The Battle of Krasnoi (at Krasny or Krasnoe) unfolded from 15 to 18 November 1812 marking a critical episode in Napoleon's arduous retreat from Moscow. Over the course of six skirmishes the Russian forces under Field Marshal Kutuzov inflicted significant blows from a prepared ambush upon the remnants of the Grande Armée, already severely weakened by attrition warfare. These confrontations, though not escalated into full-scale battles, led to substantial losses for the French due to their depleted weapons and horses.
Throughout the four days of combat, Napoleon attempted to rush his troops, stretched out in a 30 mi (48 km) march, past the parallel-positioned Russian forces along the high road. Both Kutuzov and Napoleon were in tactical control of the battle. During the skirmishes, Ozharovsky's Russian flying column initially suffered a setback, but then Eugène's and Davout's French corps were gradually pushed back and defeated, and finally Ney was repulsed; he escaped encirclement by leading his corps across the ice to the north and thus outflanking Kutuzov's army. Despite the Russian army's superiority in horse and manpower, Kutuzov hesitated to launch a full offensive, according to Mikhail Pokrovsky fearing the risks associated with facing Napoleon head-on. Instead, he hoped that hunger, cold and decay in discipline would ultimately wear down the French forces. This strategy, however, led him in a nearly perpendicular course, placing him amidst of the separated French corps.
On 17 November a pivotal moment occurred when the French Imperial Guard executed an aggressive feint. This maneuver prompted Kutuzov to delay what could have been a decisive final assault, leading him to seek support from both his left and right flanks. This strategic decision allowed Napoleon to successfully withdraw Davout and his corps but it also led to his immediate retreat before the Russians could capture Krasny or block his escape route. Kutuzov opted not to commit his entire force against his adversary but instead chose to pursue the French relentlessly, employing both large and small detachments to continually harass and weaken the French army.
If judged operationally and tactically, Napoleon suffered a tough defeat at the Battle of Krasnoi, which inflicted devastating losses upon the French forces, amplifying their already continuous losses during their perilous retreat. Despite the valiant efforts of the Imperial Guard, the confrontation left the French military in dire straits and without supplies and food, further weakening their already battered army.
The forces converge on Krasny
Napoleon retreats from Smolensk
Consisting of 100,000 combat-ready yet undersupplied troops, the Grande Armée, departed Moscow on 18 October, aiming to secure winter quarters via an alternative route to Kaluga. Following the loss at the Battle of Maloyaroslavets Kutuzov compelled Napoleon to shift northward, retracing the same ravaged path he had hoped to avoid. Smolensk, situated approximately 360 km (220 mi) to the west, was the nearest French supply depot. Despite fair weather, the three-week march to Smolensk, moving approximately 18 km (11 mi) a day, proved disastrous, subjecting the Grande Armée to challenges like traversing a sparsely populated area with continuous forest, abandoned villages, grappling with demoralization, disciplinary breakdowns, hunger, extensive loss of horses and crucial supplies, as well as persistent harassment from Cossacks and partisans who made it impossible to forage. While sources are not definitive, it's estimated that he arrived with 37,000 infantry, and 12,000 cavalry and artillery. The situation worsened with the advent of an early and harsh "Russian Winter", commencing on 5/7 November.
By 8/9 November, when the French reached Smolensk, the strategic situation in Russia had turned decisively against Napoleon. Merely 40% (37,000) of the remaining Grande Armée was still combat-ready. Concurrent losses on other fronts further exacerbated their dire circumstances. Encircled by encroaching Russian armies that imperiled their retreat, Napoleon recognized the untenability of his position at Smolensk. On 11 November, he ordered Berthier that the new troops should not come to Smolensk but return to Krasny or Orsha. Consequently, the new strategic goal became leading the Grande Armée westward into winter quarters, targeting the area of the extensive French supply depot of Minsk.
