The Battle of Mukden (19 February – 10 March 1905) was fought in the Russo-Japanese War between the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan near the town of Mukden (now Shenyang, China). Involving close to 550,000 troops and resulting in over 150,000 casualties, it was the largest battle of the war, as well as the last major engagement on land. The Battle of Mukden was a strategic victory for the Japanese that, coupled with their victory at sea in the Battle of Tsushima four months later, proved critical in ending the war in Japan's favour.
It was the largest modern-era battle fought prior to World War I, and possibly the largest battle in world history at that point. The scale of the battle, particularly in the amount of ordnance being expended, was unprecedented in world history. The Japanese side alone fired 20.11 million rifle and machine gun rounds and 279,394 artillery shells in just over ten days of fighting (while the Russians fired even more), matching the ammunition consumption of the German army in the entire 191-day Franco-Prussian War.
Background
Following the Battle of Liaoyang (25 August – 4 September 1904), Russian forces retreated to the river Sha Ho south of Mukden and regrouped. The Japanese had expected Liaoyang to be the decisive battle of the war, after which peace terms would be negotiated. However, in part due to the diversion of much manpower and most of the heavy artillery to the simultaneously ongoing Siege of Port Arthur, the Japanese had failed to take advantage of their victory at Liaoyang, allowing the Russians to retreat in good order and to soon launch a counterattack during the Battle of Shaho (12–14 October). Though unsuccessful, the battle ended without a decisive victory for either side, which increasingly pushed Japan into an unfavourable war of attrition against Kuropatkin's forces, which were being continuously reinforced. A second Russian counter-offensive, the Battle of Sandepu, fought from 25 to 29 January 1905, was also unsuccessful.
Though the combined Russian army led by General Aleksey Kuropatkin was set to receive reinforcements via the unfinished Trans-Siberian Railroad, the effects of the Bloody Sunday and the now-ongoing unrest at home placed a strain on the manpower of the whole Imperial Army as much of its resources now had to be dedicated in the quelling of the uprisings throughout its territories. Therefore, the Russian force was expected to receive little to no reinforcements and supplies from home.
The situation for the Japanese was hardly better. Though the capture of Port Arthur by General Maresuke Nogi freed up their 3rd Army, which then advanced north to reinforce the Japanese lines near Mukden in preparation for an attack, the manpower reserves of the Japanese army had been drained by February 1905. With the arrival of General Nogi's 3rd Army, Japan's entire fighting strength was concentrated at the vicinity of Mukden. The severe casualties, bitter cold climate, and approach of the Russian Baltic Fleet created pressure on Marshal Ōyama to effect the complete destruction of the Russian forces, rather than just another victory from which the Russians could withdraw farther into Manchuria.
Opposing forces
Russian forces
The Russian line to the south of Mukden was 90 miles (140 km) long, with little depth and with a central reserve:
- The 1st Manchurian Army under General Nikolai Linevich, held the hilly terrain on the east flank. This flank also held two-thirds of the Russian cavalry, under General Paul von Rennenkampf. General Kuropatkin had thus disposed his forces in a purely defensive layout, from which it would be difficult to impossible to execute an offensive without opening a major gap in the lines.
- The 2nd Manchurian Army under General Kaulbars (who had replaced the unfortunate General Oskar Gripenberg), on the right flank in the west, on flat ground.
- The 3rd Manchurian Army under General Bilderling, in the center, holding the railway and the highway.
Japanese forces
On the Japanese side, Oyama had arranged this troops thus:
- The 1st Army, commanded by General Kuroki, advanced to east of the rail line.
- The 2nd Army, commanded by General Oku advanced to the west.
- The 3rd Army, commanded by General Nogi, was kept concealed behind the 2nd Army until the start of battle.
- The 4th Army, commanded by General Nozu, also advanced to east of the rail line.
- The 5th (Yalu) Army, commanded by General Kawamura, provided a major diversion on the Russian eastern flank.
The Yalu Army was much under strength, and consisted only of the IJA 11th Division (from Port Arthur) and reservists. Despite that, it was technically not part of the Japanese Manchurian Army but was directly subordinate to the Imperial General Headquarters.
General Kuropatkin was convinced that the main Japanese thrust would come from the mountainous eastern side, as the Japanese had proven themselves effective in such terrain, and the presence of the former 3rd Army veterans from the 11th Division in that area reinforced his convictions.
Field Marshal Ōyama's plan was to form his armies into a crescent to encircle Mukden, cutting off the possibility of Russian escape. He was explicit in his orders that combat within the city of Mukden itself was to be avoided. All during the war, the Japanese had pursued a meticulous civil affairs policy aimed at avoiding civilian casualties and keeping the Chinese populace on their side – a stark contrast with the previous First Sino-Japanese War and subsequent Second Sino-Japanese War.
Battle
Opening phase
Just prior to the battle, on 9 February, General Mishchenko (who had suffered a foot injury at Sandepu) was replaced by General Rennenkampf, who took over his command of the Russian right cavalry detachment. He was ordered to clear the western side of the Hun-Ho River of Japanese troops which had managed to establish themselves there after Sandepu. Rennenkampf quickly began executing this task from 14–16 February using four cavalry brigades, but was then forced to transfer two of these back to Kuropatkin, who used them to secure the rail lines in the north.
