Avianca Flight 052 was a regularly scheduled flight from Bogotá, Colombia, to New York City, United States, via Medellín, Colombia, that crashed on January 25, 1990, at 21:34 (UTC−05:00). The Boeing 707 flying this route ran out of fuel after a failed attempt to land at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), causing the aircraft to crash onto a hillside in the small village of Cove Neck, New York, on the north shore of Long Island. Eight of the nine crew members and 65 of the 149 passengers on board were killed. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the crash occurred due to the flight crew failing to properly declare a fuel emergency, failure to use an airline operational control dispatch system, inadequate traffic flow management by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the lack of standardized understandable terminology for pilots and controllers for minimum and emergency fuel states.
The flight left Medellín with more than enough fuel for the journey and progressed toward JFK normally. While en route, the flight was placed in three holding patterns. Due to poor communication between the air crew and the air traffic controllers, as well as an inadequate management of the fuel load by the pilots, the flight became critically low on fuel. This dire situation was not recognized as an emergency by the controllers because of the failure of the pilots to use the word "emergency". The flight attempted to make a landing at JFK, but bad weather, coupled with poor communication and inadequate management of the aircraft, forced it to abort and attempt a go-around. The flight ran out of fuel before it was able to make a second landing attempt. The airplane crashed about 20 miles (32 km) from JFK. Hundreds of emergency personnel responded to the crash site and helped save victims. Many of those who survived were severely injured and required months or years to physically recover.
NTSB investigators looked at various factors that contributed to the crash. The failures of the flight crew were cited as the probable cause of the crash, but the weather, air traffic controller performances, and FAA traffic management were also cited as contributing to the events that led to the accident. This conclusion was controversial, with disagreement between investigators, passengers, and Avianca as to who was ultimately responsible. Eventually, the U.S. government joined with Avianca and settled to pay for the damages to the victims and their families. The crash has been portrayed in a variety of media.
Background
The aircraft involved was a Boeing 707-321B, registration HK-2016. The aircraft was manufactured in June 1967, and was purchased by Avianca from Pan Am in 1977. By the time of the crash, the aircraft was 22 years old and had over 61,000 flight hours. The 707 was equipped with four Pratt & Whitney JT3D-3B engines modified with a hush kit to reduce noise pollution. Avianca personnel reported that they factored in a 5% fuel overburn into the performance calculations due to the hush kit, along with an additional 5% overburn due to the age of the aircraft. Additionally, maintenance crews had noted recurring issues with the aircraft's autopilot, including the altitude hold function. These same issues were reported on the aircraft's penultimate flight, but maintenance was unable to fix the autopilot, and it was disabled as a result.
The flight was staffed by a crew of nine, including six flight attendants and three flight crew. The flight crew in the cockpit consisted of 51-year-old Captain Laureano Caviedes Hoyos, 28-year-old first officer Mauricio Klotz and 45-year-old flight engineer Matias Moyano. At the time of the crash, Captain Caviedes had been employed with Avianca for over 27 years and had logged over 16,000 hours of flight time, including over 1,500 in the 707. Caviedes had 478 hours of night flying experience in the 707 (and 2,435 hours of night flying experience in total) and had no record of any prior accidents. Co-pilot Klotz had been employed with Avianca for three years and had 1,837 hours of flight time, with 408 hours at night. Klotz had transitioned to the 707 the previous October and had logged 64 flight hours in the airframe, including 13 at night. Flight engineer Moyano had been employed with Avianca for over 23 years and had over 10,000 hours of flight time, including over 3,000 hours in the 707 and over 1,000 hours of night flying in the same airframe (and 2,986 hours of night flying regardless of airframe). All three flight crew members had previous experience in landing at JFK.
Accident
Avianca Flight 052 was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from El Dorado International Airport in Bogotá, Colombia, to JFK in Queens, New York, with an intermediate stop at José María Córdova International Airport near Medellín, Colombia.
