The Battle of Campbell's Station (November 16, 1863) saw Confederate forces under Lieutenant General James Longstreet attack Union troops led by Major General Ambrose Burnside at Campbell's Station (now Farragut), Knox County, Tennessee, during the Knoxville Campaign of the American Civil War. Longstreet hoped to crush the Union Army of the Ohio forces before they could retreat to Knoxville. During the fighting, the Confederates forced the Union troops to fall back from five separate positions. However, the final result was that Burnside's troops conducted a successful fighting withdrawal.
Longstreet's two infantry divisions, supported by 5,000 cavalry, were detached from General Braxton Bragg's army with the goal of defeating Burnside's forces and recapturing Knoxville. The only reasonable way to accomplish this was to overwhelm the Union troops before they could take refuge behind the defenses of Knoxville. The failure to trap Burnside at Campbell's Station meant that Longstreet was compelled to besiege Union forces within Knoxville. Ultimately, the Siege of Knoxville failed when major Union forces were sent to relieve Burnside and Longstreet was forced to retreat northeast toward Virginia.
Background
Union occupation
Burnside, commander of the Union Army of the Ohio, launched the Union invasion of East Tennessee in late August 1863, using two infantry divisions and cavalry from the XXIII Corps troops stationed in Kentucky. The operation was largely unopposed and Federal troops occupied Knoxville on September 1. Many of the inhabitants of East Tennessee were pro-Union and welcomed the Federals. By mid-September, Burnside's troops had gained control over much of East Tennessee. The strategic situation turned in favor of the Confederacy when Bragg's Army of Tennessee defeated the Union Army of the Cumberland at the Battle of Chickamauga on September 19–20, 1863. After his victory, Bragg effectively blockaded the Army of the Cumberland in Chattanooga.
Two divisions of IX Corps joined Burnside on September 20, and Brigadier General Orlando B. Willcox with 3,000 6-month Indiana soldiers reached at Cumberland Gap on October 3. Burnside's returns for October 1863 reported the following troops present for duty: 6,352 officers and enlisted men in IX Corps, 7,912 infantry and artillery and 7,458 cavalry in XXIII Corps, and 4,391 troops in the Left Wing. Brigadier General Robert B. Potter led IX Corps, Brigadier General Mahlon D. Manson commanded XXIII Corps, and Brigadier General James M. Shackelford directed the cavalry. Willcox commanded the Left Wing.
Off to the northeast hovered Major General Robert Ransom Jr. with 5,800 Confederate infantry plus two cavalry brigades under Brigadier General William E. Jones and Colonel H. L. Giltner. Yet, the Confederate department commander Major General Samuel Jones felt that his 8,000 troops were too weak to challenge the Union occupation. On October 17, Bragg sent an infantry division under Major General Carter L. Stevenson and two cavalry brigades under Colonels George Gibbs Dibrell and J. J. Morrison to threaten the southern part of the Union area of control. On October 20, the cavalry defeated a Union cavalry brigade under Colonel Frank Wolford in the Battle of Philadelphia. This setback compelled Burnside to abandon Loudon and fall back behind the Tennessee and Little Tennessee Rivers.
Burnside concentrated the 6,000 men from IX Corps and 3,000 soldiers from Brigadier General Julius White's XXIII Corps infantry division in the area near Lenoir's Station. The remaining XXIII Corps infantry division under Brigadier General Milo Smith Hascall held Knoxville, Brigadier General William P. Sanders' cavalry division watched the area near Maryville, Willcox defended Bull's Gap, and two infantry regiments and 300 cavalry garrisoned Cumberland Gap. Major General Ulysses S. Grant worried whether Burnside was capable of holding Knoxville.
