The Battle of the Camel, also known as the Battle of Basra (Arabic: معركة الجمل, romanized: Maʿrakat al-Jamal), took place in 656 CE outside of Basra in Iraq. It was fought between the partisans of the fourth Rashidun caliph Ali and the Uthmaniyya led by Aisha, Talha, and Zubayr. Ali's loyalists consisted predominantly of Kufan and Medinan troops, while his opponents consisted of a coalition of Meccan and Basran forces. Ali was the cousin and son-in-law of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, while Aisha was a widow of Muhammad; Talha and Zubayr were both early converts to Islam and prominent companions.
The trio called for Ali's removal from the caliphal office and for a Qurayshite council, involving Talha and Zubayr, to appoint his successor. They revolted against Ali to avenge the assassination of the third Rashidun caliph Uthman (r. 644–656). Ali emerged victorious from the battle; Talha was killed in the engagement, while Zubayr left the field before the fighting began and was later assassinated. Aisha, riding a red camel after which the battle was named, was escorted back to Hejaz afterward.
Background
Opposition to Uthman
Ali frequently accused the third caliph Uthman of deviating from the Quran and the Sunna, and he was joined in this criticism by most of the senior companions, including Talha and Zubayr. Uthman was also widely accused of nepotism, corruption, and injustice, and Ali is known to have protested his conduct, including his lavish gifts for his Umayyad kinsmen. Ali also protected outspoken companions, such as Abu Dharr al-Ghifari and Ammar ibn Yasir, from Uthman. Ali appears in early sources as a restraining influence on Uthman without directly opposing him. Some supporters of Ali were part of the opposition to Uthman, joined in their efforts by Talha and Zubayr, who were both companions of Muhammad, and by his widow Aisha. The last was critical of Uthman for religious innovations and nepotism, but also objected to him for reducing her pension. Among the supporters of Ali were Malik al-Ashtar (d. 657) and other religiously learned qurra (lit. 'Quran readers'). They sought to see Ali as the next caliph, though there is no evidence that he communicated or coordinated with them. Ali is also said to have rejected the requests to lead the rebels, although he might have sympathized with their grievances, and was thus considered a natural focus for the opposition, at least morally. It is also likely that some companions supported the protests with the hope of either deposing Uthman, or changing his policies, thus underestimating the severity of the opposition to the caliph.
Assassination of Uthman
As their grievances mounted, discontented groups from the provinces began arriving in Medina in 35/656. On their first attempt, the Egyptian opposition sought the advice of Ali, who advised them to send a delegation to negotiate with Uthman, in contrast to Talha and Ammar ibn Yasir, who reportedly encouraged the Egyptians to advance on the town. Ali similarly asked the Iraqi opposition to avoid violence, which was heeded. He also acted as a mediator between Uthman and the provincial dissidents on multiple occasions to address their economic and political grievances. In particular, he negotiated and guaranteed on behalf of Uthman the promises that persuaded the rebels to return home and ended the first siege. Ali then urged Uthman to publicly repent; the caliph complied, but soon retracted his statement, reportedly because his secretary, Marwan, convinced him that repentance would only embolden the opposition. On their way back home, the Egyptian rebels intercepted an official letter ordering their punishment. They subsequently returned to Medina and laid siege to Uthman's residence for a second time, demanding that he abdicate. The caliph refused and claimed he was unaware of the letter, for which Marwan is often blamed in the early sources. Ali and another companion accepted Uthman's denial regarding the letter, and suspected Marwan instead, while a report by the Sunni al-Baladhuri (d. 892) suggests that the caliph accused Ali of forging the letter. This is likely when Ali refused to further intercede for Uthman. That Ali was behind the letter is the opinion of Leone Caetani (d. 1935). Giorgio Levi della Vida (d. 1967) is unsure, while Wilferd Madelung strongly rejects the accusation, saying that it "stretches the imagination" in the absence of any evidence. In turn, he accuses Marwan, Uthman's chief secretary, while Hugh Kennedy holds Uthman responsible for the letter. Uthman was assassinated soon afterwards in the final days of 35 AH (June 656) by the Egyptian rebels who stormed his residence.
Role of Ali in the assassination
Ali played no role in the deadly attack, and his son Hasan was injured while guarding Uthman's besieged residence at the request of Ali. He also convinced the rebels not to prevent the delivery of water to Uthman's house during the siege. Beyond this, historians disagree about his measures to protect the third caliph. Ali is represented by al-Tabari (d. 923) as an honest negotiator genuinely concerned for Uthman. Husain M. Jafri (d. 2019) and Madelung highlight multiple attempts by Ali for reconciliation, and Martin Hinds (d. 1988) believes that Ali could not have done anything more for Uthman. Reza Shah-Kazemi points to Ali's "constructive criticism" of Uthman and his opposition to violence, while Moojan Momen writes that Ali mediated between Uthman and the rebels, urging the former to alter his policies and refusing the requests from the latter to lead them. This is similar to the view of John McHugo, who adds that Ali withdrew in frustration when his peace efforts were thwarted by Marwan. Fred Donner and Robert Gleave suggest that Ali was the immediate beneficiary of Uthman's death. This is challenged by Madelung, who argues that Aisha would have not actively opposed Uthman if Ali had been the prime mover of the rebellion and its future beneficiary. He and others observe the hostility of Aisha toward Ali, which resurfaced immediately after his accession in the Battle of the Camel. Laura Veccia Vaglieri (d. 1989) notes that Ali refused to lead the rebellion but sympathized with them and possibly agreed with their calls for abdication. Hossein Nasr and Asma Afsaruddin, Levi Della Vida, and Julius Wellhausen (d. 1918) believe that Ali remained neutral, while Caetani labels Ali as the chief culprit in the murder of Uthman, even though the evidence suggests otherwise. Mahmoud M. Ayoub (d. 2021) notes the often pro-Umayyad stance of the Western classical orientalists, with the exception of Madelung.
