The First Russian Antarctic Expedition took place in 1819–1821 under the direction of Fabian Bellingshausen and Mikhail Lazarev. The expedition aimed to reach the Southern Ocean in order to prove or disprove the existence of a suspected seventh continent, Antarctica. The sloop Vostok was under the command of Bellingshausen, while Lazarev commanded the sloop Mirny. Overall, the crew consisted of 190 people.
Due to extreme haste in equipping the voyage (the order was released on March 15, and the departure took place on July 4, 1819), it was impossible to assemble a science team. Thus, almost all scientific observations in the fields of geography, ethnography, and natural history were conducted by officers and the only scientist on board, associate professor Ivan Mikhailovich Simonov, who taught at the Imperial Kazan University. A novice painter, Pavel Mikhailov, was hired to depict the events, landscapes, and biological species encountered during the expedition. His paintings of the South Shetland Islands were used in English sailing directions until the 1940s.
The Russian Antarctic expedition ended in complete success and became the second expedition to circumnavigate Antarctica after James Cook's expedition a half century earlier. Of the expedition's 751 days, 527 were spent at sea; the overall length of the route was 49,860 nautical miles. For 127 days the expedition was above 60° south latitude; the crew approached the Antarctic shore nine times, four times as close as 13–15 kilometres (8.1–9.3 mi) from the continent. Around 28 objects were depicted on the map of Antarctica which emerged, and 29 islands in high southern latitudes and the tropics were discovered and named.
The results of the expedition were published in Russian in 1831 in two volumes with the drawings applied in an atlas. In 1842, a short report was published in Germany. In 1945, a full English translation of Bellingshausen's only book was edited by polar explorer Frank Debenham and released.
Planning and organization
Background
Bellingshausen and Lazarev's Antarctic expedition was equipped around the same time as a similar expedition to the Arctic taken on by Mikhail Vasilyev and Gleb Shishmaryov on the sloops Otkrytie and Blagonamerennyi. In the 1950s, historians raised the question of who initiated the two Russian expeditions in the high north and south polar latitudes. The prevailing opinion at that time was that in the 1810s, Adam Johann von Krusenstern, Gavril Sarychev, and Vasily Golovnin independently presented the two projects. On the contrary, English writers believed that the plan came from a minister of the Ministry of Sea Forces, Jean Baptiste Traversay. This theory was promoted by Hugh Robert Mill, a librarian of the Royal Geographical Society, and Frank Debenham, director of the Scott Polar Research Institute at the University of Cambridge. Ivan Mikhailovich Simonov, astronomer and head of the Bellingshausen expedition, claimed that it was Emperor Alexander I of Russia who initiated the voyage.
According to Tammiksaar and T. Kiik, in 1818 Alexander I was highly interested in the results of Kotzebue's round-the-world voyage on the sloop Rurik. In September, the Emperor requested a detailed report on the expedition. The report was prepared by Krusenstern, who also sent Traversay the manuscript of his article on the first attempt of Vasily Chichagov in 1765–1766 to reach high Arctic latitudes. Traversay then managed to make the Emperor interested – Krusenstern reported on it on January 26 [O.S. January 14].
Krusenstern saw that the government's mood was favorable toward sending a state scientific expedition to Antarctica. Kotzebue's discoveries in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean provided a benchmark for reaching the Arctic Ocean through the Bering Strait. In his report to Traversay, Krusenstern also mentioned Bellingshausen as a potential candidate for the head of the expedition. By January 1819, the Emperor approved this plan, although Gleb Shishmaryov was appointed as head of the expedition instead.
In this context, it is not clear how the expedition became global, and how the plan of also researching the south polar region appeared. In the 18th and 19th centuries, any attempt to reach the hypothetical southern continent was dictated by the geographical theories that were in vogue at that time. One popular theory held that the large landmasses of the Northern Hemisphere should be balanced in the Southern Hemisphere; otherwise, the Earth could tip over.
On January 17, 1773, James Cook became the first navigator to cross the Antarctic Circle during his second circumnavigation. However, when he reached 67°15′ south latitude, he faced insurmountable sea ice. In January 1774, Cook reached 71°10′ south latitude, but was again stopped by sea ice. Though Cook never denied the existence of a Southern continent, he thought that it was impossible to reach:
...The most substantial part of the Southern continent (if we assume it exists) should lie within the polar region above the southern arctic circle. Still, sea there is so covered with ice that accessing the land is impossible. The risk associated with sailing to these undiscovered and under-researched and covered with ice seas in search of the Southern continent is so large that I can bravely claim that not a single person will reach South further than I was able to do. Southern lands will never be researched.
Krusenstern completely trusted Cook's authority and directly stated that the famous English navigator had "buried" the idea of Terra Australis. Soon after Kotzebue's return, on July 30 [O.S. July 18] 1818, Krusenstern presented his project on researching the Pacific region in the belts at 20° north and south of the equator to the president of the Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences Sergey Uvarov. The aim of the project was to explore undiscovered archipelagos and put an end to the Age of Discovery. He suggested that the project be implemented as a joint venture between the academy and the Ministry of Sea Forces. Krusenstern also mentioned this project in his foreword to the 1821 report on the Kotzebue expedition.
As a result of this history, Tammiksaar and Kiik concluded that in addition to the political aims, Traversay initiated this expedition in order to outperform the results of Cook's voyage. This has been indirectly shown by the fact that Traversay did not discuss the south polar project with any of the experienced ocean navigators that were subordinated to him. Also, some notes in French and Russian with extracts from the description of Cook's voyage and an estimate of the plan for sending two sloops – one to the Arctic and one the Antarctic – are stored in Traversay's personal papers in the Russian State Archive of the Navy. The minister later asked Sarychev, who had bad relations with Krusenstern and Kotzebue, to develop recommendations for a detailed plan. These anonymous notes do not mention such notions as "The North Pole" or "The South Pole".
