The Battle of Le Mesnil-Patry during the Second World War was the last attack by a Canadian armoured battle group in Normandy in June 1944. The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada of the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Canadian Division, supported by the 6th Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) of the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade attacked the village of Le Mesnil-Patry to advance southwards towards the higher ground of Hill 107 west of Cheux. The attack was intended to support a larger operation by the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division and the 7th Armoured Division to capture the city of Caen and to advance in the centre of the bridgehead next to the First US Army. The battle was a German defensive success but the greater German objective of defeating the invasion by a counter-offensive also failed.
Both sides changed tactics after the first week of the invasion, the Germans constructed a defence-in-depth, with tank forces reserved for limited counter-attacks, intended to slow the Allied advance inland and avoid casualties and losses of equipment until reinforcements arrived. The Allies began to accumulate supplies to conduct attrition attacks, rather than persist with mobile operations by large numbers of tanks supported by infantry. More atrocities by troops of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend against Canadian prisoners occurred and orders given by a junior Canadian commander to refrain from taking German prisoners as a reprisal, were countermanded by higher authority as soon as they were discovered. Canadian offensive operations in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division area ceased, apart from raiding and reconnaissance patrols, until VIII Corps commenced Operation Epsom on 26 June.
Background
Invasion of Normandy
On 6 June 1944, Allied forces invaded France in Operation Neptune, the landings of Operation Overlord. A force of several thousand ships transported assault forces to the beaches in Normandy, supported by c. 3,000 aircraft. The D-Day landings succeeded but the Allies were unable to capture Caen as planned. The US 101st Airborne Division, 82nd Airborne Division and the British 6th Airborne Division with an attached Canadian airborne battalion, dropped behind the German coastal defences. The British and Canadian paratroops behind Sword Beach were to capture bridges over the Orne River such as Horsa and Pegasus Bridge and silence the Merville Gun Battery to hinder German counter-attacks. The Allies established a bridgehead north of Caen on the east bank of the Orne, which protected the beachhead, forced the Germans to oppose it with scarce tank units needed elsewhere and provided a jumping-off position for later attacks towards Caen.
Prelude
Plan
On 9 June, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada had come under the command of the 7th Brigade and moved to occupy Bray. On 10 June, plans were laid for an attack to fill a gap between the 7th and 9th Brigades, in the valley of the Mue River between Cairon and Rots. Planning began for an advance by the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade south of Norrey-en-Bessin to occupy high ground beyond Cheux, south of Norrey-en-Bessin, with the clearing of the Mue valley as a preliminary, in support of the main attack due on 12 June. Early on 11 June, the preliminary attack was cancelled by General Miles Dempsey, the commander of the Second Army and combined with the main attack, forming the left pincer of another attempt to capture high ground south of Cristot. The 69th Infantry Brigade of the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, attacked further west near Bronay, 1 mi (1.6 km) north-east of Le Mesnil-Patry. An attack by the 7th Armoured Division through Tilly-sur-Seulles on Villers-Bocage and Évrecy, required that all German units further east be engaged to prevent them moving westwards.
If the attack succeeded, II Battalion, SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 26 (Obersturmbannführer Wilhelm Mohnke) would be cut off and destroyed, leaving a gap in the positions of the 12th SS-Panzer Division, exposing Carpiquet, the rear of Caen and the confluence of the Odon and Orne rivers. The 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade issued orders in the morning of 10 June to the 10th Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse). At 7:30 a.m. on 11 June, the attack toward Cheux was ordered to begin as soon as possible that day. The commander of the 1st Hussars had no time to conduct a reconnaissance with the R Group (a reconnaissance group composed of attached arms, an artillery representative and the squadron leaders) and then complete an appreciation of the situation before issuing orders; the squadron commanders would have then issued detailed orders to the troop leaders. The 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (CAR) tried to get ready, "In the morning we were told we were moving at 11:00 a.m. Sunday 11 June. I knew one tank would he left behind, but was told later that only eighteen took part in the shoot. There was no briefing". Some of the 1st Hussar troops thought it would be a quiet HE shoot with the artillery.
The operation was to begin at the front positions of 7th Canadian Brigade, where a company of the Regina Rifles was astride the railway and in Norrey. The 6th Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) and The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada were to pass through Norrey and then advance 2 mi (3.2 km) south, to capture high ground near Cheux, with B Squadron attacking first, followed by C Squadron which was to move to the high ground on the right flank, ready to give covering fire and then the Headquarters Squadron, A Squadron behind B Squadron. The infantry were to ride on the tanks and in the first phase, reach Le Mesnil-Patry by 1:00 p.m., then make a right flanking movement through the village to bypass Cheux; the rest of the armoured brigade would then to join the 6th Armoured Regiment on the objective at Hill 107. The commanders of the first phase asked for more time to prepare but were refused, because of the importance of the attacks by the 7th Armoured and 50th (Northumbrian) divisions.
A Canadian success could force the Germans out of Cristot and ease the advance of the 50th (Northumbrian) Division. The plan depended on the quick seizure of Le Mesnil-Patry, which would enable the north-west part of the 12th SS-Panzer Division defence perimeter to be cut off by a supporting attack by the 69th Infantry Brigade from north-east of Le Mesnil-Patry. Much of SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 26 would be destroyed. An opportunity would be created to advance to the Odon or turn east toward Carpiquet and envelop the rest of the 12th SS-Panzer Division. When the 1st Hussars were established at Le Mesnil-Patry, the 10th and 27th CAR could attack southwards to the high ground and make Caen untenable.
