The Battle of Niakhura, also known as the Battle of Iori River and Battle of Kakabeti, took place on 7 November 1800. During this battle, the invading army of Umma Khan V, which had entered the territory of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (Georgia) in alliance with the Georgian prince Alexander, suffered a crushing defeat.The victorious forces consisted of two Russian battalions under Major Generals Ivan Lazarev and Vasily Gulyakov, supported by the Georgian militia commanded by princes Ioane and Bagrat.
This battle marked a decisive episode in the defense of eastern Georgia against incursions from the north Caucasian highlands, consolidating Russian influence in the region and weakening the opposition to the reigning Georgian monarch.
Background
At the end of the 18th century, the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti faced constant attacks from the Persian and Ottoman Empires (the latter from the direction of Akhaltsikhe), as well as systematic raids by North Caucasian mountaineers. These incursions caused irreparable damage to both the material and human resources of Georgia. At the same time, internal strife within the ruling Bagrationi dynasty intensified following the death of King Heraclius II in 1798 and the accession of his son by his second marriage, George XII. Although the raids inflicted severe losses upon the kingdom, George XII, seeking protection from his rebellious brothers, was compelled to maintain in his service up to 7,000 of the same mountaineers (the Lezgin Corps), paying them substantial wages while overlooking their acts of lawlessness, including looting and violence even in Tbilisi itself.
The most influential Dagestani ruler of the time, Umma Khan V, received from George an annual tribute of 5,000 rubles (presented as a “gift”) to deter him from raiding Georgian territory. Nevertheless, other Dagestani chieftains continued to conduct independent incursions into Georgian lands. The population suffered under unbearable taxation, while the central authority of the monarchy was effectively abolished.
In addition, at the beginning of 1798, an outbreak of the plague spread rapidly across eastern Georgia, exacerbating the crisis. Faced with so many hardships, many inhabitants abandoned the country altogether.
At the same time, the Russian Emperor Paul I did not yet recognize George XII as king of Kartli-Kakheti and, contrary to the Treaty of Georgievsk of 1783—concluded between Catherine II and Heraclius II (at the latter's request), placing Georgia under Russian protection—Paul refused to provide any assistance to the Georgian kingdom.
In 1798, the Persian shah Fath-Ali offered George his patronage, warning that otherwise the Persian army would again devastate his land and capital. Losing hope in Russia, George that same year secretly sent Prince Aslan Orbeliani to the Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid I with a request to accept Georgia under the Porte's protection. However, while Orbeliani was still in Akhaltsikhe, George's son David arrived in Tbilisi from St. Petersburg, bringing news of “the emperor Paul’s gracious disposition toward Georgia.” George immediately recalled Orbeliani and sent the same petition to Paul, explaining the situation and requesting the dispatch of 3,000 (or, in another letter, 5,000) Russian soldiers “fully armed and equipped with all military provisions.”
Arrival of Russian troops in Georgia
On 23 February 1798, an imperial rescript was issued ordering the dispatch of the jäger regiment of Major General Ivan Lazarev to Georgia. The regiment was fully equipped and provisioned with new rifles, ammunition, commissariat supplies, baggage trains, and other necessities, and underwent thorough inspection before departure.
On 20 October 1799, Lazarev, accompanied by his regiment, a Cossack detachment, and an artillery team with four guns, as well as two guns assigned to the Georgian troops, set out from Mozdok. The march across the Caucasus Mountains proved extremely difficult due to frost, heavy snowstorms, and the inadequacy of the roads for artillery and wagons. During skirmishes with local mountaineers (either Kists or Ingush), one non-commissioned officer was killed, and another officer died of illness.
The campaign lasted 36 days. On 26 November 1799, the regiment, numbering 885 men, held a parade three versts from Tbilisi, where it was met by King George XII, accompanied by his sons and a large retinue of nobles and clergy. More than 10,000 citizens gathered to witness the arrival of the Russian troops. The regiment formed in line and, to the beat of drums, greeted the king with a loud “Hurrah!”. The crowd, “unable to restrain their emotion, surged forward, embraced the jägers, and greeted them with brotherly kisses.” Later that day, under the peal of church bells and artillery salutes, the regiment entered Tbilisi.
Meanwhile, Shah Fath-Ali of Persia continued to regard Georgia as part of the Persian Empire and planned another assault on Tbilisi. The Russian envoy in Georgia, Privy Councillor P. I. Kovalevsky, sent letters to Tehran, expressing hopes for continued friendship between the two states and citing the Treaty of Georgievsk (1783) as grounds for warning against a Persian invasion. Despite this, Persian forces under the nominal command of Abbas Mirza advanced toward the South Caucasus.
In the Persian camp, located near Kars, appeared the exiled Georgian prince Alexander, brother of King George XII, seeking to resolve his political disputes in Georgia with Persian assistance. On 22 June 1800, envoys from Abbas Mirza arrived in Tbilisi carrying a firman from Shah Fath-Ali. They demanded a private audience with the king, but George refused, instead receiving them in Kovalevsky's residence in the presence of Lazarev and the officers of the jäger regiment. The envoy openly delivered the shah's ultimatum—complete submission of Georgia to Persia—or another invasion of Tbilisi.
As soon as news of this reached St. Petersburg, Lieutenant General Karl Knorring, commander of the Caucasian division, received on 22 July orders to prepare for dispatch to Georgia nine infantry battalions, ten dragoon squadrons, and artillery. Soon afterward, however, it became known that the Persian army, having plundered the Echmiadzin Monastery, had withdrawn beyond the Aras River. At the same time, Kovalensky, in his letter of August 21 to Privy Councillor Sergey Lashkarev, expressed the opinion that there were clearly insufficient Russian troops in Georgia.
