On 26 November 2025, a large fire broke out at the Wang Fuk Court apartment complex in Tai Po, New Territories, Hong Kong, and burned for 44 hours and 18 minutes. Seven out of the eight blocks of the complex were consumed by the fire. The incident killed 168 people, including one firefighter, and injured 79. Most casualties were found inside their apartments. It was the first five-alarm fire in Hong Kong since the 2008 Cornwall Court fire, which resulted in 4 deaths and 55 injuries, and the deadliest fire accident in Hong Kong since the 1948 Wing On warehouse fire, which resulted in 176 deaths.
At the time of the fire, the apartment complex was undergoing major repairs to the exterior walls of all eight residential towers. Bamboo scaffolding was erected to the full height of the buildings and was wrapped in construction safety nets and tarps. As early as 14:00 HKT (UTC+08:00) at Wang Cheong House (Block F), the safety netting covering the lower floors was ignited. Flammable expanded polystyrene foam (Styrofoam) boards covering the windows acted as potential accelerants for the fire, which quickly spread inside the building and then to the adjacent blocks.
Background
Wang Fuk Court and the renovation
Wang Fuk Court is a subsidised government Home Ownership Scheme housing complex located in Tai Po, which is part of the Tai Po District in the New Territories, Hong Kong. The estate was built in 1983 and has eight residential blocks, each 31 storeys tall with nearly 2,000 units in total. They are among the tallest buildings in Tai Po. According to the 2021 population census, there were 4,643 residents in the complex. Data from the same census showed that nearly 40% of the residents were senior citizens aged 65 and above.
An inspection in 2016 mandated large-scale repairs for the estate. In January 2024, the owners' corporation presented three repair plans, with costs ranging from HK$150 million (US$19.31 million) to HK$330 million (US$42.47 million). The first two plans, both estimated at HK$150 million, were either to repair only the damaged parts of the exterior with tessera tiles, or to repair the damaged parts and apply waterproof paint. The third plan, which was eventually chosen, was estimated at HK$330 million and entailed completely rebuilding the exterior walls and paving them with tessera. The registered contractor was Prestige Construction and Engineering Company. The project's structural engineering consultancy was provided by Will Power Architects Company Limited, whose two directors were arrested after the fire by the ICAC in connection with suspected corruption during the renovations. In June 2024, Prestige could not source the original tessera tiles and switched to ceramic tiles.
Prestige Construction had a prior history of safety violations. The company was convicted of two safety offences in a project in the Mid-Levels in November 2023, and was fined three times in 2023 for separate violations totalling HK$30,000. A shareholder of the company was imprisoned in 2009 for bribing the Housing Society.
At the time of the fire, all eight buildings of the complex were enveloped in bamboo scaffolding and green safety netting for external renovation. Furthermore, the interior windows of each floor's elevator room and all exterior windows had been sealed with flammable polystyrene.
There had been a renovation in the past year prior to the fire, and an investigation has been launched into suspected corruption related to the renovation.
Warnings to the government before the fire
In 2023, other residents filed reports to the government about fire hazards, including the safety nets, foam boards, and smoking, but said their reports did not result in any changes.
Since July 2024, the Labour Department had conducted 16 inspections of the site, with the final inspection occurring just one week before the fire. Three prosecutions had been initiated and six improvement notices issued during this period. The Labour Department said that when conducting the 16 inspections, it found that the complaints over workers smoking at the site were unsubstantiated. However, Senior Counsel Victor Dawes in April 2026 said that the initial cause of the fire was likely a cigarette in a stairwell.
In September 2024, some residents contacted the Labour Department, asking if the nets were safe, with the department answering "The chances of fire breaking out on scaffolding nets are low." A report was also made to the Labour Department regarding construction workers smoking near the nets, but the issue was not resolved.
In November 2024, a resident called the Fire Services Department to ask about the foam boards covering the windows, to which the department said there were no regulations and the foam boards were not illegal. Multiple people had complained to the FSD, with the assistant commissioner of the FSD saying "The issue of fixing polystyrene boards on building windows was not under the purview of the FSD."
Near the end of 2024, a resident went to the government's ICAC department twice to report corruption with the project's consultant and construction contractor. ICAC told him that they would not begin any investigations based on his complaint, saying it was a business dispute. He went again in April 2025 with a second resident to the ICAC office but was told there was no evidence to pursue the case. A third resident later went to the ICAC office but the complaint did not result in ICAC investigating the report. The second resident later said "Why did [the ICAC] not take our reports at the time, but it immediately arrested people two days after the incident?"
In early 2025, residents visited the government's Urban Renewal Authority (URA) to report issues with the project, but were told that they should deal directly with the consultant.
In October 2025, about a month before the fire, a resident at Wang Fuk filed two reports to the government's Housing Department about the quality of the safety nets, asking authorities to review the nets as soon as possible. The department did not mention in its reply if the department had inspected the nets.
In April 2026, one resident whose family members were killed in the fire, stated that his family had previously complained about the project to ICAC and to the Home Affairs Department, and that the fire could have been avoided if the government had taken the complaints seriously.
In March 2026, the government's Labour Department, Fire Services Department, and the Housing Bureau's Independent Checking Unit all denied that it was their responsibility to check that the construction materials met fireproof safety regulations. In July 2026, survivors of the fire blamed government departments for denying responsibility for the fire.
