The Battle of Queenston Heights was the first major engagement of the War of 1812. The battle took place on 13 October 1812, at Queenston in Upper Canada (now Ontario) and was a decisive British victory. United States regulars and New York militia led by Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer crossed the Niagara River from Lewiston and engaged British regulars and Canadian militia led by Major General Isaac Brock. Major General Roger Hale Sheaffe took command of British forces after Brock was killed. Mohawk warriors led by John Norton supported the British during the battle.
The battle was an American attempt to establish a foothold on the Canadian side of the Niagara River before campaigning ended with the onset of winter. The British victory was mainly due to the poorly managed American offensive. Despite their numerical advantage and the widely dispersed British forces defending the Niagara frontier, the Americans were unable to get the bulk of their invasion force across the Niagara River because of British artillery and the reluctance of the inexperienced American militia. As a result, British reinforcements arrived, defeated the unsupported American forces, and forced a surrender. The battle is considered historically significant mainly due to the loss of the British commander.
Background
The United States invasion across the Niagara River was originally intended to be part of a four-pronged attack on Upper and Lower Canada. Brigadier General William Hull would attack Amherstburg from Detroit, Major General Van Rensselaer would attack across the Niagara River, another attack would cross Lake Ontario to take Kingston, and Major General Henry Dearborn, the commander-in-chief of the United States Army, would use the Lake Champlain route to capture Montreal. These attacks were expected to bring the two British colonies to their knees and ensure a quick victory.
The attacks failed or were never launched. Hull was besieged at Detroit and, fearing a massacre by Britain's Indigenous allies, surrendered Fort Detroit and his entire command on 13 August. Meanwhile, Dearborn and his forces remained inactive at Albany, New York and seemed to be in no hurry to attack Kingston or Montreal.
Van Rensselaer was unable to launch an attack across the Niagara River in the summer of 1812 due to the lack of men and supplies. Although he held the rank of major general in the New York state militia he had also never commanded soldiers in battle. Van Rensselaer was considered the leading Federalist candidate for the governorship of New York. Hoping to get Van Rensselaer out of the way, New York governor Daniel Tompkins had put Van Rensselaer's name forward to command the army on the Niagara. Van Rensselaer officially took command on 13 July 1812. He secured the appointment of his second cousin, Lieutenant Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer, as his aide-de-camp. Solomon van Rensselaer was an experienced soldier who had been wounded at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794, and was a valuable source of advice to his cousin.
Prelude
British moves
Major General Isaac Brock was both the civil administrator of Upper Canada and the commander of the military forces there. He was an aggressive commander, and his successful capture of Detroit in August 1812 had won him praise, the reputation as the "Saviour of Upper Canada" and a knighthood, the news of which would not reach Upper Canada until after his death. His superior at Quebec, Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost, was of a more cautious bent, and the two clashed over strategy.
After his victory at Detroit, Brock had hastened back east, planning to cross the Niagara River and attack Van Rensselaer before he could be reinforced. Prevost, however, vetoed this plan and ordered Brock to behave more defensively. Not only was Prevost concerned by Brock's apparently rash actions, but he was also aware that the British Government had revoked the Orders in Council which had hampered American trade with France, thus removing one of the stated causes of the war. Provost believed that peace negotiations might ensue and did not wish to prejudice any talks by taking offensive action. He opened talks with Major General Dearborn, who agreed to an informal armistice. President Madison rejected Dearborn’s action and ordered him "to proceed with the utmost vigor in your operations." Hostilities resumed on 4 September.
While Brock had been at Detroit, Major General Sheaffe had been in command of the troops on the Niagara frontier. Acting under Prevost's orders, Sheaffe had negotiated an armistice with Lieutenant Colonel Van Rensselaer on 20 August, and had voluntarily restricted the movement of British troops and supplies. Brock returned to Niagara on 22 August, to find the armistice in effect. The terms of the armistice permitted the use of the river by both powers as a common waterway and the British could only watch as American reinforcements and supplies arrived. When the truce ended, Major General Van Rensselaer's forces were in much better shape than they had been previously.
American moves
The only significant American military presence along the Niagara River before June 1812 had been a company of artillery at Fort Niagara. In early June, a regiment of 600 militia volunteers commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Philetus Swift was dispatched to reinforce the garrison and establish camps at Black Rock and Lewiston. In early July, and additional 400 regulars and 1,200 militia arrived under the command of Brigadier General William Wandsworth. When Van Rensselaer arrived in mid-August this number had been reduced to roughly 1,400 due to sickness, desertions and furloughs, however, additional soldiers and artillery continued to arrive over the next several weeks. By the end of September, a brigade of 1,200 regulars under the command Brigadier General Alexander Smyth were encamped at Black Rock. The Canadian historian Robert Malcolmson has calculated that at the time of the battle, Van Rensselaer's army consisted of approximately 2,484 United States Army regulars, 4,070 New York militia and 160 Pennsylvania militia.
Although Hull had failed at Detroit, and Dearborn had yet to make any move against Montreal or Kingston, Van Rensselaer was convinced he had the strength to invade Upper Canada. He planned to cross the Niagara River from Lewiston and take the heights above Queenston, while Smyth crossed the river near Fort Niagara and captured Fort George. Smyth, however, failed to attend a council of officers in early October to plan the attack. Although a lawyer by trade, Smyth was a regular officer who refused to acknowledge that Van Rensselaer outranked him. Van Rensselaer, an amiable politician in a hurry to launch the invasion, chose to proceed with the attack from Lewiston only. His goal was to establish a fortified bridgehead around Queenston, where he could maintain his army in winter quarters while planning for a campaign in the spring.
