The Battle of Bình Giã (Vietnamese: Trận Bình Giã) was conducted by the Viet Cong (VC) and People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) from 28 December 1964, to 1 January 1965, during the Vietnam War in Bình Giã, Phước Tuy province (now part of Bà Rịa–Vũng Tàu province), South Vietnam.
1964 marked a decisive turning point in the Vietnam War. Following the ousting of President Ngô Đình Diệm in 1963, South Vietnam's top army generals continued to vie with each other for control of the country's military-dominated government instead of combating the emerging forces of the VC. The fragility of the South Vietnamese government was reflected on the battlefield, where its military experienced great setbacks against the VC. Taking advantage of Saigon's political instability, leaders in Hanoi began preparing for war. Even though key members of North Vietnam's Politburo disagreed on the best strategy to reunite their country, they ultimately went ahead to prepare for armed struggle against the South Vietnam government and their American allies.
Towards the end of 1964, the VC commenced a series of large-scale military operations against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). As part of their Winter-Spring Offensive, two VC Regiments attacked ARVN forces at Bình Giã, fighting a large set-piece battle for the first time. Over a period of four days, the VC held their ground and mauled the best units the ARVN could send against them before withdrawing.
Background
In 1964, the political establishment in South Vietnam was still in turmoil. Following the coup that ousted Diệm, the military situation quickly worsened as the VC gained significant ground in the countryside because the Military Revolutionary Council which governed South Vietnam lacked direction both in terms of policy and planning, and lacked political support from the population. Furthermore, General Dương Văn Minh, as the Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council, and his civilian Prime Minister Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ favoured a political resolution instead of using military force, which brought them into conflict with the United States over the best strategy to fight the VC in South Vietnam. As a result, both men became increasingly unpopular among the military generals who held real political power in Saigon. On 30 January 1964, General Nguyễn Khánh successfully ousted Minh from the Military Revolutionary Council without firing a single shot. For much of the year, Khánh spent most of his efforts on consolidating political power, instead of fighting the VC.
In contrast to the political unrest in Saigon, the Communist leadership in North Vietnam and in the VC were far more concerned about the best strategy to fight the South Vietnamese government and the Americans. While all leaders in Hanoi and in the VC shared the same goal of eventual reunification of their homeland, different factions within the Communist Party disagreed on the best method to achieve their desired goal. Members of North Vietnam's Politburo were divided by the issues surrounding the Soviet strategy of peaceful co-existence versus the Chinese strategy of supporting national liberation movements in emerging countries. Despite their differences of opinion, the Communist Party leadership ultimately made preparations for armed struggle in South Vietnam. From Hanoi's perspective, the military regime in Saigon was able to hold out because the Communist main forces were still not ready to fight a conventional war, so North Vietnam needed to focus on the development of its military force in the shortest period of time. In the meantime, however, the war needed to be kept at its current level in order to prevent the full involvement of the United States military.
On 11 October 1964, the VC was ordered to carry out a series of military operations as part of the Communist winter-spring offensive. The VC Nam Bo (B-2 Front in Mekong Delta) Regional Command established a sub-command under the leadership of Trần Đình Xu, with Nguyễn Hòa as the deputy commander, and Lê Trọng Tấn as the political commissar. Their mission was to inflict damage on the regular units of the ARVN and destroy the strategic hamlets constructed by the former Diệm regime. The VC identified the regions of Bình Long-Phước Long and Bà Rịa-Long Khánh, along Route 14, as the main targets for their offensive. Meanwhile, the Central Military Commission in Hanoi appointed General Nguyễn Chí Thanh as the commander of North Vietnamese military operations in southern Vietnam. Other high-ranking officers such as Major Generals Lê Trọng Tấn and Trần Độ, and Colonel Hoàng Cầm were sent to South Vietnam to supervise the military build-up that would commence in November 1964.
Prelude
In July 1964, the VC 271st Regiment and 272nd Regiment began moving into the provinces of Bình Dương, Bình Long and Phước Long to carry out their mission. During the first phase of their campaign, the VC regiments overran several strategic hamlets at Xan Sang, Cam Xe, Dong Xa, and Thai Khai. Between August and September 1964, VC regiments executed deep thrusts into Bình Dương and Châu Thành to apply additional pressure on South Vietnamese outposts situated on Route 14. During the second phase of their campaign, the VC ambushed two ARVN infantry companies and destroyed five armoured vehicles, which consisted of M24 Chaffee light tanks and M113 armored personnel carriers. The VC defeated regular ARVN units at the strategic hamlets of Bình Mỹ and Bình Co.
Following the completion of the initial stages in their campaign, the VC forces were ordered to regroup and prepare for the next offensive in the Long Khánh region. VC soldiers from the two regiments were assembled in War Zone D, where they were trained to attack well-fortified enemy strongholds. On 20 November 1964, the VC reached the Long Khánh battlefield, having completed a 200 km march from War Zone D. On the battlefield the VC 186th Battalion (from Military Region 6), the 500th and 800th Battalions (from Military Region 7), and the 445th Company also joined the offensive. To kick-start their offensive in the Ba Ria-Long Khánh region, the VC selected Bình Giã as their next target. Bình Giã was a small village located in Phước Tuy Province, about 67 km from Saigon.
In 1964 about 6,000 people lived in Bình Giã, most of whom were staunchly anti-communist. The inhabitants of Bình Giã were Roman Catholic refugees who had fled from North Vietnam in 1954 during Operation Passage to Freedom because of fears of Communist persecution. To prepare for their main battle, the VC 272nd Regiment was ordered to block Inter-provincial Road No. 2 and 15, and destroy any South Vietnamese units attempting to reach Bình Giã from the south-western flank of the battlefield. In the days leading up to the battle, the VC often came out to harass the local militia forces.
