The Soninke-Marabout War of 1850 to 1856 was a civil war between factions of the Kingdom of Kombo in the Gambia. The war resulted from a dispute between the Soninke people – pagans who were the ruling class in Kombo – and the Marabouts – a radical Muslim group with no representation in the governance of Kombo, partially inspired by Jihad. The British Empire, to whom parts of Kombo had been ceded by the Soninke since 1816, was initially reluctant to intervene. However, during the course of the war, the British intervened on two occasions. British forces stormed the Marabout town of Sabbajee twice, in 1853, and again in 1855, razing the town following the second intervention.
The conflict in Kombo was one of many Soninke-Marabout Wars across southern Senegambia, beginning in the early 19th century and continuing until the 1880s.
Origins
Gray, in his history of the Gambia published in 1940, described the primary cause of the war being the dissatisfaction with the governance of Kombo. The King of Kombo was always elected from the leading families of the district, all of whom were Soninke. The Soninke themselves, however, only comprised the central portion of Kombo. The main bond between the Soninke was considered their kinship, and they were led, at the time of the beginning of the conflict, by Suling Jatta, the King of Kombo.
The Marabouts, a faction that at the time was growing in strength, were excluded from the governance of Kombo. They were considered strongest at Gunjur, a town that had been Muslim for a longer time than the rest of Kombo, and had itself effectively declared independence in 1840. They were also strong in the southern villages surrounding Gunjur, as well as in the northern part of the kingdom around the town of Sabbajee and Brefet. Fodi Kabba was generally considered the principal leader of the Marabouts.
Early conflict
By 1850, the Marabout villages of the Kombo had formed a loose confederacy in order to contest the authority of the Soninke. There is some evidence to suggest that emissaries from North Africa and the Mediterranean coast had arrived in Senegal and the Gambia had been preaching a Jihad against non-Islamic communities.
Nature of the fighting
Demonstrations by the Marabouts began in 1850, but by the end of 1851 the disturbances had become serious and violent. The fighting between the two factions was primarily undertaken by mercenaries, most of whom were Serahulis, Serer, or Jola, who otherwise were not involved in the Soninke-Marabout dispute. Much of the fighting in this early stage took the form of a raid on an enemy village, the retaliation to which was another raid. However, it became clear that Suling Jatta was losing ground to the Marabouts, as he was outflanked to both the north and the south.
Marabouts
In particular, the Marabouts to the north in Sabbajee and Brefet were a threat to the Soninke. They had a number of supporters in Bathurst, the British capital in the Gambia, who supplied them with weapons and ammunition. The cession of part of Kombo to the British had not been popular among other citizens. In particular, Marabouts objected to Wesleyan Missionaries that now spread out among the Christian population of Kombo. A small number of elder Marabouts at Sabbajee objected to the war. However, they were both outnumbered and out-voiced by the faction that supported war. Gray has suggested that by this point, the war party of the Marabouts had been infiltrated by those with an anarchist drive, rather than a religious drive.
British response
The British colonial government at Bathurst was initially strictly neutral. In early 1852, Richard Graves MacDonnell, the Governor of the Gambia, issued a proclamation warning against people in British territory supplying arms or ammunition to either belligerent in the conflict. MacDonnell also informed the British government back in London that at some point it would be necessary for the British to intervene in the conflict. Though the British were under no treaty obligation to assist Suling Jatta, the Kingdom of Kombo had historically been good neighbours to the British, and observed the terms of their treaty. Faced with the choice of supporting the rightful ruler of the Marabouts, it was clear that the only option to restore law and order was to support the Soninke.
The British government was not prepared to give the necessary permission for MacDonnell to intervene at that point. However, as the months went on and the fighting continued, there was a growing concern that it would spill over to British Kombo. Lieutenant Colonel Luke Smythe O'Connor, who had by that point replaced MacDonnell as Governor, was instructed to use his discretion to put an end to the conflict. O'Connor proposed to Suling Jatta that he cede part of his unmanageable territory to the British, as long as the British quelled the rebels. O'Connor entered into negotiations with both the Soninke and the Marabouts. Both factions disliked the idea at first, but the Soninke eventually agreed as they saw no way of recapturing Sabbajee. A section of the anti-war Marabout elders also agreed, and on 24 May 1853 Suling Jatta and these elders signed a treaty whereby a strip of land, including Sabbajee, was added to British Kombo.
Storming of Sabbajee (1853)
Preparation
Upon the conclusion of the treaty between the British, the Soninke, and the Marabouts, it was apparent that the majority of residents of Sabbajee objected to its terms. Within 12 hours of signing the treaty, O'Connor moved a number of troops to Jeshwang. However, the inhabitants of Sabbajee refused to back down, and so a large force was gathered. This included an armed party from HMS Teazer, 463 soldiers of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd West India Regiments, 35 pensioners, and 105 men of the Gambia Militia. This was supported by a field battery consisting of two six-pounder field guns and two howitzers. On 30 May 1853, O'Connor's force marched from Bathurst to Jeshwang, eight miles (13 km) away. They made camp there and on 1 June advanced to attack the Marabouts in Sabbajee.