Departure and flight
Flight 052 departed Bogotá at 13:10 Eastern Standard Time, five minutes ahead of schedule, on January 25, 1990. The flight landed at Medellín at 14:04 and prepared to fly the leg to JFK. At Medellín, the aircraft landed with 67,200 pounds (30,500 kg) of fuel. The flight plan filed for the journey to JFK called for 55,520 pounds (25,180 kg) of fuel required for the trip to JFK, 4,510 pounds (2,050 kg) for reserve fuel, 7,600 pounds (3,400 kg) for alternate fuel, 4,800 pounds (2,200 kg) for holding fuel, and 1,500 pounds (680 kg) of taxi fuel totaling 73,930 pounds (33,530 kg) minimum of block fuel. The dispatcher at Medellín ordered a total fuel load of 78,000 pounds (35,000 kg), including 4,070 pounds (1,850 kg) of "top off" fuel to raise the aircraft weight to the maximum allowable for the planned departure runway. At Medellín, the captain and dispatcher decided to use another runway and requested an additional 2,000 pounds (910 kg) of fuel.
The flight departed Medellín at 15:08, bound for JFK. The flight first entered U.S. airspace of Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center at 17:28, flying at 35,000 feet (10,700 m), and proceeded northward, climbing to 37,000 feet (11,300 m). The flight was cleared to fly Atlantic route 7 to the DIXON navigational aid and jet airway 174 to Norfolk, Virginia. Flight 052 entered its first holding pattern over Norfolk at 19:04 and remained circling until 19:23. From there, Flight 052 continued on to the BOTON intersection near Atlantic City, New Jersey, where it was placed in a second holding pattern from 19:43 to 20:12. The flight proceeded to the CAMRN intersection where it entered its third holding pattern from 20:18 to 20:47. Flight 052 entered the CAMRN holding pattern at 14,000 feet (4,300 m), having been cleared to descend prior to arrival at the intersection, and the flight descended further to 11,000 feet (3,400 m) while in the CAMRN holding pattern. At 20:44:09, while still holding at CAMRN, the New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZNY) advised Flight 052 that there was an "indefinite hold" and to continue holding at CAMRN. At 20:44:43, the ZNY controller told the flight to "expect further clearance" at 21:05. The flight had previously been given two delay estimates that had passed.
At that point, First Officer Klotz radioed the controller, saying, "ah well I think we need priority we're passing [unintelligible]". The controller inquired as to how long the flight could hold, as well as what their alternate airport was. Klotz replied at 20:46:03 that they could hold for five more minutes. The controller once again inquired as to their alternate airport and Klotz replied at 20:46:24, "It was Boston, but we can't do it now we, we, don't, we run out of fuel now." A handoff controller listening in on the conversation called the New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (NY TRACON) at 20:46:24 and advised the TRACON controller that Avianca Flight 052 could only hold for five more minutes. The handoff controller asked whether NY TRACON could take the flight or whether to send Avianca to its alternate airport. The NY TRACON controller replied, "Slow him to one eight zero knots and I'll take him." The handoff controller later testified that he had not heard Flight 052 say that they could no longer reach their alternate airport. At 20:46:47, the NY ARTCC radar controller cleared the flight to proceed to JFK at 11,000 feet (3,400 m) and to slow to 180 knots (210 mph; 330 km/h). Flight 052 departed the CAMRN holding pattern at 20:47.
Landing attempt
At 20:47:27, the NY TRACON feeder controller told the flight crew to "expect an ILS two two left" "altimeter two niner six niner proceed direct Deer Park". At 20:54:40, the feeder controller directed Flight 052 to make a 360° turn. At 20:56:16, the controller gave the flight a wind shear advisory of an "increase of 10 knots at 1500 feet and then an increase of 10 knots at 500 feet". The flight crew acknowledged the advisory. At 21:00, JFK was experiencing light drizzle and fog with 1⁄4 mile visibility, an indefinite ceiling with 200 feet (61 m) obscured, and a wind of 21 knots (24 mph; 39 km/h) at 190°.
