The July Crisis was a series of interrelated diplomatic and military escalations among the major powers of Europe in mid-1914, which led to the outbreak of World War I. It began on 28 June 1914 when the Bosnian Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg. A complex web of alliances, coupled with the miscalculations of numerous political and military leaders (who either regarded war as in their best interests, or felt that a general war would not occur), resulted in an outbreak of hostilities amongst most of the major European states by early August 1914.
Following the assassination, Austria-Hungary sought to inflict a military blow on Serbia, to demonstrate its own strength and to dampen Serbian support for Yugoslav nationalism, viewing it as a threat to the unity of its multi-national empire. However, Vienna, wary of the reaction of Russia – a major supporter of Serbia – sought a guarantee from its ally, Germany, that Berlin would support Austria in any conflict. Germany guaranteed its support through what came to be known as the "blank cheque", but urged Austria-Hungary to attack quickly to localise the war and avoid drawing in Russia. However, Austro-Hungarian leaders would deliberate into mid-July before deciding to give Serbia a harsh ultimatum which Serbia was certain to reject, and would not attack without a full mobilisation of the army. In the meantime, France met with Russia, reaffirmed their alliance, and agreed they would support Serbia against Austria-Hungary in the event of a war.
Austria-Hungary made its ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July; Russia ordered secret, but noticed, preparations for the mobilisation of its armed forces. Although Russia's military leadership knew they were not strong enough for war, they believed that the Austro-Hungarian grievance against Serbia was a pretext orchestrated by Germany, and considered a forceful response as the best course of action. Russia's preparations — the first major military action not undertaken by a direct participant in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and which were construed at the time as a partial mobilization — increased the willingness of Serbia to defy the threat of an Austro-Hungarian attack; it also alarmed the German leadership, who had not anticipated the idea of needing to fight Russia before France.
While the United Kingdom was semi-formally aligned with Russia and France, many British leaders saw no compelling reason to get involved militarily; the UK made repeated offers to mediate, and Germany made various promises to try to ensure British neutrality. However, fearing the possibility of Germany overrunning France, Britain entered the war against them on 4 August, and used the German invasion of Belgium to galvanise popular support. By early August, the ostensible reason for armed conflict—the assassination of an Austro-Hungarian archduke—had already become a side-note to a larger European war.
Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (28 June)
At the Congress of Berlin that brought an end to the Russo-Turkish War in 1878, Austria-Hungary was given the right to occupy Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina while the status of the territory's sovereignty remained unchanged (with the Ottoman Empire). Thirty years later, Austria-Hungary formally annexed the territory, violating the Berlin treaty and upsetting the fragile balance of power in the Balkans, precipitating a diplomatic crisis. Sarajevo became the provincial capital and Oskar Potiorek, a military commander, became governor of the province. In the summer of 1914, Emperor Franz Joseph ordered Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne, to attend military exercises due to be held in Bosnia. After the exercises, on 28 June, Ferdinand toured Sarajevo with his wife, Sophie. Six armed irredentists, five Bosnian Serbs and one Bosnian Muslim, coordinated by Danilo Ilić, seeking to free Bosnia of Austria-Hungarian rule and unite all Southern Slavs, lay in wait along Ferdinand's announced motorcade route.
At 10:10 a.m., Nedeljko Čabrinović threw a hand grenade at Ferdinand's motorcade damaging the following car and injuring its occupants. Later that morning, Gavrilo Princip managed to shoot and kill Franz Ferdinand and Sophie as they drove back to visit the wounded in the hospital. Čabrinović and Princip took cyanide, but it only sickened them. Both were arrested. Within 45 minutes of the shooting, Princip began telling his story to interrogators. The next day, based on the interrogations of the two assassins, Potiorek telegraphed Vienna to announce that Princip and Čabrinović had conspired in Belgrade with others to obtain bombs, revolvers, and money to kill the Archduke. A police dragnet quickly caught most of the conspirators.
