The Battle of Schwechat was a battle in the Hungarian war of Independence of 1848-1849, fought on 30 October 1848 between the revolutionary Hungarian Army led by Lieutenant General János Móga against the army of the Austrian Empire led by Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz and Lieutenant General Josip Jelačić, at Schwechat, near Vienna. This was the last battle of 1848 in the Transdanubian campaign. The Hungarian Army wanted to relieve the revolutionaries from Vienna, besieged by the Austrian imperial army, but they were defeated. Vienna fell on the next day.
Background
After the advance of the Croatian troops to the Hungarian-Austrian border which followed the Battle of Pákozd, Jelačić was preparing for another attack, so he stopped at Moson. Here he wanted to wait for reinforcements from Upper Hungary and Vienna, and here he was informed that Ferdinand I, having received the news of the killing by the Hungarian mob from Pest of the royal commissioner and commander-in-chief of the armed forces named by the Austrian government, Count Franz Philipp von Lamberg, the king Ferdinand V. of Hungary dissolved the Hungarian Parliament on 3 October and appointed him the Hungarian King's Commissioner plenipotentiary and commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Hungary. On 6 October, however, another revolution broke out in Vienna, which also claimed the life of the Austrian Minister of War Theodor Franz, Count Baillet von Latour. Thus, now Jelačić marched on to Vienna to subdue the rebels.
By mid-October, the whole of Transdanubia was back in Hungarian hands, and the most important forts and fortresses in the western part of the country, Komárom, Lipótvár and Eszék, were secured. And on 7 October, the popular insurgents led by Artur Görgei and Mór Perczel forced the Croatian corps led by Lieutenant General Franz Karl von Roth to surrender at Ozora, which completed the defeat of the Croatian invasion. The news of the royal manifesto of 3 October - issued right at the moment of Jelačić's flight - helped most of the former officers of the K.u.K. to commit themselves to the Hungarian cause. And the Vienna Revolution also came at the right time, paralyzing the "command center" of the unfolding military counter-revolution for weeks.
After the battle of Pákozd, Lieutenant General János Móga, the Hungarian commander, sent his troops in pursuit of Jelačić. The outbreak of the Vienna Revolution meant that Jelačić's army could not count on any support for some time. On receiving the news of the Vienna revolution, the government commissioner of the Hungarian army in Győr, László Csány, commented: "God grant that it may be true. We here with our troops are enthusiastic".
After the Vienna Revolution, it seemed natural that the Hungarian army would rush to the aid of Vienna. But there were strong military and political arguments against crossing the border. Jelačić's army had been significantly changed by the beginning of October. His cavalry was reinforced and his valueless militia troops, which, due to their lack of discipline, caused the defeat from 29 September, returned to Croatia. Crossing the Austrian border meant for the Hungarians the danger that the army would have to face not only the Croatian troops but also the K.u.K. troops, which had been pushed out of Vienna by the revolutionaries. This - besides the superiority of the enemy - would have caused a serious moral conflict between the Hungarian conscripts sworn to the common monarch and the officers who came from the K.u.K. army.
So the generals and officers were waiting for a political decision. Thus the Hungarian Parliament decided that if the Vienna revolutionaries would call on the Hungarian army to help, then it would have to go to help them. In Vienna, however, neither the Imperial Assembly nor its committee, nor even the city council, were willing to formally ask for help, although most of their members privately approved the Hungarian army's entry. Jelačić was not behaving clearly (in favor or against the revolutionaries) either, and most of the politicians in the imperial city naively hoped that some way of reaching an agreement with the court would be found. The political will for joint action was therefore lacking on both sides.
In the meantime, the manifesto of 3 October in particular kept the mood in Pest in a state of excitement, and the House of Representatives, at its session of 7 October, adopted a resolution, which stated that the government should be entrusted to the Committee of National Defence (which will act after this as a Hungarian government), whose chairman was unanimously proclaimed Lajos Kossuth.
On 18 October, the Croatian force which arrived to Vienna consisted of more than 26,000 men and 75 guns. However, with the joining to them by the imperial garrison pushed out from Vienna by the revolutionaries, it numbered 37 battalions, 42 cavalry regiments, and 138 guns, or at least 40,000 troops at the lowest estimate. The Hungarian army pursuing Jelačić numbered 20,760 troops with 60 guns on 11 October, but due to the continuous joining of units to it, their number grew to 21,025 troops with 53 guns on 20 October and 26,890 troops with 82 guns on 26 October. Despite this, the Croatian army held a qualitative and quantitative advantage, and the light and heavy cavalry regiments that had joined Jelačić made up for the Croatian army's earlier weakness, the lack of cavalry. Jelačić's troops, united with the garrison troops led by Count Adolf of Auersperg, who had been pushed out of Vienna, outnumbered the Hungarian army, while the forces of the Viennese insurgents, which, while they theoretically could reinforce the Hungarians, were hardly usable outside the city walls against regular troops. As such, even a joint Hungarian-Viennese military operation would not have guaranteed success.
