The Battle of Bir Hakeim (Arabic pronunciation: [biʔr ħaˈkiːm] ⓘ) took place at Bir Hakeim, an oasis in the Libyan desert southwest of Tobruk, during the Battle of Gazala (26 May – 21 June 1942). The 1st Free French Brigade (Général de brigade Marie-Pierre Kœnig) defended the position from 26 May to 11 June against Axis forces of the Panzerarmee Afrika (Generaloberst Erwin Rommel) that captured Tobruk ten days later.
The delay imposed on the Axis offensive by the defence of Bir Hakeim influenced the cancellation of Operation Herkules, the Axis invasion of Malta. Rommel invaded Egypt, slowed by British delaying actions until the First Battle of El Alamein in July, where the Axis advance was stopped. Both sides used the battle for propaganda, Winston Churchill declared the Free French to be the "Fighting French".
Background
Eighth Army
At the beginning of 1942, after its defeat in western Cyrenaica during Unternehmen Theseus, the British Eighth Army under Lieutenant-General Neil Ritchie faced the Axis troops in Libya roughly 48 km (30 mi) west of the port of Tobruk, along a line running from the coast at Gazala, southwards for about 48 km (30 mi). Both sides accumulated supplies for an offensive to forestall their opponent and General Claude Auchinleck, Commander in Chief of Middle East Command, hoped for the Eighth Army to be ready by May. British code-breakers tracked the dispatch of convoys to Libya as the British offensive on Axis shipping to North Africa was neutralised by Axis bombing of Malta and forecast that the Axis would attack first.
As the Eighth Army was not ready to take the offensive, Ritchie planned to fight a defensive battle on the Gazala line. Auchinleck's appreciation of the situation to Ritchie in mid-May expected either a frontal attack in the centre of the Gazala line, followed by an advance on Tobruk or a flanking move to the south, looping around the Gazala line towards Tobruk. Auchinleck saw the former as more likely (with a feint on the flank to draw away the Eighth Army tanks) while Ritchie favoured the latter. Auchinleck suggested that British armour be concentrated near El Adem, where it would be well placed to meet either threat.
Since Operation Crusader in late 1941, the Eighth Army had received American M3 Grant medium tanks with a 37 mm gun in a turret and a 75 mm gun in a hull sponson, which could penetrate the armour of the opposing Panzer III Ausf. H and J and the Panzer IV tank models at 590–780 m (650–850 yd). The frontal armour of the Grant was thick enough to withstand the 50 mm Pak 38 anti-tank gun at 910 m (1,000 yd) and the short-barrelled 50 mm KwK 38 gun of the Panzer III at 230 m (250 yd). The first 112 of the new British 6-pounder (57 mm) anti-tank guns had arrived and been allotted to the motor brigades of the armoured divisions.
Panzerarmee Afrika/Armata Corazzata Africa
At the meeting of Axis leaders at Berchtesgaden on 1 May, it was agreed that Rommel should attack at the end of the month to capture Tobruk. The Panzer Army Africa (Panzerarmee Afrika/Armata Corazzata Africa) was to pause at the Egyptian border, while the Axis captured Malta in Operation Herkules and then Rommel was to invade Egypt. The Panzerarmee had finished converting to the up-armoured Panzer III Ausf. H and had received nineteen Panzer III Ausf. J, known to the British as Mark III Specials, with long-barrelled 5 cm KwK 39 guns. Four Panzer IV Ausf. G (Mark IV Specials) with long-barrelled 7.5 cm KwK 40 guns had also arrived. Abwehr (German military intelligence) had broken British codes and in late 1941 penetrated Black, the code used by Bonner Fellers, a US military attaché in Egypt. The British divulged much tactical information to Fellers, who unwittingly reported it to the Axis as well as the US government.
Air attacks by the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica on Malta reduced its offensive capacity and supply convoys from Italy reached the Axis forces in Africa with fewer losses. Until May, Axis monthly deliveries to Libya averaged 61,000 t (60,000 long tons), less than a smaller Axis force received from June to October 1941 but sufficient for an offensive. The 1,400 km (900 mi) advance to Gazala succeeded because the port of Benghazi was open, reducing the transport distance for about 33 per cent of the supplies of the Panzerarmee to 450 km (280 mi). The capture of Malta would not alter the constraints of port capacity and distance; protecting convoys and the use of a large port close to the front would still be necessary.
Unternehmen Venezia (Operation Venice), the Axis plan, was for tanks to advance around the brigade forming the Bir Hakeim "box" at the southern extremity of the Gazala line. On the left side of the manoeuvre, the Italian 132nd Armoured Division "Ariete" would neutralise the Bir Hakeim box. Further south, the 21st Panzer Division and 15th Panzer Division would advance through the desert, move east, then turn north behind the Gazala line to destroy the British armour and cut off the infantry divisions in the line. The most southerly part of the attacking formation, a Kampfgruppe (battle group) of the 90th Light Afrika Division (90. leichte Afrika Division, Generalmajor Ulrich Kleemann), was to advance to El Adem south of Tobruk, cut the supply routes from the port to the Gazala line and hold British troops at Tobruk by a ruse; aircraft-engines mounted on trucks were to raise dust, simulating the presence of a big armoured force. The Germans had combed the French Foreign Legion in French North Africa and press-ganged some 2,000 German légionnaires into the 90th Light Afrika Division.
