The Colombian peace process refers to the negotiations between the Government of Colombia under President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC–EP) aimed at ending the decades-long Colombian conflict. Formal negotiations began in September 2012 and were primarily held in Havana, Cuba. These talks culminated in the Final Peace Agreement between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP.
In 2016, negotiators announced the final agreement. President Santos and FARC commander-in-chief Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, better known as Timoleón Jiménez (nickname "Timochenko"), publicly signed the first peace accord. Londoño had assumed leadership of the FARC in 2011 following the death of Guillermo León Sáenz (better known as Alfonso Cano). At the event, Londoño issued a public apology, stating: “We are being reborn to launch a new era of reconciliation and of building peace.” However, the agreement was narrowly rejected in a national referendum held on October 2, 2016, with 50.2% voting against and 49.8% in favor.
A revised peace agreement was signed on November 24, 2016, and instead of holding another referendum, the government submitted it to the Congress of Colombia for ratification. Both houses of Congress ratified the new agreement on November 29 and 30, officially ending the conflict.
Background
The Colombian armed conflict is one of the longest-running ongoing armed conflicts in the world. It officially began in 1964 with the creation of two major guerrilla groups: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), founded by rebel leader Manuel Marulanda, and the National Liberation Army (Colombia) (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), which was later led by Spanish priest Manuel Pérez Martínez, also known as "El Cura Pérez". The ELN has been classified as a terrorist organization by the governments of Colombia, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and the European Union.
In 1990 and 1991, several smaller guerrilla groups reached peace agreements with the Colombian government, leading to their demobilization and reintegration into civilian political life. The first to do so was the 19th of April Movement (M-19), which disarmed in exchange for a blanket amnesty. Other groups that followed similar paths included most fronts of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) and the Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame (MAQL).
However, efforts to reach a peace agreement with the FARC were consistently unsuccessful. The most notable attempt prior to the 2012 peace process occurred between 1999 and 2002, during the presidency of Andrés Pastrana Arango. Pastrana granted the FARC a special demilitarized zone in southern Colombia to facilitate talks, but despite three years of negotiations, no agreement was reached. On February 20, 2002, Pastrana ended the peace process and ordered the military to retake control of the zone, just months before the 2002 presidential elections. During the process, the FARC had used the demilitarized area to hold hostages, negotiate prisoner exchanges, train fighters, and plan military operations.
This failed peace process coincided with an escalation in violence, driven in part by the rapid expansion of right-wing paramilitary groups such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), who opposed negotiations with guerrillas. Between 1998 and 2002, Colombia experienced some of its most violent years in recent history; the national homicide rate rose from 58.9 to 69.7 per 100,000 inhabitants, there were over 3,000 kidnappings annually, 390 attacks on civilian settlements and 898 massacres, primarily carried out by paramilitaries, resulting in more than 5,400 deaths.
Widespread public disillusionment with the peace process contributed to the election of Álvaro Uribe in 2002. Uribe ran on a hardline platform that rejected dialogue without a prior cessation of hostilities. As president, he implemented the democratic security (seguridad democrática) policy, reframing the conflict as a war on terrorism and drug trafficking. His administration pledged to “implacably punish” terrorism, dismantle armed groups, and reestablish state control across the country. Complementing this approach, Uribe launched collective and individual demobilization programs that offered pardons for political crimes and assistance to those who laid down arms. These efforts, along with the controversial Justice and Peace Law of 2005, provided the legal framework for the demobilization of paramilitary groups between 2003 and 2006.
As the FARC rejected President Uribe's new security policies, the Colombian government launched a large-scale military, political, and judicial offensive against the guerrilla group. While this strategy significantly weakened the FARC's military capabilities, it was also accompanied by serious human rights violations committed by the armed forces, most notably the "false positives" scandal. The government's offensive forced the FARC to retreat into remote rural areas and produced key results: the recovery of control over major highways, a sharp decrease in kidnappings, a reduction in the national homicide rate, and the restoration of state authority in several regions. These achievements, widely publicized in national media, contributed to Uribe's high approval ratings and provided the political momentum needed to pass a constitutional amendment allowing his reelection in 2006.
While government forces regained territory previously held by the guerrillas in the 1980s and 1990s, the FARC adapted by relocating and reactivating their operations in new strategic and border regions. They also carried out attacks in urban areas, such as the El Nogal Club bombing, and launched a counteroffensive in 2005.
During his second term, Uribe prioritized the consolidation of democratic security. In March 2008, FARC leader Raúl Reyes was killed in a controversial cross-border raid into Ecuador, triggering a regional diplomatic crisis. Just two months later, the group's founder, Manuel Marulanda, died of natural causes.
Amid these setbacks, the FARC attempted to regain political initiative by proposing a humanitarian exchange of hostages. In August 2007, facing public pressure, Uribe agreed to allow Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to mediate. However, Uribe terminated Chávez's role in November 2007. Subsequent hostage releases were carried out unilaterally by the FARC, with Venezuelan facilitation, as in Operation Emmanuel, or through military rescue operations, most notably Operation Jaque.
