Sporadic armed skirmishes took place between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the post-Assad Syrian Army, which was mainly composed of anti-Assadist opposition forces originating from the Syrian civil war, along the internal border between the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) and the Syrian transitional government from 2025 to 2026.
Initial clashes in January 2026 were sporadic and limited to exchanges of artillery shelling and small- to medium-arms fire in Dayr Hafir, Manbij, al-Khafsah, Deir ez-Zor, and their surrounding areas; however, heavy fighting and bombardments took place in Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyah during the Aleppo clashes. A comprehensive "ceasefire agreement" was signed on 7 October 2025 between the SDF and the Syrian Army, but clashes later resumed in December 2025 and January 2026 as the Syrian Army declared the neighborhoods "legitimate military targets".
Following the January 2026 northeastern Syria offensive by government forces, up to 80% of the DAANES' territory were captured and ceded to the Syrian government as part of an integration agreement. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 530 people, including 76 civilians, were killed in clashes between Syria's security and Syrian Democratic Forces.
Background
10 March agreement
During the fall of the Assad regime, a period marked by instability and uncertainty, Turkey and its affiliated militant group, the Syrian National Army (SNA), launched various offensives against Kurdish-controlled areas west of the Euphrates.
Following months of fighting, which stalled near the Tishrin Dam, and an SDF counteroffensive in December 2024, SDF leader Mazloum Abdi and the Syrian transitional government, led by Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, signed the US-backed 10 March Agreement. The agreement implemented a country-wide ceasefire and laid out principles for the integration of the DAANES into the new Syrian government. It envisaged equal representation for minorities in the political process and proposed integrating the SDF's military and civilian structures into the new Syrian state, while allowing the SDF to retain de facto control over border posts and oil fields in Kurdish areas. A follow-up agreement in April, which was reportedly also brokered with American involvement, established a joint security framework for the Kurdish enclaves in Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh, Aleppo. The neighborhoods remained under the control of the Asayish, when the SDF left on 4 April 2025 as part of the agreement.
Diplomatic tensions
Delays in implementing the 10 March agreement, with both sides accusing each other of obstruction, along with the cancellation of the SDF–Syria talks in Paris on 25 July and again on 9–10 August, heightened hostilities between the DAANES and the Syrian government, which, according to Hawar News and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), was facing increasing Turkish pressure. This pressure stemmed from Ankara's long-standing opposition to an autonomous Kurdish entity on its border, fearing it could fuel Kurdish nationalism in Turkish Kurdistan. Since 2015, Turkey has waged military campaigns against Kurdish forces in Syria and has, after the formation of the new Syrian transitional government, repeatedly threatened further invasions unless they integrate into the state institutions.
Integration of SNA militias and foreign fighters
The integration of SNA militias and Salafi jihadist fighters (including foreigners) during the Syrian Revolution Victory Conference into the new Syrian Army, along with the appointment of their commanders, was heavily criticized by the SDF, as the sides had in part fought earlier in the year and throughout the Syrian civil war as adversaries. Kurds within the DAANES were particularly critical, as SNA factions had been reported to engage in kidnappings of civilians, looting, beatings, and other human rights violations against Kurds, while minorities like the Alawites and Druze expressed their hostility towards the presence of Salafi jihadist foreign fighters, further leading to tensions between the sides.
Alleged government abuses and decentralization demands
The New Arab and The Insider also stated that the increasing tensions between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government were exacerbated in part by the Western Syria clashes and Southern Syria Clashes, in which government affiliated forces conducted a series of war crimes and massacres against Alawite and Druze civilians. This, in turn, damaged both the domestic and international standing of the government and intensified calls from various groups for minority rights and federalization. The transitional government was also criticized for failing to ensure minority representation, a key stipulation of the March agreement. Few government officials, and no senior military or security commanders, were drawn from minority communities. In wake of the events the DAANES organized the Conference on Kurdish Unity and Cooperation in Western Kurdistan and the Unity of Components conference in Hasakah, during which Kurdish, Druze, Alawite and Arab tribal leaders, including Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal, expressed support for a decentralized Syria. Both conferences were criticized by the transitional government for "violating the 10 March agreement," and the Unity of Components conference, in particular, was cited as a reason for the cancellation of the SDF–Syria talks in Paris. The crisis in Suwayda reportedly "cracked Damascus-SDF relations."
Blockade of Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh
At the beginning of July, tensions in Aleppo increased when government forces blocked fuel supplies from reaching the Kurdish-majority neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) described the blockade as a continuation of "old regime tactics."
Postponed elections
In August, government officials confirmed that al-Sharaa was pursuing a centralized government, as opposed to the federalization framework set out by the Kurds as a prerequisite for integration. Later that month the Syrian transitional government announced that elections would not be held in the Druze-controlled governorate of Suwayda and areas under the control of the DAANES, namely Hasakah and Raqqa, for "safety reasons". In response, the DAANES affirmed that the planned elections are not democratic and "do not in any way reflect the will of the Syrian people". It criticised the characterization of areas under DAANES control as "unsafe" and argued that it would "justify the policy of denial" against more than five million Syrians. Furthermore, it called on organisations like the United Nations not to recognize these elections.
