A series of mass killings and massacres against Alawite people occurred in Syria from 6 March 2025 to 17 March 2025, with a resurgence in early April. Estimates of the death toll range from about 1,000 to 2,000, with some sources saying the majority of the victims were civilians. The attacks were carried out by armed groups aligned with the Syrian caretaker government, at least some of whom were engaged in a counter-insurgency operation against armed remnants of the former Assad regime in the aftermath of the Syrian Civil War.
The targeting of Alawites was justified by the conflation of "regime remnants" with Alawite people in general, as the Assad family are themselves Alawites, had favored Alawites for government positions during their rule, and had positioned themselves as protectors of the Alawite community despite significant opposition from within it. The violence included many alleged cases of gunmen showing up at civilians' homes, asking them whether they were Alawite or Sunni, and then killing them if they answered "Alawite". Various parties have characterized this targeting of Alawites as a genocide or the potential leadup to one.
Especially deadly massacres began in early March 2025 in Latakia Governorate, where, according to the SOHR, Syrian security forces killed hundreds of civilians over the span of two days, including 52 Alawite individuals in the towns of Al-Mukhtariya and Al-Shir in rural Latakia alone. These events took place during a period of heightened tensions and armed clashes between Syrian transitional government forces and militants that are loyal to former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as described by Syrian authorities. Despite assurances by new government officials that minorities would be safe in the new Syria, Alawite communities have been subject to a number of massacres since December 2024.
Numerous perpetrators were suspected, including the Transitional Government's General Security Service and other former-HTS units and Turkish-backed militias such as the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division. In March 2025, Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa denied responsibility for the attacks. In his speech, al-Sharaa said that "remnants of the former regime" had no choice but to surrender immediately as he vowed to hold accountable "anyone involved in civilian bloodshed". He later promised to punish the perpetrators, saying that Assad loyalists and associated foreign powers committed the killings with the aim of destabilizing the Syrian state and restarting the civil war. In July 2025, an investigative committee submitted two lists of suspects to courts and announced its findings in a press conference. The committee's press conference did not attribute any responsibility for the massacres to Transitional Government forces.
On 10 March 2025, the Syrian government announced the end of counter-insurgency operations after expelling pro-Assad insurgents from "vital centres" and re-establishing control over most of the roadways in the coastal region. Despite al-Sharaa's statements, sectarian killings and kidnappings continued in Syria as of late 2025, with many cases remaining without charges for the perpetrators.
Background
Coastal Syria, and especially the Latakia Governorate, has historically served as the heartland of Syria's Alawite community, a minority religious group which is considered an offshoot or a sect of Shia Islam, which comprises around 11% of the entire Syrian population. The Assad family, which ruled Syria for decades, belonged to this religious minority, giving a small number of its members positions within the regime (especially those members who were closely tied to the Assad family and those members who served in the loyalist Shabiha militias and were involved in organised crime such as the Captagon trade), while it was suppressing dissent in the community and it was also portraying itself as the defender of minorities against the Sunni Muslim majority. However, the Assad government under Bashar had increasingly become unpopular among Alawites due to its corruption and the economic collapse.
Following the fall of Assad in December 2024, Alawi stronghold Qardaha (the Assad family hometown) was "the first place the opposition factions headed for, just 24 hours after entering Damascus. An opposition delegation met with prominent Alawite figures there and returned with a statement of support from them," according to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed.
After the establishment of a transitional government under then-Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) emir Ahmed al-Sharaa, a "mosaic" of new security forces was installed across the region by the new government, including: the more disciplined and professional General Security units of the former Syrian Salvation Government's HTS-controlled Ministry of Interior in the most heavily minority-dominated areas such as Latakia and Jableh in Latakia governorate; Military Operations Command units (including some Islamist foreign fighters) which were pulled out of the cities to rural areas in late December due to their lack of restraint, one unit of Fursan Sharqiyah fighters affiliated to the Turkish-backed SNA, deployed in Tartous; and local factions returning to hometowns from which they had been displaced during the civil war, e.g. in Salamiyah, Talkalakh, Qusayr, and Homs city. Servicemen from Assad's armed forces, including volunteers and conscripts, returned to their hometowns, making settlements with the new security services to gain civilian status.
