The Sykes–Picot Agreement was a 1916 secret treaty between the United Kingdom and France, with assent from Russia and Italy, to define their mutually agreed spheres of influence and control in an eventual partition of the Ottoman Empire.
The agreement was based on the premise that the Triple Entente would achieve success in defeating the Ottoman Empire during World War I and formed part of a series of secret agreements contemplating its partition. The primary negotiations leading to the agreement took place between 23 November 1915 and 3 January 1916, on which date the British and French diplomats, Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot, initialled an agreed memorandum. The agreement was ratified by their respective governments on 9 and 16 May 1916.
The agreement effectively divided the Ottoman provinces outside the Arabian Peninsula into areas of British and French control and influence. The British- and French-controlled countries were divided by the Sykes–Picot line. The agreement allocated to the UK control of what is today southern Israel, Jordan and southern Iraq, and an additional small area that included the ports of Haifa and Acre to allow access to the Mediterranean. France was to control southeastern Turkey, the Kurdistan Region, Syria and Lebanon.
As a result of the included Sazonov–Paléologue Agreement, Russia was to get Western Armenia in addition to Constantinople and the Turkish Straits already promised under the 1915 Constantinople Agreement. Italy assented to the agreement in 1917 via the Agreement of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne and received southern Anatolia. The Palestine region, with a smaller area than the later Mandatory Palestine, was to fall under an "international administration".
The agreement was initially used directly as the basis for the 1918 Anglo–French Modus Vivendi, which provided a framework for the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration in the Levant. More broadly it was to lead, indirectly, to the subsequent partitioning of the Ottoman Empire following Ottoman defeat in 1918. Shortly after the war, the French ceded Palestine and Mosul to the British. Mandates in the Levant and Mesopotamia were assigned at the April 1920 San Remo conference following the Sykes–Picot framework; the British Mandate for Palestine ran until 1948, the British Mandate for Mesopotamia was to be replaced by a similar treaty with Mandatory Iraq, and the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon lasted until 1946. The Anatolian parts of the agreement were assigned by the August 1920 Treaty of Sèvres; however, these ambitions were thwarted by the 1919–1923 Turkish War of Independence and the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne.
The agreement is seen by many as a turning point in Western and Arab relations. Arabs saw it as the failure to keep a British promise in the McMahon–Hussein correspondence with Hussein bin Ali, King of Hejaz regarding a national Arab homeland in exchange for supporting the British against the Ottoman Empire. The British later claimed that Palestine was meant to be excluded from the area of Arab rule, as it is technically located west of Damascus: for obvious reasons the Zionists took the same position. The Arabs interpreted the letter as it reads: Lebanon, not Palestine, is to the west of Damascus and the other areas mentioned. The agreement, along with others, was made public by the Bolsheviks in Moscow on 23 November 1917 and repeated in The Manchester Guardian on 26 November 1917, such that "the British were embarrassed, the Arabs dismayed and the Turks delighted". The agreement's legacy has led to much resentment in the region, among Arabs in particular but also among Kurds who were denied an independent state.
Motivation and negotiations
Earlier agreements with Russia and Italy (March–April 1915)
In the Constantinople Agreement of 18 March 1915, following the start of naval operations in the run up to the Gallipoli campaign the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Sazonov, wrote to the French and UK ambassadors and staked a claim to Constantinople and the Dardanelles. In a series of diplomatic exchanges over five weeks, the UK and France both agreed, while putting forward their own claims, to an increased sphere of influence in Iran in the case of the UK and to an annexation of Syria (including Palestine) and Cilicia for France. The UK and French claims were both agreed, all sides also agreeing that the exact governance of the Holy Places was to be left for later settlement. Were it not for the Russian Revolutions of 1917, Constantinople and the Straits could have been given to Russia upon the Allied victory. This agreement and the Sykes–Picot Agreement were complementary, as France and Britain first had to satisfy Russia in order to finalize the partitioning of the Middle East.