Prelude
While the Austrian army was taking measures against the rebellious Vienna, Móga also departed towards the Austrian capital. After the 3-day truce with Jelačić had expired, the Hungarian army finally left its camp near Martonvásár, following the enemy without any definite aim. The vanguard of the army, which under the command of Major Imre Ivánka consisted of 4 battalions of mobile noble guards, a division of volunteer cavalry from Cegléd, Kőrös and Kecskemét, a company of hussars and a battery, left Martonvásár at 6 o'clock on 3 October and arrived in Győr on 5 October, which Jelačić's rearguard left the same morning. On 6 and 7 October the rest of Móga's army arrived in Győr, and on the 8th the advance guard, reinforced by eight companies of hussars, reached Parndorf, from where the next day it began to pursue the enemy towards Bruck an der Leitha, killing some Croatian soldiers and taking about 300 prisoners. After the pursuit was over, Ivánka pushed his outposts forward to Lajta, occupying the river' line between Wilfleinsdorf and Hollern, while he received orders from the army headquarters not to cross the border, and if his outposts had already done so, to withdraw them immediately. On 10 October the bulk of the Hungarian army arrived and set up camp on the hills behind the border, with headquarters at Parndorf. Here Móga convened a council of war, which had to decide whether it was advisable and right to pursue Jelačić's army over the Austrian border. Several people spoke in favor of the continuation of the pursuit, but the majority had the opinion that the border crossing should not be carried out unless the Austrian legislature specifically requested the Hungarian government to send the army to their aid. The Hungarian House of Representatives declared that it would gladly send armed aid to the besieged people of Vienna, so that they could defend themselves against the imperial troops, and immediately sent József Irinyi, a member of the House of Representatives, with the message to the Austrian Imperial Assembly. On the afternoon of 17 October, Móga, upon the order of the political leadership, sent the outposts, commanded by newly arrived Colonel Artúr Görgei, forward over the Lajta river. However, after the Austrian provincial assembly had a reluctant stance about the offer of the Hungarian House of Representatives, Kossuth ordered Móga to abandon any offensive actions and to confine himself to the defense of the borders. The calm did not last long, however, for on the morning of October 21 the whole army moved to cross the Lajta, but when its edge reached Stixneusiedel, Móga again ordered the retreat, whereupon the army retreated again on October 22 to its original positions to await the arrival of the prospective reinforcements.
The imperial commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz was in Prague, when on 7 October, he received the first news of the Vienna Revolution. On 9 October, he mobilized the imperial troops and the garrisons from Bohemia, and with the help of the railways, he transported his troops under Vienna by 23 October. Now the Austrıan army under Vienna was an army of 80,000 (59 battalions and 2 companies of infantry, 68 cavalry companies, 210 guns). On 27 October Windisch-Grätz issued the order for a general attack on Vienna. The balance of power had thus shifted definitively in favor of the Austrian Imperial Army.
Kossuth, in order to put an end to the instability and uncertainty in the camp from Parndorf, on 17 October, set out from the capital with a squadron of Wilhelm Hussars, additional units of the 25th Honvéd battalion, 1,500 national guards from Pest, and 3 artillery batteries on boats towards Móga's camp; in the meantime, he was joined by national guards everywhere, so that by the time he reached Miklósfalva on 23 October, the relief troops he had brought with him had been increased to 12,000 men. After his arrival, Kossuth held a council of war with the officers present to receive him, and in his introductory speech he spoke enthusiastically in favor of resuming the offensive operations in order to relieve Vienna. The new attack was preceded by serious discussions. In the councils of war, a battle of military and political arguments was fought. Móga and his chief of staff, Colonel Josef Kollmann, opposed the idea of a new border crossing, citing the enemy's superior strength and the lack of training of the Hungarian troops.
Kossuth argued that ’’our cause, only linked to the cause of Vienna, is a European cause - separated from it, it will not be taken into account by anyone’’. His practical argument was that if they did not attack now, most of the National Guards would return home without having been used by the army. But if despite all this, "the leaders of our army all say that if we advance, our army will be lost, I will not order a strategic impossibility". But he added, that if there is an officer who says that, even if a victory could not be achieved, but at least the army could be saved, he is ready to hand over to him the command and give the order to attack the Austrians.
There was such an officer. Colonel Görgei declared that "there is no choice, we must go forward, because if we don't, we will lose [as a result of this] more than if we lose three battles". Kossuth was happy upon hearing this and wanted to put him in charge of the main command, but Görgei refused.
Windisch-Grätz, meanwhile, in an order sent to Móga, ordered the K.u.K. officers in the Hungarian army to go immediately to the Austrian camp, or face the most serious consequences. Móga communicated this call to Kossuth and the officers, who were encouraged to freely decide if they want to leave the Hungarian army or to stay. As a result, some 30 imperial officers - among them Major General Ádám Teleki and Major General Franz Holtsche - asked to be relieved from further service, while those who remained solemnly declared that they would continue to fight with all their heart and soul for the Hungarian cause, even against Windisch-Grätz's troops if necessary.