Storming of Sabbajee
Sabbajee was one of the oldest Muslim towns in Kombo. It boasted having the largest mosque in that part of Africa. More than a mile in circumference, Sabbajee was surrounded by a strong stockade, double ditches, and an outward abatis. It was believed that the people of Sabbajee could muster 3,000 fighting men, whose fighting ability was well known in the surrounding regions. Upon approach, O'Connor's force observed a large body of hostile fighters stationed around the mosque. The stockade was also lined with men, and a deep trench had been dug in the rear who could fire on any advancing British. O'Connor's force was drawn up in three divisions: the 1st West India Regiment, under Captain A. W. Murray, took the centre; the 2nd West India Regiment, under Captain Anderson, took the right; and the 3rd West India Regiment, under Captain Brabazon, took the left. At about 400 yards from the stockade, the field battery opened fire, and after a few rounds the roof of the mosque and the surrounding houses had gone up in flames.
Significant disorder then occurred in the Gambian ranks, and Lieutenant Colonel O'Connor took this opportunity and decided to storm the town. The right and left flanks extended in a skirmishing order, with the centre remaining in column, and the force advanced on the town. The fighters in Sabbajee kept up heavy fire from their stockade, over which a green flag was flying. The three divisions, which had advanced in a crescent, then rushed the stockade at three different points, and attacked the Gambians at bayonet-point. However, they discovered that the bulk of the defenders had retreated through the town. They had taken refuge in the nearby woods and were not pursued by the British.
Fanatics hold out
A "strong body of fanatics" still held the Sabbajee mosque, having extinguished the fire in the roof. They beat war-drums and there were cries of "Allah" from the priests. They kept up fire on the British troops as they entered the large central square of the town, where the mosque stood. The British soldiers were directed to occupy the houses enclosing the square and keep suppressing fire on the mosque until the rockets could be brought up. The second rocket that the British fired went through the roof, setting it alight again. Gambian efforts to put out the flames failed, and they quickly realised holding the mosque was untenable. Dozens committed suicide rather than surrender, and others threw themselves out the mosque and attempted to rush the British. Eventually, the fanatics in the mosque were either taken prisoner or killed.
War continues
Involvement of the Moors
Following the successful British storming of Sabbajee, O'Connor attempted to mediate between the Soninke and Fodi Kabba of Gunjur, the Marabout leader. However, his attempts were unsuccessful, so fighting continued. During the next two years, the Marabouts gained strength, despite ostensibly losing Sabbajee. Haji Ismail, a Moor, was at this time travelling through West Africa preaching Jihad. A number of his agents personally visited the Gambia, including a Moor named Omar. Omar had been involved in Abdelkader's rising against the French in Algeria in 1847, and preached Haji Ismail's Jihad in Sabbajee. Omar had some military training and organisational skill, and in early 1855 began planning an attack by a large Marabout force against the British settlements in Kombo.
Attack on Busumballa and on British in Sabbajee
On 24 June 1855, the Marabouts attacked Busumballa, the current capital of the Soninke. Although the attack was driven off, the King of the Kombo, Suling Jatta, was shot through the heart and killed. Although this attack did not form part of Omar's plan, it is evident that many Marabouts were spoiling for the fight. In early July 1855, Fodi Osmanu, a Marabout resident of Sabbajee, proceeded to Jeshwang in British Kombo and kidnapped a woman whose husband was already being held captive in Sabbajee. A warrant was issued in Bathurst for Fodi Osmanu's arrest. As it was realised there may be some difficulty in arresting him, a party was formed to execute the warrant. This consisted of the Queen's Advocate (Lieutenant Davis), a group of constables, and two officers with a sergeant's party from the 2nd and 3rd West India Regiments.
The party reached Sabbajee on 16 July, entered the town, and arrested Osmanu without resistance. However, when crossing back through the town square, they were attacked by a large armed party in all directions, while Osmanu escaped. Forming a square, the British forced steadily retreated from the town, repulsing several attacks. During this engagement, both Lieutenant Davis the West India Regiment officers, were wounded. The party retreated back to Jeshwang and took refuge in the house of James Finden, the Colonial Engineer and Officer Commanding the Gambia Militia. However, the Marabouts pursued the party to Jeshwang, forcing them to make a quick decision on how to proceed. It was decided that Finden should rush to raise the alarm, while the rest of the party, with the wounded officers, should evacuate to Cape House near Bakau.
The party with the wounded officers had a running fight for a mile and a half with the Marabouts. At Bakau Konko, a former Sergeant of the West India Regiments named Sankey, and a number of other pensioners, came to the party's assistance and kept the Marabout advance in check. Sankey's stand was sufficient to dissuade the Marabouts from advancing further, and they instead plundered some British property in Kotu. Receiving the news, O'Connor mustered all available men and set out for the Kombo. Arriving at Oyster's Creek, both Finden's house and the village of Jeshwang were seen to be in flames. O'Connor was able to find the three wounded officers at Cape St. Mary's on the evening of 16 July, and also met up with 25 pensioners under Sergeant Sankey.
Storming of Sabbajee (1855)
O'Connor's first attack
Early on the morning of 17 July, the whole force, which totaled 266 men, marched on Sabbajee, meeting no resistance until it arrived at the woods of Bakkow. To reach the town, it was necessary to proceed through the wood, which only had one single bush path. Before entering, O'Connor directed that rockets should be fired into the trees to see if any enemy were lying in wait.