At 21:03:07, Flight 052 contacted the NY TRACON final controller, who cleared them to descend progressively to 2,000 feet (610 m). At 21:03:46, the flight crew discussed the go-around procedures. At 21:09:29, flight engineer Moyano stated that the controllers "already know that we are in [a] bad condition". The captain said, "No they are descending us", and the second officer added, "They are giving us priority". At 21:11:07, the NY TRACON final vector controller informed the flight that they were 15 miles from the outer marker and instructed them to maintain an altitude of 2,000 feet (610 m) "until established on the localizer". The flight crew began preparing for an instrument landing approach, extending flaps and discussing the appropriate airspeed. The final controller instructed the flight crew to contact the JFK tower controllers and signed off. Klotz acknowledged the transmission.
At 21:15:19, Klotz contacted the tower controllers and informed that Flight 052 was "established two two left". One minute later, the captain asked if he should lower the landing gear, but the first officer replied, "No I think it's too early now." At 21:17:30, JFK tower asked Flight 052 to increase their airspeed by 10 knots to 150 knots (170 mph; 280 km/h). At 21:18:11, the flight was 3 miles (4.8 km) from the outer marker. Twenty-one seconds later, the first officer remarked "glideslope alive". At 21:19:09, the captain requested the landing gear be deployed. Almost a minute later, the JFK tower cleared the flight to land on runway 22L. The captain asked the first officer to confirm that the flight was cleared to land. At 21:20:28, the first officer began informing the captain that the aircraft was below the glideslope. At 21:22:07, Flight 052 descended to 1,000 feet (300 m). The aircraft began descending beyond the angle of the glideslope, then began climbing above it, followed by a steeper descent. At 21:22:57, the first officer commented, "This is the wind shear." The first officer warned the captain about the sink rate and noted an altitude of 500 feet (150 m) at 21:23:10. As he warned the captain, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) began 11 "whoop, whoop, pull up" audible warnings. At 21:23:13, the captain called for lights, followed by questions as to where the runway was a few seconds later. The GPWS began four "glideslope" audible warnings a few seconds later, alerting the flight crew that the aircraft was below the glideslope. In response to the captain's inquiries, the first officer replied that he did not see the runway. At 21:23:23, the flight began climbing again, having come within 250 feet (76 m) of crashing 2 miles short of the runway. The landing gear was raised, and the first officer announced that the flight was executing a missed approach.
Crash
The JFK tower controller asked the flight to climb to 2,000 feet (610 m) and make a left turn. At 21:24:06, the captain asked the first officer to "tell them we are in [an] emergency". The first officer told the JFK tower controller that "we'll try once again[;] we're running out of fuel", to which the controller replied, "okay". A few seconds later, the captain again told the first officer to "advise him we are [in an] emergency" and asked if he did so. The first officer replied, "Yes sir, I already advised him." The JFK controller directed the flight to contact the NY TRACON approach controller once more at 21:24:39. The TRACON controller asked the flight to climb once more to 3,000 feet (910 m). The captain asked the first officer again to "advise him we don't have fuel". The first officer replied, "Climb and maintain three thousand and ah we're running out of fuel sir." The captain once again asked whether the first officer had advised the controller of their emergency, and the first officer replied, "Yes sir. I already advise him[;] hundred and eighty on the heading[;] we are going to maintain 3000 feet and he's going to get us back."
A minute later, the controller instructed the flight to turn to the northeast and asked the flight crew if they had enough fuel to be directed 15 miles (24 km) from the airport. First Officer Klotz replied, "I guess so thank you very much." At 21:29:11, Klotz asked the controller if he "can give us a final now...?" The controller said, "affirmative sir[;] turn left heading zero four zero". At 21:30:12, the controller cleared another aircraft for landing. Klotz briefly thought the clearance was directed at Avianca and began to tell Captain Caviedes to change course before the controller corrected him. The controller then asked Avianca to climb to 3,000 feet (910 m). Klotz replied, "negative sir we just running out of fuel we okay three thousand now okay". The controller continued to direct the flight northward, away from the airport. At 21:31:01, the controller said, "Okay and you're number two for the approach[;] I just have to give you enough room so you make it without ah having to come out again."