On 9 October, American sailors, artillerymen, and volunteers from the militia, commanded by Lieutenant Jesse Elliot, launched a successful boarding attack on the brigs Caledonia and Detroit, anchored near Fort Erie at the head of the Niagara River. Both brigs were captured, although Detroit subsequently ran aground and was set on fire to prevent it being recaptured. Brock feared this might presage an attack by Smyth from Black Rock and galloped to Fort Erie. He soon realized that there was no immediate danger from Smyth, and returned to his headquarters in Niagara that night. It was mistakenly reported to Van Rensselaer that Brock had left in haste for Detroit.
Van Rensselaer decided to launch his attack in the early hours of 11 October, even though Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer, who was to lead the attack's first wave, was ill. Van Rensselaer sent orders to Smyth to march his brigade to Lewiston in preparation for the attack "with every possible dispatch." Smyth's brigade set out upon receipt of the letter, however, because of foul weather, the route to Lewiston was so bad that abandoned wagons could be seen "sticking in the road." The same weather drenched Van Rensselaer's men at Lewiston as they waited to embark. The officer in charge of the boats is alleged to have rowed his boat away and deserted the army, taking with him most of the oars. By the time the oars could be replaced, the attack had to be postponed.
When Smyth received word that the attack had been delayed, he ordered his men back to their camp at Black Rock, rather than press on to Lewiston. He wrote to Van Rensselaer on 12 October that his brigade would not be in condition to move out again until 14 October. Van Rensselaer, however, had decided that a second attempt would be made on 13 October.
Advanced warning
Brock was aware of the failed American attempt to cross the Niagara River at Queenston on 11 October but believed it may have been a feint to distract him from a major attack elsewhere. On 12 October Brock's brigade major, Major Thomas Evans, crossed the Niagara River under a flag of truce to request an exchange of prisoners taken in Elliot's raid on the British brigs three days before. Evans attempted to see Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer but was told that he was ill. Instead, he was met by a man who called himself Toock, who claimed to be Stephen Van Rensselaer's secretary. Toock, who was probably Van Rensselaer's secretary Major John Lovett, repeatedly insisted that no exchange could be arranged for at least several days. Evans was struck by the repetition of this phrase and had also spotted several boats hidden under bushes along the shore. He deduced that a crossing was planned for 13 October, but when Evans returned to the British lines a gathering of officers responded to his theory with skepticism. Brock, however, took Evans aside and after a private conversation became convinced of the possibility. He instructed his officers to be ready for immediate action and sent dispatch riders to warn nearby militia commanders.
Battle
British dispositions
The village of Queenston is located on the west side of the Niagara River at the north end of the Niagara Gorge. In 1812, it was home to roughly 300 inhabitants and 20 scattered dwellings surrounded by gardens and orchards. A wharf and stone guardhouse had been constructed in 1791. South of the village, the ground rose 300 feet (91 m) to the promontory known as Queenston Heights. The slope from the river to the heights was steep but overgrown with shrubs and trees, making it possible to climb. The river was fast-flowing and roughly 200 yards (180 m) wide but was described as being "little trouble to even an indifferent oarsman."
Queenston was protected by 450 regulars and militia under the command of Captain James Dennis. In the village was Dennis's grenadier company of the 49th Regiment of Foot, the two flank companies of the 2nd Regiment of York Militia, the two flank companies of the 5th Regiment of Lincoln Militia, and a ten-man detachment from the 41st Regiment of Foot. A 9-pounder gun had been positioned near the guardhouse, and an 18-pounder gun and 8-inch mortar were positioned in a redan two-thirds of the way up the escarpment above Queenston. The guns were manned by members of the 1st Lincoln Artillery, supervised by a small detachment of Royal Artillery personnel. The light company of the 49th Regiment under Captain John Williams protected the redan.
A 12-pounder gun and a 18-pounder carronade, also manned by the 1st Lincoln Artillery, were sited at Vrooman's Point, a mile north of the village, while a 9-pounder gun and a second 18-pound carronade were at Brown's Point two miles further to the north. These positions were guarded by the two flank companies of the 3rd Lincoln.
An additional 260 regulars and 300 militia were based at Fort George ten miles to the north. Nearby was an encampment of the Six Nations of the Grand River that could field 160 warriors, while at Chippewa to the south were 150 members of the 41st Regiment and 100 militia from the 2nd Lincoln.
American landing
"The grape and musket balls, poured upon them at close quarters as they approached the shore, made incredible havoc. A single discharge from a field-piece directed by Captain Dennis himself (the captain of the 49th Grenadiers) killed fifteen in one boat."
Queenston was attacked by the 6th, 13th, and 23rd Infantry Regiments. Joining the attack were the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th Regiments of New York Militia, supported by a detachment of volunteer riflemen. Van Rensselaer's plan called for 900 regulars and 2,650 militia to cross the river. The Americans had twelve batteaux, each of which could carry thirty men, and two larger batteaux which were fitted with platforms on which field guns or wagons could be carried. The first wave of the boats would carry 40 artillerymen, 150 militia, and 150 regulars. Lieutenant Colonel Van Rensselaer would lead the militia contingent while Lieutenant Colonel John Chrystie of the 13th U.S. Infantry would lead the regulars.