Longstreet's offensive
On November 4, Bragg ordered Longstreet to detach his two divisions from the Army of Tennessee and use them to recapture Knoxville. Bragg was critical of Longstreet's mishandling of the Battle of Wauhatchie on October 28, in which the Confederates failed to cut the Federals' newly established Cracker Line. Also, Bragg was anxious to get rid of a general whom he regarded as a troublemaker. Longstreet wanted to be reinforced to 20,000 men for the campaign, but Bragg refused and recalled both Stevenson's and Benjamin F. Cheatham's infantry divisions that had been sent to oppose Burnside. Longstreet tried to obtain accurate maps of East Tennessee but was only able to get poor ones. Moving Longstreet's two divisions north, while Stevenson's and Cheatham's divisions moved south overtaxed the old railroad equipment, and the transfer took until November 13 to complete. Longstreet belatedly discovered that Stevenson's troops had stripped the countryside of food supplies and that his own wagon train was barely adequate to maintain an offensive. Longstreet had 10,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 35 guns after Bragg agreed to loan him Major General Joseph Wheeler and almost all of his army's mounted force.
Longstreet's staff selected Hough's Ferry, a short distance west of Loudon, as the most suitable location for a pontoon bridge across the Tennessee River. Longstreet ordered the division of Brigadier General Micah Jenkins to cross the pontoon bridge, while Major General Lafayette McLaws' division marched northeast to distract the attention of Union forces away from the bridge. Meanwhile, Wheeler and most of the cavalry would try to seize Knoxville from the south. On the evening of November 13, the Palmetto Sharpshooters from Colonel John Bratton's South Carolina brigade crossed the Tennessee at Hough's Ferry and secured the bridge site. The usable, but somewhat rickety span was completed by the morning of November 14. At the same time, McLaws' division arrived at Loudon, after marching from Morganton. White, who had one brigade at Kingston and one brigade at Lenoir's Station, sent one infantry regiment and a section of artillery to keep an eye on the bridge.
Lenoir's Station
Chestnut Ridge started near Hough's Ferry and ran to the northeast. On its northern side, the Hotchkiss Valley Road ran from the ferry northeast to Burns House, where there was a gap in the ridge. A road passed south through the gap to Lenoir's Station on the railroad. Going north from Burns House, the road intersected the Kingston Road, which ran from Kingston to Knoxville. The railroad and the parallel main road on the south side of Chestnut Ridge ran from Loudon northeast to Knoxville. There was also a road across Chestnut Ridge near its southwestern end.
It took all day on November 14 for Jenkins' division to cross the pontoon bridge. Burnside, who arrived at the scene, ordered Colonel Marshall W. Chapin's brigade of White's division to probe Confederate forces at Hough's Ferry. This operation was supported by Brigadier General Edward Ferrero's IX Corps division. Chapin passed through the gap and marched southwest down the Hotchkiss Valley Road. Late in the day, Chapin's brigade pressed against the Confederate bridgehead until nightfall, sustaining 47 casualties. Ferrero's troops were not engaged. During the day, Colonel John F. Hartranft's IX Corps division remained at Lenoir's. Colonel Samuel R. Mott's brigade of White's division and Colonel Robert K. Byrd's 1st Tennessee Mounted Infantry were posted at Kingston; they would be bypassed by Longstreet's advance and remain isolated there during the campaign. Burnside had 9,000 troops available, including only four companies of cavalry. The bulk of Burnside's substantial cavalry force was deployed elsewhere. Longstreet led 12,000 troops, including one brigade of cavalry.
On the morning of November 15, Longstreet mounted his attack against Burnside's Federals. The Confederate commander ordered Jenkins' division and Colonel John R. Hart's cavalry brigade to advance while McLaws' division crossed the pontoon bridge. In the face of this thrust, Chapin's brigade and Ferrero's division retreated across Chestnut Ridge by the road at its southwestern end. Chapin's brigade lost 13 casualties in a skirmish with pursuing Confederates. Chapin and Ferrero reached Lenoir's at 1:00 pm, taking nine hours to march 6 mi (9.7 km) because a violent rainstorm in the night had turned the roads to quagmires. Meanwhile, Jenkins' division marched 9 mi (14.5 km) northeast on the Hotchkiss Valley Road. At Burns House, Jenkins turned south before encountering Ferrero's division and Chapin's brigade posted 0.75 mi (1.2 km) south of the gap.