Increasing military deployments
At the same time, some government-aligned members of Arab tribes in Deir ez-Zor particularly from the Al-Shaitat and Al-Baggara tribes called for "jihad and general mobilization" against the SDF and declared their "full support for other tribes and clans in backing the government of the Syrian Arab Republic." This development raised concerns that Arab tribes could be used by the transitional government against the SDF in a manner similar to their earlier use against the Druze in Suwayda. Coinciding increased Islamic State (ISIS) activity prompted additional SDF deployments along the Euphrates. The Alma Research and Education Center explained that the SDF sent "massive" military reinforcements to the Deir ez-Zor area to "fill the security vacuum" left as a result of the extensive withdrawal of American coalition forces. This was seen by some as "a move that directly contradicts the spirit of the [10 March] agreement", Alma Research says. Regional reports also claimed that Damascus had amassed as many as 50,000 troops near Palmyra, with "orders to advance on Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor unless the SDF cedes control", further heightening tensions along the SDF–STG contact line. Government reinforcements were also regularly deployed to the vicinity of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah in what was described as a "show-of-force operation" intended to raise fears of a possible field escalation.
Clashes
2025
In the months following the agreement, the Syrian transitional government engaged in several armed clashes with the SDF, primarily in Deir ez-Zor province, which is divided between the two sides along the Euphrates River, and near the town of Dayr Hafir, where a 20-meter-wide canal separates SDF and Syrian Army forces to the north. In turn both parties accused each other of violating the 10 March agreement.
The first clashes were reported on 2 August 2025 near Dayr Hafir and al-Khafsah. Syria's state-owned Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) claimed that four Syrian Army soldiers and three civilians were injured during the fighting, and made the SDF solely responsible for the incident.
On 4 August, the SDF accused government-linked factions of attacking four of its positions in the village of Al-Imam, near Manbij.
On 12 August, one Syrian Army soldier was killed in clashes with the SDF near Dayr Hafir. In addition the government's Ministry of Information claimed that two civilians were killed and three injured. Coinciding with the clashes the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) warned of a 'wider conflict' if the US does not remain fully engaged in preventing the collapse of the March agreement.
On 13 August, the Internal Security Forces (Asayish) claimed that an "interim government-affiliated" drone attack wounded two of its forces in the Kurdish enclave of Sheikh Maqsoud, Aleppo. The Syrian transitional government's Ministry of Defense denied the accusations. That same day the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported on a "wide deployment of armoured vehicles, and medium and heavy weapons" by the Syrian Army along the frontline, while the SDF raised its military readiness and reinforced its positions as well.
On 14 August, clashes broke out between the SDF and Syrian Army forces in Deir ez-Zor, amid reports of government armour heading eastwards. Machine guns and mortar fire were reported, injuring some Syrian Army soldiers as well as local fishermen. The pro-government news outlet Enab Baladi reported that one civilian was killed. On the same day the SOHR reported on tribal fighters, led by Abu Hatem Shaqra's 86th Division, which abducted six off-duty SDF fighters in a pharmacy in the town of Gharanij. The following clashes, which included mortar fire coming from government-controlled areas, lead to the death of one tribal fighter and injury of three more, while one SDF vehicle was seized. Two kidnapped members were released later on the same day, while the four others were freed on 16 August. The SDF increased its military presence in the region with over 100 military vehicles and YAT special forces after the events.
On 24 August, the SDF reported that "armed groups affiliated with the Damascus government" launched an attack on a military post of the al-Kasra Military Council in the town of al-Junaynah, Deir ez-Zor's western countryside, violating the ceasefire.
On 31 August, another round of clashes was reported in Tel Ma'az, near Dayr Hafir, between the SDF and the Syrian Army.
Around September, Turkey staged its first airstrikes in months on Kurdish positions, and the Kurds dug new defensive tunnels. Mottassem Abbas, commander of the Syrian Army's 80th Division, said to Reuters in an interview: "We're sending more men and weapons to reinforce [the contact line with the SDF]."
On 10 September, tensions flared, as the SOHR reported mutual shelling in Maskanah between the SDF and the Turkish-backed Suleiman Shah Brigade, a militant group that had been integrated into the Syrian Army as the 62nd Division. No casualties were reported. The FDD reported that clashes on the same day caused the death of two civilians and injury of three more.
On 14 September, clashes broke out between the SDF and Syrian transitional government forces near the al-Asharah-Darnaj bridge. According to a statement by the SDF, the "assault by armed groups linked to the Syrian government" was aimed at securing river crossings for smugglers, a claim confirmed by local sources cited by the SOHR.