The Battle of Lesnaya was fought on 9 October 1708 during the Swedish invasion of Russia in the Great Northern War. Russia was the sole remaining enemy of Sweden following the dissolution of the anti-Swedish coalition in 1706. Peter I of Russia led a flying corps (corps volant [ru]), supported by two additional divisions, to destroy a convoy under general Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt that was heading for the Swedish main army in Ukraine with reinforcements and supplies. Peter caught up with the convoy at the village of Lesnaya (Lyasnaya) in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, present-day Belarus.
The Swedes were attacked in the rear at 11:00 as they were crossing the stream of Lesnyanka, at Lesnaya, heading for Propoysk (Slawharad) on the river Sozh behind which Charles XII's army was expected. The initial phase of the battle was fought over a forest clearing a distance from Lesnaya, where a Swedish outpost attempted to stall the attack. The Swedes were pushed back to the village after some hours, where Lewenhaupt ordered a general assembly. The following phase saw Russian attempts to capture the Lesnyanka bridge, to cut him off from the road to Propoysk. Reinforcements arrived successively on both sides during the battle, which continued until 19:00 when the approach of night and a sudden snowfall compelled the Russians to disengage.
Lewenhaupt decided to continue the march in the night, but thousands of troops were either too exhausted to keep up the pace or got lost in the dark. The bulk of his forces arrived at Propoysk the next day, where most wagons were abandoned or destroyed in fear of a Russian pursuit. His army crossed the Sozh over the following days. Peter, who refrained from a general pursuit, sent only smaller units to round up Swedish stragglers along the road to Propoysk, which was taken by storm. Lewenhaupt rendezvoused with Charles at Rukova on 23 October with about half of his forces remaining. The next year, Peter defeated the Swedes at Poltava and forced them to surrender at Perevolochna, resulting in the formation of a new anti-Swedish coalition.
Background
In 1700, Sweden and its ally Holstein-Gottorp were attacked by a coalition of Saxony, Russia, and Denmark–Norway. Saxony, under Augustus II, who also ruled the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, invaded Swedish Livonia and besieged Riga early in the year. Meanwhile, Frederick IV of Denmark invaded Holstein-Gottorp and laid siege to Tönning, but was quickly defeated following a Swedish landing at Humlebæk under Charles XII of Sweden. Subsequently, Peter I of Russia swept into Swedish Ingria and besieged the city of Narva.
Charles dealt the Russians a crushing blow at Narva, resulting in their withdrawal out of Ingria. The Saxons and their allies were beaten at the battle of Düna near Riga in 1701, which paved the way for a Swedish invasion of the Commonwealth to have Augustus removed from the Polish throne. In 1704, following the defeats at Kliszów, Kraków, Pultusk and Toruń, Augustus was replaced on the throne by the Swedish-installed Stanisław Leszczyński, who made peace with Sweden the next year. By this time, the Russians had captured several Swedish possessions in their Baltic Dominions, among others, the fortresses of Nöteborg, Nyenskans, Dorpat and Narva.
In 1705, the Commonwealth became the theatre of a major confrontation as the Russians intervened in force to restore Augustus on the throne. Following the battles of Gemauerthof, Warsaw, Grodno and Fraustadt, the Swedes were able to clear most of Poland from enemies and invade Saxony, forcing Augustus into an unfavourable peace in 1706. With Russia being the last remaining major threat, the Swedes launched an invasion in 1708. After some time of campaigning, Charles called upon reinforcements from Swedish Livonia where the general and governor of Riga, Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt, was the acting Commander-in-chief.
Prelude
Assembling the convoy
On 5 March 1708, Lewenhaupt received orders from Charles XII to assemble a convoy with as much men as possible without leaving Swedish Livonia exposed. For further planning, he visited the king's winter quarters at Radashkovichy from 4 April to 17 May, arriving at Riga seven days later. The convoy would rendezvous with Charles at Mogilev in the first weeks of August, but its assembling was complicated by the war-torn and crop-failing region. When royal orders arrived on 13 June to start campaigning, it was nowhere ready to leave. Charles struck camp three days later, while Lewenhaupt ordered his troops in Livonia and Courland to move no sooner than 6 July. Some 6,000 men were concurrently being raised to act as a reserve in Livonia by late summer.
