The Battle of Gela took place in the summer of 405 BC in Sicily. The Carthaginian army under Himilco (a member of the Magonid family and kinsman of Hannibal Mago), which had spent the winter and spring in the captured city of Akragas, marched to confront the Greeks at Gela. The Syracuse government had deposed Daphnaeus, the unsuccessful general of the Greek army at Akragas, with Dionysius, another officer who had been a follower of Hermocrates. Dionysius schemed and gained full dictatorial powers.
When the Carthaginians laid siege to Gela, Dionysius responded by leading his forces from Syracuse to confront the threat. He devised a complex three-pronged attack strategy against the Carthaginians, but the plan failed due to a lack of proper coordination. Faced with the defeat and growing discontent in Syracuse, Dionysius made the decision to evacuate Gela to preserve his own power. After the Greeks had fled to Camarina Himilco, the Carthaginian general, sacked the abandoned city.
Background
Carthage had stayed away from Sicilian affairs for almost 70 years following the defeat at Himera in 480, during which time Greek culture had started to penetrate the Elymian, Sikanian and Sicel cities in Sicily. This all changed in 411 when the Elymian city Segesta was defeated by the Dorian Greek city Selinus. Segesta appealed to Carthage for aid, and the Carthaginian Senate agreed to intervene on behalf of Segesta. Hannibal Mago of Carthage led an army which took the city of Selinus by storm in 409 and then also destroyed the city of Himera. Syracuse and Akragas, the leading Greek cities in Sicily did not confront Carthage at that time and the Carthaginian army withdrew with the spoils of war. For three years, a lull fell on Sicily. No treaties had been signed between the Greeks and Carthaginians signaling a closure of hostilities.
The expedition of 406 BC
The raids of the exiled Syracusan general, Hermocrates, on Punic territory around Motya and Panormus provoked Carthage into sending another army to Sicily in 406 under Hannibal Mago. The leading Greek cities of Sicily, Syracuse and Akragas, had prepared for the conflict by hiring mercenaries and expanding the fleet, along with keeping the city walls in good repair. Although Syracuse was involved in the Peloponnesian War and with disputes with her neighbors, their government sent an appeal for support to Magna Graecia and mainland Greece once the Carthaginians landed in Sicily.
Hannibal besieged Akragas in summer 406, which withstood the initial assault. While building siege ramps for future attacks the army was struck by plague and Hannibal along with thousands of Carthaginians perished. Part of the Carthaginian army under Himilco, Hannibal’s kinsmen and deputy, was defeated by the Greek relief army led by Daphnaeus, and the city was relieved. The Akragans were not happy with the decision of the generals (who refrained from chasing the defeated Carthaginians) and had four of them stoned to death. The Greeks then cut off supplies to the Carthaginian camp and almost caused a mutiny in the Punic army. Himilco saved the situation by managing to defeat the Syracusan fleet and capturing the grain convoy bound for Akragas. The Greeks, faced with starvation, abandoned Akragas, which was sacked by Himilco. The siege had lasted for eight months.
A tyrant rises
The homeless people from Akragas arrived at Syracuse and some made accusations against the Syracusan generals. In the assembly, Dionysius, who had fought bravely at Akragas, supported these accusations. He was fined for breaking meeting rules, but his friend Philistos paid the fine. The assembly deposed Daphnaeus and the other generals and appointed replacements, Dionysius among them. The Akragan refugees ultimately found shelter in Leontini. An appeal from Gela then reached Syracuse to send aid, as the Carthaginians were approaching that city.
Dionysius started scheming to expand his power. He got the government to recall political exiles who were former followers of Hermocrates, and then marched to Gela, which was under the command of the Spartan Dexippus. Dionysius dabbled in the political feud of Gela and managed to condemn their generals to death. He gave his soldier double pay from the confiscated property of the dead generals, then returned to Syracuse to accuse his fellow generals of taking bribes from Carthage. The Syracusan government deposed the others and made Dionysius sole commander. Dionysius marched to Leontini, held an assembly, and after some stage-managed theatrics, promptly got the people to give him a bodyguard of 600 men, which he increased to 1,000. Then he sent Dexippus away and had Daphnaeus and other Syracusan generals executed. The tyranny of Dionysius had begun.
Opposing forces
Hannibal Mago had brought together an army recruited from Carthaginian citizens, Africa, Spain and Italy, and a fleet of 120 triremes to Sicily. The army had been reduced by plague and casualties at Akragas and it is not known if Himilco had received any reinforcements or recruits while he wintered at Akragas. The original forces may have numbered around 60,000 men, and the survivors marched to Gela in the spring of 405. The Carthaginian fleet, which numbered around 105 ships after losing 15 triremes at Eryx to the Greeks fleet under Leptines, was at Motya and did not accompany the army.
Carthaginian cohorts
The Libyans supplied both heavy and light infantry and formed the most disciplined units of the army. African heavy infantry fought in close formation, armed with long spears and round shields, wearing helmets and linen cuirasses. Light Libyan infantry carried javelins and a small shield, same as the Iberian light infantry. The Iberian infantry wore purple-bordered white tunics and leather headgear. The heavy infantry fought in a dense phalanx, armed with heavy throwing spears, long body shields, and short thrusting swords. Campanian (probably equipped like Samnite or Etruscan warriors), Sicel, Sardinian and Gallic infantry fought in their native gear, but often were equipped by Carthage. Sicels and other Sicilians were equipped like Greek Hoplites.
