The Battle of Mycale was one of the two major battles (the other being the Battle of Plataea) that ended the second Persian invasion of Greece during the Greco-Persian Wars. It took place on 27 or 28 August, 479 BC on the slopes of Mount Mycale, which is located on the coast of Ionia opposite the island of Samos. The battle was fought between an alliance of Greek city-states, including Sparta, Athens and Corinth; and the Persian Empire of Xerxes I.
The previous year, the Persian invasion force, led by Xerxes himself, had scored victories at the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium, and conquered Thessaly, Boeotia and Attica; however, at the ensuing Battle of Salamis, the Greek navy had won an unlikely victory, and therefore prevented the conquest of the Peloponnese. Xerxes then retreated, leaving his general Mardonius with a substantial army to finish off the Greeks the following year.
In the summer of 479 BC, the Greeks assembled an army, and marched to confront Mardonius at the Battle of Plataea. At the same time, the Greek fleet sailed to Samos, where the demoralized remnants of the Persian navy were based. The Persians, seeking to avoid a battle, beached their fleet below the slopes of Mycale, and built a palisaded camp with the support of a Persian army unit. The Greek commander Leotychides decided to attack the Persians anyway, landing the fleet's complement of marines to do so.
Although the Persian forces put up a sturdy resistance, the heavily armored Greek hoplites eventually routed the Persian troops, who fled to their camp. The Ionian Greek contingents in the Persian army defected, and the Persian camp was attacked, with a large number of Persians slaughtered. The Persian ships were then captured and burned. The complete destruction of the Persian navy, along with the destruction of Mardonius' army at Plataea, allegedly on the same day as the Battle of Mycale, decisively ended the invasion of Greece. After Plataea and Mycale, the Greeks would take the offensive against the Persians, marking a new phase of the Greco-Persian Wars.
Background
After Xerxes I was crowned the emperor of the Achaemenid Empire, he quickly resumed preparations for the invasion of Greece, including building two pontoon bridges across the Hellespont. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. In August 480 BC, after hearing of Xerxes' approach, a small Greek army led by Spartan king Leonidas I blocked the Pass of Thermopylae, while an Athenian-dominated navy sailed to the Straits of Artemisium. The vastly outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae against the Persian army for six days in total before being outflanked by the Persians. The Persians also achieved a costly naval triumph at the Battle of Artemisium, where they forced the Greek fleet to withdraw and thus captured the Euripus Strait.
After Thermopylae, the Persian army burned and sacked the Boeotian cities which had not surrendered, namely Plataea and Thespiae, before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. The Greek army, meanwhile, prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth. The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis ended in a decisive victory for the Greeks, marking a turning point in the conflict. Following the defeat of his navy at Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia with a minor portion of his army.
The Persian fleet was stationed in Samos to defend Ionia and avert an Ionian revolt. The Persians were not expecting the Greeks to mount a naval attack on the other end of the Aegean Sea, because the Greeks had not followed through on their victory at Salamis by chasing the Persian fleet. However, the morale of the Persian fleet was breaking, and they were anxiously awaiting new reports on the status of the land army led by Mardonius. According to historian Charles Hignett, it was clear only the triumph of the Persian land army in Greece could sustain Persian rule in Ionia.
Xerxes left Mardonius with most of his army, and the latter decided to camp for the winter in Thessaly. The 110 ships of the Greek fleet were anchored at Aegina under the command of Spartan king Leotychides in the spring of 479 BC. Six people from Chios who had made an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Strattis, their ruling tyrant, escaped to Sparta. They requested the Spartan ephors to free Ionia, and the latter sent them to Leotychides. They managed to persuade the Greek fleet to move to Delos. The Greeks hesitated to sail anywhere farther than Delos; because they were unfamiliar with the lands which lay there, thought they were full of armed peoples and believed the journey was too long. The Greek and Persian fleets stayed in their positions, apprehensive of moving closer to their opponents. Meanwhile, the Athenian navy under Xanthippus had joined with the Greek fleet off Delos.