In mid-December, HTS sources stated that armed criminals who were connected to the old regime were involved in looting and lawlessness in the coastal region. HTS units were ambushed by Assad loyalist militias. The HTS-led security forces launched a campaign to disarm these groups and to get temporary IDs affording them protection as civilians.
There were demonstrations in support of the old regime on 25 December, and sectarian slogans were posted by both sides, in Latakia in the early days after the fall of Assad, as well as reports of disinformation fuelling sectarian tensions. The same day, there were ex-regime militias ambushed security forces in the Tartous countryside, to which HTS special forces responded with a three-day operation, focusing on Khirbet Maazah (home to many former regime loyalists), which involved considerable use of force including shoot-outs and alleged looting, the first of a series of clashes between government forces and pro-Assad loyalist holdouts, particularly in regions with significant Alawite populations.
On 17 February, al-Sharaa made a symbolic visit to Latakia as part of a national tour, meeting with local dignitaries from various sects.
The Jerusalem Post reported that the new administration had been restructuring state apparatus through widespread dismissals of officials, many of whom came from the Alawite community. According to Alawite activists, members of their community had experienced targeted violence and persecution since Assad's fall, particularly in rural areas of Homs and Latakia Governorates. The Post said that, despite al-Sharaa's public commitment to inclusive governance, no formal meetings with senior Alawite representatives were reported, in contrast with the administration's documented meetings with leaders from other minority groups including Kurds, Christians, and Druze. In addition, several reports of mass-distributed flyers filled with hate speech against Alawites alongside the filmed destruction and vandalization of Alawi religious shrines had been reported since December 2024.
Violence and massacres
January
From January, the Middle East Institute, the US-based NGO Syrian Justice and Accountability Centre, and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), a UK-based monitor formerly associated with the anti-Assad opposition but highly critical of the new government, reported several sectarian incidents, including some alleged massacres, in the western countryside of Homs province, committed during security sweeps aiming to disarm former regime loyal militias.
On 14 January 2025, the SOHR reported that Alawite civilians of Tasnin located in the Homs countryside were targeted by gunmen who said they are part of the Military Operations Command. According to SOHR, the gunmen launched a widespread arrest operation towards the village from early morning to the afternoon of 16 January. Several suspects resisted the arrest attempts. During the operation, the attackers set seven houses on fire and murdered six civilians. Multiple villagers and elders in Tasnin and nearby settlements attempted to report the massacre to Syrian government police and security forces, but did not receive any response mentioning the violence.
On 23 January 2025, the Military Operations Command launched a large-scale security campaign in collaboration with local gunmen in the villages of al-Hamam, al-Ghozaylah, al-Gharbiyah and Fahel in the countryside west of Homs. During the operation, four civilians were extrajudicially killed, ten civilians were injured, and five others were arrested. The SOHR claimed that government-aligned gunmen abused and assaulted other villagers, forcing several to bark and bray like animals, and destroyed several village tombstones.
March
4 March
On Tuesday 4 March, according to state media, security forces launched a campaign against Assad loyalist militias in the Daatour neighbourhood of Latakia city after an ambush by "members of the remnants of Assad militias" killed two security personnel. Ali Akbar Velayati, an international affairs advisor to Iran's supreme leader, said a civil war could break out in Syria at any moment, and that Iran had evidence "indicating the beginnings of the state's disintegration."
5 March
There were several fires in forested areas of Latakia, with the transitional government blaming seventeen on sabotage acts by "remnants" of the Assad regime.
