The Sertorian War was a civil war in the Roman Republic fought from 80 to 72 BC between two Roman factions, one led by Quintus Sertorius and another led by the senate as constituted in the aftermath of Sulla's civil war. The war was fought on the Iberian Peninsula (called Hispania by the Romans) and was one of the Roman civil wars of the first century BC. The Sertorians comprised many Roman exiles from the Sullan proscriptions led by Sertorius, who fashioned himself proconsul, and native Celts, Aquitanians, and Iberians.
The war takes its name from Quintus Sertorius, the leader of the opposition. It was notable for Sertorius' successful use of guerrilla warfare. Sertorius was sent by the Marian regime as proconsul to Hispania in 83 BC, but was ejected by a Sullan army in 81 BC. He returned in 80 BC, landing in Hispania Ulterior, and campaigned with success against the Sullan governors, depicting himself as the legitimate Roman governor of Hispania while winning over the native tribes.
Sertorius consolidated control over both Hispanian provinces (Ulterior and Citerior) between 80–77 BC through pitched battles and guerrilla warfare, along with the aid of his legate Lucius Hirtuleius. Metellus Pius, sent against Sertorius in 80 BC, failed to dislodge him after several years of campaigning, as Sertorius repeatedly defeated him. The Roman Senate sent Pompey to help Metellus in late 77 BC, but in 76 BC Pompey was defeated by Sertorius at the Battle of Lauron, and the Sullan generals made no progress in the year.
75 BC featured four large battles that deteriorated the Sertorian cause. Marcus Perperna Veiento and Gaius Herennius were defeated by Pompey at the Battle of Valentia, while Metellus defeated Hirtuleius at the Battle of Italica. Sertorius engaged Pompey at the indecisive Battle of Sucro, and then the combined armies of Pompey and Metellus at the indecisive Battle of Saguntum.
The Sertorian armies were greatly diminished following these battles. The Sullan generals were able to call on reinforcements from Rome, and from 74 BC onward conducted a war of attrition that the Sertorians were unable to stop. After years of fighting, discontent in the Sertorian coalition grew and culminated in the assassination of Sertorius by Perperna in 73 or 72 BC. The war ended soon after when Perperna was promptly defeated by Pompey in the Battle of Osca.
Origins
During Sulla's civil war, Quintus Sertorius fought for the Marian-Cinnan faction against Sulla. In 83 BC, Sertorius, after falling out with his faction's leadership, was sent to the Iberian Peninsula as its governor. Unfortunately for Sertorius, his faction lost the war in Italy, and Sulla dispatched an army which drove him from Iberia. After some wandering, Sertorius ended up in Tingis in North Africa. There, he helped the locals depose Ascalis, a pro-Sullan tyrant. In Tingis he was met by an embassy of discontented Lusitanians, a fierce Celtic people, who implored him to lead them against the Sullan government which was extorting them back home. The Lusitanians chose Sertorius because of the mild policy he had pursued while governor in 82 BC, as compared to harsher earlier governors.
The Lusitani had a long history of resistance to Rome. Some historians have concluded that the Lusitani were seeking independence, and by taking over the leadership of the movement, Sertorius was opposing Rome itself. Philip Spann considers this unlikely, because were Sertorius to accept such a treasonable offer, it would be to destroy any hope of his return to Rome. More likely, the offer grew out of an acceptance by the Lusitani that they would not be able to defeat Rome and that their best hope was to assist the establishment in Rome of a regime sympathetic to them. Spann suggests that a major reason for Sertorius' acceptance was that it was becoming clearer that there would be no amnesty for him and his followers nor reconciliation with the regime set up by Sulla.
In 80 BC, Sertorius, after defeating off Mellaria a small naval force under Aurelius Cotta, landed in the Iberian Peninsula at Baelo, near the Pillars of Hercules (Gibraltar). Plutarch's account implies that Sertorius first went to Lusitania, where he organized the tribes and only then returned to the Baetis valley to defeat a Roman force under Lucius Fufidius (probably the governor of Hispania Ulterior). Spann suggests that a more probable sequence is that the battle of the Baetis River occurred during Sertorius' initial march to Lusitania.