They were then approached by a delegation from Samos under the leadership of Hegesistratos in July, who said the Ionian cities were eager to revolt. They also pointed out the poor morale and reduced seaworthiness of the Persian fleet, the latter had occurred probably due to the long time it had spent at sea. Leotychides found Hegesistratos' name to be a good omen, since it meant "Army Leader". The delegation from Samos, as envoys of their nation, pledged their loyalty to the Hellenic alliance. Leotychides and the council of war decided to exploit this opportunity and sailed for Samos. The route he took probably began from the Cyclades, then involved sailing for approximately 40 kilometers (22 nautical miles), passing Icaria and Coressia to finally land near Mount Ampelus in Samos.
The Persians withdrew from Samos; Hignett argues that by doing so, they left to the Greeks an advantageous post which was the strongest on the Ionian coast. The Persians at Samos had control of the best harbor in all of the Aegean Sea and a great water supply. Historian John Barron argues their retreat was not absurd: the channel was just about 1 kilometre (0.62 mi) wide at its thinnest point, therefore, the Greeks could not send their entire fleet after the Persians. But the Persians did not force a battle, and did not move to the excellent harbor at Miletus, instead choosing to land at Mycale, where Barron says they could observe the Greeks but the Greeks could not see them. Barron notes the absolute breakdown of the Persians' will to fight at this point.
Classicists Michael Flower and John Marincola argue the Greeks decided to sail to Samos only because they were told about a potential Ionian revolt and the disrepair of the Persian fleet. They note the Greeks were previously quite hesitant to sail beyond Delos because of the Persian fleet. Historian Marcello Lupi also notes the Greek fleet sailed at the insistence of the Samians and was unwilling to chase the Persians after Salamis, hesitating to move out of Delos. Flower and Marincola argue the envoys from Samos were more reliable than the envoys from Chios, since the latter were "conspirators on the run" while the former were the representatives of their people. They note Hegesistratos claimed there was a chance the Persian fleet could be seized with one maneuver. They argue Leotychides considered this a risk he could take. They also note the Greek fleet had already sailed for Samos when their ambassadors reported the dismissal of the Phoenician ships from the Persian fleet.
Historian Peter Green argues the Phoenician ships were dismissed either to defend the shores of Thrace and the Dardanelles; or because the Persian high command could not trust the Phoenicians after Salamis. Barron argues the Phoenicians were dismissed due to their low morale. Historian Jack Balcer observes the error of the Persians in dismissing the Phoenicians, and claims the battle would have unfolded differently if the Phoenicians were not dismissed. Hignett argues Leotychides was taking the risk of fighting a naval battle where the location and circumstances would be picked by the Persians, who could thus maximize their advantages. Barron argues that passing over the opportunity to destroy their opponent's fleet would be an absurd decision to make for both the Persians and the Greeks, especially since the land war was coming to a close, and because both sides would be expecting the mustering of their opponent's flotillas. Balcer notes the original mission of the Greek fleet was not letting the Persian fleet reinforce Mardonius, and how the fleet took a bold decision to go on the offensive.
Opposing forces
Persians
Ancient historian Herodotus gives the size of the Persian fleet which wintered at Cyme at 300 ships. The Phoenician ships were dismissed from the Persian fleet before the battle, which reduced its strength. Historian Charles Hignett found the fleet size of 300 ships to be too large, even if this number included the Phoenician ships. Green estimates there were approximately just 100 ships in the Persian fleet after the Phoenicians left. Barron also arrives at an estimate of 100 ships after the dismissal.