On January 22 [O.S. January 10] 1819, Traversay met Tsar Alexander I. As of 2014, there were no documents on the initial stage of the double expedition project. The project may have been secret. Finally, on April 12 [O.S. March 31] 1819, the Emperor personally signed an order authorizing 100,000 rubles to finance the expedition. At the same time, Krusenstern sent a detailed letter to Traversay from Hagudi which implies that he was not informed about the negotiations taking place in high circles of power. According to Traversay's personal papers, the minister personally formulated the geographical objectives of both of the expeditions. Later, these items were included in the instructions published in Bellingshausen's report. Probably the main consultant was Sarychev.
Due to a lack of documentary evidence, it is almost impossible to determine why the expedition was equipped in such haste, why the funding was doubled, or why four ships were sent instead of two. On February 15 [O.S. February 3] 1819, Traversay signed the order forming the expedition on behalf of the Emperor. In Traversay's documents, units were called "divisions". According to the available data, Krusenstern's role in planning and forming the expedition was minimal.
Goals
The Vasilyev–Shishmaryov and Bellingshausen–Lazarev expeditions were respectively the third and fourth Russian circumnavigations to be organized and financed by the state. Both squads met in Portsmouth with the sloop Kamchatka, which was returning to St. Petersburg from the second circumnavigation under the command of Vasily Golovnin. Vasilyev's squad crossed the equator five days earlier than Bellingshausen.
Bulkeley later refuted the theory that the expedition was entirely scientific. According to him, differences between the aims of the Navy and the Merchant fleet were blurred. He claimed that Krusenstern's expedition carried commercial cargoes and specialists of the Russian American Company, even during the First Russian circumnavigation. Out of 23 circumnavigations that were carried out during the rule of Alexander I, half were commercial.
Bulkeley suggested that Russian circumnavigations significantly influenced Alaska development and the politics of isolationism in Haijin and Sakoku. The Mulovsky expedition that was initially planned under the rule of Catherine the Great was a reaction to the first voyage of James Cook in the northern part of the Pacific. Military-political goals determined the equipment of the Vasilyev and Bellingshausen expeditions. After the Congress of Vienna, Russian–British relations significantly worsened. Thus, Sir John Barrow expressed concern in 1817 that Russia would be the first country to open the Northwest Passage.
In 1818, there were rumors that Barrow planned a double expedition with four ships to reach the pole from both the Bering and the Davis Strait. When Alexander I heard about Barrow's plans, he ordered the sloops urgently outfitted and sent. However, counter admiral Lev Mitin noted that Bellingshausen's expedition was explicitly scientific and did not imply the goals of territorial expansion. According to Bulkeley, the lack of political aims in the expedition program does not signify anything since neither the Admiralty instructions for the 1818–1819 British Arctic expedition of Frederick William Beechey, William Parry, and John Ross, nor Franklin's lost expedition of 1845–1848, had any written political aims. Thus, Bulkeley claimed that without any political aims, the expedition would be much less effective.
The following passage in Bellingshausen's description was very remarkable:
In case of gaining islands and yet unknown costs, and also in commemoration of our stay in different places, it was allowed to leave and to give medals – silver for important people, and bronze – for others. These medals were minted in the Saint Petersburg Mint; on the one side it was Alexander I, and on the other was the inscription: sloops ‘Vostok’ and ‘Mirny’ in 1819, the same time when they were sent.
The Ministry of Sea Forces published the instruction that was signed by the Emperor on May 22 [O.S. May 10]. The most important points were:
- The sloops were to go through England and the Canary Islands before continuing on to Brazil;
- Heading to South Georgia Island, the expedition was to round the South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands from the eastern side and advance as far south as possible;
- The expedition was then to "use all possible efforts and the greatest effort to achieve as close to the Pole as possible, to look for unknown lands, and not leave this enterprise otherwise than with insurmountable obstacles";
- After the end of the first Arctic summer, the expedition would reach Port Jackson (Sydney);
- From Australia, the expedition would sail to Pacific waters, explore the islands that Kotzebue was researching, and "conduct observations about other neighbors, of which the inhabitants of the first-mentioned";
- After a second visit to Australia, "head south again to distant latitudes; resume and ... continue their research on last year's example with the same determination and perseverance, and the other meridians will sail to make the way around the globe, turning to the very height from which the division set off";
- Finally, after successfully completing the task, the expedition was to return to Russia.
The Emperor also commands that in all the lands which they will approach, and in which the inhabitants live, to treat them [locals] with the greatest affection and humanity, avoiding as much as possible all cases of causing offenses or displeasure, but on the contrary, trying to attract them with caress, and never apply too strict measures, unless in necessary cases, when the salvation of the people entrusted to his superiors will depend on this.
Equipment and staff
Commanders and crew
Judging by the available archival documents, appointing a commander was a very complicated process. Traversay constantly delayed his decision on the matter. On March 27 [O.S. March 15], orders of appointment of Shishmaryov and Lazarev were released. Lazarev was given command of the sloop Mirny. Lazarev's brother Alexei Lazarev served as a lieutenant on Blagonamerennyi. Finally, on May 4 [O.S. April 22], Vasilyev was appointed as commander of the second division. Initially, Traversay wanted to appoint Makar Ratmanov as head of the Southern (first) division. According to the order dated the beginning of May (which is stored at the Russian State Archive of the Navy), Ratmanov was supposed to head the Northern (second) division, but his name was later crossed out. Krusenstern claimed that Bellingshausen's appointment was entirely based on merit. However, Bellingshausen stated that he owed his place to Ratmanov's recommendation.