Events of 80–77 BC
Sertorius‘ victory at the Baetis brought the majority of Hispania Ulterior back under his control. While he consolidated his power in the south-west (Ulterior) he sent his trusted lieutenant, Lucius Hirtuleius, to Hispania Citerior to take care of its governor, one Cotta, and the remaining Sullan forces on the Iberian Peninsula. Concerned at the growing threat, the authorities in Rome upgraded Hispania Ulterior from a propraetorian to a proconsular province, and appointed Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius, Sulla's consular partner of 80 BC, as its governor. In 79 BC, with Metellus on his way, Marcus Domitius Calvinus (who had taken over Hispania Citerior from Cotta) crossed over into Hispania Ulterior, he found his passage blocked by the army of Hirtuleius who had fortified Consabura.
Hirtuleius, a lieutenant of Quintus Sertorius, was taking a handful of cohorts up a narrow road between two steep and impassable mountains. On being told that a substantial enemy force was approaching he dug a ditch between the mountains, and set a wooden rampart behind that. He then set fire to the rampart and made his escape with the enemy cut off [on the other side of the flames].
Hirtuleius used guerrilla warfare to wear down Domitius Calvinus's army while he lured him inland. Eventually a battle was fought at the Anas River; where Domitius was defeated; he either died in battle or was killed by his own troops who defected to the rebels.
Metellus, unaware of the disaster, had already sent one of his legates, Lucius Thorius Balbus, to provide assistance to Domitius, but he too was defeated, this time by Sertorius himself. Domitius Calvinus's replacement as governor was Quintus Calidius. Metellus entered Spain in late 80 or early 79 BC, basing himself at Metellinum (modern Medellin), made several thrusts into the interior, but was thwarted by Sertorius who used guerrilla tactics.
He [Metellus] was accustomed to regular warfare with heavy infantry. He liked to command a solid, ponderous bloc of infantry. This formation was superbly trained to push back and vanquish the enemy in combat at close quarters. For constantly chasing men who floated like the wind over mountains he had to climb, for enduring – as their enemy did – constant hunger without either tent or campfire, his army was useless. The light armour and consequent agility of his Iberian warriors meant Sertorius was constantly shifting the focus and changing the situation, until Metellus was at his wits' end. Metellus was no longer young, and after the many heroic contests of his youth he was now inclined to ease and luxury, while Sertorius was full of mature vigour. ... When Sertorius challenged Metellus to single combat, Metellus' men cheered and urged him to fight it out, general on general, and they mocked him when he declined.
Lacking strong-points in central Hispania, Metellus set about creating them, he also started to methodically secure the cities and tribes of Hispania [this was the same strategy his father had used in the Jugurthine War when he had to fight king Jugurtha of Numidia who also used guerrilla tactics – Metellus had served on his father's staff back then]. Some of these forts are known today – Metellinum (Medellin), Castra Caecilia (Cáceres), Viccus Caecilius and Caecilina. This strategy might have worked on an inferior opponent, but Sertorius kept up a relentless campaign of hit-and-run attacks and ambuscades slowly wearing down Metellus who was soon forced to call for help.
Lucius Manlius, the governor of Gallia Transalpina, tried to come to Metellus's aid, he marched with three legions and 1,500 cavalry across the Pyrenees. He fought a battle with the forces of Lucius Hirtuleius near Ilerda where he was defeated and driven back into the city. After this setback, Manlius decided to retreat to his province. Hirtuleius tried to put Manlius under siege in Ilerda, but the governor of Gaul was able to escape. When he returned to Gaul where he was attacked by the Aquitani.
In 78 BC Metellus tried to take Langobriga (probably Laccobriga near Lisbon), a town allied to Sertorius. Metellus intended it to be an object lesson; he wanted the Celtic towns to know Sertorius could not protect them. Forewarned Sertorius supplied and fortified the city and stripped the countryside around Langobriga of anything useful. Through these countermeasures Sertorius not only forced Metellus into besieging the city but also caused him to rapidly run out of supplies. Metellus detached a legion to go scouting for provisions. Upon their return they were ambushed by Sertorius who routed them and forced them to abandon their supplies. Metellus was left with nothing to feed his army; he abandoned the siege and marched back to the coast. Back in Rome, Sulla died (78 BC) of natural causes leaving his faction without a strong leader.
