The Pereiaslav Agreement or Pereyaslav Agreement (Ukrainian: Переяславська рада, romanized: Pereiaslavska Rada, lit. 'Pereiaslav Council', Russian: Переяславская рада) was an official meeting that convened for a ceremonial pledge of allegiance by Zaporozhian Cossacks to Russian tsar Alexis (r. 1645–1676) in the town of Pereiaslav in central Ukraine, in January 1654. The ceremony took place concurrently with ongoing negotiations that started on the initiative of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky to address the issue of the Cossack Hetmanate with the ongoing Khmelnytsky Uprising against the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and which concluded the Treaty of Pereiaslav (also known as the March Articles). The treaty itself was finalized in Moscow in April 1654 (in March according to the Julian calendar).
Khmelnytsky secured the military protection of the Tsardom of Russia in exchange for allegiance to the tsar. However, although the council was attended by a delegation from Moscow headed by Vasiliy Buturlin, the latter refused to swear an oath on behalf of the tsar, thus making it uncertain whether the Pereiaslav Agreement was legally binding. An oath of allegiance to the Russian monarch from the leadership of the Cossack Hetmanate was taken, shortly thereafter followed by other officials, the clergy and the inhabitants of the Hetmanate swearing allegiance. The exact nature of the relationship stipulated by the agreement between the Hetmanate and Russia is a matter of scholarly controversy. The council of Pereiaslav was followed by an exchange of official documents: first, the so-called March Articles from the Cossack Hetmanate, which stipulated an autonomous status of the Hetmanate within the Russian state. And second, the tsar's declaration (from Russia).
The agreement precipitated the Russo-Polish War of 1654–1667. The definitive legal settlement was effected under the Treaty of Perpetual Peace in 1686 concluded by Russia and Poland that re-affirmed Russia's sovereignty over the lands of Zaporozhian Sich and left-bank Ukraine, as well as the city of Kiev.
The Pereiaslav Agreement or Pereyaslav Agreement (Ukrainian: Переяславська рада, romanized: Pereiaslavska Rada, lit. 'Pereiaslav Council', Russian: Переяславская рада) was an official meeting that convened for a ceremonial pledge of allegiance by Zaporozhian Cossacks to Russian tsar Alexis (r. 1645–1676) in the town of Pereiaslav in central Ukraine, in January 1654. The ceremony took place concurrently with ongoing negotiations that started on the initiative of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky to address the issue of the Cossack Hetmanate with the ongoing Khmelnytsky Uprising against the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and which concluded the Treaty of Pereiaslav (also known as the March Articles). The treaty itself was finalized in Moscow in April 1654 (in March according to the Julian calendar).
Khmelnytsky secured the military protection of the Tsardom of Russia in exchange for allegiance to the tsar. However, although the council was attended by a delegation from Moscow headed by Vasiliy Buturlin, the latter refused to swear an oath on behalf of the tsar, thus making it uncertain whether the Pereiaslav Agreement was legally binding. An oath of allegiance to the Russian monarch from the leadership of the Cossack Hetmanate was taken, shortly thereafter followed by other officials, the clergy and the inhabitants of the Hetmanate swearing allegiance. The exact nature of the relationship stipulated by the agreement between the Hetmanate and Russia is a matter of scholarly controversy. The council of Pereiaslav was followed by an exchange of official documents: first, the so-called March Articles from the Cossack Hetmanate, which stipulated an autonomous status of the Hetmanate within the Russian state. And second, the tsar's declaration (from Russia).
The agreement precipitated the Russo-Polish War of 1654–1667. The definitive legal settlement was effected under the Treaty of Perpetual Peace in 1686 concluded by Russia and Poland that re-affirmed Russia's sovereignty over the lands of Zaporozhian Sich and left-bank Ukraine, as well as the city of Kiev.
Background of negotiations
In January 1648, a major anti-Polish uprising led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky began in the Zaporizhia lands. Supported by popular masses and by Crimean Khanate the rebels won a number of victories over the government forces of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth seeking the increase of Cossack registry (kept at the expense of the state treasury), weakening of the Polish aristocratic oppression, oppression by the Jews who governed estates as well as recovery of positions of the Orthodox Church in own lands. However, the autonomy obtained by Khmelnytsky found itself squeezed between three Great powers: the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Tsardom of Russia and the Ottoman Empire.
Being the main leader of the uprising, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was not able to declare independence because he was not a legitimate monarch, and there was not such a candidate among other leaders of the uprising. Considering the economic and human resources, the rebellion was taking place in regions of the Polish Crown, Kijów (Kyiv), Czernihow (Chernihiv) and Bracław (Bratslav) voivodeships. The Crimean Khan, the only ally, was not interested in a decisive victory of Cossacks.