Battle
Le Mesnil-Patry
The 6th CAR had recently received twenty replacement tanks and crews, who had not had time to settle in and few of the men had much idea of the plan. The 6th CAR advanced south across the highway and railway, with B Squadron forward, carrying D Company of the Queen's Own Rifles (QOR) on the backs of the tanks. South of the railway was a knocked out Panther,
A couple of nervous troops immediately deployed upon sighting it and several tanks engaged the hulk with direct fire. The road was narrow with high abutments. The Regiment continued in single file and reached Norrey at 2:30 p.m.,...as our leading squadron was starting off they found that the Regiment would have to pass through Norrey-en-Bessin [Norrey] in line ahead formation. Our infantry had sown mines on both sides of the road Bretteville–Norrey, and they had not been lifted; there was no time to wait for them to accomplish this. We changed our start line as soon as this intelligence was received and B Squadron went on its way followed by C and A squadrons and Regimental Headquarters (RHQ) close to the rear.
The Canadian column reached Norrey-en-Bessin at 2:00 p.m., to find that the Canadian troops there had not been informed of the attack and that the proposed forming up place was in a minefield. The flat grain fields towards Le Mesnil-Patry had not been occupied and there had been no sign of a German withdrawal. The advance through the fields between Norrey and Le Mesnil-Patry was intended to begin at the same time as the attack further west against Cristot but this was delayed. The village was dominated by a church in the centre and the Pioneer Platoon from II Battalion, SS-Panzer Grenadier Regiment 26 was inside the village. The Canadian advance had been reported and as the vanguard reached the village centre, German artillery and mortar fire began while the QOR, on the backs of the tanks, were exposed. The tanks increased speed but in the village centre was a crossroad, where the road to Le Mesnil took a sharp right turn. At 3:06 p.m., the regiment reported that the advance had been held up by fire from unseen positions.
SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 26 and a company of tanks from the 12th SS-Panzer Division ambushed the tanks of B Squadron in the grain fields near Le Mesnil-Patry, assisted by intelligence gleaned from Hussar radio traffic, after capturing wireless codes from a knocked out Canadian tank on 9 June. The Germans had been instructed to
...let the tanks roll by and only fight the infantry following behind with rifles and machine guns... since the enemy infantry did not follow the tanks but was [were] mounted on them, the men opened fire immediately. The Canadian infantry jumped off. The tanks rolled, their machine guns firing wildly in all directions, at high speed towards Le Mesnil. Bloody hand-to-hand combat between the Pioneers and the Canadian Infantry broke out.
The Shermans were easy targets in the narrow streets and drove for open country, while the QOR were left to fight the German infantry. The battle group had been dispersed and would have no secure base, until D Company consolidated the village. About a platoon of D Company followed the tanks on foot and advanced about 300 yd (270 m); the tanks mopped up some machine-gun nests and infantry positions. The tanks of B Squadron pushed on, scattering German infantry in their path. Some B Squadron tanks and infantry reached a small rise on the edge of the village, where the tanks were engaged by concealed anti-tank guns on the left flank near St Mauvieu, which quickly knocked out six tanks. C Squadron moved to the right to give covering fire but was mistakenly engaged by British anti-tank gunners of the 50th (Northumbrian) Division. A Squadron and the RHQ advanced through Norrey, to the start line just to the west and C Squadron retired, flying recognition signals and having to pick its way round the Canadian minefields and the ruins of Norrey, where German artillery-fire had collapsed the church into the road.
As B Squadron and D Company advanced from Norrey, C Squadron and troops of the QOR also advanced and were engaged from the north-west, from Le Mesnil-Patry and from the south-east,
Suddenly both B and C Squadrons reported a/tank guns and tanks firing on them. This information was passed to our Brigade who in turn ordered our men not to fire on them as they were friendly tanks. The CO ordered Major A. d'A. Marks [of] C Squadron to hold his fire and fly his recognition flags. Major A. d'A. Marks acted upon this and even got out of his tank to ensure that all the tanks were flying their flags.
the Canadians had broken through the boundary of III Battalion, SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 26 and I Battalion, SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 26. Both were supported by 7.5 cm Pak 40 anti-tank guns and Panzer IVs of the 2nd SS-Panzer Battalion. Mohnke was well forward and requested tank support. D Company troops kept to the ground and crawled forward to the outskirts of Le Mesnil-Patry. A party of seven riflemen and two tanks worked to a flank and entered the east end of the village.
Three German tanks attacked from the right flank and knocked out several Canadian tanks, which had taken post in an orchard. The German and Canadian infantry took cover from crossfire as tanks on both sides were knocked out. The commander of the first Sherman saw that the German troops and tanks in the area were formed up for attack. Three half-tracks were seen parked together near infantry, who began running around in confusion and then about thirty more tanks also parked together were seen, then a battery of 88 mm guns and more half-tracks. Three of the half-tracks were destroyed by the Sherman, which then caught fire. The crew reversed for 600 yd (550 m), with clothes and ammunition burning on the outside of the tank as Panzergrenadiers threw grenades and the crew fired back, before bailing out and retiring along a ditch.