Although no formal peace negotiations with the FARC were initiated during President Álvaro Uribe's administration, there were reports of clandestine contacts between the government and the guerrilla group. In 2012, as the new peace process was underway, El Tiempo reported that Uribe had pursued "secret approaches with the FARC in search of a peace process" up until the final months of his second term.
In 2013, former Swiss mediator Jean Pierre Gontard revealed that, in 2006, Uribe had authorized three brief, unilateral military ceasefires to facilitate contact between the two parties.
In July 2008, following the successful rescue of 15 hostages by the Colombian military during Operation Jaque, the government initiated discreet contacts with the FARC. These included outreach to the group's new commander, Alfonso Cano, offering the possibility of a “dignified” exit from the conflict.
According to the Colombian government's 2010–2014 National Development Plan, the FARC had been forced to revert to basic guerrilla warfare tactics: carrying out sporadic, uncoordinated attacks against security forces and using intimidation against civilians.
In 2010, former Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos was elected president with Uribe's endorsement, campaigning on a platform that promised to continue consolidating democratic security. In September of that year, Santos celebrated the death of FARC military commander Mono Jojoy in a targeted military operation. Nonetheless, President Santos soon began to distance himself from his predecessor. In his inaugural speech, he stated that the “door to dialogue” was not “locked with a key", signaling openness to talks with illegal armed groups under certain conditions. In 2011, his administration secured congressional approval for the landmark Victims and Land Restitution Law (Law 1448 of 2011), which formally recognized victims of the armed conflict and granted reparation rights, including land restitution.
Santos also worked to restore diplomatic relations with neighboring Venezuela and Ecuador, which had deteriorated under Uribe. Venezuelan President Chávez shifted his position on the conflict and began advocating for a peaceful, negotiated solution, joining Cuba as an external supporter of dialogue.
Peace process
Exploratory meetings
A number of secret exploratory meetings between representatives of the Colombian government and the FARC began taking place in the spring of 2011. The FARC reported that the first of such meetings took place in March 2011 near the Colombian-Venezuelan border, with the guerrillas represented by Rodrigo Granda (the FARC's main international representative) and Andrés París (a veteran political theorist and negotiator), and the government by presidential advisers Alejandro Eder and Jaime Avendaño. Two further meetings took place by July, where both parties agreed to continue exploratory meetings in Havana, Cuba. These first contacts were meant to settle the details of where, how, and when the next stage of the process–secret encounters to set an agenda for talks–would be held.
In July 2011, the government appointed senior officials to participate in the process: Frank Pearl González, serving as environment minister; Sergio Jaramillo Caro, national security adviser to the president; and President Santos' brother Enrique Santos, former director of El Tiempo. For the magazine Semana, Enrique Santos' inclusion was a "gesture of confidence" by President Santos to the guerrilla forces, because of the familial ties between the two men and Enrique Santos' past involvement in dialogues with the guerrilla forces. The FARC negotiating team was joined by Mauricio Jaramillo and Marcos Calarcá.
Secret negotiations continued despite the death of Alfonso Cano, the FARC leader, in a military operation in November 2011. Semana reported that both negotiating parties had agreed to the principle that nothing coming from the outside could influence the discussions, while the FARC stated that its Central High Command had decided to continue the exploratory meetings, "for it was the will of Alfonso Cano".
Once the negotiators had been agreed upon, the two sides moved to designate foreign guarantor countries. Cuba, host to previous encounters, was a logical choice, while Norway was chosen as the second guarantor country for its active role in international conflict mediation. Additionally, two facilitator or "accompanying countries" were also designated. The FARC chose Venezuela, while the Colombian government chose Chile. Exploratory meetings continued in Havana in February 2012, with limited social exchanges between the two negotiating teams to preserve the confidentiality of the talks. By August 2012, nearly ten preparatory rounds had taken place, with each round lasting between four and eight days, for a total of approximately 65 encounters between both sides. The five main speakers for both sides remained in Cuba for the duration of the process.
In February 2012, as a first public "gesture of peace", the FARC announced by communiqué that it would henceforth proscribe the practice of extortive kidnappings, which it had "legalized" by its ley 002 in 2000.
In August 2012, former President Álvaro Uribe affirmed that the government was negotiating with the FARC in Cuba: claims which were denied by defence minister Juan Carlos Pinzón and foreign minister María Ángela Holguín. However, on August 27, Telesur broke the news that the government and the FARC were on the verge of announcing the signature of an agreement to begin formal peace negotiations, and President Santos later confirmed the information.
In a televised address on September 4, Santos announced the signature of a "general agreement" setting the rules and agenda for peace negotiations. He stressed that "past mistakes will not be repeated", as they would not demilitarize any territory or suspend military operations, and would hold the peace negotiations outside of Colombia with international support.
General Agreement
Delegations and installation of dialogues
A General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace (Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera) was signed by representatives of the Colombian government and the FARC on August 26, 2012, in Havana, Cuba. The agreement set a road map for the initiation of a formal peace process, established the rules by which the negotiations would operate, and outlined a five-point thematic agenda.