Ali and retribution for Uthman
Ali was openly critical of the conduct of Uthman, though he generally neither justified his violent death nor condemned the killers. While he did not condone the assassination, Ali probably held Uthman responsible through his injustice for the protests which led to his death, a view for which Ismail Poonawala cites Waq'at Siffin. Still, in his letters to Mu'awiya (r. 661–680) and elsewhere, Ali insisted that he would bring the murderers to justice in due course, probably after establishing his authority. Quoting the Shia al-Ya'qubi (d. 897-8) and Ibn A'tham al-Kufi, Ayoub suggests that a mob from various tribes murdered Uthman and that Ali could have not punished them without risking widespread tribal conflict, even if he could identify them. Here, Farhad Daftary and John Kelsay say that the actual murderers soon fled Medina after the assassination, a view for which Jafri cites al-Tabari. Closely associated with Ali was Malik al-Ashtar, a leader of the qurra, who had led the Kufan delegation against Uthman, even though they heeded Ali's call for nonviolence, and did not participate in the siege of Uthman's residence. A leading Egyptian rebel with links to Ali was his stepson, Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr, who is reported to be among those who killed Uthman. Some authors have rejected this accusation, though most sources seem to agree that Muhammad confronted Uthman shortly before his death and rebuked him for his conduct. These two men and some other supporters of Ali were implicated by Mu'awiya in the assassination of Uthman. As such, some authors suggest that Ali was unwilling or unable to punish these individuals. The revenge for Uthman soon became the agenda for two revolts against Ali.
Election of Ali
When Uthman was killed in 656 CE by the Egyptian rebels, the potential candidates for caliphate were Ali and Talha. The Umayyads had fled Medina, and the provincial rebels and the Ansar (early Medinan Muslims) were in control of the city. Among the Egyptians, Talha enjoyed some support, but the Basrans and Kufans, who had heeded Ali's call for nonviolence, and most of the Ansar supported Ali. Some authors add the majority of the Muhajirun to the above list of Ali's supporters. The key tribal chiefs also favored Ali at the time. The caliphate was offered by these groups to Ali, who was initially reluctant to accept it, saying that he preferred to be a minister (wazir). Some early reports emphasize that Ali then accepted the caliphate when it became clear that he enjoyed popular support, reporting also that Ali demanded a public pledge at the mosque. Perhaps he also accepted the caliphate so as to prevent further chaos, but his nomination by the rebels left Ali exposed to accusations of complicity in Uthman's assassination. It appears that Ali personally did not force anyone for pledge and, among others, Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas, Abd Allah ibn Umar, Sa'id ibn al-As, al-Walid ibn Uqba, and Marwan likely refused to give their oaths, some motivated by personal grudges against Ali. On the whole, Madelung suggests that there is less evidence for any violence here than in the case of Abu Bakr, even though many broke with Ali later, claiming that they had pledged under duress. At the same time, that the majority favored Ali in Medina might have created an intimidating atmosphere for those opposed to him.
Opposition to Ali in Mecca
Talha and Zubayr
Talha and Zubayr, both companions of Muhammad with ambitions for the high office, offered their pledges to Ali but later broke them, after leaving Medina on the pretext of performing the umra (lesser pilgrimage). Some early reports suggest that the duo pledged to Ali under duress. Ibn Abi Shayba (d. 849) writes that Talha told some in Basra that he pledged to Ali with a sword over his head in a walled garden. Hasan al-Basri (d. 728) too said that he saw Talha and Zubayr pledging to Ali with a sword over their head in a walled garden. Alternatively, a report by al-Baladhuri implies that Talha voluntarily paid his allegiance to Ali, while other reports by Ibn Sa'd (d. 845), al-Tabari, al-Ya'qubi (d. 897-8), al-Kufi (ninth century), and Ibn Abd Rabbih (d. 940) place Talha and Zubayr among the first who voluntarily pledged to Ali. Vaglieri (d. 1989) views the claims about coercion as an invented justification for the later violation of the pacts made by Talha and Zubayr. Gleave similarly dismisses the (Sunni) reports that Talha and Zubayr did not pledge or did so under duress, saying that these reports reflect their authors' attempts to provide a fuller context for their subsequent rebellion against Ali in the Battle of the Camel. Madelung argues that the election of Ali could have not happened without the pledge of Talha, as the main rival of Ali, but he also suggests that Talha did not come to the ceremony voluntarily and was dragged there by al-Ashtar. Alternatively, Hamid Mavani refers to a letter in Nahj al-Balagha where Ali rebukes Talha and Zubayr before the Battle of the Camel for breaking their oaths after voluntarily offering them. Madelung also dismisses as legendary the report by al-Tabari about Zubayr's refusal to pledge.