Cossack — Moscow negotiations timeline
It is believed that negotiations to unite the Zaporizhian lands with Russia started as early as in 1648. Such idea is common among Soviet historians of Ukraine and Russia such as Mykola Petrovsky. Many other Ukrainian historians among which are Ivan Krypiakevych, Dmitriy Ilovaisky, Myron Korduba, Valeriy Smoliy and others interpret negotiations as an attempt to attract the tsar to military support of Cossacks and motivate him to struggle for the Polish Crown which became available after the death of Władysław IV Vasa.
18 June 1648 – the first known official letter of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi to Tsar Alexis I; it was finished: "So let the God fulfill the prophecy, which was celebrated from ancient times, to which we gave ourselves, and to the merciful feet of your royal majesty, like the lower ones, submit obediently."
18 June 1648 – letter of Khmelnytskyi to the Muscovite voivode of Siveria, Leontiev. Mention of favorable attitude of the Cossacks to the tsar. The issue of allegiance to the tsar is not raised.
21 July 1648 – letter of Khmelnytskyi to the Muscovite voivode of Putivl, Pleshcheyev. Mention of motivation of the Russian tsar to the struggle for the Polish Crown. The issue of allegiance to the tsar is not raised.
end of December 1648 – departing of Khmelnytskyi delegation to Moscow. The delegation included the chief envoy Syluyan Muzhylovsky and Patriarch Paisius I of Jerusalem.
January 1649 – in Moscow, Patriarch Paisius convinced the tsar of Khmelnytskyi's intentions "...striking with forehead to your Imperial Majesty, so the emperor ordered to grant him, Khmelnytskyi and all the Zaporizhian Host adoption under His high imperial hand...", but in the Muzhylovsky's notes is mentioned only request for military assistance, while the issue of allegiance to the Tsar was not raised.
April 1649 – meeting of Khmelnytskyi with the tsar's envoy Grigoriy Unkovsky in Chyhyryn. The Hetman emphasized the kinship of Ukraine and Muscovy: "...from the baptizing by St. Volodimer', we had with Moscow our one pious Christian faith and one power..." and asked for military assistance.
May 1649 – deportation of Khmelnytskyi's envoys to Moscow headed by Chyhyryn Colonel Fedir Veshnyak. In accreditation letter it was expressed petition for protectorate of the Russian tsar. "...take under own mercy and defense... all of Ruthenia". Alexis refused Veshnyak's offer with the pretext that he did not wish to break the "eternal" Treaty of Polyanovka (1634) with the Commonwealth, which had ended the Smolensk War. At the same time, a similar delegation was sent to the Prince of TransylvaniaGeorge II Rákóczi to encourage him to fight for the Polish Crown.
16 August 1649: The Cossacks achieved a hollow victory at the Battle of Zboriv. Abandoned by the Crimean Khanate at Zboriv, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi blamed Moscow for not sending help. Cossack-Moscow relations worsened. The Hetman and his associates resorted to diplomatic pressure on Moscow: they openly expressed the need for a campaign against the Muscovites, and refused to extradite impostor Timofey Akudinov who claimed to be the son of tsar Vasili IV of Russia.
18 August 1649 N.S.: The Commonwealth and Cossacks concluded the Treaty of Zboriv, which recognised the Cossack Hetmanate as an autonomous territory within the Commonwealth, but subject to the Sejm and the King, and with a maximum of 40,000 Registered Cossacks. Due to conflicting reports about the Treaty of Zboriv and Khmelnytsky's intentions, tsar Alexis prohibited contact between his officers and Khmelnytsky.
October 1649: Tsarist envoy Grigorii Neronov rejected Khmelnytsky's suggestion that Muscovy should protect both the Cossacks and their Crimean Tatar allies, because the Crimean Khan was a vassal of the Ottoman Sultan. Khmelnytsky tried to persuade Neronov by pointing out that the Crimean Khan was dissatisfied with the Ottomans at the time.
January 1650: Muscovite envoys Grigorii Pushkin, Stepan Pushkin and Gavrila Leontev were sent to Warsaw to demand punishment for Poles who improperly recorded Alexis' title in official documents (he was supposed to be the "Tsar of Russia", not the "Prince of Moscow"), and threatened war unless the Commonwealth "returned the cities taken by Wladystaw IV and punished those who had insulted the tsar."
March 1650 – Khmelnytskyi ignored orders of the king of Poland on preparations to a shared Polish-Crimean campaign against Moscow.
Summer-fall of 1650 – revival of the Turkish-Ukrainian dialogue to transfer under the Ottoman protectorate: "... Ukraine, White Ruthenia, Volhynia, Podolie with whole Ruthenia all the way to Wisla..."
