The 2026 Ebola epidemic is an outbreak of the Ebola virus disease (EVD) mainly in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and neighbouring countries. Initial cases were reported on 14 May 2026 in the Ituri Province. It is the 17th Ebola outbreak in the DRC and began five months after the end of the previous outbreak. Early infections are theorised to have occurred in January or February 2026 in the town of Mongbwalu. By early August, it had become the fastest growing Ebola outbreak on record, as well as the second largest.
It is caused by the Bundibugyo ebolavirus (BDBV) pathogen, which has complicated efforts as existing treatments and vaccines are for the Zaire ebolavirus. The outbreak was declared a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 16 May 2026.
There have been 5,026 confirmed deaths in the DRC, 2 in Uganda and 2 in Kenya, as of the final week of October. Poor health infrastructure and ongoing armed conflicts in the region hinder detection, treatment, and prevention; it is considered likely that the true scale of the outbreak exceeds the confirmed numbers, stressing a preexisting severe humanitarian crisis. This added instability provided a situation ripe for rebel groups to capitalise on.
The outbreak has spread beyond Ituri to seven more provinces in the DRC. Cases were also reported in Uganda's capital of Kampala, in France (following the return of a health worker on a humanitarian mission), in Kenya and in Nigeria.
Background
There have been 16 known previous outbreaks of Ebola in the DRC. There have been two previous outbreaks of Bundibugyo virus, one in the Bundibugyo District of Uganda in 2007 and 2008, from which it got its name, and another in 2012 in Isiro, DRC.
Regional issues
The outbreak began in Ituri, a province of eastern DRC with a long history of ethnic conflict. The area is rich in valuable metals including gold, tin, tungsten and tantalum, which are predominantly extracted by small scale artisan mining. Armed groups such as the Islamic State-aligned Allied Democratic Forces (ADF-Baluku), the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO), and the Rwanda-backed March 23 Movement (M23)—the last of which belongs to the rebel group coalition, the Congo River Alliance (Alliance Fleuve Congo, AFC)—struggle for control of mining areas. Fighting and restrictions by armed groups restricts humanitarian access, obstructs aid operations, curtails civilian movement and limits access to essential services.
Large-scale refugee movements and cross-border travel, as well as mining-related travel, complicate contact tracing. Ituri's status as a commercial and migratory hub greatly increases the risk of diseases spreading to the broader region.
Traditional burial rituals in the region often span several days. They may involve washing and dressing the corpse, returning it to ancestral land, and touching it as part of the interment ceremony; these practices put mourners at risk of infection. In contrast, safe burial practices require that the body be immediately placed in a sealed bag and transported to a designated burial site. This potentially places health workers in conflict with cultural tradition.
There have been several attacks on health workers, particularly those involved with burials, fuelled by misinformation about the disease and the motives driving the humanitarian response. Conspiracy theories also circulated on WhatsApp. For example, in late May 2026, a crowd at a hospital in Mongbwalu demanded the return of bodies for traditional burial and set fire to a tent used by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), prompting the organisation to withdraw its staff; during the unrest, 18 suspected Ebola patients absconded the hospital. A May 2026 survey by ActionAid in three health zones in Ituri found that only 64% of respondents believed Ebola was real and not caused by spiritual or mystical forces. Rumours included claims that the disease had been invented for financial gain, that health workers were spreading the virus, and that alcohol could provide immunity. On 23 October a spontaneous deadly attack against a health worker happened in the health region Bafwasende in the province of Tshopo. Angry Youths attacked the health worker with a machete after accusations of spreading ebola by contaminating water.
Epidemiology
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Epidemic in DRC
The Congolese Ministry of Public Health, Hygiene, and Social Welfare publicly confirmed an outbreak of Ebola virus disease in Ituri Province on 15 May.
As of 18 October 2026, the DRC has seen cases in 66 health zones across the eight affected provinces. With 28 of 36 in Ituri, 17 of 34 in North Kivu, 1 of 3 in South Kivu, 7 of 13 in Haut-Uélé, 7 of 23 in Tshopo, 4 of 11 in Bas-Uélé, 1 of 16 in Sud-Ubangi and 1 of 11 Nord-Ubangi reporting cases.
Uganda
Uganda declared an outbreak of Ebola on 15 May.
On 27 May, Uganda closed its borders with DRC for at least four weeks after it reported seven cases and a death. Anyone entering Uganda from DRC was also to be isolated for 21 days. Ugandan authorities implemented a preparedness plan and activated an Ebola treatment centre which was on standby at Mulago hospital. The first two cases were moved to the treatment centre; subsequent cases came direct to the hospital. An estimated 6,000 contacts were isolated for an incubation period of 21 days. On 16 July, Uganda discharged its last Ebola patient from hospital, leaving no confirmed active cases in the country. On 28 July 2026 Uganda declared the end of the outbreak after completing a 42-day period with no new cases; the WHO certified the declaration on 26 August. Overall, Uganda recorded 20 confirmed cases (fifteen of whom were people who had travelled from DRC) and two deaths.
France
On 24 June, France confirmed its first case after a doctor who had been in the DRC on a humanitarian mission returned.
Germany
Two people were medically evacuated to Germany; one arrived in July, while another one was discharged earlier (June), from a German hospital; both were American humanitarian workers with Ebola flown in from the DRC.
Netherlands
On 1 October 2026, a staff member of Médecins sans Frontières who had been working on the Ebola response in DRC had tested positive for Bundibugyo virus and was medically evacuated to the Netherlands for specialist treatment.