In 77 BC Metellus adopted a more cautious strategy, only holding on to the line of the Baetis river while he awaited the events in Rome where a new revolt loomed. Sertorius left Metellus to his devices and concentrated on subduing those tribes in the interior that had not yet yielded to his authority.
Events of 76–74 BC
The ongoing Sertorian threat forced the government in Rome into taking drastic measures; they agreed that the new governor of Hispania Citerior should get a proconsular command and that he should be sent out with a sizeable army to support Metellus's struggle against Sertorius and his rebels. In 76 BC the Senate accepted a proposal by Lucius Marcius Philippus to send his son-in-law Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey), who had never been a magistrate, on behalf of the consuls (both of whom had refused the command themselves). Pompey recruited an army of 30,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, its size evidence of the seriousness of the threat presented by Sertorius, and marched to Hispania.
In the same year (76 BC) Sertorius was joined by Marcus Perperna, who brought the remnant of the army of rebellious consul Marcus Aemilius Lepidus from Sardinia. However, Perperna had only reluctantly agreed to put himself under Sertorius's command; he had sailed his army to Liguria and was raising troops from among the Ligurians and Gauls there. When his men heard that Pompey was marching north to deal with them, they demanded that Perperna take them to Hispania and join up with Sertorius. Perperna brought a substantial force of fifty-three cohorts (almost five-and-a-half legions) with him to Spain. Thus reinforced Sertorius decided to take on the eastern cities who supported the Sullan faction. His first target was the city of Lauron between Valentia and Saguntum. Meanwhile, Pompey had crossed the Pyrenees and was marching his army toward Sertorius. He intended to finish the rebellion in one stroke by trying to force Sertorius into a pitched battle and defeating him. Pompey also sent a fleet under his brother-in-law, Gaius Memmius, accompanied by the Spaniard Balbus, to try and take New Carthage, secure it as a base, and from there move up the coast. Memmius was immediately blockaded in the city, probably by Sertorius's pirate allies, and was unable to play his part in the campaign.
The Battle of Lauron
Pompey had a veteran army (recruited from among his own and Sulla's veterans) of 30,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry at his back and must have been very confident for he immediately took the offensive. Upon entering Hispania he started clearing the coastal strip from the Pyrenees to New Carthage in order to link up with Metellus who was in Hispania Ulterior. Initially successful, he suffered a major setback when he faced Sertorius at the city of Lauron. Sertorius arrived at Lauron first, and began to lay siege to the city. Pompey was very confident of victory; when he arrived he built his camp close to that of Sertorius to force Sertorius into battle. Sertorius decided to teach Pompey a lesson.
Pompey, was delighted with the way things had turned out, for he now positioned his army so that Sertorius was, as he believed, caught between the city and the army. So Pompey sent a messenger to the people of Lauron. He invited them to celebrate, and take their seats along the city wall to see how Sertorius enjoyed being besieged. Sertorius was told of this, and found it highly amusing. Sulla's pupil (as he jokingly liked to refer to Pompey) was due another lesson – this time from Sertorius himself.
Sertorius responded by sending out his light troops and cavalry to harass Pompey's foragers. He ordered his men to concentrate on the forage parties in the nearby areas but to leave the Pompeians in the more distant tracts alone. Eventually, tired of the continual raids, the Pompeians moved their foraging operations to the more remote areas. This was what Sertorius had been waiting for; During the night he ordered ten cohorts of heavily armed troops and ten cohorts of light troops under the command of Octavius Gracinus and two thousand cavalry under Tarquitius Priscus to move out of his camp and ambush the foragers.
The Battle of Lauron was a brilliant tactical victory for the Sertorians and proved the war was far from over. Unfortunately for Sertorius, Metellus fought his way past Perperna who was trying to keep him from interfering and came to Pompey's rescue. Unwilling to be caught between two enemies, Sertorius withdrew.