The boycott of the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles followed four years after the American-led boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. The boycott involved nineteen countries: fifteen from the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union, which initiated the boycott on May 8, 1984; and four non‑aligned countries which boycotted on their own initiatives. The boycotting countries organized alternative sporting events called the Friendship Games which were held in various Eastern Bloc countries from July to September 1984. Although the boycott affected Olympic events that were normally dominated by the absent countries, 140 nations still took part in the Los Angeles Games, which was a record at the time.
Since the announcement by U.S. president Carter of the boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow in 1980, there was fear from United States officials that a reciprocal boycott could occur during the 1984 Games, scheduled for Los Angeles. The Soviets for their part gave sparsely few indications that this would happen, and indeed, from formalized talks which occurred over the course of three years, indicators seemed to point towards Soviet participation. Only in the last year before the Games began did a sense of non-participation come about.
During that final year, the loss of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 and the subsequent vitriol directed at the Soviets by various activist groups which formed in the aftermath of the flight's destruction seriously hampered relations between the two committees tasked with coordinating Soviet attendance, the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) and the Soviet National Olympic Committee (Soviet NOC). Their faltering relations did not improve with the ascension of Konstantin Chernenko to the post of General Secretary of the Soviet Union in February 1984. Chernenko was a close acolyte of Leonid Brezhnev and therefore predisposed to avoiding Los Angeles due to the 1980 boycott. American reticence in dealing with anti-Soviet activists coupled with American mishandling of the Soviets' Olympic attaché, incentivized the Soviets enough in their view to justify boycotting the Games. Most of the Soviet-allied nations of the Eastern Bloc joined the boycott in solidarity, despite the decision being hugely unpopular amongst Bloc countries with significant prior Olympic medal winnings.
Leadup to boycott
California legislative response to KAL 007
On September 16, 1983, the California State Assembly and California State Senate approved Senate Joint Resolution 31, a measure urging President Ronald Reagan to ban the Soviets from participating in the Los Angeles Games. The non-binding resolution was hurriedly put forth by California State Senator John Doolittle in response to the Soviet shootdown of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 just 15 days prior. The resolution was reportedly amended to include the Olympic banning clause in the waning moments of the legislative session and that most of those voting for it did not know of the clause's inclusion. The only American Olympic official to speak out against the legislation was F. Don Miller, Executive Director of the U.S. Olympic Committee, who criticized what he termed "narrow‑minded legislators for trying to use the Olympics in American foreign policy". LAOOC President Peter Ueberroth and LAOOC Chairman Paul Ziffren both remained silent on passage of the legislation, saying they felt the best response was to "say nothing". In February 1984, the California State Senate advanced a bill to rescind the earlier legislation. The newer measure welcomed athletes from all nations to the Games and urged Californians to "be gracious hosts to all competitors".
Ban the Soviets Coalition
Another response to the shootdown of KAL 007 was the creation of a group calling itself Ban the Soviets Coalition. Formed by evangelical Christian writer David Balsiger—a self-described "maverick Republican"—and three other Southern California businessmen approximately one month after the flight's destruction, the Coalition's first effort was to petition President Reagan to support a ban on the Soviets attending the Olympic Games. Petitions labeled "We Cannot Forget Them" invoking the passengers and crew killed aboard KAL 007 were distributed to the public with a request for assistance in persuading lawmakers to agree to the endeavor. The Coalition initially estimated getting 1 million signatures from the public, but after thirty days, found they had gathered only 1% of that number.
Seeking a more direct approach, the Coalition wrote to White House Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver advising him that nearly all members of the Coalition were "the same groups that made the difference in Reagan going to the White House", groups who supported him because of his "strong anti-Communist stand and his firm position on moral, family, and Judeo-Christian issues". The letter cited unnamed national opinion polls that reportedly showed "70 million Americans supporting a ban on the Soviets" and also conveyed the Coalition's concerns regarding proposed Soviet Olympic arrangements which the Coalition felt would "introduce adverse security implications" for the United States. Deaver's response was that the U.S. intended to honor the Olympic Charter, whose provisions prevented host countries from banning other nation's athletes, and that the U.S. would "carefully consider any security implications".
Upon realizing that Reagan would not support a ban, the Coalition turned to more provocative actions, including sending letters to Soviet Olympic officials warning that their athletes might be physically harmed. These efforts brought the Coalition outsized media attention in the United States and abroad, while the LAOOC, along with the Reagan Administration, refrained from publicly denouncing their activities. Faced with increasing threats from the Coalition and silence from the LAOOC and the White House, the Soviets took their concerns to the U.S. State Department, who instead warned the Soviets about the publicity Soviet media was beginning to devote to Ban the Soviets Coalition, as it was generating "far more interest and U.S. press coverage of this insignificant group than it could have ever achieved on its own." The Soviets requested that the State Department ban demonstrations against Soviet athletes while also suggesting that Balsiger be forcibly removed from Los Angeles to "a remote and quiet place", leaving Deputy U.S. Secretary of State Kenneth Dam to ask "What more do they want, other than to change Los Angeles into a miniature of the Soviet Union?"
In early April 1984, members of the Coalition met at a private home in the genteel residential enclave of Hancock Park, in Los Angeles, to discuss erecting billboards along freeways that the Soviet athletes would travel during the Games as a means of encouraging defection, saying they hoped to establish 500 safe houses for any defectors. This spurred LAOOC President Ueberroth to belatedly begin reassuring the Soviets, first by telling them that the California legislation was unimportant because of the "scatterbrained way it was adopted", and second, by dismissing the Coalition as "fringe extremists, not a legitimate threat to athletes". Near the end of April 1984, the Coalition began boasting to the media that they had infiltrated the LAOOC with operatives who were preparing to assist any Soviet athletes who came to the Games and wished to defect, prompting Ueberroth to publicly label the group's leader Balsiger as "nutty". This led to the Coalition threatening to boycott all major Olympic Games' corporate sponsors if no public apology were forthcoming from Ueberroth. Ueberroth replied that he would "apologize if they'd change their name to a proper one ... maybe call themselves the Coalition to Hurt Athletes or maybe the Coalition to Play into the Hands of the Soviets."
Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates said of the Coalition, "I respect that group's First Amendment right to do what they are doing, but I can tell you that the Russian athletes would never be aware of theirs or any other peaceful demonstrations". Gates and Ueberroth did not share the Soviets' perception of the Coalition as a large and formidable threat, with Gates stating he "couldn't believe that the Russians would be intimidated by a tiny group like the Ban the Soviets Coalition" and Ueberroth saying the Coalition's entire membership "could all fit in a station wagon and drive south, and it would be the end of it".
Preliminary positive meetings
In spite of strong American reactions to the Korean Air Lines incident, several positive encounters signaling a likely Soviet attendance still preceded the Games. During the Summer of 1983 the Soviets signed a $3 million dollar television contract to broadcast the Games in the Soviet Union. In December 1983, a meeting of officials representing the LAOOC and 14 members of the Soviet NOC took place in Los Angeles, resulting in the signing of a protocol agreement concerning Soviet expectations for participation. At that time, the chairman of the Soviet NOC, Marat Gramov, communicated his view of the upcoming Summer Games as being positive, and that he "saw no reason why the Soviet Union should not participate". One month later in January 1984, a second Soviet delegation visited Los Angeles to meet with the International Olympic Committee (IOC)'s Executive Commission. This meeting was also viewed positively, with no mention of boycotts being made at that time. A final, positively viewed meeting was held during the IOC's 87th Session on February 5, 1984, in Sarajevo, three days before the start of the Sarajevo Winter Olympic Games. During that meeting, Soviet IOC member Konstantin Andrianov offered congratulations to the LAOOC, saying they were doing "a great job". Four days later on February 9, 1984, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Yuri Andropov, died.
Yermishkin visa denial
On March 2, 1984, the Soviets' proposed-Olympic attaché, Oleg Yermishkin, was denied an entry visa from the U.S. State Department, which identified him as an operational officer of the KGB. The LAOOC expressed consternation towards the State Department's decision on what the LAOOC considered to be a "minor issue", saying that it should not have been at all surprising that the Soviets, who had security concerns, would have wanted as their Olympic attaché, someone who was experienced in security matters directing the preparations for their team. After all, the LAOOC noted, the Israeli and Turkish delegations also had intelligence personnel involved as attachés in the preparations for their teams. LAOOC President Ueberroth, relying on assurances he said he received from the Reagan Administration, told the Soviets in Sarajevo that Yermishkin would be acceptable and that they should go ahead and proceed formally with his visa application. Although preparations for Yermishkin's arrival were ongoing for the past 5 months, the denial of his travel visa occurred on the very day he was set to travel to Los Angeles.
David Simon, the LAOOC's chief of government relations, said of Yermishkin's visa denial:
"It was the first time that I can recall where we really had egg on our face, where Ueberroth basically gave them his word that this was going to be the case and then had to retract it a couple of weeks later when Yermishkin was turned down. That's the one thing where the Soviets really had a right to be angry with us."
— David Simon, LAOOC Government Relations Chief
Soviet NOC criticisms
On April 9, the Soviet NOC released their first statement voicing criticisms concerning preparations for the Los Angeles Olympic Games. In response, IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch convened a meeting of the IOC Executive Commission on April 24, 1984 at the IOC main office in Lausanne. Peter Ueberroth attended as representative of the LAOOC, with Marat Gramov representing the Soviet NOC. During the meeting, Gramov revealed for the first time that the "Soviet NOC had received declarations and letters from various nationalistic and terrorist groups and organizations with threats". In light of these threats, Gramov made four requests of the LAOOC covering entry into the United States, security, Soviet delegation and media access to Olympic sites, and the use of Aeroflot charter flights. Gramov also requested use of the Soviet cruise ship MS Gruziya for equipment storage, recreational space, and lodging for Soviet personnel other than athletes and trainers (who instead, would reside in Rieber Hall at UCLA).
According to the LAOOC, "the parties also discussed other minor matters and agreed that all matters regarding the participation of any NOC could be resolved through dealing directly with the LAOOC only." In addition, the Soviet NOC stated that it "intended to participate in the Games of the XXIII Olympiad in Los Angeles under the condition that the Olympic Charter is enforced". Both the LAOOC and the Soviet NOC agreed to communicate more often in the future. However, following the meeting, the LAOOC sent daily telexes to the Soviet NOC for several days, but received no response. The LAOOC stated that "although the meeting itself had been encouraging, the lack of response by the USSR NOC to these messages was a clear cause for worry."
National Security Decision Directive No. 135
Anticipating Gramov's request for accommodations, Reagan had already signed National Security Decision Directive No. 135 on March 27, 1984, which addressed two of those requests: approval of Aeroflot flights to Los Angeles and permission for the docking of the MS Gruziya in Long Beach Harbor.
The directive stated:
"This Directive delineates the counterintelligence and security precautions the United States Government will take. ... We will ensure the safe passage of Soviet Aeroflot flights to and from our country for the Soviet 'Olympic Family' (i.e., those Soviets, including a reasonable number of spectators, directly involved in the Games) and for the visit of the Soviet vessel Gruziya to the Long Beach Harbor area."
— NSDD No. 135, March 26, 1984