The Libyans, Carthaginian citizens, and the Libyo-Phoenicians provided disciplined, well-trained cavalry equipped with thrusting spears and round shields. Numidia provided superb light cavalry armed with bundles of javelins and riding without bridle or saddle. Iberians and Gauls also provided cavalry, which relied on the all-out charge. Carthage at this time did not use elephants, but Libyans provided the bulk of the heavy, four horse war chariots for Carthage, which is not mentioned being present at Gela. The Carthaginian officer corps held overall command of the army, although many units may have fought under their chieftains.
The Punic navy was built around the trireme, Carthaginian citizens usually served alongside recruits from Libya and other Carthaginian domains.
Greek forces
Large Sicilian cities like Syracuse and Akragas could field up to 10,000–20,000 citizens, while smaller ones like Himera and Messana mustered between 3,000–6,000 soldiers. Gela probably could field similar numbers. Dionysius brought 30,000 foot and 1,000 horsemen, recruited from Syracuse, allied Sicilian Greek cities, and mercenaries along with 50 triremes to Gela in 405.
The mainstay of the Greek army was the hoplite, drawn mainly from the citizens by Dionysius, and had a large number of mercenaries from Italy and Greece as well. Sicels and other native Sicilians also served in the army as hoplites and also supplied peltasts, and a number of Campanians, probably equipped like Samnite or Etruscan warriors, were present as well. The Phalanx was the standard fighting formation of the army. The cavalry was recruited from wealthier citizens and hired mercenaries They were augmented by mercenary hoplites hired from Sicily and Italy and even mainland Greece. Some of the citizens also served as peltasts while the wealthier citizens formed the cavalry units. Sicels and Sikan soldiers also served in the force. Mercenaries provided archers, slingers, and cavalry.
Gela under threat
While Dionysius was busy with scheming his way to absolute power, the Carthaginian army had left their winter base at Akragas after destroying the city. Himilco marched along the coast to Gela, and set up camp near the sea on the west of the city, fortifying it with a trench and palisade. The Carthaginians spent some time plundering the countryside and gathering provisions prior to commencing siege operations. The Gelans had proposed removing their women and children to Syracuse, but the women insisted on staying put. Finally no one was forced to evacuate the city, and the Greeks kept up an active defense by harassing the Carthaginian foragers.
Assault on Gela
Himilco resolved on storming the city before any help arrived. The Carthaginians did not bother to build circumvallation walls around Gela, they decided on direct assault. Despite Gelan resistance, the Carthaginians managed to move battering rams up to the western walls of the city and make some breaches in them. However, the defenders managed to keep the attackers at bay all day and repaired the walls at night. The help of the women in repairing the walls was invaluable. The Carthaginians had to start from the beginning the following morning.
Siege relieved
Apart from his political machinations, Dionysius had managed to make ready an army made of Italian and Sicilian Greeks and mercenaries, numbering at least 30,000 hoplites and 4,000 cavalry and a fleet of 50 triremes, and had marched at a slow pace to Gela. The arrival of this army lifted the Punic siege for the time being. The Greeks encamped at the mouth of River Gela on the western bank beside the city opposite the Carthaginian camp, close enough to the sea to direct both land and naval operations.
Prelude to battle
For three weeks Dionysius harassed the Carthaginians with light troops and cut off their supplies using his fleet. These tactics had almost brought disaster for the Carthaginians at Akragas, but it is likely that Dionysius chose to fight a pitched battle after three weeks because of the mood of his soldiers against a war of attrition. The Carthaginian army probably outnumbered the combined Greek force and Dionysius resolved to use stratagem to neutralize this enemy advantage.
Pulling a Cannae on Carthage
One hundred and eighty-nine years after the events at Gela, Hannibal destroyed a large Roman army near a Roman supply depot in Apulia using perhaps the best-known example of the double envelopement maneuver. Dionysius almost pulled one off on the Carthaginains at Gela in 405, but given the difference in circumstances that existed at Cannae and Gela, the battle plan of Hannibal and Dionysius varied; and like Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal Barca found at the Battle of Dertosa in 215, a field commander needs a certain amount of luck along with skilled subordinates and disciplined soldiers to coordinate the complexities of the maneuver correctly.
The Greek battle plan
The Carthaginians were camped to the west of Gela and Dionysius planned a three-pronged attack that had to follow a precise timetable. The Carthaginian cavalry was posted on the landward side while the mercenaries were on the seaward side, with the Africans in between inside the camp. Dionysius, observing that a seaborne force could attack the camp from the south, where it was open and lightly defended, decided on the following course:
- A group of a few thousand light troops would land on the beach south of the Carthaginian camp under the command of his brother Leptines and attack the south end of the camp from the west, occupying the Carthaginian forces, while 4,000 Italian hoplites would march along the coast and attack the south end of the camp from the east. At the same time, the Greek cavalry, supported by 8,000 hoplites would engage the Carthaginians on the northern side of the camp.
- Dionysius, with the reserve force and Gelan hoplites, would sally out from the West gate of the city and attack the camp once the Carthaginians were fully committed on the flanks of their camp.
Difference with Hannibal’s plan at Cannae
The armies and terrain, as well as the circumstances at Cannae, differed greatly from those at Gela and the battle plans of Hannibal and Dionysius reflected this: