The Battle of Carrhae (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkar.rʰae̯]) was fought in 53 BC between the Roman Republic and the Parthian Empire near the ancient town of Carrhae (present-day Harran, Turkey). An invading force of seven legions of Roman heavy infantry under Marcus Licinius Crassus was lured into the desert and decisively defeated by a mixed cavalry of armoured cataphracts and light horse archers led by the Parthian general Surena. On such flat terrain, the legion proved to have no viable tactics against the highly mobile Parthian horsemen, and the slow and vulnerable Roman formations were surrounded, exhausted by constant attacks, and eventually crushed. Crassus was killed along with most of his army. It is commonly seen as one of the earliest and most important battles between the Roman and Parthian Empires and one of the most crushing defeats in Roman history. According to the poet Ovid in Book 6 of his poem Fasti, the battle occurred on 9 June.
Crassus, a member of the First Triumvirate and the wealthiest man in Rome, had been enticed by the prospect of military glory and riches and decided to invade Parthia without the official consent of the Senate. Rejecting an offer from the Armenian King Artavasdes II to allow Crassus to invade Parthia via Armenia, Crassus marched his army directly through the deserts of Mesopotamia. His forces clashed with Surena's troops near Carrhae. Surena's cavalry killed or captured most of the Roman soldiers. Crassus was killed when truce negotiations turned violent, and his death ended the First Triumvirate.
Background
Triumvirate
The war against Parthia resulted from political arrangements intended to be mutually beneficial for Marcus Licinius Crassus, Pompeius Magnus, and Julius Caesar, the so-called First Triumvirate. In March and April 56 BC, meetings were held at Ravenna and Luca, in Caesar's province of Cisalpine Gaul, to reaffirm the weakening alliance formed four years earlier. It was agreed that the Triumvirate would marshal its supporters and resources to secure legislation for prolonging Caesar's Gallic command and to influence the upcoming elections for 55 BC, with the objective of a second joint consulship for Crassus and Pompey. The Triumvirate aimed to expand their faction's power by traditional means: military commands, placing political allies in office and advancing legislation to promote their interests. Pressure in various forms was brought to bear on the elections: money, influence from patronage and friendship and the force of 1000 troopers brought from Gaul by Crassus's son Publius. The faction secured the consulship and most of the other offices that were sought. Legislation passed by the tribune Trebonius (the Lex Trebonia) granted extended proconsulships of five years, matching that of Caesar in Gaul, to the two outgoing consuls. The Spanish provinces would go to Pompey. Crassus arranged to have Syria with the transparent intention of going to war with Parthia.
Developments in Parthia
Meanwhile, in Parthia, a war of succession had broken out in 57 BC after King Phraates III had been killed by his sons Orodes II and Mithridates IV, who then began fighting each other over the throne. In the first stage, Orodes emerged victorious and appointed his brother as king of Media (his de facto governor) as a compromise. However, another armed clash made Orodes force Mithridates to flee to Aulus Gabinius, the Roman proconsul of Syria. Gabinius sought to interfere in the succession dispute on behalf of Mithridates so that Rome could make him its puppet king and seize control of Parthia in the process. However, Gabinius abandoned his plans and opted to intervene in Ptolemaic Egyptian affairs instead.
Mithridates proceeded to invade Babylonia on his own with some initial success but was soon confronted by the army of the Parthian commander Surena.
Gabinius's successor, Crassus, also sought to ally himself with Mithridates and invaded Parthia's client-state Osroene in 54 BC but wasted most of his time in waiting for reinforcements on the Balikh River's left bank while Surena besieged, defeated and executed Mithridates in Seleucia on the Tigris. Orodes, now unopposed in his own realm, marched north to invade Rome's ally Armenia, where King Artavasdes II soon defected to the Parthian side.
Crassus's preparations
Marcus Crassus, by then very wealthy, was around 62 when he embarked on the Parthian invasion. Greed is often regarded by ancient sources, particularly Plutarch, as his major character fault and his motive for going to war. Historian Erich S. Gruen believes, however, that Crassus's purpose was to enrich the public treasury since he himself was already very wealthy. Most modern historians tend to view insatiable greed, envy of Pompey's military exploits and rivalry as his motivations since his long-faded military reputation had always been inferior to Pompey's and, after five years of war in Gaul, Caesar's. His major military achievements had been the defeat of Spartacus in 71 BC and his victory at the Battle of the Colline Gate for Sulla a decade earlier. Plutarch noted that Caesar wrote to Crassus from Gaul and endorsed the plan to invade Parthia, an indication that he regarded Crassus's military campaign as complementary and not merely rivalrous to his own.
Another factor in Crassus's decision to invade Parthia was the expected ease of the campaign. The Roman legions had crushed the numerically superior armies of other eastern powers such as Pontus and Armenia. Crassus thus expected Parthia to be an easy target.
Cicero suggested an additional factor: the ambitions of Marcus's son, Publius Crassus, who had commanded successful campaigns in Gaul under Caesar. Upon his return to Rome as a highly decorated officer, Publius took steps to establish his political career. Roman sources view the Battle of Carrhae not only as a calamity for Rome and a disgrace for Marcus Crassus but also as a tragic end to Publius's promising career.
Some Romans objected to the war against Parthia. Cicero called it a war nulla causa ("with no justification") on the grounds that Parthia had a treaty with Rome. The tribune Ateius Capito put up strenuous opposition and infamously conducted a public ritual of execration as Crassus prepared to depart. Despite protests and dire omens, Marcus Crassus left Rome on November 14, 55 BC. Publius joined him in Syria the following winter along with a thousand Celtic cavalry from Gaul.