Tigranes was the commander of the Persian land forces at Mycale. Artaÿntes was the joint commander of the Persian fleet, and he appointed his nephew Ithamitres as the third commander for the fleet. Herodotus states there were 60,000 soldiers in the Persian army at Mycale. Hignett argues Herodotus' own narrative of the battle contradicts these numbers, and claims Tigranes could not have had more than 10,000 soldiers in his unit. Shepherd also estimates Tigranes had around 10,000 soldiers; with an additional 3,000 Persian infantry who had disembarked from the ships. Shepherd also notes Tigranes notably did not have cavalry contingents among his troops. Green estimates Tigranes had only 6,000 soldiers with him, who were joined by the 4,000 marines in the Persian fleet, for a total of 10,000 combatants. Historian Richard Evans estimates there were around 4,000 total Persian combatants.
Greeks
Historian Andrew Robert Burn estimates the Greek fleet had 110 ships. Burn notes that the figure of 250 ships is only stated by Ephorus. Flower and Marincola argue the Athenians did not have the numbers to provide marines for 50 triremes and 8,000 hoplites at Plataea both at the same time. They argue the claim of 250 Greek ships is therefore not realistic. Herodotus did not give a precise order of battle for Mycale in his account. Historian William Shepherd estimates Athens provided one-third of the ships; while Sparta and the Peloponnesian poleis may have contributed 10 and 20–30 ships respectively. Shepherd estimates Aegina and Corinth sent 10 ships each. Historian David Asheri posits the Athenians contributed 50 ships to the Greek fleet at Mycale. An epigram from an agora (public square) in Megara says Megarians fought and suffered casualties in the battle of Mycale, but they are not mentioned in any account of the battle.
The standard complement of a trireme was 200 people, including 14 marines. Flower and Marincola estimate the Greeks had 3,300 marines, with the 110 ships having 30 marines each. They note the complement of marines on a trireme was probably not fixed, with Plutarch stating there were 14 marines on each trireme at Salamis. Herodotus had said the Chian ships at the Battle of Lade carried 40 marines each. Hignett also arrives at an estimate of 3,300 marines in the Greek force. He argues there could not have been more than 6,000 marines, even if there were hoplites employed as rowers. Burn notes the Greek contingent of marines was strong, and argues some of the Greek oarsmen served as light infantry. Historian George Cawkwell argues the Greeks had only 2,000 to 3,000 marines, because their ships had mostly naval personnel on board. Flower and Marincola also note Leotychides and Xanthippus probably had equal powers, and posit military decisions were finalized by a majority vote.
Shepherd argues the Greek contingent at Mycale did not have more than 25,000 soldiers. Shepherd arrives at an estimate of 3,000 marines with 30 on each ship; and argues the remaining 22,000 people on board served mostly as light infantry, with some of them being employed as hoplites. Green's estimate for the number of Greek combatants was 5,000 heavy infantry (rigid, heavily armed infantry), and 2,000 to 3,000 sailors serving as light infantry. Evans estimates there were 70 Athenian, 8 Spartan, 20 Corinthian, 3 Troezenian and 8 Sicyonian ships in the Greek fleet at Mycale. Supposing each ship had 10 hoplites on board, he comes up with the following order of battle: 700 hoplites from Athens, 200 from Corinth, 80 from Sicyon, 30 from Troezen and 80 from Sparta (probably helots); for a total of 1,100 hoplites. The triremes did not have weapons on board for the 170 oarsmen who staffed them, and so the oarsmen probably used whatever weapons and armor they could find, assuming they did fight.
Prelude
When the Persians heard the Greek fleet was approaching, they set sail from Samos towards Mycale in the Ionian mainland, possibly because they had decided they could not fight a naval battle. During the chaos of their retreat, the Samians freed 500 Athenian captives. Burn argues the Persian fleet anchored at Mycale because their commanders thought it would be "useless to fight at sea". The Persian fleet moved from Samos to Mycale for protection according to Herodotus. Green argues the Persians retreated to Mycale because they could communicate easily with Sardis and retreat without trouble. The Persians arrived on the southern shore of Mycale, near a temple dedicated to the two Potnia (female goddesses), Demeter and Kore (Persephone). Another temple dedicated to Eleusinian Demeter was nearby; three temples dedicated to these same goddesses were also present on or near the battlefield of Plataea.