The 1973 Chilean coup d'état (Spanish: Golpe de Estado en Chile de 1973) was a military overthrow of the socialist president of Chile Salvador Allende and his Popular Unity coalition government. Allende, who was the first Marxist to be democratically elected president in a Latin American liberal democracy, faced significant social unrest and political tension with the opposition-controlled National Congress of Chile. On 11 September 1973, a group of military officers, led by General Augusto Pinochet, seized power in a coup, ending civilian rule.
During the air raids and ground attacks preceding the coup, Allende delivered his final speech, expressing his determination to remain at Palacio de La Moneda and rejecting offers of safe passage for exile. He died in the palace. The exact circumstances of Allende's death are still disputed, but it is generally accepted as a suicide. Following the coup, a military junta was established and it suspended all political activities in Chile and suppressed left-wing movements, such as the Communist Party of Chile and the Socialist Party of Chile, the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), and other communist and socialist parties. Pinochet swiftly consolidated power and was officially declared president of Chile in late 1974.
The Nixon administration, which had played a role in creating favorable conditions for the coup, promptly recognized the junta government and supported its efforts to consolidate power. In 2023, declassified documents showed that Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and the United States government, which had described Allende as a dangerous communist, were aware of the military's plans to overthrow Allende in the days before the coup d'état. According to historian Sebastián Hurtado Torres, there is no documentary evidence to support that the United States government acted actively in the coordination and execution of the coup actions by the Chilean Armed Forces. However, Richard Nixon's interest from the beginning was that the Allende government would not be consolidated. Historian Peter Winn found extensive evidence of United States complicity in events that helped in part to create the conditions that led to the coup.
Fidel Castro's Cuba was allied with the Allende Government, providing weapons to Left-Wing groups in Chile and Cuban officials tried to convince Allende to make a coup before the opposition made one. Castro visited Chile in 1971 staying for 24 days, more than initially expected. The KGB considered Allende a "confidential contact" according to the Mitrokhin Archive.
Chile had previously been regarded as a symbol of democracy and political stability in South America, while other countries in the region suffered under military juntas and caudillismo. The period in Chile before the coup is known as the Presidential Republic (1925–1973) era. At the time, Chile was a middle-class country, with about 30% or 9 million Chileans being middle class. The collapse of Chilean democracy marked the end of a series of democratic governments that had held elections since 1932.
Historian Peter Winn described the 1973 coup as one of the most violent events in Chilean history. The coup led to a series of human rights abuses in Chile under Pinochet, who initiated a brutal and long-lasting campaign of political suppression through torture, murder, and exile, which significantly weakened leftist opposition to the military dictatorship of Chile (1973–1990). Following the internationally supported 1988 referendum about his continuity and the 1989 constitutional reform referendum held under the military junta, Pinochet stepped down from power, leading to the peaceful transition to democracy. Due to the coup's occurrence on the same date as the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, it has sometimes been referred to as "the other 9/11".
Political background
Allende contested the 1970 Chilean presidential election with Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez of the National Party and Radomiro Tomic of the Christian Democratic Party. Allende received 36.6% of the vote, while Alessandri was a very close second with 35.3%, and Tomic third with 28.1%, in what was a close three-way election. Although Allende received the highest number of votes, according to the Chilean constitution and since none of the candidates won by an absolute majority, the National Congress had to decide among the candidates.
The Chilean Constitution of 1925 did not allow a person to serve consecutive terms as president. The incumbent president, Eduardo Frei Montalva, was therefore ineligible to run. The CIA's "Track I" operation was a plan to influence Congress to choose Alessandri, who would resign after a short time in office, forcing a second election. Frei would then be eligible to run. Alessandri announced on 9 September that if Congress chose him, he would resign. Allende signed the Statute of Constitutional Guarantees, which stated that he would abide by the constitution during his presidency, in an effort to shore up support for his candidacy. Congress then decided on Allende. The U.S. feared the example of a "well-functioning socialist experiment" in the region and exerted diplomatic, economic, and covert pressure upon Chile's elected socialist government. At the end of 1971, the Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro made a four-week state visit to Chile, alarming American observers worried about the "Chilean Way to Socialism".