Having lost contact with Kutuzov over the past two weeks, Napoleon mistakenly assumed that the Russian army had suffered equally due to harsh conditions and was a couple of days behind. Underestimating the potential for a Kutuzov-led offensive, Napoleon made the tactical blunder of resuming his retreat. He dispatched the individual corps of the Grande Armée from Smolensk on four successive days, starting on Friday 13 November with the Polish Corps under Zajączek, who replaced the wounded Poniatowski. Next came the Westphalians. Napoleon left on the 14th, at five in the morning, preceded by Mortier with the Legion of the Vistula and Claparède who departed with the captures treasures and baggage wagons; Beauharnais left on the next day, Davout on the 16th, and Ney at 2 a.m. on the 17th. This resulted in a fragmented column of disconnected corps, spanning 50 km (31 mi), ill-prepared for a significant battle. In the intervening space between and around these French corps, nearly 40,000 disintegrated troops formed mobs of unarmed, disorganized stragglers. As the soldiers, including the sick, blind and wounded, improvised unconventional methods to withstand the cold, the scene resembled a disordered carnival procession. (Napoleon complained to the Duke of Feltre about the quality of the 180 grain-mills which were sent and distributed.)
A blizzard struck on 14 November, bringing heavy snowfall of approximately 5 ft (1.5 m) and a temperature plummet to −24 °C (−11 °F). This led to further casualties among men, horses, and the abandonment of artillery. The intense cold enfeebled, first of all, the brain of those whose health had already suffered, especially of those who had had dysentery, but soon, while the cold increased daily, its pernicious effect was noticed in all...actions of the afflicted manifested mental paralysis and the highest degree of apathy. Ostermann-Tolstoy, part of Miloradovich's avant-guard, shelled Napoleon and his guards, but the assault was repelled. While Miloradovich desired to attack, he was not granted permission by Kutuzov. Meanwhile, Claparède and the Vistula-legion arrived at Krasny since August occupied by a small French battalion. They were expelled by Ozharovsky's flying column.
In the afternoon of 15 November, Napoleon himself arrived at Krasny accompanied by his 12,000-strong Imperial Guard. He planned to await the arrival of the troops of Eugène, Davout and Ney over the next several days before recommencing the retreat.
Kutuzov's southern march
During the same period, the main Russian army under Kutuzov followed the French on a parallel southern road. This route passed through Medyn and Yelnya, the latter became a significant center for the partisan movement. Unlike the Grande Armée, the main Russian army approached Krasny in a much less weakened state, but still had to contend with the same, extreme weather conditions and scarcity of food. Kutuzov promoted an easy retreat for the French army and initially forbade his generals to cut off their retreat. General Bennigsen, who disagreed, was sent back to Kaluga on the 15th.
Due to outdated intelligence reports, Kutuzov somehow believed that only one-third of the French army had passed from Smolensk to Krasny with the remainder of Napoleon's forces marching much farther to the north or still at Smolensk. On this basis, Kutuzov accepted a plan proposed by his staff officer, quartermaster general Colonel Karl Toll, to march on Krasny to destroy what was believed to be an isolated Napoleon.
The Russian position at Krasny began forming on 15 November, when the 3,500-strong flying advance guard of Adam Ozharovsky took possession of the town, located in the Pale of Settlement, and destroyed magazines and stock before the French arrived. On the same day, the 18,000 troops of Miloradovich established a strong position, across the high road about 4 km (2.5 mi) before Krasny. This movement effectively separated Eugene, Davout, and Ney from the Emperor. On 16 November Kutuzov's 35,000-strong main force slowly approached from the south, and halted 5 km from the main road to Krasny. Another 20,000 Cossack irregulars, operating mostly in small bands, supplemented the main army by harassing the French at all points along the long road to Krasny. In the first skirmishes at Krasny, the French still showed stubborn resistance and desperate courage.