The rest of the Italian XX Motorised Corps, the 101st Motorized Division "Trieste", would gap the minefield north of Bir Hakeim, near the Sidi Muftah box, to create a supply route to the panzers. Rommel anticipated that having dealt with the British tanks, he would have captured El Adem, Ed Duda and Sidi Rezegh by nightfall and later the Knightsbridge defensive box, about 25 mi (40 km) north-east of Bir Hakeim. The Axis tanks would be in a position next day to thrust westwards against the Eighth Army defensive boxes between Gazala and Alem Hamza, meeting the eastwards attack by the Italian X Corps and XXI corps. By late May, the Axis forces comprised 90,000 men, 560 tanks and 542 aircraft.
Prelude
Gazala line
Between Gazala and Timimi (just west of Tobruk), the Eighth Army was able to concentrate its forces sufficiently to turn and fight. By 4 February, the Axis advance had been halted and the front line had been stabilised, from Gazala on the coast 30 mi (48 km) west of Tobruk, to the old Ottoman fortress of Bir Hakeim, 50 mi (80 km) to the south. The Gazala line was a series of defensive boxes accommodating a brigade each, laid out across the desert behind minefields and wire, watched by regular patrols between the boxes. The Free French were in the south at the Bir Hakeim box, 13 mi (21 km) south of the 150th Infantry Brigade box, which was 6 mi (9.7 km) south of the 69th Infantry Brigade box. The line was not evenly manned, with a greater number of troops covering the coast road, leaving the south less protected but deep minefields had been laid in front of the boxes.
The longer line made an attack around the southern flank harder to supply. Behind the Gazala line were the Commonwealth Keep, Acroma, Knightsbridge and El Adem boxes, sited to block tracks and junctions. The box at Retma was finished just before the Axis offensive but work on the Point 171 and Bir el Gubi boxes did not begin until 25 May. By late May, the 1st South African Division was dug in nearest the coast, with the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division to the south and 1st Free French Brigade furthest left at Bir Hakeim. The British 1st and 7th Armoured divisions waited behind the main line as a mobile counter-attack force, the 2nd South African Division garrisoned Tobruk and 5th Indian Infantry Division was in reserve. The British had 110,000 men, 843 tanks and 604 aircraft.
Bir Hakeim
The fortress at Bir Hakeim (Old Man's Well) had been built by the Ottomans and later used as a station by the Italian Meharist (Camel Corps) to control movement at the crossroads of two Bedouin paths. The wells had long been dry and had been abandoned but Indian troops re-occupied the site to build a strongpoint surrounded by 50,000 mines. The fortification was a rough pentagon pointing north, about 2.5 mi × 3 mi (4 km × 5 km) wide. On 14 February, the 150th Infantry Brigade was relieved at the box by the 1st Free French Brigade (Général Marie Pierre Kœnig), part of XXX Corps (Lieutenant-General Willoughby Norrie). With a fighting strength of 3,000 men and a rear echelon of about 600 men based 15 mi (24 km) to the east behind the line, the brigade comprised the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion (13e DBLE), an established unit and the backbone of the Free French, with the 2nd Colonial Demi-Brigade.
The 13e DBLE had been formed to fight in Finland but was used in the Norwegian campaign and was the first unit to join the Free French in England. It was a veteran of the fighting in Italian Eritrea and French Syria against Vichy; the half-brigade was reinforced by c. 1,000 légionnaires and two officers of the defeated 6th Foreign Infantry Regiment (6e REI), which now formed a third battalion. By mid-May the perimeter and central areas were honeycombed with 1,200 entrenchments, foxholes, gun emplacements and underground bunkers, deep camouflaged hides for vehicles and supply dumps. The interior of the fort was divided into zones, each the responsibility of a unit, with Kœnig's headquarters near the centre, at the crossroads. The V-shaped anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields were patrolled by the 3rd Foreign Legion Battalion (Lamaze), in 63 Bren Gun Carriers divided into three squadrons. The patrols moved along lanes in the minefields, paying particular attention to the area north to the Sidi Muftah box at Got el Ualeb, held by the 150th Brigade.
Battle of Gazala
At 2:00 p.m. on 26 May, the Italian X and XXI Corps began a frontal attack on the central Gazala line. A few elements of the Afrika Korps and the Italian XX Motorised Corps participated and during the day the bulk of the Afrika Korps moved north, to give the impression that it was the main attack. After dark, the armoured formations turned south in a sweeping move around the southern end of the Gazala line. Early on 27 May, the main force of Panzerarmee Afrika, the Afrika Korps, XX Motorised Corps and the 90th Light Division, went round the southern end of the Gazala line, using the British minefields to protect the Axis flank and rear. The Ariete Division was held up for about an hour by the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade (7th Armoured Division), dug in about 3.7 mi (6 km) south-east of Bir Hakeim.
The 15th Panzer Division engaged the 4th Armoured Brigade, which had come south to support the 3rd Indian and 7th Motorised brigades. The Germans were surprised by the range and power of the 75 mm guns on the new M3 Grants but by late morning the 4th Armoured Brigade had withdrawn toward El Adem and Axis armoured units had advanced more than 25 mi (40 km) north. Their advance was stopped around noon by the 1st Armoured Division, in mutually-costly fighting. On the right, the 90th Light Division forced the 7th Motorised Brigade out of Retma eastwards on Bir el Gubi. Advancing toward El Adem at mid-morning, armoured cars of the 90th Light Division overran and scattered the advanced HQ of the 7th Armoured Division (Major-General Frank Messervy), near Bir Beuid. Messervy was captured and removed his insignia, persuading the Germans that he was a batman; he escaped with several other men to rejoin the division. The 90th Light Division reached the El Adem area by mid-morning and captured several supply bases. The following day, the 4th Armoured Brigade moved on El Adem and forced the 90th Light Division to retire to the south-west.