According to the former KGB agent, Vasili Mitrokhin, the Soviet Union provided financial support for the election of Salvador Allende, with whom it had had ties since the 1950s, by granting him a "personal subsidy of $500,000," which was approved by the Politburo with the aim of "strengthening confidential relations." It is also reported that $18,000 was paid to a left-wing senator to "persuade him not to run as a candidate." Once elected, the USSR provided $30,000 in October 1971 to "consolidate relations of trust" with the Allende government and another $50,000 requested in February 1973, shortly before the 1973 Chilean parliamentary election. The documents also claim that the Soviet intelligence service sought closer cooperation between Chilean intelligence agencies and the Soviet Union, including a possible reorganization of the Chilean Army and intelligence services, proposals to which Allende allegedly reacted positively. The KGB reportedly viewed the Popular Unity government's situation as increasingly difficult by 1972 and criticized Allende for not using "force" against his opponents. After the 1973 Chilean coup d'état, Soviet intelligence officials reportedly complained that Allende had given little importance to their warnings about the possibility of his overthrow.
Allende presided over an increasingly unstable economy. A fiscal deficit of 3.5% in 1970 grew to 24% by 1973. In 1972, Economics Minister Pedro Vuskovic adopted monetary policies that increased the amount of circulating currency and devalued the escudo. That year, inflation increased by 225% and reached 606% by 1973. The high inflation in 1973 decreased wages by 38%. To combat this, Allende created the Committees of Supplies and Prices (Juntas de Abastecimiento y Precios (JAP)). JAP reopened private shops and requisitioned goods that had been slowly disappearing due to declining production.
In October 1972, Chile suffered the first of many strikes. The Trucker's Strike that began on 1 October in Aysen province was a response to economic problems and rumors of transportation nationalization. Eight days later, the Confederation of Truckers, led by Leon Vilarín and supported by the guilds and possibly the CIA, called for an indefinite national strike, which further hindered the movement and distribution of goods that were already struggling. Truckers then blocked all main roads on 12 October, creating a shortage of essential goods. Allende declared a state of emergency in response, and the strike leaders were arrested. This would only further provoke the Chilean population, and more strikes and protests ensued. The state of emergency also failed to reverse the strike or the economic crisis.
Among the participants were small-scale businesspeople, some professional unions, and student groups. Its leaders – Vilarín, Jaime Guzmán, Rafael Cumsille, Guillermo Elton, Eduardo Arriagada – expected to depose the elected government. Other than damaging the national economy, the principal effect of the 24-day strike was drawing Army head, General Carlos Prats, into the government as Interior Minister, an appeasement to the right wing. This replaced General René Schneider, who had been assassinated (Schneider had been shot on 22 October 1970 by a group led by General Roberto Viaux, whom the Central Intelligence Agency had not attempted to discourage, and died three days later) General Prats supported the legalist Schneider Doctrine and refused military involvement in a coup d'état against President Allende.
Despite the declining economy, President Allende's Popular Unity coalition increased its vote to 43.2% in the March 1973 parliamentary elections; but, by then, the informal alliance between Popular Unity and the Christian Democrats ended. The Christian Democrats allied with the right-wing National Party, who were opposed to Allende's government; the two right-wing parties formed the Confederation of Democracy (CODE). The internecine conflict between the legislature and the executive branch paralyzed government operations.
Allende began to fear his opponents, convinced they were plotting his assassination. Using his daughter Beatriz as a messenger, he explained the situation to Fidel Castro. Castro gave four pieces of advice: convince technicians to stay in Chile, sell only copper for US dollars, do not engage in extreme revolutionary acts which would give opponents an excuse to wreck or seize control of the economy, and maintain a proper relationship with the Chilean military until local militias could be established and consolidated. Allende attempted to follow Castro's advice, but the latter two recommendations proved difficult to implement.
