The battle of Cadore, also known as the battle of Rio Secco or Rusecco, took place near Pieve di Cadore during the opening phase of the War of the League of Cambrai, part of the Italian Wars, on 2 March 1508, opposing the Venetian armies commanded by Bartolomeo d'Alviano and those of the Holy Roman Empire under the leadership of Sixt von Trautson. The battle resulted in a decisive Venetian victory, stopping the Habsburg invasion of Cadore and allowing the Venetians to reconquer all their lost strongholds as well as invade Habsburg-ruled lands in Friuli and the Julian March, besieging Trieste and marching on Istria. This would trigger the creation of the League of Cambrai and the beginning of the War of the League of Cambrai.
Background
The coronation of Maximilian I and the Diet of Constance
In 1507, Louis XII of France had conquered Genoa and in fact dominated much of northern Italy, having already conquered the Duchy of Milan in 1500. Such preponderance in lands so close to his borders troubled the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I of Habsburg, already worried by the French attempts to award the papal seat to Georges d'Amboise, archbishop of Rouen, who proposed to crown the King of the French as emperor. Worried by this, and anxious to stress the role of the Empire, Maximilian I summoned the diet in Constance (April 1507), where in front of the princes and the electors he exposed his concerns about the excessive French power in Italy and the repercussions that such a situation could have in the matters of Germany; he thus managed to persuade the princes to fund an invasion of Italy. Maximilian I proposed himself as defender of the Church, declared Louis XII an enemy of Christianity and announcing his coming to Rome to be crowned Emperor and guarantee the freedom of the holy city. Louis XII immediately denied any aims towards the Empire or St. Peter, staying in Genoa without an army to demonstrate his peaceful intentions, but the diet granted Maximilian I eight thousand knights and twenty-two thousand infantry for six months.
Habsburg preparations
The first movements of the imperial armies on the borders of Cadore and towards Friuli began between 9 and 10 January 1508, leading Bartolomeo d'Alviano to carry out inspections of the castles of Botestagno and Chiusaforte, reinforcing the fortresses, ordering a moat to be dug in Primolano and ramparts built in Celazzo and Laurone. On 24 January 1508 an imperial messenger reached Verona asking the mayor, Alvise Malipiero, to prepare lodgings for 8,500 horses, since Emperor Maximilian intended to stay there for three days before continuing to Rome. The mayor decided to take his time and relayed Maximilian's request to Venice. The Council of Ten sent a reply stating that the Serenissima would grant him passage as long as the emperor intended to cross its territory "quietly and peacefully". On the other hand, the Venetians had many reasons to consider Maximilian's request nothing more than a pretext for the invasion. They therefore decided to strengthen the Rovereto garrison and to evacuate the town of women, children and other non-combatants, while a garrison of 500 infantrymen under the command of Dionigi Naldi was deployed in Brentonico, and an embassy was sent to Charles II d'Amboise, Grand Master of France and governor of Milan, requesting to send reinforcements under the command of Gian Giacomo Trivulzio. In the following days the hostile intent of the imperials became evident as more and more men gathered around Trento and began to plunder the Lagarina Valley north of Rovereto and the Asiago plateau.
Invasion of Cadore
On 4 February, Pietro Gixi, captain of Cadore, was informed of the arrival around Bruneck of about three hundred German knights and hundreds of infantrymen who, however, did not immediately attack the Venetians as the mountain passes were blocked by the large amount of snow that had fallen in the previous weeks. In the night between 20 and 21 February the German infantry invaded and sacked Ampezzo, besieging the castle of Botestagno, and the next day 4,000 German infantrymen, equipped with grappelle so as not to slip on the ice or sink into the snow, descended from Passo Tre Croci and quickly overran all of Cadore, including the castle of Pieve di Cadore held by Pietro Gixi, who surrendered on the 23rd. By next day only sixty infantrymen under Bortolo Malfato remained to oppose the Habsburg advance at Chiusa di Venas, but they too were forced to retreat first to Pieve and then, after a second battle that lasted four hours and in which they risked being encircled, to the castle of Gardona.
The Venetians, having learned the news, immediately ordered Bartolomeo d'Alviano, on his way to Friuli, to go to Bassano del Grappa together with Giorgio Corner and to prepare a plan to regain control of the region. Andrea Loredan, lieutenant of Udine, sent Geronimo Savorgnan, Francesco Sbrogliavacca, Francesco Beraldo and Antonio Pio to Carnia with their 4,000 infantry to try to lift the siege from the castle of Botestagno. On February 27 the imperial artillery, personally commanded by Maximilian, forced Giovanni Michel and Francesco Zani to hand over the castle after six days of resistance.