Throughout 1651–1652: Muscovy was clearly still not interested in risking war with the Commonwealth by supporting the Ukrainian rebels. All Muscovite diplomatic efforts against the Commonwealth throughout 1651 and 1652 were squarely focused on the supposed deliberate dishonouring of the tsar in official Commonwealth correspondence.
1 March 1651 – Zemsky Sobor in Moscow. The Moscow clergy found it possible in case of not following by the Polish side conditions of the Eternal Peace permit Alexis Mikhailovich to adopt the Zaporizhian Host as one of his subjects.
September 1651 – Osman-aga, an Ottoman envoy, arrived to Chyhyryn, and informed about readiness of the High Porte to take Ukraine under its protection. Khmelnytskyi did not rush, anticipating Moscow's answer.
28 (18) September 1651: Khmelnytsky and Grand Crown Hetman Mikołaj Potocki signed the Treaty of Bila Tserkva after several Cossack defeats and the Crimean Khan had abandoned the Cossacks.
March 1652 – Khmelnytskyi's envoys in Moscow. Envoy Ivan Iskra proposed immediately to take the Zaporizhian Host under the tsar's custody. The tsar's government agreed to take only the army without the territory, anticipating in the future to give it lands in the interfluve of Don and Medveditsa.
On 11 (1) October 1653, the Zemskii Sobor ((Assembly of the Land) that took place in Moscow in the fall adopted the decision to intervene in Commonwealth affairs in order to protect the Orthodox population there against persecution. This was the last time the Zemskii Sobor was ever convened; it had ceased to function by the mid-17th century. On 2 November 1653, the Moscow government declared war on the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. To conduct negotiations between two states, a large delegation headed by the boyarVasili Buturlin departed from Moscow to Ukraine. In its composition were also okolnichiy Ivan Olferiev (Alferov), dyak Larion Lopukhin and representatives of the clergy.
The travel took almost three months. Besides bad roads and disorder, a new royal standard had to be made, the Buturlin's speech text, and the mace (bulawa) designated to Hetman disappeared several precious stones that had to be recovered. Also, the delegation had to wait almost a week for arrival of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, who was delayed in Chyhyryn at the burial of his older son Tymofiy Khmelnytsky and later was not able to cross the Dnieper since the ice on the river was not strong enough. On 23 (13) December 1653, a Cossack committee led by Teteria welcomed the Buturlin delegation outside Pereiaslav and escorted them into the city. On 16 (6) January 1654, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky arrived in Pereiaslav, and one day later secretary-general Ivan Vyhovsky.
Pereiaslav meeting and the autonomous Cossack state
At a meeting between the council of Zaporozhian Cossacks and Vasiliy Buturlin, representative of Tsar Alexis I of Russia, during the Khmelnytsky Uprising. The Pereiaslav Council of Ukrainians took place on January 18; it was meant to act as the supreme Cossack council and demonstrate the unity and determination of the "Rus' nation". Military leaders and representatives of regiments, nobles and townspeople listened to the speech by the Cossack hetmanBohdan Khmelnytsky, who expounded the necessity of seeking the Russian protection. The audience responded with applause and consent. The treaty, initiated with Buturlin later on the same day, invoked only protection of the Cossack state by the tsar and was intended as an act of official separation of Ukraine from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (Ukrainian independence had been informally declared earlier in the course of the Uprising by Khmelnytsky). Participants in the preparation of the treaty at Pereiaslav included, besides Khmelnytsky, Chief Scribe Ivan Vyhovsky and numerous other Cossack elders, as well as a large visiting contingent from Russia.
The Cossack leaders tried in vain to exact from Buturlin some binding declarations; the envoy refused, claiming lack of authority and deferred resolution of specific issues to future rulings by the tsar, which he expected to be favourable to the Cossacks. Khmelnytsky and many Ukrainians (127,000 total, including 64,000 Cossacks, according to the Russian reckoning) ended up swearing allegiance to the Tsar. In many Ukrainian towns, residents were forced to go to the central square to take the oath. Part of the Orthodox clergy took the oath only after a long resistance, and some Cossack leaders did not take the oath. The actual details of the agreement were negotiated the following March and April in Moscow by Cossack emissaries and the Tsardom. The Russians agreed to the majority of the Ukrainian demands, granting the Cossack state broad autonomy, large Cossack register and preservation of the status of the Kiev Orthodox Metropolitan, who would keep reporting to the Patriarch of Constantinople (rather than Moscow). The Cossack hetman was prohibited from conducting independent foreign policy, especially in respect to the Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire, as the Tsardom pledged now to provide the Hetmanate's defense. The status of Ukraine, seen by the negotiators as being now in union with the Russian state (rather than Poland), was thus settled. The erroneous but stubborn policies of the Commonwealth are widely seen as the cause of the Cossacks' changed direction, which gave rise to a new and lasting configuration of power in central, eastern and southern Europe.