The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, also called the Varian Disaster (Latin: Clades Variana) by Roman historians, was a major battle fought between an alliance of Germanic peoples and the Roman Empire between 8 and 11 September 9 AD, possibly near modern Kalkriese. Fighting began with an ambush by the Germanic alliance on three Roman legions being led by Publius Quinctilius Varus and their auxiliaries; the alliance was led by Arminius, a Germanic chieftain and officer of Varus's auxilia. Arminius had received Roman citizenship and a Roman military education, thus allowing him to deceive the Romans methodically and anticipate their tactical responses.
Teutoburg Forest is considered one of the most important defeats in Roman history, bringing the triumphant period of expansion under Augustus to an abrupt end. It dissuaded the Romans from pursuing the conquest of Germania, and so can be considered one of the most important events in European history.
The provinces of Germania Superior and Germania Inferior, sometimes collectively referred to as Roman Germania, were established in northeast Roman Gaul, while territories beyond the Rhine remained independent. Retaliatory campaigns were commanded by Tiberius and Germanicus and enjoyed success, but the Rhine became the border between the Roman Empire and the rest of Germania. Rome then made no major incursion into Germania until Marcus Aurelius (r. 161–180) during the Marcomannic Wars.
Some of the descendants of the vassal kingdoms, like the Suebi (by suzerainty), that Augustus tried to create in Germania to expand the romanitas and the Empire, were the ones that invaded Rome in the fourth and fifth centuries.
Background
Geopolitical situation
The Roman Republic expanded rapidly in the first century BCE, most notably under Julius Caesar, who conquered most of western Europe and parts of the British Isles in the Gallic Wars (58–50 BCE). These mostly were against the Gauls but also included battles with various Germanic tribes. Caesar twice crossed the River Rhine but the engagements were inconclusive. His conquests ended as Caesar's civil war (49–45 BCE) drew near.
Continental Europe was mostly neglected by Rome for the next two decades, as power struggles wracked the Republic. Troops previously garrisoned in Gaul were pulled out in 31 BCE for the showdown between Octavian and Mark Antony at the Battle of Actium. The Gauls promptly rebelled, and Roman control was not regained until 28 BCE.
27 BCE saw drastic change for both Gaul and Rome as a whole. The Roman Republic reorganised into the Roman Empire, with Octavian as the first emperor. Octavian, now styled Augustus, aimed at solidifying control of Gaul by dividing the region into three smaller provinces that emphasised the strategic importance of the Rhine valley. Troops were kept near the Rhine, though policy towards the Germanic lands remains unclear. Two main theories exist. The first is that Augustus simply sought to cement the Rhine as the Northern border of the Empire; the second that the border was far more fluid, and that the troops were more focused on maintaining order in the Empire than on preventing Germanic intrusion. The Germans operated with apparent impunity anyway, as exemplified by the crushing defeat in the Lollian disaster in 16 BCE.
The Lollian disaster prompted a reorganisation of the legions in Gaul, which was completed by 12 BCE, when Emperor Augustus sought finally to tame the Germanic tribes. He began by making his stepson Drusus I governor of Gaul. Drusus campaigned against the Germans from 11–9 BCE, earning a series of victories, despite considerable obstacles, before his untimely death in a riding accident in 9 BCE. His elder brother and future emperor Tiberius was given command of Germany in 8 BCE. Tiberius continued his brother's campaign against the Sugambri, extending de facto, if not de jure Roman rule, but he fell out of political favour and chose exile in 6 BCE. He was, in turn, succeeded by Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, who had been consul in 16 BCE. Ahenobarbus suppressed a number of local uprisings and then crossed the Elbe river, the first and last Roman general to do so. As the turn of the century approached, the Romans felt secure about Germany, reassured by thriving cross-border trade and relative peace.