March towards Pieve
On 27 February, Alviano reached Belluno, where he consulted with Corner and together they decided to launch an offensive aimed at recovering Cadore. The invasion of that province represented a great threat to the Serenissima, as if the Germans had attacked in Friuli, the Venetians would have been forced to move part of the troops stationed in the Vicenza and Treviso areas, further weakening the defenses and risking the loss of the Belluno and Feltre areas and eventually the invasion of the Treviso plain, which would have resulted in the encirclement of Friuli. From Belluno Alviano set out with an army of about 3,000 men towards the castle of Gardona and on the following day reached the crossroads of Muda. At this point there were two ways to reach Pieve di Cadore. The first, shorter and easier, continued along the Piave Valley along the river as far as Perarolo, where a bridge made it possible to cross the confluence of the Boite. At that point it would be possible to choose whether to take the path that led directly to Pieve, less steep but narrow and exposed to being spotted and ambushed by the enemy, or the one that led to Valle, steeper but less exposed. The second option was to detour to the Muda crossing the Val di Zoldo and then descend into Cadore; this road was difficult because it was long, steep and led to high altitudes, where the snow was even more abundant, yet it made it possible to avoid being sighted by the enemy. Alviano chose the latter and sent envoys to Savorgnan, informing him of the details of the offensive, which would be launched on the morning of March 2. His troops, once they reached Forno di Zoldo, would have marched along the Cibiana Pass descending to Venas and then moving towards Pieve, and at the same time Savorgnan's men would have had to go from Forni di Sopra to the Mauria Pass and then descend to Lorenzago, capture Treponti and go up the Val d'Ansiei up to Passo Tre Croci and Misurina Pass. Once the Val d'Ansiei was secured, the men of Savorgnan would have had to descend to Domegge, besieging Pieve from the east. In this way the Venetians would have cut off all supply and escape routes for the Germans, forcing the latter to fight them or starve. On the same day part of the Germans went up towards Domegge but were intercepted by Beraldo's stradioti and forced to fall back to Pieve, where they entrenched themselves with palisades and wooden shelters.
Battle of the Rio Secco
On 29 February, Alviano reached the Val di Zoldo with his army exhausted by the long march, and was greeted by a storm that prevented him from proceeding, therefore he stopped to clear the snow as much as possible. In the evening the Malatesta troops joined the rest of the army. On 1 March the army set off again and after having crossed the Cibiana Pass and passed the Boite at the end of the day it reached Venas, three miles from Pieve, where it left a garrison to block the escape of the enemies. In order to discipline his soldiers, Alviano ordered the commanders to keep them close to their flag, forbade anyone from retreating under penalty of being treated as an enemy, and promised rewards to those who would kill deserters. He forbade taking prisoners and booty before the battle was over, threatening to hang anyone who disobeyed. Finally, he promised the stradioti a ducat for each enemy head and a provision for life in case of victory as well as full compensation for the horse to those who had lost it in the battle. The command of the infantry was then entrusted to Pietro dal Monte, that of the cavalry to Giacomo Secco, the crossbowmen to Franco dal Borgo and the stradioti to Repossi Busicchio. The vanguard consisted of 400 infantry led by Pietro del Monte, 200 to 300 infantry under Rinieri della Sassetta and 54 infantrymen led by Bortolo Malfato and was deployed in the plain between the town of Nogaré and the slopes of Monte Zucco. The right wing consisted of Carlino Naldi's 400 infantrymen, Babone Naldi's 200 infantrymen and the condotta of Giovan Francesco Gambara. The left wing was composed of the 600 infantrymen under Lattanzio da Bergamo. In a battalion placed to the left of the infantry there were about 100 heavy knights and 300 cavalrymen led by Giacomo Secco. The approximately 70-100 mounted crossbowmen under the command of Franco dal Borgo would target the right side of the enemy infantry, while those of the Aviano (led by Pietro Querini) and those of the Malatesta would target the left side. In front of the enemy right wing the 100 stradioti infantry led by Repossi Busicchio were deployed, alongside him the men of Count Ruggero Zofa and behind it the 200 stradioti crossbowmen of Teodoro Manes and Costantino Paleologo. The artillery would have been deployed to the right of the Venetian army. There remained about 1,400 reserve men made up of the broken lances of Alviano and Pandolfo IV Malatesta.
From Venas the Venetians continued towards Valle, which they reached around 10 am on 2 March. D'Alviano sent in advance a group of stradioti who, however, violating the general's recommendations, set fire to some houses of Tai inside which some German infantrymen were housed. This was the spark that forced the Venetian general to start a battle that lasted less than an hour and took place near the snow-covered banks of the Rio Secco, whose whiteness was stained by the shed blood. The German infantrymen, about four thousand, knowing they were risking the encirclement, lined up in a square with the baggage and the women in the middle, then quickly marched against the Venetians with the intention of breaking through the ranks and opening up an escape route. Alviano, riding a nag in the center of the Venetian array, ordered the wings, made up of crossbowmen, cavalrymen and stradioti, to attack the flanks of the enemy to disturb it and slow it down while he reorganized the army, as part of the cavalry had not yet arrived. Rinieri della Sassetta, together with a dozen cavalrymen from Cardillo, Busicchio's stradioti and Franco dal Borgo's crossbowmen, attacked the enemy artillery on three sides and managed to capture it. On the right, the infantrymen of Naldi and Gambara, assisted by the Querini crossbowmen and the artillery, kept the left flank of the Germans engaged. During the clashes the commander Sixt von Trautson engaged in a duel with Rinieri della Sassetta, who carried the banner of the Serenissima, managing to wound him with a blow to the face. Rinieri responded by mortally wounding him in the neck with his pike and throwing him from the saddle.