It was soon decided to send to Georgia only the musketeer regiment of Major General Vasily Gulyakov, accompanied by a Cossack hundred and four guns. Should circumstances demand it, other Russian troops stationed along the Caucasian Line near Mozdok were kept ready for immediate deployment. On 25 August 1800, Gulyakov departed from Mozdok, and on 23 September arrived in Tbilisi, where his regiment was received with celebrations equal in grandeur to those that had greeted Lazarev's jägers a year earlier.
The presence of Russian forces in Georgia was intended solely for defense against external enemies. Should internal strife arise, an imperial rescript of 29 October (10 November) ordered that the troops be withdrawn immediately to prevent their involvement in civil conflicts.
Umma Khan's invasion of Georgia
Umma Khan’s Request for Russian Protection
In early August 1800, an envoy from Umma Khan V, Haji Musa, arrived in Mozdok with a petition addressed to Emperor Paul I of Russia. In it, the Avar ruler sought to place his dominion, the Avar Khanate, under the protection of the Russian Empire. In a report dated 3 (15) August, General-Lieutenant Karl Knorring requested permission from the Emperor to send the Avar envoy onward. By rescript of 26 August, Paul I granted approval for the envoy's arrival in Saint Petersburg. It was further decided that, should Umma Khan and his lands enter Russian allegiance, the annual payment of 5,000 rubles, formerly made to him by the Georgian king, would henceforth be provided by the Russian government as a lifetime pension “in reward for his fidelity.”
However, even before this permission reached its destination, at the end of August 1800, Umma Khan had already set his army in motion toward the Georgian border, signaling a turn from diplomacy to military action.
The plan to capture Tbilisi
A plan of attack on Tbilisi was drawn up, according to which Prince Alexander, with 2 thousand men, was to capture Sagarejo (about 50 versts from Tbilisi). The rest of the army was divided into two groups: one was to go directly to Tbilisi and try to capture it, while the other was to cross the river Kura (on the right bank) and join the troops of Imeretian King Solomon II, along with the opposition brothers of George—Iulon, Vakhtang, and Parnaoz. With their united forces, they were to approach Tbilisi from the west. In case the first group could not take it, they were supposed to do so together with the united forces of the second.
Lazarev's correspondence with Umma Khan and Alexander, and the movement of their troops
In mid-October, Umma Khan sent a letter to the Georgian prince David, explaining that his "hostile" actions against Georgia were a result of George's failure to pay the tribute owed to him.
Upon receiving the first reports of Umma Khan's movement, George sent his sons Ioane and Bagrat with 2,000 of the best Georgian troops to the Kakhetian border at Signagi, located 85 kilometers from Tbilisi. There, the princes began assembling a local militia. Lazarev, however, initially downplayed the significance of Umma Khan's advance, believing that the latter was unaware of the retreat of the Persian forces and the arrival of a Jaeger Musketeer Regiment in Tbilisi to reinforce him. But soon, after learning of Umma Khan's plans, Lazarev and Gulyakov, each leading a battalion from his regiment along with a Cossack detachment (1,224 men and 4 guns), set out to confront him on October 28. The remaining forces under Colonel Karyagin stayed behind in Tbilisi to maintain order and safeguard the capital from internal threats. On October 31, Umma Khan crossed to the left bank of the Alazani River at the Urdo ford and positioned his army on the plain near the Top-Karagach tract, about 16 miles from Signagi. The following day, a Russian detachment arrived in Signagi, where Bagrat's forces had already grown to 3,000 Georgian troops, with more militia continuing to join them.
That day, Lazarev sent a letter to Umma Khan urging him to leave Georgia, which was under Russia's protection. He pointed out that the actions of the "high-ranking khan" were not in line with his own request for Russia's patronage, which had already been promised to him by the Emperor. In response, Umma Khan assured Lazarev that he harbored no “hostility” toward Russia, “except for united friendship,” but, having hosted Prince Alexander, he felt it his duty to assist him. Umma Khan also expressed his hope that Alexander would reconcile with his elder brother George. Following this, Lazarev urged Alexander to return to Tbilisi and reconcile with his brother, offering his full cooperation to facilitate the process. However, Alexander remained steadfast in his position.
On 4 November, the Russian-Georgian army advanced and, upon reaching the village of Prasiani, set up camp. The following day, Lazarev decided to attack the enemy and approached within 6 versts. Before the assault, he once again appealed to Umma Khan, demanding that he leave Georgia within twenty-four hours to avoid bloodshed. A parliamentarian (Captain Kalantarov of Georgian service) was sent with the message, ordered to return with a response in no more than three hours, but he was detained in Umma Khan's camp. Meanwhile, Umma Khan, having instructed his troops to avoid direct confrontation with the Russian detachment, bypassed his camp on the night of 6 November and moved toward Sagarejo. In the morning, with no definite results, the parliamentarian returned,and Georgian mounted pickets reported the movement of the Highlanders. The Russo-Georgian army immediately broke camp and moved in the opposite direction along their previous path, parallel to Umma Khan's army, with the aim of attacking his flank and forcing him into battle. To navigate the difficult terrain, the transport, arranged in a Wagenburg formation and protected by 100 huntsmen and musketeers with 2 officers, was left near Prasiani. By evening, the Russo-Georgian army reached a long valley and camped in a convenient location with a water source, while Umma Khan's army settled along the edge of the forest near the village of Kakabeti, on the right bank of the Iori River.