Investigation and accusations
Immediately following the assassinations, Serbian envoy to France Milenko Vesnić and Serbian envoy to Russia Miroslav Spalajković put out statements claiming that Serbia had warned Austria-Hungary of the impending assassination. Serbia soon thereafter denied making warnings and denied knowledge of the plot. By 30 June, Austro-Hungarian and German diplomats were requesting investigations from their Serbian and Russian counterparts, but were rebuffed. On 5 July, based on interrogations of the accused assassins, Potiorek telegraphed Vienna that Serbian Major Voja Tankosić had directed the assassins. The next day, Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires Count Otto von Czernin proposed to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov that the instigators of the plot against Ferdinand needed to be investigated within Serbia, but he too was rebuffed.
Austria-Hungary immediately undertook a criminal investigation. Ilić and five of the assassins were promptly arrested and interviewed by an investigating judge. The three young Bosnian assassins who had travelled to Serbia stated that Tankosić had directly and indirectly supported them. In fact, Princip had received a few days of training and some weapons through renegade intelligence officers in Serbia and Mlada Bosna, the freedom fighting group to which Princip was primarily loyal, had members who came from all three major Bosnian ethnic groups. A total of twenty-five people were indicted as a result of the investigation, while the group was dominated by Bosnian Serbs, four of the indictees were Bosnian Croats, all of them were Austro-Hungarian citizens, none from Serbia.
Within Serbia, there was popular rejoicing over the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Because Serbian elections were scheduled for 14 August, Prime Minister Nikola Pašić was unwilling to court unpopularity by being seen to bow down to Austria-Hungary. If he had actually warned the Austro-Hungarians in advance of the plot against Franz Ferdinand, Pašić was probably concerned about his chances at the polls and perhaps his life being endangered if such news leaked out.
Léon Descos, French Ambassador to Belgrade, on 1 July reported that a Serbian military party was involved in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, that Serbia was in the wrong, and that Russian Ambassador Hartwig was in constant conversations with Regent Alexander to guide Serbia through this crisis. The "military party" was a reference to Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence, Dragutin Dimitrijević and the officers he led in the 1903 murder of the King and Queen of Serbia. Their acts led to the installation of the dynasty ruled by King Peter and Regent Alexander. Serbia requested and France arranged the replacement of Descos with the more hawkish Auguste Boppe who arrived on 25 July.
Austria-Hungary edges towards war with Serbia (29 June – 1 July)
While few mourned Franz Ferdinand himself, many ministers argued the assassination of the heir to the throne was a challenge to Austria-Hungary that must be avenged. This was especially true of Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold; in October 1913, his ultimatum to Serbia made them back down over the occupation of Northern Albania, which gave him confidence it would work again.
Members of the "War Party", like Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, saw it as an opportunity to destroy Serbia's ability to interfere in Bosnia. Moreover, the Archduke, who had been a voice for peace in the previous years, had now been removed from the discussions. The assassination combined with existing instability in the Balkans sent deep shockwaves through the Austro-Hungarian elite. The murder has been described by historian Christopher Clark as a "9/11 effect, a terrorist event charged with historic meaning, transforming the political chemistry in Vienna".
Debate in Vienna
Between 29 June to 1 July, Berchtold and Conrad debated an appropriate response to the events in Sarajevo; Conrad wanted to declare war on Serbia as soon as possible, stating: "If you have a poisonous adder at your heel, you stamp on its head, you don't wait for the bite." He advocated immediate mobilisation against Serbia, while Berchtold wanted to ensure public opinion be prepared first. On 30 June, Berchtold suggested they demand Serbia disband anti-Austro-Hungarian societies and relieve certain officials of their responsibilities, but Conrad continued to argue for the use of force. On 1 July, Berchtold told Conrad that Emperor Franz Joseph would await the criminal inquiry results, that István Tisza, Prime Minister of Hungary, was opposed to war, and that Karl von Stürgkh, Prime Minister of Austria, hoped that the criminal inquiry would provide a proper basis for action.
Opinion in Vienna was divided; Berchtold now agreed with Conrad and supported war, as did Franz Joseph, although he insisted German support was a prerequisite, while Tisza was opposed; he correctly predicted war with Serbia would trigger one with Russia and hence a general European war. The pro-war party saw it as a reactionary means of re-invigorating the Habsburg monarchy, restoring it to the vigour and virility of a real but far away past, and that Serbia must be dealt with before it became too powerful to defeat militarily.