In the Treaty of London of 26 April 1915, Article 9 included commitments regarding Italian participation in any partitioning of the Ottoman Empire. The article stated: "If France, Great Britain and Russia occupy any territories in Turkey in Asia during the course of the war, the Mediterranean region bordering on the Province of Adalia within the limits indicated above shall be reserved to Italy, who shall be entitled to occupy it."
Earlier agreement with the Arabs (July 1915 – March 1916)
While Sykes and Picot were in negotiations, discussions were proceeding in parallel between Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, and Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner to Egypt (the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence). Their correspondence comprised ten letters exchanged from July 1915 to March 1916, in which the British government agreed to recognize Arab independence after the war in exchange for the Sharif of Mecca launching the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire.
The area of Arab independence was defined to be "bounded on the North by Mersina and Adana up to 37 degrees of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jerizat (Ibn ʿUma), Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the South by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina", with the exception of "portions of Syria" lying to the west of "the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo".
Hussein's reply of 1 January to McMahon's 14 December 1915 was received at the Foreign Office, McMahon's cover stating:
Satisfactory as it may be to note his general acceptance for the time being of the proposed relations of France with Arabia, his reference to the future of those relations adumbrates a source of trouble which it will be wise not to ignore. I have on more than one occasion brought to the notice of His Majesty's Government the deep antipathy with which the Arabs regard the prospect of French Administration of any portion of Arab territory. In this lies considerable danger to our future relations with France, because difficult and even impossible though it may be to convince France of her mistake, if we do not endeavour to do so by warning her of the real state of Arab feeling, we may hereafter be accused of instigating or encouraging the opposition to the French, which the Arabs now threaten and will assuredly give.
After discussions, Grey instructed that the French be informed of the situation, although Paul Cambon did not take the agreement that seriously.
Anglo-French negotiations (October 1915 – March 1916)
On 21 October 1915, Grey met Cambon and suggested France appoint a representative to discuss the future borders of Syria as Britain wished to back the creation of an independent Arab state. At this point Grey was faced with competing claims from the French and from Hussein and the day before had sent a telegram to Cairo telling the High Commissioner to be as vague as possible in his next letter to the Sharif when discussing the northwestern, Syrian, corner of the territory Hussein claimed and left McMahon with "discretion in the matter as it is urgent and there is not time to discuss an exact formula", adding, "If something more precise than this is required you can give it."
"The main problem to be solved is to discover a middle course which will harmonise with the requirements of the various parties, which are as follows:
(a) France requires a settlement which (1) while compensating her for the inconvenience and loss attendant upon the disruption of the Ottoman Empire, will (2) safeguard her historic and traditional position in Syria, (3) assure her of full opportunity of realising her economic aspirations in the Near East.
(b) The Arabs require (1) recognition of their nationality, (2) protection of their race from alien oppression, and (3) an opportunity of re-establishing their position as a contributing factor in the world's progress.
(c) Great Britain requires (1) to assure her position in the Persian Gulf, (2) opportunity to develop Lower Mesopotamia, (3) (a) commercial and military communication between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean by land, (b) influence in an area sufficient to provide the personnel engaged in Mesopotamia irrigation work with suitable sanatoria, and hill stations, and containing an adequate native recruiting ground for administrative purposes, (4) to obtain commercial facilities in the area under discussion.
(d) Lastly, such a settlement has to be worked in with an arrangement satisfactory to the conscientious desires of Christianity, Judaeism, and Mohammedanism in regard to the status of Jerusalem and the neighboring shrines."
— "Preliminary Observations"; Sykes–Picot Joint Memorandum, 3 January 1916
The first meeting of the British interdepartmental committee headed by Sir Arthur Nicolson with François Georges-Picot took place on 23 November 1915. Picot informed the Nicolson committee that France claimed the possession of land starting from where the Taurus Mountains approach the sea in Cilicia, following the Taurus Mountains and the mountains further East, so as to include Diyarbekir, Mosul and Erbil, and then returning to Deir ez-Zor on the Euphrates and from there southwards along the desert border, finishing eventually at the Egyptian frontier. Picot, however, added that he was prepared "to propose to the French government to throw Mosul into the Arab pool, if we did so in the case of Baghdad".
