The Battle of Guillemont (3–6 September 1916) was an attack, during the Battle of the Somme in the First World War, by the British Fourth Army against the German 2nd Army near the village of Guillemont in northern France. The village is on the D 20 running east to Combles and the D 64 south-west to Montauban. Longueval and Delville Wood lie to the north-west and Ginchy to the north-east. The village was on the right flank of the British sector, near the boundary with the French Sixth Army. The Fourth Army had advanced close to Guillemont during the Battle of Bazentin Ridge (14–17 July) and the capture of the village was the culmination of British attacks which began on the night of 22/23 July. The attacks were intended to advance the right flank of the Fourth Army and eliminate a salient further north at Delville Wood. German defences ringed the wood and had observation over the French Sixth Army area to the south, towards the Somme river.
Preparatory to a general attack intended for mid-September, from the Somme north to Courcelette (beyond the Albert–Bapaume road), the French Sixth Army, the Fourth Army and the Reserve Army conducted numerous attacks to capture the rest of the German second line and to gain observation over the German third line. The German defences around Guillemont were based on the remaining parts of the second line and fortified villages and farms northwards from Hem, Maurepas and Combles, to Falfemont Farm, Guillemont, Ginchy, Delville Wood and High Wood, which commanded the ground in between. The Battles Nomenclature Committee report of May 1921, called British military operations on the Somme during the fighting for Guillemont, the Battle of Delville Wood (14 July – 3 September) by the Fourth Army and the Battle of Pozières (23 July – 3 September) by the Reserve Army and III Corps of the Fourth Army.
Attempts were made by Joseph Joffre, the French supreme commander, Sir Douglas Haig, Ferdinand Foch and the army commanders Henry Rawlinson and Émile Fayolle to co-ordinate attacks, which failed due to the recovery of the German 2nd Army from the disorganisation caused by the defeats in early July, disagreements over tactics by Haig and Joffre in July and August and organisational constraints caused by congestion behind the front, roads and tracks obliterated by Anglo-French artillery-fire becoming swamps when it rained. Increasing German artillery-fire on targets behind the front line, inexperience, unreliable machinery, guns, ammunition and an unpredictable flow of supplies from Britain, reduced the effectiveness of the British armies. Difficulty in co-ordinating attacks by the Entente armies and the large number of piecemeal attacks resorted to by the British, have been criticised as costly failures and evidence of muddle and incompetence by the generals. The French Sixth and Tenth armies had similar difficulties and severe strain had been put on the German 2nd Army and the 1st Army (formed on 19 July), forcing them into a similar piecemeal defence.
The official historian, Wilfrid Miles, wrote in the History of the Great War volume (1938), that the defence of Guillemont was judged by some observers to be the best performance of the war by the German Army on the Western Front. A pause at the end of August in Anglo-French attacks to organise bigger combined attacks and postponements for bad weather, coincided with the largest German counter-attack yet. Joffre, Foch and Haig abandoned attempts to organise large combined attacks, in favour of sequenced army attacks. The capture of the German defences from Cléry north of the Somme to Guillemont from 3 to 6 September brought the Sixth and Fourth armies onto ground which overlooked the German third position. Rain, congestion and relief of tired divisions forced a pause in French attacks until 12 September. At the Battle of Ginchy (9 September) the Fourth Army captured the village, ready to begin the Battle of Flers–Courcelette, (15–22 September).
Background
Strategic developments
On 1 July, the Anglo-French offensive had captured the first German defensive line from Foucaucourt south of the Somme to the vicinity of the Albert–Bapaume road, north of the river. The German 2nd Army abandoned the second line on the south bank in the XVII Corps area, to occupy the shorter third position behind it close to Péronne, despite the policy of an unyielding defence. The Chief of Staff, Generalmajor Paul Grünert, was sacked by Falkenhayn that night and replaced by Colonel Fritz von Loßberg. Next day Below issued a secret order that ground must be held at all costs, defensive positions were to be recovered by counter-attacks and that all commanders must make it clear that "The enemy must be made to pick his way forward over corpses". Over the next ten days, fifteen fresh divisions were sent to the Somme front, being split up as they arrived and used piecemeal to fill gaps at the most vulnerable points, which led to many casualties in the reinforcing units. The 2nd Army suffered 40,187 casualties in the first ten days, compared to 25,989 men in the first ten days at Verdun.
