The First Taranaki War (also known as the North Taranaki War) was an armed conflict over land ownership and sovereignty that took place between Māori and the Colony of New Zealand in the Taranaki region of New Zealand's North Island from March 1860 to March 1861.
The war was sparked by a dispute between the colonial government and the Te Āti Awa people, led by Wiremu Kīngi Te Rangitāke, over the disputed sale of the Pekapeka land block at Waitara. The deal was orchestrated by minor Te Āti Awa rangatira Te Teira Manuka. Initially a conflict over individual title and collective land ownership, all-out war broke out and soon spread throughout the region. It was fought by more than 3,500 imperial troops brought in from Australia, as well as volunteer soldiers and militia, against Māori forces that fluctuated between a few hundred and about 1,500. Total losses among the imperial, volunteer and militia troops are estimated to have been 238, while Māori casualties totalled about 200, although the proportion of Māori casualties was higher.
The war ended in a ceasefire, with neither side explicitly accepting the peace terms of the other. Although there were claims by the British that they had won the war, there were widely held views at the time they had suffered an unfavourable and humiliating result. Historians have also been divided on the result. Historian James Belich has claimed that the Māori succeeded in thwarting the British bid to impose sovereignty over them, and had therefore been victorious. But he said the Māori victory was a hollow one, leading to the invasion of the Waikato.
In its 1996 report to the Government on Taranaki land claims, the Waitangi Tribunal observed that the war was begun by the Government, which had been the aggressor and unlawful in its actions in launching an attack by its armed forces. An opinion sought by the tribunal from a senior constitutional lawyer stated that the Governor, Thomas Gore Browne, and certain officers were liable for criminal and civil charges for their actions. Historian William Oliver has criticised this report claiming the tribunal ignores the constraints and political realities faced by the Crown while simultaneously taking into account the surrounding circumstances when judging the actions of the Taranaki Maori. The term "First Taranaki War" is opposed by some historians, who refer only to the Taranaki Wars, rejecting suggestions that the post-1861 conflict was a second war. The 1927 Royal Commission on Confiscated Land also referred to the hostilities between 1864 and 1866 as a continuation of the initial Taranaki war.
Background
The catalyst for the war was the disputed sale of 600 acres (2.4 km2) of land known as the Pekapeka block, or Teira's block, at Waitara. The block's location perfectly suited European settlers' wish for a township and port to serve the north of the Taranaki district and its sale was viewed as a likely precedent for other sales that would open up for settlement all land between New Plymouth and the Waitara River. Pokikake Te Teira Manuka, a minor chief of the Te Atiawa iwi, first offered the land to the New Zealand government in 1857, immediately attracting vehement opposition from the paramount chief of the tribe, Wiremu Kīngi, who declared a veto on the plan. Kingi initially claimed that the land was collectively owned and therefore Teira did not have the right to sell the land, but later admitted Teira and his family were the sole owners of the land and that he simply didn't want the land to be disturbed. Teira's sale was, however, supported by Ihaia Kirikumara and his brother Tamati, who wrote letters to newspapers claiming that European occupation would allow returned slaves to live in security and lessen the chance that Waikato war parties would return.
Governor Browne felt obliged to resist the veto; he insisted Māori had the right to sell if they wished, and wanted to demonstrate support for a friendly chief over an individual who was resisting the Crown's authority and the expansion of European law. Browne accepted the purchase with full knowledge of the circumstances and tried to occupy the land, anticipating it would lead to armed conflict. A year earlier Browne had written to the Colonial Office in England, advising: "I have, however, little fear that William King (Kingi) will venture to resort to violence to maintain his assumed right, but I have made every preparation to enforce obedience should he presume to do so."
Although the pressure for the sale of the block resulted from the colonists' hunger for land in Taranaki, the greater issue fueling the conflict was the Government's desire to impose British administration, law and civilisation on Māori as a demonstration of the substantive sovereignty the British believed they had gained in the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. The hastily written Māori translation, however, had given Māori chiefs an opposing view that the English had gained only nominal sovereignty, or "governorship" of the country as a whole while Māori retained "chieftainship" over their lands, villages and treasures.