In early CE 6, Legatus Gaius Sentius Saturninus and Consul Legatus Marcus Aemilius Lepidus led a massive army of 13 legions and their entourage, totaling around 100,000 men (65,000 heavy infantry legionaries, 10,000–20,000 cavalrymen, archers, and 10,000–20,000 civilians) against Maroboduus, the king of the Marcomanni, who were a tribe of the Suebi.
However, Tiberius was then forced to turn his attention to the Bellum Batonianum, also known as the Great Illyrian Revolt, which broke out in the Balkan province of Illyricum. Led by Bato the Daesitiate, Bato the Breucian, Pinnes of Pannonia, and elements of the Marcomanni, it lasted nearly four years. Tiberius had to stop his campaign against Maroboduus and recognise him as king so that he could then send eight legions to crush the rebellion in the Balkans.
Following Rome's transfer of forces to the Balkans, only three legions remained to face the Germanic tribesmen. The weakened Roman position provided an opportunity for a Germanic rebellion.
Commanders and their armies
Publius Quinctilius Varus
The Varian disaster takes its name from Publius Quinctilius Varus, the commander of the remaining Roman forces in the region. Varus was a promising leader; Emperor Augustus appointed him quaestor in 22 BCE as a young man, even though the office usually required the holder to be at least 30. He went on to command the XIX legion in 15 BCE, and was elected junior consul. He was appointed governor of Africa in 8 BCE and of Syria in 7 BCE. The Syrian posting was prestigious, and a very difficult job due to political struggles in the Eastern Empire and its border nations. Varus acted to resolve the succession crisis at the death of Herod the Great in 4 BCE, but his performance as governor is disputed by contemporary sources. Josephus (writing some decades after the fact) has a positive view of Varus, whereas Velleius Paterculus implicitly accuses him of corruption. Regardless, Varus married the Emperor's great-niece after his term as governor ended, which ensured him a place in the Emperor's inner circle. Varus likely remained with the Emperor in Rome until his appointment to the command in Germania in 7 CE. Michael McNally assesses that Varus was not assigned to Germania for his military abilities, but for his political acumen; this was likely sought by the Emperor to deal with the factionalism among Germanic tribes.
Varus's name and deeds were known beyond the empire because of his ruthlessness, including crucifixion of insurgents. While he was feared by the people, he was highly respected by the Roman Senate. On the Rhine, he was in command of the XVII, XVIII, and XIX legions. These had previously been led by General Gaius Sentius Saturninus, who had been sent back to Rome after being awarded the ornamenta triumphalia. The other two legions in the winter-quarters of the army at castrum Moguntiacum were led by Varus' nephew, Lucius Nonius Asprenas, and perhaps Lucius Arruntius.
Varus initially commanded five legions plus auxiliaries in Germania. In the early imperial period, each legion at full strength had 4,800 men supported by 120 light escort/scouting cavalry. Combined usually with a group of engineers and officers, a legion was roughly 5,000 fighting men. This did not include the 1,200 non-combatant servants who were integrated into the legion. Varus's initial command of about 25,000 (not counting auxiliaries) represented some 20% of the Roman frontline army. But it is unclear how many men were truly under his command at the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest; estimates generally range from 20,000 to 30,000. Of his five starting legions, only three were under his command at the battle (~15,000 men), supported by nine small auxiliary units (~4,500 men). Winter attrition due to casualties, illness, and other causes would have sapped the legions' strength. The Roman historian Cassius Dio assumed that a large number of civilians were part of the camp following. But McNally finds this unlikely. Recent reforms had required that legionaries be unmarried, which meant that families were no longer part of the camp following. McNally puts the likely number of civilians at a few hundred, mostly merchants who followed the army. Assuming 10% winter attrition, and an auxiliary force of about 4,000 after attrition, McNally comes up with 17,000 combatants, supported by roughly 3,800 servant non-combatants. Combined with the civilians, the army would have numbered about 21,000 at the start of campaigning, but was probably smaller by the time of the battle, as further attrition combined with the need to detach garrisons along the way would have sapped the army's strength.