Kenya
On 6 October, Kenya confirmed its first ever Ebola case and death in a Kenyan citizen who had been resident in the DRC. The person had travelled by road from DRC to Uganda, and boarded a flight from Entebbe to Nairobi. They tested positive for Bundibugyo ebolavirus. Further cases involved close contacts of the first.
Nigeria
On 20 October, Nigeria confirmed its first case, the wife of a Swiss diplomat who had flown to Abuja, Nigeria from Entebbe, Uganda. She began showing symptoms on 7 October and was transferred to a private hospital on 11 October with an initial diagnosis of malaria. Ebola was diagnosed on 19 October. On 26 October, after her condition improved, she was medically evacuated to Switzerland.
This person had been holidaying in Uganda and had not visited DRC, sparking concern over how and where she may have acquired the infection. Genomic analysis has revealed that her infection was closely related to the first case in Kenya, leading to speculation that the two may have crossed paths while in Uganda.
Switzerland
On 26 October, the first case in Nigeria was medically evacuated to Switzerland as she was the wife of a Swiss diplomat.
Deaths
Early in the epidemic, the case fatality rate (CFR) was provisionally estimated as low as 10% to 20%. However with improved monitoring and reporting, the CFR is estimated with more confidence to be around 46%.
Bundibugyo virus disease
Symptoms
The most common symptoms are similar to EBOV disease due to Zaire ebolavirus: fever, diarrhoea and vomiting, headache, difficulty breathing and swallowing, and muscle and joint pain. However a study of BDBV patients in the current outbreak found that bleeding, a common feature of EBOV infection, occurred in relatively few (approximately 10%). The lack of bleeding has made it difficult to diagnose BDBV from symptoms alone, and made it less likely that people will be isolated or taken to hospital, thus contributing to the spread of disease.
Cause
Ebola viruses regularly spread in Central and West Africa. Bats are often reservoir hosts, although this has not been confirmed for this species of the virus. The virus can infect mammals that prey on bats and can be transmitted to humans through contact with infected bats, carcasses, or bushmeat. The virus is transmitted between humans through close, direct contact with the bodily fluids of a sick or dead person; this places the close family of an infected person and health workers at particular risk.
BDBV virus appears to replicate more slowly in vitro than the more common Zaire ebolavirus (EBOV). The strain of BDBV which is causing this outbreak is distinct from the strains which caused previous outbreaks; a study was commissioned in August 2026 to investigate whether viral evolution, which may facilitate transmission or increase severity of the disease, may explain the unprecedented scale of this outbreak.
Diagnosis
Early symptoms are non-specific, such as fever, aching, headache, weakness and fatigue, sore throat, loss of appetite. Other diseases common in the affected area, such as malaria and typhoid fever, can appear similar.
On 22 May 2026, Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention recommended molecular diagnostic testing (using real-time PCR) for identifying the Bundibugyo ebolavirus strain, because no antigen rapid diagnostic test (RDT) met WHO TPP specifications for recommendation during the outbreak response. As of 25 August 2026, a reliable test is only available in hospitals.
Medical countermeasures
At the start of the epidemic, there was no approved vaccine or medicine specifically for Bundibugyo virus. As of October 2026 the situation has not changed, although a number of drugs and vaccines are under investigation.
Vaccines
A study involving macaques suggests that the vaccine for Zaire ebolavirus, rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine (Ervebo), may be partially effective; though the WHO initially judged this evidence insufficient and has recommended against its use in the current outbreak. On 31 July, on consideration of new evidence, the WHO Technical Advisory Group authorised a Phase 3 clinical trial of rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine to take place in the DRC. As of 6 September 2026, that vaccine had been administered to 2,007 healthcare and frontline workers.
For prevention, the WHO selected three other potential vaccines to be expedited; these were candidates under development by IAVI, Moderna, and the University of Oxford. On 1 June 2026, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) announced funding to fast-track the three vaccine candidates. Funding allocated was IAVI ($3.2 million), Moderna ($50 million), and the University of Oxford ($8.6 million).
Subsequently, on 27 August, CEPI announced funding of $16.5 million to the Minapharm Group for development of a candidate vaccine based on the modified vaccinia Ankara (MVA) vaccine platform. On October 28, a consortium led by IAVI was awarded a further $36 million from the US Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority for further development of their vaccine candidate.
Treatments
On 28 May 2026, the WHO recommended several candidate treatments for clinical trials. The drugs to be trialled were the antiviral remdesivir and the monoclonal antibody therapies MBP-134 and maftivimab. The WHO-sponsored PARTNERS clinical trial protocol was deployed to test remdesivir and MBP-134 starting in the DRC in July.
Timeline of the outbreak
The outbreak may have started as early as January. Based on models of the spread of Bundibugyo virus, it is estimated that the virus crossed over into humans in January or February, the most plausible time of a spillover event being in mid-to-late February. The outbreak may have started with the funeral of a pastor in Mongbwalu on 4 February. During the funeral, the coffin was broken and the corpse was handled by family members. Though the pastor was never diagnosed with Ebola, nearly 50 others were reported to have died with Ebola-like symptoms following the funeral, including several of his brothers.
April
The earliest suspected case in Ituri was a man who began experiencing hemorrhagic symptoms on 24 April 2026. Early household transmission occurred when a sibling developed symptoms on 26 April and died the following day. The initial case subsequently died on 28 April.
A potential outbreak signal was reported on 30 April, though initial testing in Bunia was negative for Zaire Ebola and samples were sent to the INRB laboratory in Kinshasa.