On the eastern flank, General Alekseev (sometimes spelled Alexeiv) took command of the Chenghocheng Detachment (Russian: Цинхеченский отряд) from Rennenkampf. This detachment was just larger than a division and was composed of a mix of infantry, cavalry and artillery. It extended the Russian lines by around 30 kilometres south-east of the 1st Manchurian Army along the Sha-Ho river and was meant to provide early warning and room for maneuver in case of a Japanese attempt an envelopment from that flank. Alekseev did not arrange his force as one continuous line, but instead as two main forces: one, commanded by General Liubavin, was around 15 kilometres away from the main Russian line, while the second, under General Ekk, was a further 10 kilometres east. These two forces held several hills in the area and covered important mountain passes through the area, while the space separating them consisted of difficult terrain.
Kawamura began advancing his 5th (Yalu) Army on the night of 18–19 February to reach a preassigned start point some 20 kilometres from his original position near the village of Piao-tsy-iuan. On 20 February, Kawamura conducted a probing attack on the Chenghocheng Detachment with eight battalions and 12 guns. Alekseev reacted by notifying Linevich on the same day, who dispatched four machine guns and a regiment of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division to aid Alekseev. On 21 February, the Japanese and Russian forces mainly exchanged artillery fire without any significant movement.
On 22 February, using Linevich's reinforcements, Alekseev attempted an attack on the opposing Japanese Kobi (reserve) division and 11th Division. Crossing very icy ground on an exceptionally cold day in four columns, the Russians made little progress. After encountering Japanese artillery fire, the Russians mounted a weak attack but broke contact after suffering some 150 casualties, retreating to their original defensive positions.
On 23 February, the Japanese Kobi and 11th divisions attacked Alekseev's Chenghocheng Detachment in full force. Despite terrible weather conditions, the Japanese attacked with considerable determination, but were nevertheless unable to make much progress in the face of strong Russian hill defences.
The Japanese renewed their attack on 24 February. The 9th Kobi brigade, aided by infantry and sappers from the 11th Division, was able to storm some of the Russian hilltops. Shortly after, the Japanese began firing on the remaining Russian positions, which retreated to the next line of hills. Alekseev, whose original mission was mainly to screen and delay the Japanese, rather than hold ground indefinitely, then decided to retreat even further by moving his force around 10 kilometres west, such that it would be around 10 kilometres east of Linevich's 1st Army.
Kuroki began moving the 2nd Division of his 1st Army on the same day, advancing to the right of Kawamura's 5th Army. After encountering some Siberian Cossacks, Kuroki and Kawamura were now positioned according to Oyama's plans for further pressure to Linevich's eastern flank. This caused some worry among the Russians, and so Linevich began reinforcing his 3rd Siberian Corps, while Kuropatkin decided to delay the planned offensive on the Russian right (the western flank), towards Sandepu, and instead keep additional troops in reserve (rather than reinforcing Kaulbars' 2nd Army) in case the eastern flank demanded it.
Kuropatkin grew so concerned about the left flank that he transferred the 1st Siberian Army Corps and two other brigades to Linevich's 1st Army, equal to around 42 battalions and 128 cannons. He also transferred Rennenkampf — who had a reputation of high competence — back to commanding the Chenghocheng Detachment instead of Alekseev.
On the night of 24–25 February, Kuroki began applying increasing pressure to Linevich's 1st Army, especially his 3rd Siberian Army Corps, mainly in the form of night skirmishes and infiltrations. Kawamura similarly tried advancing in the east, but was unable to do so due to poor weather and difficult terrain. Meanwhile, as the threat to his left flank around Sandepu had been minimised, Oyama decided to transfer most of the Japanese 3rd Division from Oku's 2nd Army to support Nogi's future advance instead. On 26 February, Kuroki continued applying pressure towards Linevich, attempting to stretch his flank east, towards Chenghocheng, though poor weather and terrain again impeded the Japanese from major advances.
By 26 February, Rennenkampf had returned to command the Chenghocheng Detachment, where he decided to retreat some 7–10 kilometres north and consolidate his position there. The temperature dropped to a record low of −8 °F (−22 °C) and Rennenkampf was able to halt Kawamura's advance, limiting the combat on the extreme east to exchanges of artillery fire. Kuroki, using his easternmost units, attempted to exploit a gap the Japanese thought was forming between Rennenkampf and Linevich, but was unable to do so: Linevich had positioned his Cossacks unexpectedly close to Rennenkampf, which hampered the Japanese advance.
At this point, Linevich possessed greater forces than the opposing Japanese in his area, and suggested to Kuropatkin that he might advance and turn the right flank of Kuroki's 1st Army. However, nothing came of the suggestion, while the Japanese high command decided to switch their focus to the rest of the (hitherto largely static) battlefield.
Japanese attack and Russian counterattack
In the centre, the Japanese and Russian fronts were largely separated by the Sha-Ho river, with the former south of it, while the latter were north of it. The Putilov and Novgorod hills, however, were held by the Russians and were south of the river. This area of the front was held by Bilderling's 3rd Manchurian Army, with his three corps holding only a narrow 18 kilometre strip. The opposing Japanese forces were a modest three divisions commanded by Nozu's 4th Army. In the face of the superior Russian position, Nozu did not attempt a frontal assault, instead focusing on fixing Bilderling's troops in place by the use of 108 heavy artillery pieces, including the 28 centimetres (11 in) howitzers, some of the heaviest artillery deployed on land at that point. The Japanese started a large-scale artillery barrage on 27 February, but the Russians were able to return accurate fire while suffering only minimal casualties thanks to their well-prepared fortifications and good positions.
Also on 27 February, Oyama ordered Nogi's 3rd Army to begin advancing on the Western flank. Planning to eventually envelop the Russian 2nd Manchurian army by attacking north and then east, the Japanese made quick progress on that day: the Cossack units opposing them limited themselves to observation only, withdrawing from direct combat, thus allowing the 9th Division to advance 10 kilometres, while the 1st Division and cavalry advanced nearly 20 kilometres.