Chilean military before the coup
Before the coup, the Chilean military had undergone a process of depoliticization since the 1920s, when military officers had held cabinet positions. Subsequently, most military officers remained underfunded, having only subsistence salaries. Because of low salaries, the military spent much of their time in military leisure facilities (e.g., country clubs) where they met other officers and their families. The military remained apart from society and was, to some degree, an endogamous group, as officers frequently married the sisters of their comrades or the daughters of high-ranking older officers. Many officers also had relatives in the military. In 1969, elements of the military made their first act of rebellion in 40 years when they participated in the Tacnazo insurrection. The Tacnazo was not a proper coup, but a protest against under-funding. In retrospect, General Carlos Prats considered that Christian Democrats, who were in power in 1969, committed the error of not taking the military's grievances seriously.
Throughout the 1960s, the governments of Ecuador (1963), Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966), Peru (1968), and Bolivia (1969) were overthrown and replaced by military governments. In June 1973, Uruguay joined the coup d'état wave that swept through the region. The poor conditions of the Chilean military contrasted with the change of fortune the military of neighboring countries experienced as they came to power in coups.
During the decades before the coup, the military became influenced by the United States' anti-communist ideology in the context of various cooperation programs, including the U.S. Army School of the Americas.
Crisis
On 29 June 1973, Colonel Roberto Souper surrounded La Moneda presidential palace with his tank regiment and failed to depose the Allende Government. That failed coup d'état – known as the Tanquetazo tank putsch – had been organized by the nationalist "Fatherland and Liberty" paramilitary group.
In August 1973, a constitutional crisis occurred; the Supreme Court publicly complained about the government's inability to enforce the law of the land. On 22 August, the Christian Democrats united with the National Party of the Chamber of Deputies accused the government of unconstitutional acts and called upon the military to enforce constitutional order.
On August 21, both Tomé and Concepción saw large demonstrations, prompting the Chilean Army and Navy to occupy the two cities. The occupation lasted three weeks, culminating in the assault of the presidential palace, La Moneda, in Santiago.
For months, the government had feared calling upon the Carabineros national police, suspecting them of disloyalty. On 9 August, Allende appointed General Carlos Prats as Minister of Defense. He was forced to resign as both defense minister and Army commander-in-chief on 24 August 1973, embarrassed by the Alejandrina Cox incident and by a public protest by the wives of his generals at his house. General Augusto Pinochet replaced him as Army commander-in-chief the same day. In late August 1973, 100,000 Chilean women congregated at Plaza de la Constitución to protest against the government for the rising cost and increasing shortages of food and fuels, but they were dispersed with tear gas.
Resolution by the Chamber of Deputies
On 23 August 1973, with the support of the Christian Democrats and National Party members, the Chamber of Deputies passed 81–47 a resolution that asked "the President of the Republic, Ministers of State, and members of the Armed and Police Forces" to "put an immediate end" to "breach[es of] the Constitution ... with the goal of redirecting government activity toward the path of Law and ensuring the Constitutional order of our Nation, and the essential underpinnings of democratic co-existence among Chileans".
The resolution declared that the Allende government sought "to conquer absolute power with the obvious purpose of subjecting all citizens to the strictest political and economic control by the state ... [with] the goal of establishing a totalitarian system", claiming it had made "violations of the Constitution ... a permanent system of conduct". Essentially, most of the accusations were about the government disregarding the separation of powers and arrogating legislative and judicial prerogatives to the executive branch. Finally, the resolution condemned the "creation and development of government-protected armed groups, which ... are headed towards a confrontation with the armed forces". President Allende's efforts to reorganize the military and the police forces were characterized as "notorious attempts to use the armed and police forces for partisan ends, destroy their institutional hierarchy, and politically infiltrate their ranks".
It can be argued that the resolution called upon the armed forces to overthrow the government if it did not comply, as follows: "To present the President of the Republic, Ministers of State, and members of the Armed and Police Forces with the grave breakdown of the legal and constitutional order ... it is their duty to put an immediate end to all situations herein referred to that breach the Constitution and the laws of the land with the aim of redirecting government activity toward the path of Law". The resolution was later used by Pinochet as a way to justify the coup, which occurred two weeks later.