Seeing that all our Asiatic attacks were collapsing against the closed formation of the European one, I decided to send the Chechen regiment forward in the evening to break down the bridges on the way to Krasny, block up the road, and try in every possible way to block the enemy's march; but with all our forces, encircling right and left and crossing the road in front, we exchanged fire with they were, so to speak, the vanguard of the vanguard of the French army.
In total, Kutuzov commanded a force of 50,000 to 60,000 regular troops, which included a substantial cavalry unit and around 50/200 cannon, some transported on sledges. The disposition of troops adopted by Kutuzov, drawn up by Toll, quartermaster general, consisted of the following. Kutuzov's forces were organized into three columns. The larger contingent, under the leadership of General Tormasov, formed the left flank and maneuvered around Krasny so Napoleon could not withdraw. Meanwhile, the second column, led by Golitsyn and his brother-in-law Stroganov, held the army's center and launched an attack on Krasny. Miloradovich's position anchored the Russian right flank, controlling a vital road to Krasny. This road required the French army to cross a stream within a gully. Despite Miloradovich's pivotal role, he left his strategic position not by his own will, to aid Golitsyn against the Young Guard. Consequently, Davout managed to successfully cross the Losvinka brook, albeit at the cost of his rearguard's sacrifice.
Kutuzov ordered: Tormasov with 3 corps and 1 cuirassier division to move through Kutkovo to Dobraya; Miloradovich with 4 corps to occupy Nikulino and Larionovo and, having let the French through, to attack them in the rear; Golitsyn with 1 corps and 1 cuirassier division to attack in the flank, from the side of the village of Uvarovo, and thus secure the flank movement of Tormasov, who was entrusted with the main task; Count Osterman with 1 corps to move with the aim of demonstrating in the direction of Smolensk.
15 November: the rout of Ozharovsky
Outside Smolensk, leaving the floodplain of the Dniepr, there is a steep slope passing into a long descent, slightly undulating until Krasny. The rear of the Imperial Guard was harassed by the Cossacks of Orlov-Denisov, who captured 1,300 soldiers, 400 carts and 1,000 horses. Near Merlino, around noon, the Imperial Guard, marched past Miloradovich's troops, who were positioned left of the road, backed by a forest. Impressed by the order and composure of the elite guardsmen, Miloradovich had orders from Kutuzov not to attack the flanks, and settled instead for bombarding the French at extreme range. The Russian cannon fire inflicted little damage on the large corps of Guards which continued moving toward Krasny.
As Napoleon and the Imperial Old Guard approached, it was fired upon by Ozharovsky and Russian infantry and artillery. A surprised army did not expect that they had been overtaken and could be attacked from the front. The eyewitness description of this encounter by the partisan leader Davidov, which eloquently portrays the comportment of the Old Guard, forming a "fortress-like square", has become one of the most often quoted in the histories of the 1812 war:
...after midday, we sighted the Old Guard, with Napoleon riding in their midst... the enemy troops, sighting our unruly force, got their muskets at the ready and proudly continued on their way without hurrying their step... Like blocks of granite, they remained invulnerable... I shall never forget the unhurried step and awesome resolution of these soldiers, for whom the threat of death was a daily and familiar experience. With their tall bearskin caps, blue uniforms, white belts, red plumes, and epaulettes, they looked like poppies on the snow-covered battlefield... Column followed upon column, dispersing us with musket fire and ridiculing our useless display of chivalry... the Imperial Guard with Napoleon ploughed through our Cossacks like a 100-gun ship through fishing skiffs.
Before dusk, Napoleon entered Krasny. He planned to remain so that Eugene, Davout and Ney could catch up with him. However, part of this small town was set on fire after the Old Guard took shelter in the monastery, barns and houses. The streets were filled with soldiers and there was not much to eat or drink. As there was not enough room the Young Guard camped east, outside the town without any shelter against the cold. To keep his men busy Napoleon decided in the late evening to force the withdrawal of Ozharovsky's Cossacks from the Losvinka.