Bamboo scaffolding and construction safety netting
In 2025, several fires occurred in Hong Kong that were related to structures with bamboo scaffolding encased in construction safety nets, including one at Texaco Road, Tsuen Wan in February, and in October at Chinachem Tower in Central, at the Casa Delight construction site, and at a University of Hong Kong dormitory.
Bamboo scaffolding is typically used in Hong Kong building construction and maintenance. According to a January 2025 estimate by industry representatives, nearly 80% of scaffolding in Hong Kong was bamboo-based. The chairperson of the Hong Kong Institution of Safety Practitioners, Lee Kwong-sing, stated that bamboo scaffolding and fire-retardant netting that meets government requirements are not easily ignited, and that the main cause of such fires is usually the presence of a large amount of debris, which can readily combust when exposed to sparks generated during the construction process. The Labour Department made several inspections of the construction site and found that the safety nets were certified to meet flame retardant standards.
While the Labour Department has issued safety guidelines that stipulate that the netting used with bamboo scaffolding must meet certain flame-retardant requirements, the guidelines have no legal effects or ramifications if ignored. Flame-retardant netting used in a scaffolding of 18 metres (59 ft) by 2 m (6.6 ft) would cost HK$90 (US$11.58) and has to be disposed after a single use due to the flame retardant properties degrading under the sun due to UV and environmental exposure, while an ordinary netting without fire retardancy would cost HK$50 (US$6.44) and is reusable. Consequently, some construction sites may have opted to use ordinary netting without flame retardancy as a cost-saving measure.
On 17 March 2025, government authorities announced that they would begin to phase out the use of bamboo and replace it with metal scaffolding, stating that bamboo deteriorates over time, has contributed to 23 deaths in scaffolding-related accidents since 2018, and is combustible. After the Chinachem Tower fire, the Buildings Department issued a statement urging enhanced flame-retardant standards for construction safety nets used for exterior walls at construction sites.
Other potential contributory factors
Residents had alleged as early as September 2024 that the construction workers had been smoking, littering cigarette butts throughout the construction site. A former security staff also claimed that as early as May 2025, he had found the fire alarm system intentionally turned off so that workers could enter and exit buildings more conveniently. Authorities also suspected that some materials on the exterior bamboo walls did not meet fire resistance standards, allowing the fast spread of the fire. The construction safety netting enclosed the buildings in a manner that created a chimney effect, promoting strong upward convection, fuelling rapid fire growth. Additionally, some of the windows in stairs were converted from glass to wood, so that workers could enter and exit the exterior more conveniently.
On the day of the fire, Hong Kong was affected by the northeast monsoon season. The weather was dry with strong winds. The relative humidity recorded in the district area for that afternoon was 40% to 50%. A Red Fire Danger Warning was issued by the Hong Kong Observatory on 24 November due to dry conditions; it remained in effect on the day of the fire.
Fire
Early signs
The fire is believed to have started from the safety netting covering the lower floors of Wang Cheong House (Block F). As early as 14:00 HKT (UTC+08:00) on 26 November 2025, signs of a fire at Wang Cheong House (Block F) first appeared when a resident at Wang Shing House (Block G) smelled smoke through her window. Through a gap in the mesh, she spotted a small flame burning in an apartment unit in Block F and attempted to contact the property management office to no avail. She then went down to the ground floor, only to be told by the security guard at the lift lobby that there was a fire. She went back to her apartment unit and sheltered in place until she was rescued. By 14:45, there were more eyewitness reports of the bamboo scaffolding along the exterior walls of Wang Cheong House having caught fire. Seen in the first video posted on social media, a bystander outside repeatedly shouted in dismay that there was no fire alarm.
Spread
The fire department received the first report of a fire at 14:51; firefighters arrived in ten minutes, but the fire had already escalated rapidly. The police received reports from passersby at around 15:00 and subsequently more calls from residents who reported that they were unable to escape. Some residents stated that they did not hear the fire alarm sirens even though they had broken the fire alarm glass and pressed the button; it was later determined that none of the fire alarms had activated in any of the eight towers. Other residents were notified of the fire through communication groups and neighbours knocking on doors.
The emergency alert was raised from a 1 alarm to 4 by 15:34, and to the highest level, 5, by 18:22. The emergency response included 128 fire engines, 57 ambulances and 767 firefighters. The fire began spreading on the scaffolding, moving indoors through the windows and then to all but one of the other buildings. At 20:15, the fire department reported that the conditions on scene continued to worsen, with debris falling from above and calls for help increasing, therefore necessitating the level 5 alarm to bring in more firefighters. Many residents remained trapped in their apartment units; however, the firefighters could not enter the buildings due to intense heat. Authorities instructed these trapped residents to shelter in place, and to seal window gaps and doors as the firefighters continued to try accessing the buildings to rescue them. Firefighters deployed seven ladders to douse the exterior of each burning building with water. At the same time, firefighters accessed the unaffected eighth building to activate the rooftop fire protection system to prevent a further fire spread and to fight the fire on the neighbouring building. Throughout the night, explosions were heard from various apartment units in the burning buildings.