The Battle of Sedan or Second Battle of Sedan (12–15 May 1940) took place in World War II during the Battle of France in 1940. It was part of the German Wehrmacht's operational plan codenamed Fall Gelb (Case Yellow) for an offensive through the hilly and forested Ardennes to encircle the Allied armies in Belgium and north-eastern France. German Army Group A crossed the Meuse with the intention of capturing Sedan and pushing westwards towards the Channel coast, to trap the Allied forces that were advancing east into Belgium as part of the Allied Dyle Plan.
Sedan is situated on the east bank of the Meuse. Its capture gave the Germans a base from which to take the Meuse bridges and cross the river. They then advanced across the open and undefended French countryside to the English Channel. On 12 May, Sedan was captured without resistance and the Germans defeated the French defences around Sedan on the west bank of the Meuse. German Luftwaffe bombing and low morale prevented the French defenders from destroying the bridgeheads. On 14 May, the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and the French Armée de l'Air jointly tried to destroy the bridgeheads, but the Luftwaffe prevented them from doing so. In large air battles, the Allies suffered high losses which depleted Allied bomber strength in the campaign.
The French counter-attacked the German bridgeheads from 15 to 17 May, but the offensives fell victim to delay and confusion. On 20 May, five days after consolidating their bridgeheads, the German Army reached the Channel. Crossing the Meuse had enabled the Germans to achieve the operational goal of Fall Gelb and encircle the strongest Allied armies, including the British Expeditionary Force. The resulting June battles destroyed the remaining French army as an effective fighting force and drove the British from the continent, leading to the defeat of France.
Background
German plan
On 10 May 1940, the Wehrmacht invaded Luxembourg, Netherlands and Belgium. In the Netherlands, the Germans made steady progress. By 12 May, units of the German Army Group B were closing on Rotterdam and Amsterdam, while in central Belgium the Germans were close to reaching the Dyle river east of Brussels. In response, the Allied First Army Group, under the command of Gaston Billotte, containing the French Seventh Army, French Ninth Army, French First Army and the British Expeditionary Force, advanced to the Dyle river to form a solid front line as part of the Dyle Plan, a defensive strategy to halt the German advances in Belgium. However, the offensive by Army Group B was a diversion.
The main thrust of Fall Gelb was conducted by Army Group A through the Ardennes in Luxembourg and southern Belgium. Once these lightly defended areas were traversed, Army Group A's XIX Panzerkorps (19th Tank Corps), under the command of Heinz Guderian, struck into France at Sedan, located on the Meuse river. Its capture enabled a German advance into the undefended interior of France and to the English Channel, behind the Allied mobile forces advancing into Belgium. The result was a strategic encirclement.
For the offensive, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German High Command) gave Army Group A the most powerful concentration of German armour and motorised forces. Although Army Group B was allocated 808 tanks, over 1⁄4 of the total German tanks, they were largely light tanks such as the Panzer I and Panzer II, as opposed to the Panzer III and Panzer IV. The heavier tanks were assigned to Army Group A, as it required the best machines to conduct the critical operation at Sedan. Army Group A had 1,753 tanks of the heavier types.
'Impenetrable' Ardennes
Following the First World War, the French General Staff had ruled out the idea of a future German thrust through the Ardennes–Sedan sector. They were certain such terrain could not be crossed by tanks. Marshal Philippe Pétain described them as "impenetrable", while French general Maurice Gamelin described the geographical feature as "Europe's best tank obstacle". The "barrier" of the Meuse and Ardennes appeared to be a sound strategic defence feature that a future enemy could not get through or go around. The French concluded that, at best, a German assault through the Ardennes towards Sedan could not reach the Meuse for two weeks, and would take between five to nine days to penetrate the Ardennes alone.