Lewenhaupt's convoy included, apart from three-months' worth of provisions for its own troops, about six-weeks' worth of ammunition and other materiel for the main army. It could potentially feed their combined armies for two to four weeks in an emergency, which was inadequate for a joint invasion deep into Russia. Hence, it is suggested that its role was more independent; perhaps to secure the route along the Daugava (Düna), to pave the way for more supplies and reserves to reach the envisioned Swedish winter quarters at Smolensk. The convoy included anything from 10,914 to 13,000 soldiers, of which 1,950–4,950 were used to drive the wagons and cattle. Konovaltjuk and Lyth estimates that it had at least 4,500 wagons, some 13,000–18,000 livestock, 16,500–18,000 draught horses, 7,000 riding horses and 1,000 pack horses, as well as 4,100–7,100 civilian coachmen and officers' servants.
On the march
Reports soon arrived of a Russian force under Rudolph Felix Bauer that was ravaging Swedish Livonia. This compelled Lewenhaupt, who was reluctant of leaving an enemy in his rear, to stall the marching pace in expectance of a counter-order from Charles. Once having reached at least 100 km (62 mi) into Lithuania, Lewenhaupt was informed that Bauer had withdrawn. Subsequently, he received confirmation of previous orders, to continue over Berezino in the Vitebsk region to the operating base at Mogilev. The convoy marched from Anykščiai on 11 August, whereas Lewenhaupt's column stayed at Dawhinava from 26 August to 10 September for repairs and supplies; continuous torrential rain, which turned the roads into mud and flooded the streams, was especially damaging to the wagons. The convoy crossed the Berezina at Berezino, before halting at Chereya from 18 to 25 September where Lewenhaupt learnt that the Russians had recently burned Mogilev.
Following the Battle of Holowczyn, Charles quit Mogilev on 15 August and commenced a demonstrative march southeast to draw the enemy's attention away from the convoy whilst collecting supplies. He turned north at Cherikov, reaching Tatarsk (in the Smolensk Oblast) on 21 September where he stopped to await Lewenhaupt. On 25 September, as supplies were running dangerously low and with no words heard from the general, Charles deviated from his plans of attacking Moscow via Smolensk. Instead, he marched south to establish a base of operation in Severia to exploit its rich granary; incorrect reports falsely informed him that the convoy had already crossed the Dnieper river at Mogilev, thus being relatively safe. In reality, it was still about 45 km (28 mi) west of the Dnieper and 135 km (84 mi) from him at the time.
Peter left Boris Sheremetev in command of the main army to shadow Charles, while he assembled an army, including a flying corps, to intercept the convoy at the Dnieper. Lewenhaupt reached Talachyn on 26 September and Vorontsevichi the following day, where he received instructions from Charles to rendezvous at Starodub in Severia. Reports informed him that Russian forces were gathering about 50 km (31 mi) east of the river. He beat the Tsar to the Dnieper at Shklov, of which crossing between 2 and 3 October has been considered a "military masterpiece" in retrospect. But with the Swedish main army gone east over the next major natural barrier, the Sozh river, the convoy was left isolated between the two rivers. The Russians made contact with it in the following days as it had turned south, now heading for Propoysk (Slawharad) on the Sozh via Belitsa and the marshy Dolgii Mokh. The Swedes had to march in defensive formation as the number of shadowing Russians steadily grew.
Belitsa and Dolgii Mokh
Some 4,000 Russian dragoons along with irregular light cavalry under Gebhard von Pflug approached the Swedish rear at Belitsa on 7 October. The road network forced the convoy into a single column, resulting in bottlenecks. Lewenhaupt prepared an ambush for them with 60–70% of his army drawn up in battle formation. The Russians, discouraged from attacking, were driven off when 4,000 Swedish cavalry counter-attacked, killing 40 Russians and capturing three to eleven, to only four wounded Swedes. The Swedish vanguard reached the small village of Lesnaya (Lyasnaya), about 20 km (12 mi) south of Belitsa, that same day and began setting up camp for the army.