6 March
Violence significantly escalated on Thursday 6 March, when intense armed confrontations broke out in Latakia Governorate between Syrian security personnel and armed groups loyal to the former president. The fighting spread across several towns in the region predominantly inhabited by Alawites. Rob Geist Pinfold, a lecturer in international security at King's College London, told Al Jazeera English that this was part of an on-going co-ordinated insurgency by Assadist militias such as Syrian Popular Resistance (formed in December), designed to provoke sectarian conflict and "set Syria on a path to civil war". Local civil rights activists described the perpetrators as former regime loyalists and former elements of the army, security services and forces allied with the Assad regime, and that the violence was well planned and co-ordinated.
The violence initially concentrated around the Jableh area but rapidly expanded to other locations. Armed remnants of the former Assad regime (reportedly including fighters loyal to former army General Suheil al-Hassan) launched a series of coordinated attacks against security forces in the cities of Jableh, Baniyas and the surrounding areas. Insurgents overran several positions. According to SNHR, upwards of 75% of the city of Baniyas was captured by remnants of the former Assad regime in this assault. SOHR said that 48 people were killed in clashes in Jableh. At least 10 members of the security forces were captured by pro-Assad gunmen in Qardaha, according to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed. Reuters verified video of fighting between pro-Assad forces and security forces in Homs.
The insurgency provoked widespread rage: there were street protests against the insurgency in traditionally anti-Assad neighbourhoods across Syria, calling for a response. To quell the rebellion, Syrian interim government authorities sent in reinforcements to western Syria. including tanks and armoured vehicles. The Syrian Minister of Defense mobilized government military forces to "break the back of the remnants of the regime and make them an example to anyone who dares to tamper with the country's security." Latakia's Director of Public Security mobilized a full security response to the province. The official Military Operations Management Telegram channel initially urged for popular participation in heading to coastal Syria to "support our brothers", before stating that additional support was no longer needed.
At the same time, the Alawite Islamic Council in Syria and the Diaspora called on Alawites to "take to the streets and demonstrate [against the new government] in coastal cities and towns" and the Alawite Council in Latakia called on Russia to "immediately and urgently intervene to protect the Syrian people, especially the Alawite sect, from the threat of genocide by terrorist organizations."
Thousands of fighters from Islamist groups, including pro-Turkish factions from the Free Syrian Army, arrived from Idlib, Aleppo, and Deir ez-Zor to coastal Syria with many local residents joining. Several mosques broadcast calls to jihad, according to Le Monde reporters. Multiple videos recorded by armed men showed large convoys of militants moving towards Tartus and Latakia. A narrator in one video (which CNN was unable to geolocate) stated: "It was the battle for liberation. Now it's a battle for purification [of Syria]," while a man in military gear stated, "To the Alawites, we're coming to slaughter you and your fathers" and "we will show you the [strength] of the Sunnis."
According to SOHR, at least 35 pro-government fighters and 32 pro-Assad gunmen died in the violence, while four civilians were also killed.
The government imposed a 24-hour curfew in the coastal cities in the evening and began a search for militants following the violence.
7 March
Beginning at approximately 8:00 a.m. AST on 7 March 2025, armed groups entered Alawite neighborhoods in Baniyas, a multi-faith coastal town in Tartus Governorate. According to eyewitness accounts provided to Le Monde, these groups included Syrian Ministry of Defense and General Security Service members from nearby regions in conjunction with fighters described as "foreigners", including individuals of purported Turkmen and Chechen origin. Multiple witnesses described systematic targeting of Alawite residents, with men being executed on rooftops and in streets. SOHR reported sixty people killed in Baniyas, including ten women and five children, marking one of the largest single massacres documented on 7 March.
General Security entered the village of Beit Ana in search of wanted individuals but were attacked, after which ambulances transporting the dead and wounded security forces were also attacked. State media reported that militias loyal to Assad had opened fire on "members and equipment of the defence ministry" near Beit Ana, killing one security force member and wounding two. SOHR reported that in response there were "strikes launched by Syrian helicopters on armed men in the village of Beit Ana and the surrounding forests, coinciding with artillery strikes on a neighbouring village".