The French assessments were less credible in the light of military exercises carried out in 1938. That year, General André-Gaston Prételat took command of manoeuvres which created a scenario whereby the German Army launched an assault with seven divisions, including four motorised infantry divisions (the type of the remaining three are not given) and two tank brigades. The "French" side's defences collapsed. "The result was a defeat of so comprehensive a nature that the wisdom of publishing it was questioned lest morale be damaged." As late as March 1940, a French report to Gamelin named the defences at Sedan, the last "fortified" position on the Meuse, and the last before the open country of France, as "entirely inadequate." Prételat had correctly identified the landscape as relatively easy terrain for armour to cross. At most, he concluded, the Germans would need 60 hours to reach the Meuse and one day to cross it. This estimate was to prove inaccurate by just three hours; the Germans achieved the Meuse crossing after just 57 hours.
The French Army authorised strengthening of the fortifications in the autumn of 1939, but severe winter weather prevented the pouring of concrete and the delivery of the necessary materials. On 11 April 1940, General Charles Huntziger asked for another four divisions to work on the defences but was denied.
French defences at Sedan
The French defences at Sedan had been neglected and were weak. The French had long believed that the German Army would not attack through the Sedan sector, and only Brigadier General Henri Lafontaine's French 55th Infantry Division, a category B division, was allocated to this sector. The Maginot Line ended 20 kilometres (12 mi) east of Sedan at La Ferté, with Fort No. 505 as its westernmost component. Sedan was a part of the extended Maginot Line that ran north behind the Meuse river. Between Sedan and La Ferté lay the Stenay gap, a stretch of unprotected terrain not covered by French defences or natural obstacles. This was the reason a significant number of French generals insisted on strengthening this sector, while ignoring Sedan.
As the French constructed further fortifications, Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft detected the activity and reported it. The steep slopes on the banks of the Meuse, added to what appeared in photographic reconnaissance to be a formidable barrier of bunkers and defence lines, caused Colonel-General Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander in chief of Army Group A, to question the wisdom of Guderian in choosing Sedan as the point of maximum effort. To identify how strong these fortifications were, a team of photographic specialists were called in to evaluate the pictures. Their analysis concluded that what appeared to be strong fortified positions were just the construction sites of half-built bunkers that were, to all intents and purposes, empty shells. The contribution of the specialists tilted the Sedan attack plan in Guderian's favour.
General Huntziger was happy to rely on "concrete" to ensure the safety of Sedan, as he had rejected the idea that the Germans would attack through the Ardennes. The Second Army built 52,000 cubic metres (1,800,000 cu ft) of concrete fortifications along its front, but very little in the Sedan sector. Only 42 bunkers protected the Sedan bridgeheads on the outbreak of war in September 1939 and an additional 61 were built by 10 May. However, by 10 May, most of the bunkers were incomplete, lacking gun port shutters for the artillery casemates. Some of the bunkers lacked rear doors, making them vulnerable to infiltration by infantry. To the north of Sedan, on the northern bend of the Meuse, the town of Glaire overlooked the crossing points on the river, which was to be where the German armour would deliver its heaviest blow. There was a gap of 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) between Bunker 305 at Glaire and Bunker 211 next to the Pont Neuf bridge. This allowed an attacker coming from the north to use the good roads along the Fleigneux–Saint-Menges–Glaire axis to enter Sedan from the north.
The defences at Sedan also lacked any mines. The French Second Army was guarding a front of 70 kilometres (43 mi), and was given only 16,000 mines. Of that number, 7,000 were given to the cavalry divisions that were intended to delay a German advance through southern Belgium, as well as to blockhouse points along the Franco–Belgian border. That left 2,000 for the defence of the Meuse. Of those, the 55th Infantry Division got 422. Not all of these were laid, and some barriers were moved during the bunker construction in the Sedan sector.