Invasion of Parthia
Crassus arrived in Syria in late 55 BC and immediately set about using his immense wealth to raise an army. According to Plutarch, he assembled a force of seven legions for a total of about 28,000 to 35,000 heavy infantry. He also had about 4,000 light infantry, and 4,000 cavalry, including the 1,000-strong Gallic cavalry that Publius had brought with him. With the aid of Hellenic settlements in Syria and the support of about 6,000 cavalry from Artavasdes, the Armenian king, Crassus marched on Parthia. Artavasdes advised him to take a route through Armenia to avoid the desert and offered him reinforcements of a further 10,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry.
Crassus refused the offer and decided to take the direct route through Mesopotamia in order to capture the great cities in the region. At Ichnae he easily defeated forces led by the local satrap, Silaces, who fled to advise Mithridates, then still battling his brother Orodes, of the invasion. The other cities, save Zenodotium, fell with no resistance; after it had fallen Crassus sacked it and let his troops claim the treasure for themselves. After that, he garrisoned 7,000 of them there and retreated to Syria with the bulk of his forces to spend the winter training the rest, flush with victory but generally inexperienced, for the more difficult battles he knew would come against the Parthians in the springtime, when he also expected his son to have arrived with his Gaulish forces, bolstering his army.
Late in the winter Artavasdes visited Crassus's camp at the head of a force of 6,000 cavalrymen, and reiterated his offer to provide troops if Crassus would march through Armenia. Again Crassus refused, possibly because he felt Roman forces were enough and may not have trusted Artavasdes completely, as he had been close to Pompey. Orodes, now the unchallenged king of Parthia after having defeated and executed his brother, also sent an emissary to discuss possible terms of peace. Crassus was not interested, seeking the political benefits of victory on Rome's terms, but did nothing to conceal his troops and preparations during the visit, allowing the Parthians to gain valuable intelligence.
In the spring of 53 BC, Crassus began marching on the Parthian heartland. Orodes divided his army and took most of the soldiers, mainly foot archers with a small amount of cavalry, to punish the Armenians himself. He sent the rest of his forces, an all-cavalry force under the command of spahbod Surena, to scout out and harass Crassus's army. Orodes did not anticipate that Surena's heavily outnumbered force would be able to defeat Crassus and merely wanted to delay him. Plutarch describes Surena's force as "a thousand mail-clad horsemen and a still greater number of light-armed cavalry". Including slaves and vassals, Surena's expedition numbered ten thousand in total, supported by a baggage train of one thousand camels.
Crassus received directions from the Osroene chieftain Ariamnes, who had assisted Pompey in his eastern campaigns. Crassus trusted Ariamnes, who, however, was in the pay of the Parthians. He urged Crassus to attack at once and falsely stated that the Parthians were weak and disorganised. He then led Crassus's army into what Plutarch describes as the most desolate part of the desert, far from any water. But US Army War College military historian Gregory Hospodor has found that Crassus followed a well-traveled caravan route that passed several towns along the Balikh River, which offered ample water at the time due to spring runoff, casting doubt on Plutarch's suggestion that Ariamnes was deliberately sabotaging Crassus. Crassus then received a message from Artavasdes that the main Parthian army was in Armenia, begging him for help. Crassus ignored the message and continued his advance into Mesopotamia.
Scouts sent ahead of the army regularly reported that Surena's forces seemed to be avoiding combat, which along with Ariamnes's information likely reinforced his expectations of a swift, decisive victory once battle was joined. He encountered Surena's army near the town of Carrhae on the morning of 9 June, when the reconnaissance screen found the scouts had been slain and a large force of cavalry was approaching.
Battle
After being informed of the presence of the Parthian army (which numbered roughly 10,000), Crassus's army panicked. Crassus' commanding general, Cassius, recommended that the army be deployed in the traditional Roman fashion, with infantry forming the centre and cavalry on the wings. At first, Crassus agreed, but he soon changed his mind and redeployed his men into a hollow square, each side formed by twelve cohorts. That formation would protect his forces from being outflanked but at the cost of mobility. The Roman forces advanced and came to a stream. Crassus's generals advised him to make camp and to attack the next morning to give his men a chance to rest. Publius, however, was eager to fight and managed to convince Crassus to confront the Parthians immediately.
The Parthians went to great lengths to intimidate the Romans. Firstly, they beat a great number of hollow drums and the Roman troops were unsettled by the loud and cacophonous noise. Surena then ordered his cataphracts to cover their armour in cloths and advance. When they were within sight of the Romans, they simultaneously dropped the cloths and revealed their shining armour. The sight was designed to intimidate the Romans.
Though Surena had originally planned to shatter the Roman lines with a charge by his cataphracts, he judged that it would not yet be enough to break them. Thus, he sent his horse archers to surround the Roman square, remaining beyond the range of the Roman pila javelins. Crassus thus sent his skirmishers to drive the horse archers off, but they were driven back by the latter's arrows. The horse archers then engaged the legionaries. The legionaries were protected by their large shields (scuta) and armour, but they could not cover the entire body. Some historians describe the arrows partially penetrating the Roman shields and nailing the shields to the limbs of the Roman infantry and nailing their feet to the ground. However, Plutarch wrote in his accounts that the Romans were met with a shower of arrows that passed through every kind of cover, hard and soft alike. Other historians state that most wounds inflicted were nonfatal hits to exposed limbs.