By 1860, it was tacitly recognised that British law prevailed in the settlements and Māori custom elsewhere, though the British, who by then outnumbered Māori, were finding this increasingly irksome. One commentator observed, concerning Waitara: "We seem to be fast approaching a settlement of that point, whether Her Fair Majesty or His Dark Majesty shall reign in New Zealand." The British were convinced that their system represented the best that civilization had to offer and saw it as their duty and right to impose it on other peoples.
However, in the 20 years since the signing of the Treaty, Māori had made significant political advances. They had moved from being a collection of independent tribes to an effective confederation known as the Māori King Movement, which was centred on the Waikato region, but which influenced large areas of the North Island. One of the uniting principles of the King Movement was their opposition to the sale of Māori land and the spread of British sovereignty.
The settlement of New Plymouth—at the time "a line of wooden houses straggling untidily along the waterfront and intersected by bush-filled gullies which provided perfect cover for an attacking party"—was deemed vulnerable to assault by hostile Māori because of tensions over land sales and a detachment of British troops had been placed in the settlement in 1855. The killing of Katatore, an opponent of land selling at Waitara, in January 1858—which in turn sparked more feuding among local Māori and threats of a revenge massacre at Waitara by Kingi—prompted the formation of the Taranaki Militia in 1858 and Taranaki Volunteer Rifle Company in 1859.
Battle at Te Kohia
Teira was paid a £100 deposit for the land in December 1859. When Māori obstructed surveyors as they began work on the block, Browne responded by declaring martial law throughout Taranaki on 22 February 1860. Two days later a deed for the sale of the disputed Pekapeka block was executed, with 20 Māori signatories of Te Teira's family accepted as representing all owners of the land.
On 4 March, Browne ordered Colonel Charles Emilius Gold, commanding the 65th Regiment, the Taranaki Militia and the Taranaki Rifle Volunteers, to occupy the disputed block of land at Waitara in preparation for a survey. Four hundred men landed at Waitara the next day to fortify a position and the survey of the land began on 13 March without resistance.
On the night of 15 March, however, Kingi and about 80 men built an L-shaped pā, or defensive strong point, at Te Kohia, at the south-west extremity of the block, commanding the road access. The next day, they uprooted the surveyors' boundary markers and when ordered the following day, 17 March, to surrender, they refused. Gold's troops opened fire and the Taranaki wars had begun.
Gold's troops, by then numbering almost 500, poured in heavy fire all day from as near as 50 metres, firing 200 rounds from two 24-pound howitzers as well as small arms fire. Despite the firepower, the Māori suffered no casualties and abandoned the pā that night. Though it was small—about 650 square yards—the pā had been situated so that it was difficult to surround and had also been built with covered trenches and 10 anti-artillery bunkers, roofed with timber and earth, that protected its garrison.
The British objective at Waitara had been a rapid and decisive victory that would destroy the main enemy warrior force, checking and crippling Māori independence and asserting British sovereignty. That mission failed and the Te Kohia clash ended as little more than a minor skirmish with a result that disappointed English settlers.
Yet for Māori, too, the engagement had strong symbolic importance. Outnumbered and outgunned, Kingi needed to draw allies from several places, but by Māori tikanga, or protocol, support would not be offered to an aggressor. Te Kohia pa, hastily built and just as quickly abandoned, appeared to have been built for one purpose: to provide plain evidence of the Governor's "wrong". The aggressor having been identified, others were then free to launch reprisals under utu laws.
Within days, Māori war parties began plundering the farms south of New Plymouth, killing six settlers who had not taken refuge in the town. Fearing an attack on New Plymouth was imminent, the British withdrew from Waitara and concentrated around the town.