A second meeting of the Nicolson committee with Picot took place on 21 December 1915 wherein Picot said that he had obtained permission to agree to the towns of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus being included in the Arab dominions to be administered by the Arabs. Although the French had scaled back their demands to some extent, the British also claimed to want to include Lebanon in the future Arab State and this meeting also ended at an impasse.
On Tuesday 28 December, Mark Sykes informed Gilbert Clayton that he had "been given the Picot negotiations". Sykes and Picot entered into "almost daily" private discussions over the six-day period; no documents survive from these discussions.
On Monday 3 January 1916, they agreed and initialled a joint memorandum containing what was to become known as the Sykes–Picot Agreement. They had agreed to compromise on the two primary areas of difference—they split the Mosul Vilayet in two at the Little Zab river, with the French taking the northern part (Mosul and Erbil) and the British taking the southern part (Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah), and Palestine was to be placed under an "international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other allies, and the representatives of the sheriff of Mecca."
The memorandum was forwarded to the Foreign Office and circulated for comments. On 16 January, Sykes told the Foreign office that he had spoken to Picot and that he thought Paris would be able to agree. An interdepartmental conference was convened by Nicolson on 21 January. Following the meeting, a final draft agreement was circulated to the cabinet on 2 February, the War Committee considered it on the 3rd and finally at a meeting on the 4th between Bonar Law, Chamberlain, Lord Kitchener and others it was decided that:
M. Picot may inform his government that the acceptance of the whole project would entail the abdication of considerable British interests, but provided that the cooperation of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil the conditions and obtain the towns of Homs, Hama, Damascus and Aleppo, the British Government would not object to the arrangement. But, as the Blue Area extends so far Eastwards, and affects Russian interests, it would be absolutely essential that, before anything was concluded, the consent of Russia was obtained.
Picot was informed and five days later Cambon told Nicolson that "the French government were in accord with the proposals concerning the Arab question".
Later, in February and March, Sykes and Picot acted as advisors to Sir George Buchanan and the French ambassador respectively, during negotiations with Sazonov.
Eventually, Russia having agreed on 26 April 1916, the final terms were sent by Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Edward Grey, on 9 May 1916, and ratified in Grey's reply on 16 May 1916.
The formal agreements between Britain, France and Russia comprised the eleven letters below.
In the chain of agreements between France, Russia and Britain, the Russian claims were assented to first: France confirmed their agreement on 26 April and Britain on 23 May, with formal sanction on 23 October. The Anglo-French agreement was confirmed in an exchange of letters on 9 May and 16 May.
Agreement with Italy (April–August 1917)
In a meeting in a railway car at Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne on 19 April 1917, a tentative agreement was reached between British and French Prime Ministers, David Lloyd George and Alexandre Ribot, and the Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Paolo Boselli and Sidney Sonnino; to settle the Italian interest in the Ottoman Empire—specifically article 9 of the Treaty of London. The agreement was needed by the Allies to secure the position of Italian forces in West Asia.
The goal was to balance the military power drops at the Middle Eastern theatre of World War I as Russian (Tsarist) forces were pulling out of the Caucasus campaign, even though they were replaced with the forces of what would be called the First Republic of Armenia. It was clear to the Italians that the area allotted to them may not be easily given up by the Turkish Empire, such that the British Prime Minister proposed a vague formula for post-war adjustment should the actual post-war allocation not appear to be balanced.
The agreement was drafted and negotiated by the countries' diplomats over the coming months, and signed by the allies between 18 August and 26 September 1917. Russia was not represented in this agreement as the Tsarist regime was in the midst of a revolution. The lack of Russian consent to the Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne agreement was subsequently used by the British at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to invalidate it, a position that greatly incensed the Italian government.
The brown zone and the imperial interest
Vereté describes how a dispute with the Ottoman Empire over the Eastern boundary of Egypt ended in 1906 when the borders were redrawn along the Rafa-Aqaba line and subsequently the fear of an attack on Egypt led to an increased strategic importance of "The hinterland of Sinai, western and eastern Palestine at least up to the Acre-Dar'a line".