The siege of Orléans (12 October 1428 – 8 May 1429) marked a turning point of the Hundred Years' War between France and England. The siege took place at the pinnacle of English power during the later stages of the war, but was repulsed by French forces inspired by the arrival of Joan of Arc. The French would then regain the initiative in the conflict and begin to recapture territories previously occupied by the English.
The city held strategic and symbolic significance to both sides of the conflict. The consensus among contemporaries was that the English regent, John of Lancaster, would have succeeded in realising his brother the English king Henry V's dream of conquering all of France if Orléans fell. For half a year the English and their Burgundian allies appeared to be on the verge of capturing the city, but the siege collapsed nine days after Joan of Arc arrived.
Background
Hundred Years' War
The siege of Orléans occurred during the Hundred Years' War, an inheritance dispute over the French throne between the ruling houses of France and England. The conflict had begun in 1337 when England's King Edward III decided to press his claim to the French throne, a claim based on his status as the son of Isabella of France and thus of the contested French royal line.
Following a decisive victory at Agincourt in 1415, the English gained the upper hand in the conflict, occupying much of northern France. Under the Treaty of Troyes of 1420, England's Henry V became regent of France. By this treaty, Henry married Catherine, the daughter of the current French king, Charles VI, and would then succeed to the French throne upon Charles's death. The Dauphin of France (title given to the French heir apparent), Charles, the son of the French king, was then disinherited.
Geography
Orléans is located on the river Loire in north-central France. During the time of this siege, it was the northernmost city that remained loyal to the Valois French crown. The English and their Burgundian allies controlled the rest of northern France, including Paris. Orléans's position on a major river made it the last obstacle to a campaign into central France. England already controlled France's southwestern coast.
Armagnac party
As the capital of the duchy of Orléans, this city held symbolic significance in early 15th century politics. The dukes of Orléans were at the head of a political faction known as the Armagnacs, who rejected the Treaty of Troyes and supported the claims of the disinherited and banished Dauphin Charles to the French throne. This faction had been in existence for two generations. Its leader, the Duke of Orléans, also in line for the throne, was one of the very few combatants from Agincourt who remained a prisoner of the English fourteen years after the battle.
Under the customs of chivalry, a city that surrendered to an invading army without a struggle was entitled to lenient treatment from its new ruler. A city that resisted could expect a harsh occupation. Mass executions were common in this type of situation. Reasoning of the late medieval established that since the city of Orléans had escalated the conflict, it forced the use of violence upon the English, justifying a conquering lord in exacting vengeance upon the citizens. The city's association with the Armagnac party made it unlikely to be spared if it fell.
Preparations
State of the conflict
After the brief fallout over Hainaut in 1425–26, English and Burgundian forces renewed their alliance and offensive on the Dauphin's France in 1427. The Orléanais region southwest of Paris was of key importance, not only for controlling the river Loire, but also to smoothly connect the English area of operations in the west and the Burgundian area of operations in the east. French forces had been largely ineffective before the Anglo-Burgundian onslaught until the siege of Montargis in late 1427, when they managed to successfully force it to be lifted. The relief of Montargis, the first effective French action in years, emboldened sporadic uprisings in the thinly-garrisoned English-occupied region of Maine to the west, threatening to undo recent English gains.
However, the French failed to capitalize on the aftermath of Montargis, in large part because the French court was embroiled in an internal power struggle between the constable Arthur de Richemont and the chamberlain Georges de la Trémoille, a new favourite of the Dauphin Charles. Of the French military leaders, John, the "Bastard of Orléans" (later called "Dunois"), La Hire and Jean de Xaintrailles were partisans of La Trémoille, while Charles of Bourbon, Count of Clermont, the marshal Jean de Brosse and John Stewart of Darnley (head of the Scottish auxiliary forces), were lined up with the constable. The inner French conflict had reached such a point that their partisans were fighting each other in the open field by mid-1428.
The English took advantage of French paralysis to raise fresh reinforcements in England in early 1428, gathering a new force of 2,700 men (450 men-at-arms and 2,250 longbowmen), brought over by Thomas Montagu, 4th Earl of Salisbury, who was regarded as the most effective English commander of the time. These were bolstered by new levies raised in Normandy and Paris, and joined by auxiliaries from Burgundy and vassal domains in Picardie and Champagne, to a total strength possibly as great as 10,000.
At the council of war in the spring of 1428, the English regent John, Duke of Bedford determined the main thrust of English military campaigns would be towards the west, to stomp out the remaining Armagnac forces in the Maine and lay siege to Angers. The city of Orléans was not originally in this plan. Indeed, Bedford had secured a private deal with Dunois, whose attentions were focused on the Richemont-La Trémoille conflict, then raging violently in the Berri. As Charles I, Duke of Orléans was at the time in English captivity, it would have been contrary to the customs of knightly war to seize the possessions of a prisoner. Bedford agreed to leave Orléans alone, but, for some reason, changed his mind shortly after the arrival of English reinforcements under Salisbury in July 1428. In a memorandum written in later years, Bedford expressed that the siege of Orléans "was taken in hand, God knoweth by what advice", suggesting it was probably Salisbury's idea, not his.
