The Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes or Winter Battle of the Masurian Lakes, known in Germany as the Winter Battle in Masuria and in Russia as the Battle of Augustowo, was the northern part of the Central Powers' offensive on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1915 during World War I. The offensive was intended to advance beyond the Vistula River and potentially knock Russia out of the war. It was the last major battle fought on German soil during World War I.
Background
The Central Powers planned four offensives on their Eastern Front in early 1915. The Germans, led by Supreme Commander of All German Forces in the East Paul von Hindenburg, would attack eastward from their front line in western Poland, which had been occupied after the Battle of Łódź in 1914, toward the Vistula River and also in East Prussia in the vicinity of the Masurian Lakes, site of the 1914 Battle of the Masurian Lakes. The Austro-Hungarians would emerge from the Carpathian Mountain passes to attack the Russians by driving toward Lemberg. They would be led by General Alexander von Linsingen. Further south General Borojevic von Bojna would attempt to relieve the besieged fortress at Przemyśl.
According to Prit Buttar, "It was with considerable reluctance that Falkenhayn agreed to the deployment of four additional corps on the Eastern Front in early 1915. Whilst he remained convinced of the primacy of the Western Front, the failure to win a decisive victory there left him unable to counter the arguments of Hindenburg and Ludendorff ... might be able to inflict a sufficiently heavy defeat upon Russia to end the conflict in the east."
Ludendorff wrote, "It was agreed with OHL to use the four corps to strike against the enemy forces deployed against 8th Army as soon as they arrived. The experiences of Tannenberg and the Battle of the Masurian Lakes had shown that a great and swift victory in battle could be achieved if the enemy were attacked from two sides." Ludendorff's target for the German attack was the Russian 10th Army, with a northern thrust from Tilsit through Wladislawow to Kalvarija, and a southern thrust from the Spirding-See near Bialla to Raigrod and then to Augustowo. The Russians were to be held in position by a frontal attack, and if successful, Ludendorff planned further attacks on Osowiec and Grodno.
The German northern thrust was to be made by the newly formed 10th Army, under the command of Eichhorn, with the XXI Corps, XXXIX Reserve Corps, and XXXVIII Reserve Corps deployed from the Niemen River to Insterburg. Landwehr formations were held in reserve. The German southern thrust was to be made by Below's 8th Army, with the XL Reserve Corps deployed west of Johannisburg, and the XX Corps at Ortelsburg. The Russian 10th Army consisted of the 3rd Army Corps opposite Eichhorn, and the 3rd Siberian Army Corps opposite Below, while the 20th and 26th Army Corps held the centre.
Battle
Chief of the German Great General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn strongly believed that the war would be won on the Western Front. Nonetheless, he sent four additional army corps to Paul von Hindenburg, Supreme Commander of All German Forces in the East. By February 1915, thirty-six percent of the German field army was in the east.
The German 9th Army attacked from Silesia into Poland at the end of January. They released tear gas, which stopped their assault by blowing back on the attackers. The Russians counterattacked with eleven divisions under a single corps commander, losing 40,000 men in three days.
In East Prussia, further Russian incursions were blocked by trench lines extending between the Masurian Lakes; they were held by the German 8th Army, commanded by General Otto von Below. The 8th Army was reinforced by some of the newly arrived corps, while the rest of them became the German 10th Army, commanded by Colonel-General Hermann von Eichhorn, which was formed on the German left. The 10th Army was to be one wing of a pincers intended to surround their opponents: General Sievers' Russian 10th Army. A new Russian 12th Army under General Pavel Plehve was assembling in Poland roughly 100 km (62 mi) to the southwest.
Sievers warned the Northwest Front commander, General Nikolai Ruzsky, that they were likely to be attacked, but was ignored. On February 7, despite a heavy snowstorm, the left wing of Below's 8th Army launched a surprise attack against Sievers, whose trenches were shallow, disconnected ditches, with little or no barbed wire because the first shipments had not arrived until December 1914. The following day, the German 10th Army also drove forward. Snow, with drifts as high as a man, slowed German progress down the roads for the first two days; off the roads, the ground was too boggy for fighting. Despite these formidable obstacles, the German pincers advanced 120 km (75 mi) in a week, inflicting severe casualties on the Russians.
Sievers' ordered Evgeny Radkevich's 3rd Siberian Army Corps to pull back to Lyck, where it would form a new defensive line with the XXVI Corps. Nikolai Epanchin's 3rd Army Corps, which had already lost most of its equipment, withdrew to Kovno and Olita, where they no longer became a factor in the battle. Pavel Bulgakov's 20th Army Corps now faced the German XXI Corps and XXXIX Reserve Corps on its northern flank. According to Buttar, "Whilst the German advance might have been aided by the snow trampled by the retreating Russians, it was only possible at all because of the food abandoned by the retreating 10th Army; the movements of German supply columns were as restricted by the weather as everyone else."
Heavy snow fell on 11 February as temperatures dropped to −15 °C (5 °F). On 12 February, Otto von Lauenstein's XXXIX Reserve Corps captured Eydtkuhnen and Wirballen. On 14 February, the German 10th Army's XXI Corps, under the command of Fritz von Below, cut the road connecting Augustowo to Sejny. Lyck was also captured by the Germans on 14 February. The Russian 26th, 20th, and 3rd Siberian Army Corps were now in danger of being encircled. On 15 February, the weather changed to rain, and a thaw, turning the roads into knee-deep mud.