Conrad continued to push for war, but worried what attitude Germany would take; Berchtold replied that he planned to inquire of Germany what its position was. Berchtold used his memo of 14 June 1914, proposing Serbia's destruction, as the basis for the document that would be used to solicit German support.
The German "Blank Cheque" (1–6 July)
German officials reassure Austria-Hungary of its support
On 1 July, Viktor Naumann, a German journalist and friend of German Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow, approached Berchtold's chief of cabinet, Alexander, Count of Hoyos. Naumann's advice was that it was time to annihilate Serbia and that Germany could be expected to stand by her ally. The next day, German Ambassador Heinrich von Tschirschky spoke to Emperor Franz Joseph and stated that it was his estimate that Emperor Wilhelm II would support resolute, well-thought-out action by Austria-Hungary with regard to Serbia.
On 2 July, the Saxon Ambassador in Berlin wrote back to his king that the German Army wanted Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia as quickly as possible because the time was right for a general war since Germany was more prepared for war than either Russia or France. On 3 July, the Saxon military attaché in Berlin reported that the German General Staff "would be pleased if war were to come about now".
Wilhelm II came to share the views of the German General Staff and declared on 4 July that he was entirely for "settling accounts with Serbia". He ordered the German ambassador in Vienna, Count Heinrich von Tschirschky, to stop advising restraint, writing that "Tschirschky will be so good to drop this nonsense. We must finish with the Serbs, quickly. Now or never!". In response, Tschirschky told the Austro-Hungarian government that next day that "Germany would support the Monarchy through thick and thin, whatever action it decided to take against Serbia. The sooner Austria-Hungary struck, the better". On 5 July 1914, Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff, wrote that "Austria must beat the Serbs".
Hoyos visits Berlin (5–6 July)
In order to ensure Germany's full support, Hoyos visited Berlin on 5 July. On 24 June, Austria-Hungary had prepared a letter for its ally outlining the challenges in the Balkans and how to address them, but Franz Ferdinand was assassinated before it could be delivered. According to the letter, Romania was no longer a reliable ally especially since the Russo-Romanian summit meeting of 14 June in Constanța. Russia was working toward an alliance of Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro against Austria-Hungary, dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, and the movement of borders from east to west. To break up this effort, Germany and Austria-Hungary should first ally with Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. To this letter was added a post-script on the Sarajevo Outrage and its impact. Finally, Emperor Franz Joseph added his own letter to Emperor Wilhelm II which closed with advocating the end of Serbia as a political power factor.
Hoyos provided Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Count Ladislaus de Szögyény-Marich with two documents, one of which was a memo by Tisza, advising that Bulgaria should join the Triple Alliance, and another letter by Franz Joseph stating that the only way of preventing the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy was "to eliminate Serbia" as a state. The letter by Franz Joseph was based closely upon Berchtold's 14 June memo calling for the destruction of Serbia. Franz Joseph's letter explicitly stated that the decision for war against Serbia had been made before the assassination of the Archduke, and that the events of Sarajevo only confirmed the already pre-existing need for a war against Serbia.
After meeting with Szögyény on 5 July, the German Emperor informed him that his state could "count on Germany's full support", even if "grave European complications" ensued, and that Austria-Hungary "ought to march at once" against Serbia. He added that "in any case, as things stood today, Russia was not at all ready for war, and would certainly think long before appealing to arms". Even if Russia were to act in defence of Serbia, Wilhelm promised that Germany would do everything in its power, including war, to support Austria-Hungary. Wilhelm added that he needed to consult with Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, who he was quite sure would have a similar view.
After his meeting, Szögyény reported to Vienna that Wilhelm "would regret it if we [Austria-Hungary] let this present chance, which was so favourable for us, go by without utilising it". This so-called "blank cheque" of German support up to and including war was to be the main determining factor in Austro-Hungarian policy in July 1914.