air District Command 11) in Hanover. These fighter units would function as an autonomous fighter command or Jagdfliegerführer (Fighter Flyer Leaders). The command of Fighter Command unit was given to Oberstleutnant Carl-August Schumacher, a former commander of II./Jagdgeschwader 77. Schumacher had served in the Kaiserliche Marine (Imperial German Navy) during the First World War and as an officer cadet had seen combat at the Battle of Jutland. It was hoped with his naval background and easy personality it would ease any difficulties with naval service cooperation. Schumacher and his counterpart in the Navy were of the same rank, so each lacked authority over the other, an arrangement that stifled unity of command.
Forces involved
Luftwaffe
Schumacher was given a new command, Stab./Jagdgeschwader 1 (Command./Fighter Group 1, or JG 1), sometimes referred to as JG Nord (Fighter Group North) or JG Schumacher. In addition to the Bf 109D and E variants, the force was also equipped with the Messerschmitt Bf 110. The lack of action during the Phoney War period meant that these aircraft, usually in demand by offensive air fleets (Luftflotte), were available for defensive roles.
Stab./JG 1 controlled all the following Gruppen (groups; wings in RAF parlance) which had a combined strength of 80–100 aircraft:
- II./Jagdgeschwader 77 (JG 77) commanded by Hilmer von Bülow-Bothkamp
- II./Trägergruppe 186 (Carrier Air Group 186; TrGr 186) which was officially attached to Zerstörergeschwader 1 (Destroyer Wing 1; ZG 1) but placed under Stab./JG 1 for defensive duties under Major Heinrich Seeliger
- 10. (Nacht)./Jagdgeschwader 26 (JG 26) under Staffelkapitän (Squadron Leader) Johannes Steinhoff
- I./Zerstörergeschwader 76 (ZG 76) under the command of Hauptmann Günther Reinecke, and 2. Staffel
- I./Zerstörergeschwader 76 (ZG 76) under the command of Geschwaderkommodore (Wing Commander) Wolfgang Falck.
- JGr. 101 was attached to ZG 1 and eventually became II./ZG 1. It was commanded by Major Hellmuth Reichardt.
RAF
The RAF committed No. 3 Group RAF to the attack. Usually the group consisted of 9 Squadron, 37 Squadron, 38 Squadron, 99 Squadron, 115 Squadron, 149 Squadron together with 214 Squadron and 21 Squadron in reserve. The Group was hastily set up for daylight missions, having been intended for night bombing. The quality of the training was dubious and many of the crews had not been given proper tuition in formation flying. Only 9 and 214 squadrons were able to fly in perfect formations. To improve formation flying and give crews experience of combat conditions, 37 Squadron practised mock combats with RAF Fighter Command Supermarine Spitfires from RAF Tangmere. Warnings were given by the Spitfire pilots that they could have decimated the squadron within ten minutes because of their poor formation flying and lack of fighter escort but were ignored.