In the evening of November 15, Burnside began moving his forces northeast toward Knoxville. He ordered the four companies of the 6th Indiana Cavalry Regiment and Lieutenant Erskine Gittings' Battery L and M, 3rd US Artillery to withdraw to the key intersection of the Lenoir and Kingston Roads. These units were soon followed by Hartranft's infantry division and two artillery batteries. All these units were slowed by the muddy roads. The leading elements of McLaws' division reached the Burns House where Longstreet ordered McLaws to camp for the night. Longstreet hoped to cut off Burnside's retreat toward Knoxville, but he was handicapped by a lack of reliable maps of the area. Longstreet later claimed that he was misled by his guide, but darkness had fallen and that prevented effective reconnaissance. Soldiers on both sides suffered from a sudden drop of night-time temperature.
Wheeler's strike
Wheeler arrived at Sweetwater on November 11 with four cavalry brigades. Longstreet ordered Wheeler to begin the operation against the south side of Knoxville at dawn on November 13. He hoped Burnside's focus would be on the north bank of the Tennessee River. Nevertheless, Longstreet made Wheeler aware that a strong Union cavalry force was opposing him. By the evening of November 13, Wheeler's horsemen crossed the Little Tennessee River at Motley's Ford, southeast of Morganton. Hoping to trap Union cavalry at Maryville, Wheeler sent Brigadier General Frank Crawford Armstrong's division circling to the north of that town while Brigadier General William T. Martin's division struck the town from the west. In the event, the Union brigade under Colonel Charles D. Pennebaker had withdrawn behind the Little River to Rockford, leaving only the 11th Kentucky Mounted Infantry in Maryville. Armstrong established a blocking position, but most of the 11th Kentucky escaped the trap thanks to a providential rainstorm.
Next, Armstrong sent Colonel Thomas Harrison's brigade to attack the 1st Kentucky Cavalry and 45th Ohio Mounted Infantry Regiments, which were 2 mi (3.2 km) southwest of Rockford. Harrison's troopers overwhelmed the two regiments, driving them back to Rockford. Quickly finding places to cross the Little River, the Confederates compelled Sanders to abandon Rockford and form a new defense line behind Stock Creek, 2 mi (3.2 km) north. Wheeler sent Martin's division to cross upstream and outflank Sanders' line while Armstrong applied pressure in front. By evening on November 15, Wheeler's Confederates drove Sanders' cavalry within the defenses on the south side of Knoxville. That evening and the next morning, Wheeler's cavalry was stopped by Colonel Daniel Cameron's infantry brigade of Hascall's division. On November 16, Longstreet urgently asked Wheeler to join him, so Wheeler crossed to the north bank of the Tennessee River at Louisville. By that time, it was too late to help Longstreet cut off Burnside's retreat.
Wheeler claimed to have captured 300 Union soldiers for the loss of 57 men. On November 14 at the clash south of Rockford, the 1st Kentucky lost 1 killed, 4 wounded, and 37 captured, while the 45th Ohio lost 2 wounded and 5 captured, for a total of 49 casualties. On November 15–16 on the south side of Knoxville, the Union cavalry suffered 101 casualties. The 11th Kentucky lost 1 wounded and 3 captured, the 27th Kentucky Mounted Infantry lost 3 killed, and the 45th Ohio lost 3 killed, 8 wounded, and 83 captured.
Battle
Morning
Burnside decided to abandon Lenoir's Station during the night in order to reach Campbell's Station. At 7 pm, he sent away most of his artillery, but the roads were so deep in mud that mule teams had to help drag the guns. Meanwhile, the Union troops destroyed the remaining supplies at Lenoir's before following the others at dawn. Colonel William Humphrey's brigade of Ferrero's division and one section of Captain Jacob Roemer's Battery L, 2nd New York Artillery formed the rearguard. Since one of its regiments was guarding the wagon train, Humphrey's brigade was only 700-strong. One of Chapin's companies never got the order to retire and its soldiers were captured. Longstreet ordered Jenkins' division to follow the Federal retreat, a distance of 12 mi (19.3 km) to Campbell's Station. Hart's cavalry brigade and McLaws' division moved north from Burns House to the Kingston Road and then turned east, a distance of 10 mi (16.1 km). During the retreat, Bratton's Confederate brigade continually pressed the Humphrey's rearguard.