Early on 8 October, the Russians launched a two-front attack on the Swedish rear as it was crossing the Rasta at Dolgii Mokh; von Pflug with up to 5,000 men confronted Berndt Otto Stackelberg from the west, who was protecting the crossing with two or three regiments of infantry, while Mikhail Golitsyn and Alexander Menshikov sought to ford the stream further up north with several thousand men. Lewenhaupt arrived in time with a contingent to block them. The two sides exchanged musket- and cannon fire from 12:00 to 16:00 before the Russians gave up their efforts.
The whole convoy arrived at Lesnaya later that night, situated a day's march from Propoysk – behind which both Lewenhaupt and the Tsar expected it to reach the protection of the Swedish main army. But Peter's flying corps was closing in from the north, and two Russian divisions under Nikolai Grigorovitj von Werden and Bauer approached from the northeast and east, respectively. A small detachment was also sent to block the Swedes at Propoysk in the south.
Battlefield
To the immediate south of Lesnaya was the unwadable and swampy Lesnyanka stream, running parallel to the village in a northeast to southwest direction; its bridge in the western outskirts led the Swedish convoy south through the forest, on the road to Propoysk at a distance of 12 km (7 mi). The Lesnaya-field, a 1,400 square metre large open plain, surrounded the village from the east, north and west, ending with forests in all three directions. A further 200 metres northwest, through the southern forest curtain, a clearing appeared – also referred to as the Middlefield – over which the highway leading to Lesnaya went. At the southern end of the forest clearing a crossroads was formed with a road coming from the southwest over the Krivl bridge. To the west of the clearing was the northern forest curtain and the road leading to Lopatichi. Apart from the open fields and forest clearings, the battlefield was dominated by bogs, swamp streams and wild forests, with minimal differences in elevation.
Opposing forces
Swedish army
General Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt commanded the Swedish army with major General Stackelberg assisting. According to Lewenhaupt, the army consisted of 10,914 men at the beginning of the campaign, of which 2,900 were employed to guard and drive the wagons. At the day of battle, a vanguard of 700 men was sent towards Propoysk, with 2,806 more crossing the Lesnyanka to follow them; this was done in response to reports of a Russian detachment at Propoysk. Hence, only 4,508 effectives remained at the north side of the stream to receive the initial Russian onslaught. Some 970 men employed at the baggage that still remained at Lesnaya were quickly recalled to the lines, as were the 2,806 sent towards Propoysk, increasing the effectives north of the Lesnyanka to 8,284 throughout the action.
Other estimates include that of lieutenant Friedrich Christoph von Weihe of the Uppland reserve regiment, who puts the Swedish force available for the campaign at 6,800 infantry and 4,650 cavalry, and ensign Robert Petre of the Hälsinge Regiment, with 8,000 and 4,950, respectively; Petre states that there were only 4,300 Swedes available for battle in the beginning, with the rest marching for Propoysk. Modern estimates by Eggenberger, Uddgren, Dorrell and Ulfhielm puts the Swedish army at 11,000, 12,000 (with 9,000 available for battle), 12,500 (with at least 9,700 at Lesnaya), and 13,000 men (with 8,700 at Lesnaya), respectively. It had six 8-pounder cannons and 10 or 11 4-pounder cannons and a few hand mortars at its disposition, and included both allotted and reserve regiments, and a few militias.
According to the official Russian accounts, based on the testimonies of Swedish prisoners captured on 6 October, the Swedish convoy had a strength of 16,000 men, of whom 13,000 had fought at Lesnaya from the beginning and 3,000 at Propoysk. In his later accounts, Lewenhaupt ascribed this data to one of his captured adjutant generals, Lode or Knorring, but stated that it was at the time outdated by four months, and included non-participating units as well as sick soldiers and non-combatants. According to Friedrich Christoph Schlosser, the Swedish army consisted of 10,000 men.