On 17 July, Falkenhayn reorganised the twenty German divisions engaged on the Somme, by re-establishing the 1st Army under the command of Below, north of the Somme and appointing Lieutenant-General Max von Gallwitz to the command of the 2nd Army south of the river, combining both armies in armeegruppe Gallwitz-Somme. On 17 July, Below issued another secret order, noting that unauthorised withdrawals were still being made and threatened to Court-martial commanders who did not fight to the last man. By the end of July, despite the discipline and sacrifice of the German troops, more ground had been lost and Gallwitz issued an order on 30 July, stating that the decisive battle of the war was being fought on the Somme and that no more ground should be given up, regardless of losses. In August, the Germans retained far more ground than in July, at a cost of c. 80,000 casualties.
On 6 July, Joffre had visited Fayolle and discussed bringing the cavalry close to the front to exploit success and on 8 July, Foch, commander of Groupe d'armées du Nord (GAN, Northern Army Group), ordered Fayolle to reinforce the success of the corps south of the Somme for an attack on 20 July, while defending north of the river. After the British victory of the Battle of Bazentin Ridge (14 to 22 July), Joffre directed Foch to co-ordinate broad-front attacks with the British, who were making the main effort, to force the Germans to spread their artillery-fire and infantry over a wider front. Foch ordered the attack to be extended north of the river, although the transfer of artillery had put the main weight of the attack on the south side. In mid-July, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) General Headquarters (GHQ) received intelligence reports of "demoralisation and confusion" among the German defenders but recovery was noted within three days, particularly due to improvements in the flow of supplies to the German front line.
By the end of July, there was no expectation of a rapid German collapse, as the defenders north of the Somme had been relieved by three times as many fresh divisions and the Fourth Army was ordered to prepare for a German counter-attack. Intelligence reports showed very high German casualties and that one of the fresh German divisions had previously lost 104 per cent of its infantry strength at Verdun. A copy of the order issued by Below for unyielding defence was captured in late July, which indicated that German tactics were making attrition a feasible Entente objective. The destruction of British intelligence networks in occupied northern France and Belgium restricted GHQ Intelligence to gleaning documents from the battlefield and prisoner interrogation, causing the number of German divisions available for the Somme front to be underestimated. On 2 August, Haig issued a directive stating that Falkenhayn could continue to replace troops on the Somme and a German collapse was not expected, forecasting a "wearing-out" battle until September. Anglo-French intelligence estimates of German casualties ranged from 130,000–175,000 men in July.
After another general relief of German divisions in mid-August, reports of "despondency" among prisoners, an estimate that the British had engaged 23 of the 41 German divisions which had fought on the Somme, which were exhausted after 4+1⁄2 days, yet kept in the line for twenty; news of German peace feelers and mounting domestic unrest raised Allied optimism again. At the end of August, the Rumanian declaration of war and the sacking of Falkenhayn led to hopes that his replacement by Generalfeldmarschall (Field Marshal) Paul von Hindenburg as Chief of the General Staff and General Erich Ludendorff as erster Generalquartiermeister (First Quartermaster General) would lead to more emphasis on the eastern front, easing the task of the Entente armies in France and Belgium. The advances in early September and the publication of German casualty lists for July (which showed that seven of the twelve German divisions on the Somme opposite the British had lost more than 50 per cent of their infantry) encouraged Haig and Joffre to persist with the offensive. Bavarian units in the area around Guillemont were believed to have maintained high morale but suffered many casualties and had few reserves available.
Tactical developments
A vast increase in British war production had been achieved in 1916 but the flow of equipment and ammunition caused transport problems in France, particularly on the Chemins de Fer du Nord (Nord) railways, which had become overloaded by the increase in the size of the BEF, the large number ammunition trains from the Channel ports to the Somme front and the need to move unprecedented numbers of casualties after 1 July. Congestion of the railways began to affect operations in July and rainy periods made delivery of ammunition from railheads to gun positions much harder, when 550 lorry-loads were being delivered even on quiet days. Shortages of heavy howitzer ammunition in mid-July were made worse in areas under German observation and harassing-fire, as more German artillery arrived on the Somme front.