Battle of Waireka
The military action at Waitara brought the result Kingi had been hoping for and within 10 days of the Te Kohia battle, about 500 warriors from the Taranaki, Ngati Ruanui and Ngā Rauru iwi converged on the New Plymouth area to provide support. The warriors built an entrenched and stockaded pā named Kaipopo on one of the hills at Waireka, about 8 km southwest of New Plymouth and 4 km from the Omata stockade that lay on the road to the town. The area was scattered with some houses built by European settlers, and on 27 March, five settlers, including two boys, were either shot or tomahawked in the Omata district.
Tensions in New Plymouth quickly climbed and settlers with large families were ordered, under martial law, to evacuate to the safety of the town. Among those who remained in the Omata area were the Rev. Henry Brown, the Rev. Thomas Gilbert and several others who were either French or Portuguese. All felt safe: both ministers were treated by Māori as tapu or untouchable, while the others were confident the Māori grievance was with only the British.
About 1 pm on 28 March, a British force of about 335 men—28 Navy, 88 from the British 65th Regiment, 103 members of the newly formed Taranaki Rifle Volunteers and 56 from a local militia—set off in two columns to ostensibly rescue those who had remained behind. It would be the first occasion on which a British Volunteer corps engaged an enemy on the battlefield.
Captain Charles Brown, in command of the settlers, was ordered to march down the coast until he reached the rear of the Māori positions at Waireka. The Regulars, under Lieut-Colonel George Freeman Murray, marched down the main road to Omata, intending to dislodge a war party reported to be at Whalers Gate, north of Omata. Once the road was clear, it was intended they would be joined by the Volunteers and militia, who would rescue the settlers, before marching back to New Plymouth. Because of the heightened state of fear in New Plymouth, however, Murray had been ordered to return his troops to the town before nightfall. The Volunteers were armed with muzzle-loading Enfield rifles and the militia had old smooth-bore muskets from the 1840s, with each man issued with just 30 rounds of ammunition.
Murray met no resistance at Whalers Gate, but as he approached Waireka he heard the sound of rapid firing towards the coast. He entrenched his men and opened fire on the Kaipopo pā with a rocket tube. The gunfire Murray heard was being exchanged between about 200 Māori warriors—who, armed mostly with double-barrel shotguns and some rifles, were firing from the cover of bush and flax in the river gully—and the militia and Volunteers, who had retreated to the safety of the farmhouse of settler John Jury. Most of the battle took place on the flat farm land below the pa.
About 5.30 pm, Murray sounded the bugle for a retreat, withdrawing his Regulars for the march back to New Plymouth so they could arrive before dark. His withdrawal left the settler force, which had already suffered two killed and eight wounded, isolated at the farmhouse with little ammunition and late in the night, carrying their casualties, they scrambled across paddocks to the Omata stockade, arriving about 12.30 am, before returning to New Plymouth.
Late in the afternoon, meanwhile, Captain Peter Cracroft, commander of HMS Niger, had landed 60 bluejackets at New Plymouth and marched via Omata to Waireka, encountering Murray as he prepared to retreat. Cracroft's troops fired 24-pound rockets into the pā from a distance of about 700 metres and stormed it at dusk, tearing down three Māori ensigns. The first man into the pā was leading seaman William Odgers, who was awarded a Victoria Cross for bravery–the first awarded in the New Zealand Wars. Cracroft's men then returned to New Plymouth, without making contact with the settler force, who were still at the Jury farmhouse. The storming of the pā was the second stage of the battle. Most or all or the Māori casualties—between 17 and 40—occurred during the first stage of fighting around the gully and Jury homestead, according to Cowan.
Cracroft was lauded as a hero, with claims of the number of Māori killed by his troops ranging from 70 to 150. Total European losses were 14 killed and wounded. Historian James Belich has claimed the pā was more of a camp and all but empty and the total Māori casualties amounted to no more than one. He described the "legend" of Waireka as a classic example of the construction of a paper victory, with invented claims of "enormous" losses and a great British victory.
The settlers, apparently overlooked in the fracas, watched the action from their house and the next day made their way to New Plymouth, where Gilbert said: "It was no wish of ours that an armed expedition should be set on foot on our behalf. We were perfectly safe."
Murray was widely condemned for his actions in withdrawing his troops and a court of inquiry was convened into his conduct.