German approach
As the German Army advanced through southern Belgium on 12 May, General Ewald von Kleist and Guderian clashed over where the main point of attack should be. Kleist was Guderian's immediate superior, commanding Panzergruppe von Kleist, consisting of XLI and XIX Panzer Corps (under Guderian). Kleist pressed for Flize, further west than Sedan. Kleist argued that the blow would avoid a double river crossing at the Meuse (at Sedan) and Ardennes canal (to the west of Sedan). Moreover, the blow would strike at the dividing line between the French Ninth and Second armies. Guderian saw things differently, and pointed out that a thrust along the lines of Kleist's plan would put the flank of the advance within range of the fortress artillery at Charleville-Mézières, some 25 kilometres (16 mi) north-west of Sedan. The shift of operations further north would also disperse concentration (or Schwerpunkt) and disrupt the intense planning of the German tactical units, which had been in training for the Sedan attack and an advance north-west for months. He also felt that regrouping in front of Sedan would delay the assault for 24 hours and allow the French to bring up reinforcements. Kleist agreed that such a delay was unacceptable, so he agreed to Guderian's plan.
Nevertheless, while Kleist accepted the folly of choosing Flize, he insisted the offensive concentration point should be made west of the Ardennes Canal. Kleist reaffirmed this in a letter to Guderian on 18 April, but when operations began Guderian ignored this completely. He had wanted a large, 20-kilometre (12 mi) bridgehead at Sedan and the rapid occupation of Stonne and the high ground surrounding Sedan.
Guderian's plan for 13 May was straightforward. The 2nd Panzer Division in the north was to form the right flank of the assaulting force when it reached the Meuse near Donchery. The 1st Panzer Division, reinforced by the Infantry Regiment Großdeutschland, a battalion of assault engineers, and divisional artillery of the 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions, was to make the main attack by crossing the Meuse just north of Sedan and seizing the Heights of la Marfee overlooking the city. The 10th Panzer Division was to cross the Meuse south of Sedan and protect the southern flank of the corps. Throughout the day, large masses of troops and equipment assembled north of the Meuse in preparation for the river crossing.
Forces involved
German forces
The German forces consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions. The 1st Panzer Division, under the command of General-Major (Major General) Friedrich Kirchner, had on strength 52 Panzer IIs, 98 Panzer IIIs, 58 Panzer IVs, 40 Panzer 35(t)s and eight Sd.Kfz. 265 Panzerbefehlswagens. The 2nd, under the command of Generalleutnant (Lieutenant General) Rudolf Veiel, had 45 Panzer Is, 115 Panzer IIs, 59 Panzer IIIs and 32 Panzer IVs. It also had 16 Sd.Kfz. 265s. The 10th, under the command of Generalleutnant Ferdinand Schaal, had 44 Panzer Is, 113 Panzer IIs, 58 Panzer IIIs, 32 Panzer IVs and 18 Sd.Kfz. 265s. In total Guderian commanded three out of eight divisions that Panzer Group Kleist had, consisting of up to 60,000 infantry troops, 41,000 vehicles, 788 tanks and 141 artillery pieces. He could also call upon 1,470 aircraft.
Part of Guderian's problem was the lack of mobile artillery. He had no intention of halting a breakout to wait for additional artillery units to be moved into place to assault Sedan. Instead, he requested maximum support from the Luftwaffe. For the first few days, the German air arm would be used mostly in support of Army Group B. Most of the that was to be provided by Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3). Initially, only limited numbers of air units were to be used, but the Luftwaffe's workload was greatly increased as the battle neared. The Luftwaffe was to commit I. Fliegerkorps (1st Air Corps under Ulrich Grauert), II. Fliegerkorps (under Bruno Loerzer), V. Fliegerkorps (under Robert Ritter von Greim), and VIII. Fliegerkorps (under Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen). These units came from Luftflotte 2 and Jagdfliegerführer 3 (Fighter Leader 3). The most significant unit was VIII. Fliegerkorps, nicknamed the Nahkampf-Fliegerkorps (Close Support Air Corps), which contained Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 (Dive bomber Wing 77), a powerful concentration of dive-bomber units equipped with the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka precision ground attack aircraft. This powerful air concentration numbered some 1,470 aircraft: 600 Heinkel He 111 and Junkers Ju 88 medium bombers and Dornier Do 17 light bombers, 250 Ju 87s, 500 Messerschmitt Bf 109s and 120 Messerschmitt Bf 110s.