After 1 July, work began on extensions of the railway mainline behind the Somme front towards Maricourt and the metre-gauge line from Albert to Bray was extended to Fricourt and Montauban by 14 July. Anglo-French conferences on railway policy on 15 and 18 June settled administrative questions on railway building, line extensions and the building of all-weather connecting roads. Operation of the extensions proved difficult, due to the number of soldiers, lorries, wagons and guns criss-crossing the rear of the battlefront and road closures due to accidents and German bombardments, which made the delivery of supplies unpredictable.
From 1 to 11 July, the XIII Corps artillery (357 guns), received 77 guns to replace 65 which were out of action due to defects and lack of spare parts; the supply of ammunition was adequate but much of it was of poor quality, fuzes from heavy howitzer shells falling out in flight. On 31 July, Rawlinson concentrated the artillery of XIII Corps on the right flank against Guillemont and then a line from Leuze Wood to Ginchy, with assistance from the XV Corps artillery. On 3 August, the British Armies received a directive from Haig, which laid down the methods to be adopted to capture all of the Morval–Thiepval ridge, as it was clear that the German defence had become more formidable.
Methodical preparation of small attacks, with immediate consolidation was required and great economy of men and equipment was necessary, to conduct another general attack in mid-September. The French XX Corps was to be assisted by the capture of Falfemont Farm, Leuze Wood, Guillemont and Ginchy. Rawlinson altered the XIII Corps boundary, to concentrate it against Guillemont; the 55th (West Lancashire) Division and the 2nd Division sapped forward to reduce the width of no man's land, which brought the British front line to Arrow Head Copse and about half-way from Trônes Wood to Guillemont.
The two German armies on the Somme made corps headquarters permanent geographical entities, with divisions temporarily attached, before relief by fresh formations. On the south bank, Gruppe von Quast was formed from the XVII Reserve Corps. Eventually the area north of the Somme to the Ancre was held by Gruppe Gossler (VI Reserve Corps) from the Somme to Hardecourt, Sixt von Armin (IV Corps) from Hardecourt to Pozières on the Albert–Bapaume road and Gruppe von Stein (XIV Reserve Corps) from Pozières, across the Ancre to Gommecourt. On 2 July, Loßberg surveyed the battlefield near Péronne, then began to arrange defensive positions like those used in the Second Battle of Champagne in September 1915. Front-line positions were to be thinly held, maintained regardless of loss and recaptured by Gegenstöße (immediate counter-attacks). If a Gegenstöß failed, Gegenangriffe (organised counter-attacks) were to be made.
Loßberg ordered a new telephone line to be built, parallel to the front line, out of artillery range, with branches to forward headquarters, ordered artillery headquarters to move close to infantry division headquarters to improve liaison and moved artillery observation posts back from the front line to positions which overlooked it. Lack of reserves was the chief difficulty of the defence and Loßberg urged Falkenhayn to end the Battle of Verdun to supply reinforcements; for as long as German attacks continued at Verdun, troops, supplies and equipment arrived on the Somme intermittently, forcing piecemeal reinforcement of weak spots by battalions and companies, rather than complete units from a settled echelon of reserves, which caused irreplaceable losses in divisions kept in the line for too long.
German infantry began to avoid trench lines in mid-July and occupied shell-holes, which made Allied bombardments less effective and diverted infantry into mopping-up operations. Allied attacks on limited objectives reduced the effectiveness of German defensive dispersal, positions were incessantly bombarded, trenches, barbed wire and dugouts disappearing as far back as the second line. Shell-hole positions about 20 yd (18 m) apart, containing two or three men were quickly overrun by Anglo-French infantry and prepared for defence, before a Gegenstöß could be made. Deliberate counter-attacks (Gegenangriffe) were planned but most were cancelled due to shortages of troops, artillery and ammunition. Attempts to connect shell-hole positions during quiet periods failed, because Allied air reconnaissance quickly directed artillery-fire onto them. Trenches were evacuated before attacks, which began the development of defended areas, in which small groups manoeuvred to deprive Allied gunners of recognisable targets, vastly inflating the amount of ammunition necessary for bombardments.