On 16 February, the Germans reached Augustowo, and Georg von der Marwitz's XXXVIII Reserve Corps captured Suwałki. Eichhorn's 10th Army was now to the north of Augustowo, while Below's 8th Army was to the west. Karl Litzmann's XL Reserve Corps were ordered over the Augustów Canal on 17 February, the 3rd Siberian Army Corps abandoned their defensive positions, while Bulgakov's 20th Army Corps, isolated, attempted to retreat to the east.
Destruction of the 20th Army Corps
For the commander of the huge 20th Army Corps, which had five infantry divisions instead of two like other Russian corps, P. Bulgakov, there was only one way out - to break through from the "encirclement" to the east, towards Grodno.
At the forefront of the huge corps column stretching out from Suwalki was the 27th Infantry Division. It was she who began the battle at Macharce on February 16. The ram attack of 16 Russian battalions hit three battalions of the German 65th Brigade (97th Infantry Regiment) and two batteries of the 15th Field Artillery Regiment and a pioneer company that had taken up positions. In a stubborn battle, the German batteries fired all the shells, the Russian infantry advanced their machine guns and fired at the covering soldiers.
Before the retreat to Frącki (no more than 250 men remained), the artillerymen managed to remove locks and sights from 8 guns and drown them in a swamp. Two machine guns were also lost. The commander of the 65th Brigade, Major General E. von Estorff, sent the remaining battalions of his brigade to Macharce. At the Gaienek Village, the Russian regiments, which continued to advance forward, dispersed one battalion and captured 2 more guns, but were stopped.
The approaching regiments of the 29th Infantry Division were thrown into the battle from the Russian side, and the regiments of the 59th Infantry Brigade from the German side. Since at that time the German 31st Division was successfully advancing through Sapotskin to Lipsk and Golynka, only the 42nd Division was supposed to hold the passage to Grodno. After suffering heavy losses, Estorff withdrew the remnants of the brigade.
It seemed that the breakthrough of Russian divisions on Grodno could no longer be stopped. But the German units showed a higher coherence of actions. Having learned about the battle from Macharce, the commander of the XXXIX Reserve Corps Otto von Lauenstein, without hesitation, sent the 78th Reserve Division there, which managed to approach the Frącki. The stubborn battle continued until the morning of February 17, when units of the 2nd Infantry Division made their way to Studzianki from the south and finally closed the encirclement around the Russian 27th, 28th, 29th, 53rd and parts of the 56th Infantry Divisions.
At the same time, the German 9th Landwehr Brigade broke into Augustow, capturing 5,000 prisoners, 12 guns and 2 machine guns and a banner. Macharce was also repulsed, all the lost guns and machine guns were returned, and the prisoners taken by the Russians were released. The banner of the 138th Infantry Regiment buried in the snow was also found. In just two days, the Germans lost 11 officers and 381 soldiers killed at Macharce, 15 officers and 665 soldiers wounded, and two officers and 1,020 soldiers missing.
The Supreme Commander of All German Forces in the East considered the task of the operation solved. On February 18, the Germans who surrounded the 20th Army Corps began to eliminate it, the defense of the outer front of the encirclement was assigned to the R. Kosh group, reinforced by the Königsberg Landwehr, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 5th Guards Brigade. K. Litzman's group and the 4th Cavalry Division were transferred to the 10th Army to develop the offensive against the Bobr River and assist in the encirclement of Osowiec. The capture of the fortresses of the Narew line (Osowiec, Łomża, Różan) was entrusted to the 8th Army.
Part of the Russian troops south of Augustow managed to avoid encirclement. The Siberian Riflemen withdrew across the Bobr River and destroyed the bridges, stopping the pursuit in this way. The 64th and 84th Infantry Divisions of the 26th Army Corps retreated “due to a telegram sent by the mentally ill Chief of Staff, General Budberg, that the troops should retreat to Osowiec” (from the testimony of Infantry General Aleksandr Gerngross).
At Augustow, the corps suffered heavy losses, artillery parks, carts, divisional infirmaries, two light and mortar batteries were abandoned, but the infantry broke out of the already closing ring. This was also the merit of the fighters of the 20th Army Corps, who chained three German divisions to themselves on the way to Grodno. For the group of General Bulgakov, the path to salvation was closed, and the retreating neighbouring corps were never sent by Thadeus von Sivers on a counteroffensive to break through the ring from the outside.
The German 31st Infantry Division occupied Lipsk on February 18, and Bartniki on February 19 with minimal losses (2 killed, 6 wounded, while 13 Russian officers and 1,285 soldiers were taken prisoner). On this day, the 80th Reserve and 4th Cavalry Divisions started a battle on the Bobr River, closing at Kolnica with the 75th, 76th and 78th Reserve Divisions advancing from the north through Lipsk.
On February 20, the German divisions continued to compress the encirclement. On the night of February 21, Bulgakov decided on a new breakthrough attempt, taking advantage of a snowstorm. The Russian columns stormed the hastily prepared German positions near Lipina and Wołkusze. At the beginning of the battle, the commander of the German 65th Infantry Brigade, Major General E. von Estorff, fell, then the commander of the 31st Field Artillery Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel R. Kollmann, died. The commander of the 131st Infantry Regiment, Colonel K. Fisher, was seriously wounded.