On the night of 4-5 December a VC local force company attacked Binh Gia as elements of the 1st Regiment probed Duc Thanh District headquarters several kilometers away. By dawn on the 5th, the VC had only been able to occupy part of Binh Gia because of stubborn resistance. The ARVN then staged a relief effort. A ranger company marched unimpeded by road to the hamlet. Americans speculated that the VC had decided not to ambush it in the hopes of snaring bigger prey to follow. Instead of sending more troops by road, however, US Army helicopters delivered the rest of the 38th Ranger Battalion by air, avoiding the ambush the 2nd Regiment set for it. After linking up with the first company, the Rangers recaptured Binh Gia, losing seven dead, 14 wounded, and five missing. The VC left behind 23 bodies.
On the night of 7-8 December, two VC companies attacked Binh Gia again, while two battalions attacked Đất Đỏ district headquarters and VC artillery bombarded Xuyen Moc and Duc Thanh District headquarters and the CIDG camp at Van Kiep. The bombardments proved inconsequential, and Binh Gia held. At Đất Đỏ, 54 territorial soldiers and an armored car repulsed four ground attacks with the help of fighter-bombers.
On 9 December III Corps responded to the expanding threat by sending a troop of M113s to clear Highway 2 between Duc Thanh and Binh Gia. The VVC 2nd Regiment had been waiting for four days for such a move. It assaulted the convoy where the road passed through a rubber plantation, about 12km north of Phuoc Tuy’s capital of Baria. The engagement began when a mine exploded under the lead M113, knocking it out and killing the troop commander. The VC then opened fire from one side of the road. The troop responded by turning off the road and moving in between rows of rubber trees toward the enemy. The tree rows permitted forward and backward movement but hindered any other kind of maneuver. As the carriers advanced, VC recoilless rifles posted on the opposite side of the road fired into the carriers’ rear. VC soldiers then rushed forward to deploy demolition charges and to throw grenades into vehicle openings. The fighting was fierce. Nine U.S. Army gunships arrived within 15 minutes of the start of the ambush, firing in support and marking targets for 14 fighter-bomber sorties. After about an hour, eight of the 14 M113s succeeded in disengaging. At 21:00, the surviving carriers linked up with a Ranger company delivered by U.S. Army helicopters and they advanced to recover the wounded, but the VC blocked the attempt. The ambush destroyed six M113s, six 3.5-inch rocket launchers, one 81mm mortar, and one .50-caliber machine gun. The VC captured two .50-caliber machine guns, five .30-caliber machine guns, two Browning Automatic Rifles, and 24 small arms. The ARVN lost 12 dead, 31 wounded, and ten missing. The VC left behind one dead and one weapon, with the allies estimating that they had evacuated another 100 casualties. The VC claim that the 272nd Regiment destroyed the entire unit including 16 M113s.
Over the next two days, the ARVN probed the ambush site and a nearby mangrove swamp where they thought the enemy might be hiding, with no results.
On 17 December VC soldiers wearing ranger uniforms and red berets ambushed a convoy near Long Hai, Phuoc Tuy, killing four, wounding three, and destroying an armored car and a truck. They damaged another armored car and truck and captured a machine gun and 29 weapons. Twenty-one ARVN troops went missing. The VC claim that the 272nd Regiment destroyed six armored vehicles.
Battle
At 04:45 on 28 December 1964, while mortars and recoilless rifle fire hit Duc Thanh Post, elements of the VC 271st Regiment and the 445th Company penetrated Bình Giã's eastern perimeter. There, they clashed with members of the South Vietnamese Popular Force militiamen, which numbered about 65 personnel. The militia fighters proved no match for the VC and their overwhelming firepower, so they quickly retreated into underground bunkers, and called for help. Once the village was captured, Colonel Ta Minh Kham, the VC regimental commander, established his command post in the main village church and waited for fresh reinforcements, which came in the form of heavy mortars, machine guns and recoilless rifles. To counter South Vietnamese helicopter assaults, Kham's troops set up a network of defensive fortifications around the village, with trenches and bunkers protected by land mines and barbed wire. The local Catholic priest, who was also the village chief, sent a bicycle messenger out to the Bà Rịa district headquarters to ask for a relief force.
On 29 December two companies of the ARVN 33rd Ranger Battalion and a company from the 30th Ranger Battalion were airlifted into area located west of Bình Giã, by helicopters from the U.S. 118th Aviation Company to face a VC force of unknown size. As soon as the rangers arrived at the landing zone, they were quickly overwhelmed by the VC in a deadly ambush. The entire 30th Ranger Battalion was then committed to join the attack, but they too did not initially succeed in penetrating the strong VC defensive lines. Several more companies of the Rangers then arrived for an attack from multiple directions. Two companies of the 33rd Ranger Battalion advanced from the northeast. One of them came to the outskirts of the village, but was unable to break through the VC defenses. The other one, trying to outflank the enemy, had been lured into a kill zone in open terrain and were quickly obliterated in an ambush by the three VC battalions using heavy weapons. The two companies suffered a 70 percent casualty rate, and survivors were forced to retreat to the nearby Catholic church. The 30th Rangers had more success by assaulting from the western direction and succeeded in fighting their way into the village, aided by local residents. It however also suffered heavy losses, with the battalion commander and his American adviser severely wounded. The local civilians in Bình Giã retrieved weapons and ammunition from the dead Rangers, and hid the wounded government soldiers from the VC. The 38th Ranger Battalion, on the other hand, landed on the battlefield unopposed by the VC, and they immediately advanced on Bình Giã from the south. Soldiers from the 38th Rangers spent the whole day fighting, but they could not break through the VC defences to link up with the survivors hiding in the church, and fell back after calling in mortar fire to decimate VC fighters moving to encircle them.