The main Roman army was highly professional and outfitted by the state. They were given standardised weapons and armour, consisting of a gladius (shortsword), a large shield, a pilum (javelin), a helmet, a mail shirt, and some segmented armour. The auxiliary units were not outfitted by the Romans, and instead would have represented the equipment and fighting styles of their homelands, which put them much on par with the Germanic troops.
Arminius
The Germanic coalition was led by Arminius, of the Cherusci tribe. Arminius was in a strong position to understand Roman tactics and strategy: though he was born in Germania, he had been taken hostage by the Romans after Drusus defeated the tribe in combat in 8 BCE, when Arminius would have been about 10 years old. He received an aristocratic education in Rome, as he was the son of a nobleman—even if he was still a hostage. When he came of age, he joined the ordo equester (the Roman cavalry), which would later lead to his appointment as a commander of Roman auxiliaries. By 4 CE, he was serving in Pannonia (in the northwestern Balkan states). Soon after, he returned to his homeland in Germania, still nominally loyal to Rome.
McNally suggests that two important events shaped Arminius's view of the Romans: an ambush in 11 BCE led by the Cherusci against Drusus, and Drusus' victory over the Cherusci in 8 BCE. In the ambush in 11 BCE, the Cherusci had trapped Drusus' army in unfavourable terrain, and the Romans escaped only with great difficulty. Drusus' victory in 8 BCE would have been unforgettable to Arminius, who had been made a hostage because of it. From these events, McNally argues that Arminius surmised a key lesson: "the Romans could be defeated, but only in a situation where their tactical flexibility and discipline could not be brought to bear."
The size of Arminius's forces is a guessing game at best since no written records of the Germanic peoples survive. Estimates thus vary widely based on the starting assumptions. Historian Adrian Murdoch suggests a force of 25,000. Historian Peter Wells suggests that the army may have pulled from a large area, and gives a range of estimates between 17,000 and 100,000, but suggests that 18,000 were probably involved at the final stage of the battle when the Romans were routed. McNally finds fault with Wells's demographic calculation style, finding his upper estimate of 100,000 to be very unlikely. Historian Hans Delbrück suggested that each tribe involved probably had 6,000 to 8,000 fighting men, for a total in the 20,000 to 30,000 range.
Delbrück notes that these troops were not just mere farmers; they were experienced soldiers in their own right, even if not outfitted by the state as the Romans were. But the Germanic army was, with the exception of armor, generally as well equipped as the Romans. Most had no armour and would have been limited to a simple shield and a hunting spear or axe. There was a gradation in equipment quality according to the wealth and status of the fighter. Those fighters who held command roles or been part of a chief's guard would have carried a heavy spear and a number of javelins, along with various other secondary weapons, as well as high-quality shields. Still, armour was very rare and would have been acquired as spoils of war from defeated Romans, or perhaps from time serving as a Roman auxiliary.
After his return from Rome to Gaul, Arminius became a trusted advisor to Varus, even as he secretly constructed an alliance of Germanic peoples that had traditionally been enemies. These probably included the Cherusci, Marsi, Chatti, and Bructeri, out of the roughly fifty Germanic tribes at the time. Using the collective outrage over Varus' tyranny, insolence and cruelty to the conquered, Arminius was able to unite the disorganised groups who had submitted to Rome, and maintain the alliance until the most opportune moment to strike.
Lead-up to battle
A simple Roman campaign
Ancient battles were constrained by the seasons and weather. Typically, the campaigning season began in March, and ended by October, at which point armies would return to winter camps. Over the winter of 8 to 9 CE, Varus planned a simple campaign for the coming year. The disparate elements of the army would meet at Vetera (modern day Xanten, Germany), cross the Rhine, march to Cherusci territory while resupplying garrisons on the way, and then set up a summer camp in nominally pacified Cherusci lands from which to base summer operations.