Salisbury's approach
Between July and October, the Earl of Salisbury swept through the countryside southwest of Paris – recovering Nogent-le-Roi, Rambouillet and the area around Chartres. Then, rather than continuing southwest to Angers, Salisbury turned abruptly southeast towards Orléans instead. Pressing towards the Loire, Salisbury seized Le Puiset and Janville (with some difficulty) in August. From there, rather than descending directly on Orléans from the north, Salisbury skipped over the city to seize the countryside west of it. He reached the river Loire at Meung-sur-Loire, which he promptly seized (a detachment of his men crossed the river then to plunder the abbey of Cléry). He pressed a little downriver, in the direction of Blois, to take the bridge and castle of Beaugency. Salisbury crossed the Loire at the point, and turned up to approach Orléans from the south. He arrived at Olivet, just one mile south of Orléans, on 7 October. In the meantime, an English detachment, under John de la Pole, brother of the Earl of Suffolk, had been sent to seize the regions upriver, east of Orléans: Jargeau fell on 5 October, Châteauneuf-sur-Loire immediately after, while further upriver, the Burgundians took Sully-sur-Loire. Orléans was cut off and surrounded.
Manning the defenses of Orléans, John of Dunois had watched the tightening English noose and took care to prepare the city for siege. Dunois correctly anticipated that the English would aim for the bridge, nearly one quarter mile (400 m) long, that led from the south shore of the Loire into the centre of the city of Orléans on the north shore. The bridge passed over the riverine island of St. Antoine, an optimal location for Salisbury to position English cannon within range of Orléans city centre. At the southern end of the bridge was a turreted gatehouse, Les Tourelles, which stood in the river, connected by a drawbridge to the southern bank. Dunois rapidly erected a large earthwork bulwark (Boulevart) on the south shore itself, which he packed with the bulk of his troops, thus creating a large fortified complex to protect the bridge. Just across from the Boulevart was an Augustinian friary, which could be used as a flanking firing position on any approach to the bridge, although it seems Dunois decided not to make use of it. On his orders, the southern suburbs of Orléans were evacuated and all structures leveled to prevent giving the English cover.
Early stages of the siege
Assault on the Tourelles
The siege of Orléans formally began on 12 October 1428, and initiated with an artillery bombardment that began on 17 October. The English assaulted the Boulevart on 21 October, but the assaulters were held back by French missile fire, rope nets, scalding oil, hot coals and quicklime. The English decided against a new frontal attack, and set about mining the bulwark. The French countermined, fired the pit props and fell back to the Tourelles on 23 October. But the Tourelles itself was taken by storm the next day, 24 October. The departing French blew up some of the bridge arches to prevent a direct pursuit.
With the fall of the Tourelles, Orléans seemed doomed. But the timely arrival of the Marshal de Boussac with sizeable French reinforcements prevented the English from repairing and crossing the bridge and seizing Orléans immediately. The English suffered another setback two days later, when the Earl of Salisbury was struck in the face by debris kicked up in cannon fire while supervising the installation of the Tourelles. English operations were suspended while Salisbury was carried off to Meung to recover, but after lingering for about a week, he died of his injuries.
The investment
The lull in English operations following Salisbury's injury and death gave the citizens of Orléans time to knock out the remaining arches of the bridge on their end, disabling the possibility of a quick repair and direct assault. The new siege commander appointed by Bedford in mid-November, William de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk resolved on surrounding the city and starving it into submission. He did not have enough men to invest the city with continuous trenchlines, so he set up a series of outworks, (bastides). Over the next few months, seven strongholds were set up on the north bank, and four on the south bank, with the small riverine isle of Charlemagne (west of Orléans) commanding the bridges connecting the two banks.
In the winter, a Burgundian force numbering about 1,500 men arrived to support the English besiegers.
The establishment of the outworks was not without difficulty. The French garrison sallied out repeatedly to harass the builders, and systematically destroyed other buildings (notably, all the churches) in the suburbs to prevent them serving as shelter for the English during the winter months. By the Spring of 1429, the English outworks covered only the south and west of the city, with the northeast basically left open (nonetheless swarming with English patrols). Sizeable contingents of French men-at-arms could push aside the patrols and move in and out of the city, but the entry of any lighter-escorted provisions and supplies was firmly blocked, there and further afield.
On the south bank, the English center was the bridge complex, composed of the Tourelles-Boulevart and the now-fortified Augustines. Guarding the approach to the bridge from the east was the bastille of St. Jean-le-Blanc, while to the west of the bridge complex was the bastille of Champ de St. Privé. St. Privé also guarded the bridge to the island of Charlemagne (which had another bastille). On the north bank of the Loire, on the other side of Charlemagne bridge, was the bastille of St. Laurent, the largest English bulwark and the nerve center of English operations. Above that were a series of smaller outworks, in order: the bastille de la Croiz Boisse, the bastille des Douze Pierres (nicknamed "London"), the bastille de Pressoir Aps (nicknamed "Rouen") and, just north of the city, the bastille de St. Pouair (nicknamed "Paris"), all on top of the main roads. Then came the great northeastern gap, although its back was mostly covered by thick forest of the Bois d'Orléans. Finally, some 2 km east of the city, on the north bank, there was the isolated bastille of St. Loup.